When can you enforce a demand to settle within the policy limits against the insurance company?

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Addison Ins. Co., WD75963 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2013)

This case discusses the essential elements of the tort of bad faith failure to settle, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on conditions for enforcement of demands to resolve within policy limits.

“See, e.g., Bonner v. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of insurer because insured never made demand that insurer settle within policy limits despite evidence that injured third party made demand to settle for policy limits); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Metcalf, 861 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993); Purscell v. TICO Ins. Co., _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2013 WL 2450825, at *4 (W.D. Mo. May 24, 2013) (granting summary judgment in favor of insurer because insured never made a sufficiently definite demand for settlement within policy limits). Other decisions have softened rigid application of the “elements” announced in Dyer, calling their efficacy into question. See, e.g., Am.”

“Those essential elements are: (1) that the insurer has the authority to settle a claim against its insured within (or by payment of) the policy limits; (2) that the insurer has the opportunity to settle a claim against its insured within (or by payment of) the policy limits; (3) that the insurer fails to settle a claim against its insured within (or by payment of) the policy limits in bad faith; and (4) that the insured suffers damage as a proximate result. These essential elements properly relegate evidence heretofore inappropriately characterized as an “essential element” to merely relevant in assessing whether the essential elements have been established.”

“We take no position on whether sufficient evidence could be marshaled to establish a bad faith failure to settle claim in these or other similar situations, since they are not presented here, and note only that the essential elements herein described would not foreclose assertion of the claim in such situations as a matter of law.”

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Addison Ins. Co., 448 S.W.3d 818 (Mo. 2014)

This case discusses the elements of a bad faith refusal to settle action in Missouri, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on conditions for enforcement of demands to resolve within policy limits.

“Accordingly, a bad faith refusal to settle action will lie when a liability insurer: (1) reserves the exclusive right to contest or settle any claim; (2) prohibits the insured from voluntarily assuming any liability or settling any claims without consent; and (3) is guilty of fraud or bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within the limits of the policy.”

“This Court has never required the insured to make a demand for settlement and declines United Fire’s invitation to do so. The existence of a demand is, nevertheless, highly relevant in determining whether an insurer acted in bad faith in refusing to settle.”

“Requiring an excess judgment would force the insured to go to trial after its insurer wrongfully refuses to settle instead of permitting the insured to protect itself from further liability by settling.”

“See Truck Ins. Exch., 162 S.W.3d at 93.”

Advantage Bldgs. & Exteriors, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 449 S.W.3d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)

This case discusses the elements of a bad faith claim in Missouri, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on conditions for enforcement of demands to resolve within policy limits.

“See Kinnaman–Carson, 283 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting Mistele v. Ogle, 293 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.1956)); see also New Appleman on Insurance Law § 16.03[3][c][v].”

“Therefore, Mid–Continent was estopped to deny coverage for the claim to the extent of its policy limits.”

“The elements to prove such a claim are: (1) the liability insurer has assumed control over negotiation, settlement, and legal proceedings brought against the insured; (2) the insured has demanded that the insurer settle the claim brought against the insured; (3) the insurer refuses to settle the claim within the liability limits of the policy; and (4) in so refusing, the insurer acts in bad faith, rather than negligently. Rinehart, 261 S.W.3d at 595. Missouri law has held, since Zumwalt, that a liability insurer is liable for a judgment against the insured in excess of policy limits if the insurer “is guilty of … bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within the limits of the policy.” 228 S.W.2d at 753. “While an insurance contract is the basis for the relationship between the insurer and its insured, ‘bad faith’ liability in handling third-party claims is premised on tort concepts and the extent of the damages is not confined to the liability amount stated in the policy.””

Buildings v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. WD76880 (Mo. Ct. App. Sep. 2, 2014)

This case discusses the conditions for an insurer’s liability for a judgment against the insured in excess of policy limits, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on demands to resolve within policy limits.

“See Kinnaman-Carson, 283 S.W.3d at 765 (quoting Mistele v. Ogle, 293 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1956)); see also NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW § 16.03[3][c][v]. Here, Mid-Continent’s purported “reservation of rights” notification was not timely or clear, nor did it fully and unambiguously inform the insured of the insurance company’s position as to coverage.”

“The elements to prove such a claim are: (1) the liability insurer has assumed control over negotiation, settlement, and legal proceedings brought against the insured; (2) the insured has demanded that the insurer settle the claim brought against the insured; (3) the insurer refuses to settle the claim within the liability limits of the policy; and (4) in so refusing, the insurer acts in bad faith, rather than negligently. Rinehart, 261 S.W.3d at 595. Missouri law has held, since Zumwalt, that a liability insurer is liable for a judgment against the insured in excess of policy limits if the insurer “is guilty of . . . bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within the limits of the policy.” 228 S.W.2d at 753.”

Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 S.W.3d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)

This case discusses the requirements for making a demand to an insurance company for either the policy limits or a specific amount of money, as set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.040, and also discusses the implications of receiving such a demand letter.

“The Johnsons’ demand letter satisfied the requisites of Section 408.040, RSMo 2000, which authorizes individuals with a claim like the Johnsons’ to make a demand to an insurance company for either the policy limits or for a specific amount of money. As required by the statute, they sent their demand by registered mail and kept the demand open for 60 days. The statute did not require the Johnsons to send any documentation to support their demand. The General Assembly amended Section 408.040 in 2005 to require documentation to support a demand letter.”

“Such a letter, he said, should alert an insurance company that it could be liable for prejudgment interest if it does not respond to the demand.”

Norman v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 619 S.W.3d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021)

This case discusses the application of Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.040, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.058 and Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.065.

“Statutory citations refer to the 2016 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, updated through the 2019 Cumulative Supplement.”

“” § 408.040.3. Among other requirements, the claimant’s demand or offer must be in writing and be left open for ninety days. See id. On May 26, 2017—six days after the entry of judgment—Progressive’s counsel sent Norman’s counsel three checks: one for $100,000.00, the policy’s per-person bodily injury limit of liability; one for $3,118.95 for “statutory costs”; and one for $8,600.00 for “post-judgment interest.””

Hurst v. Jenkins, 908 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)

This case discusses the requirements for a proper settlement demand under Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.040, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on conditions for enforcement of demands to resolve within policy limits.

“The judgment is affirmed.”

“The letter requested documentation and information regarding Mr. Jenkins’ insurance coverage and his net worth, as well as a statement detailing his version of the accident. After listing these requests, the letter stated, in pertinent part: In accordance with Missouri Revised Statute 408.040, this letter is a formal demand for payment of the policy limits of all liability insurance coverages that apply to this case.”

“In accordance with Missouri Revised Statute 408.040, that offer was open for 60 days. As you know, that time period has now come and gone and no money has been paid by your company and no settlement has been reached or finalized.”

Bonner v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, 899 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)

This case discusses the elements required to recover for the bad faith refusal of an insurance company to settle a claim within policy limits, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on conditions for enforcement of demands to resolve within policy limits.

“In Ganaway v. Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554 (Mo.App.S.D. 1990), our colleagues in the Southern District stated that “an insurer’s duty to defend is distinct and different from its duty to settle a claim against its insured within the policy limits when it has a chance to do so.”

“In Metcalf, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Southern District set out the elements required to recover for the bad faith refusal of an insurance company to settle a claim within policy limits. The elements of the tort appear to be that: (1) the liability insurer has assumed control over negotiation, settlement, and legal proceedings brought against the insured; (2) the insured has demanded that the insurer settle the claim brought against the insured; (3) the insurer refuses to settle the claim within the liability limits of the policy; and (4) in so refusing, the insurer acts in bad faith, rather than negligently. Metcalf, 861 S.W.2d at 756 (citing Dyer v. General American Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App. 1976)).”

“Essentially, Paula and Elbert take the position that Marla was a covered person under the policy owned by Elbert.”

Jameson v. Still, 643 S.W.3d 306 (Mo. 2022)

“Still argues, however, that the legislature intended to alter this common law counteroffer rule for offers made expressly under sections 408.040 and 537.058. Still asserts the plain language of these statutes renders any such offers irrevocable and “non-rejectable” for 90 days.”

“Thus, the question now before the Court is whether sections 408.040 and 573.058 demonstrate a legislative intent to alter the common law contract formation rule that a counteroffer operates as a rejection. Because neither statute relates to the formation of settlement agreements – rather, they each govern distinct issues, as discussed below – this Court holds that neither section alters the common law rule that a counteroffer operates as a rejection of a settlement offer.”

“Section 537.058, titled “Personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death, time-limited demand to settle, requirements,” explains what a settlement offer must include to qualify as a “time-limited demand to settle” and governs when evidence of an opportunity to settle is admissible in tort actions for extra-contractual damages, i.e., for bad faith refusal to settle claims.”

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Prairie Framing, LLC, 162 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)

“Prairie Framing responds that because TIE refused to settle, Prairie Framing was denied the benefit of obligations it was entitled to under the policy and now has an unsatisfied $4,000,000 judgment recorded against it — a judgment that Prairie Framing has not been released from by the Rolfes. Inherent in a policy of insurance is the insurer’s obligation to act in good faith regarding settlement of a claim.”

“Under Missouri law, an insurer, “having assumed control of its right to settle claims against the insured, may become liable in excess of its undertaking under the policy provisions if it fails to exercise good faith in considering offers to compromise the claim for an amount within the policy limits.” Ganaway, 795 S.W.2d at 556. This obligation to act in good faith regarding settlement continues even if an insurer denies coverage and refuses to defend the insured.”

Sprint Lumber, Inc. v. Union Ins. Co., 627 S.W.3d 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021)

“Id. at 25 (internal quotes and citation omitted). But as discussed above, where an insurer wrongly denies coverage, refuses to defend, and then refuses to engage in settlement negotiations, an insurer cannot avoid liability for bad faith failure to settle by its wrongful refusal to assume control of the proceedings. Shobe , 279 S.W.3d at 211. See also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Prairie Framing, LLC, 162 S.W.3d 64, 94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (The “obligation to act in good faith regarding settlement continues even if an insurer denies coverage and refuses to defend the insured.”).”

Rinehart v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)

“It is undisputed that Mr. Anderson entered into an agreement pursuant to Section 537.065 with the plaintiffs and Allied, under which Allied agreed to pay plaintiffs one-half of its policy limits up front, and the remainder only if Cincinnati’s policy was adjudged to provide no coverage for the accident. Also pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Anderson agreed to allow a default judgment to be taken against him, and plaintiffs agreed to execute any judgment only against the Cincinnati garage policy. Section 537.065 RSMo (1994) provides in relevant part: Any person having an unliquidated claim for damages against a tort-feasor, on account of bodily injuries or death, may enter into a contract with such tort-feasor or any insured in his behalf or both, whereby, in consideration of the payment of a specified amount, the person asserting the claim agrees that in the event of a judgment against the tort-feasor, neither he nor any person, firm or corporation claiming by or through him will levy execution . . . except against the specific assets listed in the contract and except against any insurer which insures the legal liability of the tort-feasor for such damage . . . As plaintiffs note, entry into a Section 537.065 settlement is not itself fraudulent and does not void a policy where the insurer has refused to defend or provide coverage.”

“Moreover, the premise of Section 537.065 is that, where an insurer unjustifiably declines to provide coverage, and refuses to defend, its insured is justified in reaching a settlement which enables the insured to be released from personal liability. Cincinnati cannot have its cake and eat it too by both refusing coverage and at the same time continuing to control the terms of settlement in defense of an action it had refused to defend.”

State Farm v. Metcalf, by Wade, 861 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)

“Dyer v. General American Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App. 1976), states the elements required to recover on a tort claim for bad faith refusal of an insurance company to settle a claim within policy limits. The elements of the tort appear to be that: (1) the liability insurer has assumed control over negotiation, settlement, and legal proceedings brought against the insured; (2) the insured has demanded that the insurer settle the claim brought against the insured; (3) the insurer refuses to settle the claim within the liability limits of the policy; and (4) in so refusing, the insurer acts in bad faith, rather than negligently. Id. at 704. State Farm’s assertion that Count III of the counterclaim did not allege, and the evidence did not show, that claimants offered to settle within applicable policy limits nor that State Farm had the opportunity to settle for such sum is supported by the record on appeal.”

Advantage Bldgs. & Exteriors, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 449 S.W.3d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)

“In Points I and III, Mid–Continent contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for JNOV on Advantage’s bad-faith failure to settle claim in which Mid–Continent argued that Advantage did not make a submissible case for bad faith. We review the denial of a JNOV motion de novo to determine whether the plaintiff made a submissible case.”

“Rinehart, 261 S.W.3d at 595. Missouri law has held, since Zumwalt, that a liability insurer is liable for a judgment against the insured in excess of policy limits if the insurer “is guilty of … bad faith in refusing to settle a claim within the limits of the policy.” 228 S.W.2d at 753. “While an insurance contract is the basis for the relationship between the insurer and its insured, ‘bad faith’ liability in handling third-party claims is premised on tort concepts and the extent of the damages is not confined to the liability amount stated in the policy.””

“Id. at 67–68. The Zumwalt Court explained that “[b]ad faith is, of course, a state of mind, indicated by acts and circumstances, and is provable by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.” 228 S.W.2d at 754.”

Rinehart v. Shelter, 261 S.W.3d 583 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)

“The letters demanded $50,000 for each claimant. Nitz responded with a letter stating that Shelter was willing to pay the policy limit of $100,000, but Ingram and Krohn would have to agree with Adkins on how to divide the total amount.”

“On June 17, 1999, Evans again sent written demands to Shelter for payment of the $50,000 per person policy limit to Ingram and Krohn. The demand letters stated that the offer would expire on August 16, 1999, and all offers to settle would then be forever withdrawn.”

“On August 3, 1999, Shelter sent a letter to Evans offering to settle with Ingram and Krohn for two-thirds of the policy limits if the claimants were willing to waive any underinsured motorist claims and hospital liens.”

Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362 (Mo. 1950)

“Holdman v. Thompson, 216 S.W.2d 72; Taylor v. Silver King Oil Co., 203 S.W.2d 147; Cason v. K.C.T. Railway Co., 123 S.W.2d 133; Payne v. Carson, 224 S.W.2d 60; Cass v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 224 S.W.2d 405; Bowers v. Etherton, 216 S.W.2d 83; Hauber v. Gentry, 215 S.W.2d 754; Roeslein v. C. E.I.R. Co., 214 S.W.2d 13; And other cases cited in argument. (6) The facts involved herein show such bad faith and legal malice on the part of defendant insurance company as to warrant the imposition of punitive and vexatious damages and attorneys’ fees. (7) Punitive damages are properly allowable in a negligence case in addition to actual damages; where as here defendant was guilty of gross negligence, malice and wanton conduct in mishandling of case.”

“The trial court committed error in refusing to submit such question to the jury. Sec. 6040, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. v. Surety Co., 279 Mo. 535, 215 S.W. 20; School District v. Casualty Co., 340 Mo. 1070, 104 S.W.2d 319; Brown v. Assurance Co., 45 Mo. 221; Lockwood v. Insurance Co., 47 Mo. 50; 33 C.J., p. 148, sec. 887; Corder v. Morgan, 355 Mo. 127, 195 S.W.2d 441; Clair v. A.B. Insurance Co., 137 S.W.2d 969; Carthage Stone Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 274 Mo. 537, 203 S.W. 882; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun. 114 F.2d 526; Meyn v. Aetna Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 143; Evans v. Great Northern Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 317, 167 S.W.2d 118; Foster v. Aetna Ins. Co., 168 S.W.2d 449; Zips v. Mutual Ben.”

“The defendant’s next assignment of error is that the trial court erred in giving instruction No. 1 on behalf of plaintiffs.”

Brown v. Donham, 900 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. 1995)

“Section 408.040.2 allows prejudgment interest in a tort action when a claimant has made a demand for payment and the amount of the judgment exceeds the claimant’s demand for payment. This provision serves two public policies. Lorabee v. Washington, 793 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Mo.App. 1990).”

“Settlement can only occur by the unequivocal acceptance of a definite offer or demand, resulting in an enforceable contract. From the documents that constitute the record below, it cannot be determined what Ms. Brown was demanding as “policy limits of all insurance coverages” or what she would have accepted in settlement of her claim during the sixty-day time limit alleged in her amended petition.”

Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)

“Steven A. Ganaway (plaintiff) brought this action against Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter), a liability insurance carrier, seeking to recover damages on the ground that Shelter refused, in bad faith, to settle a claim against its insured and thereby became liable to its insured for a judgment recovered against him in excess of the policy limits.”

“A great deal has been written about the duty of a liability insurer to exercise good faith in considering an offer to compromise a claim against its insured, but it is a fair general statement of the rule that a liability insurer, having assumed control of the right to settle claims against the insured, may become liable in excess of its undertaking under the policy provisions if it fails to exercise good faith in considering offers to compromise the claim for an amount within the policy limits.”

“The “bad faith” doctrine has been recognized and applied by our courts. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950); Dyer v. General American Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App. 1976); Landie v. Century Indemnity Company, 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo.App. 1965); McCombs v. The Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 231 Mo.App. 1206, 89 S.W.2d 114 (1935). As carefully pointed out in Landie, an insurer’s duty to defend is distinct and different from its duty to settle a claim against its insured within its policy limits when it has a chance to do so.”

Knockerball MidMo, LLC v. McGowan & Co., No. WD85458 (Mo. Ct. App. May. 9, 2023)

“Knockerball then retained counsel and, on May 18, 2017, entered into an agreement with Hart pursuant to the provisions of section 537.065 (“the 537.065 Agreement”). The 537.065 Agreement contained the following provisions: All statutory references are to the REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI 2016, as supplemented. Knockerball and Hart, by and through their respective counsel, entered into an undated Addendum to the section 537.065 Agreement in which (in pertinent part) they enlarged the scope of additional third party claims to include claims against McGowan.”

“Execution or garnishment proceedings in aid thereof shall lie only as to assets of the tort-feasor specifically mentioned in the contract or the insurer or insurers not excluded in such contract. § 537.065.1. And, under the 537.065 Agreement relevant to this case, Hart agreed that he would not levy execution by garnishment or otherwise provided by law, or otherwise collect or attempt to collect on any property, asset, or right of Knockerball, except against the following specific assets: a. The assets of any insurer that insures the legal liability of Knockerball, including, but not limited to, the assets of [Liability Insurer’s] Policy; b. Any proceeds of any cause of action or claim that Knockerball has or may have against [Liability Insurer] or any other insurer for their refusal to settle, defend, and/or indemnify Knockerball in the Lawsuit or any other Claim resulting from the Accident including, but not limited to, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, or professional liability.”

Shobe v. Kelly, 279 S.W.3d 203 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)

“An insurer under a liability policy has a fiduciary duty to its insured to evaluate and negotiate third-party claims in good faith. Duncan v. Andrew County Mut.”

“Where it wrongfully breaches this duty and refuses to settle within policy limits, the insurer may be held liable for resulting losses to the insured.”

“Zumwalt, 228 S.W.2d at 754; see Johnson, 262 S.W.3d at 662 (discussing Zumwalt and listing circumstances which may show bad faith); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Prairie Framing, LLC, 162 S.W.3d 64, 94 (Mo.App. W.D. 2005) (the “obligation to act in good faith regarding settlement continues even if an insurer denies coverage and refuses to defend the insured”). The tort creates liability in order to compensate an insured where she has been wrongly subjected to an excess judgment, and to deter insurance companies from failing to fulfill fiduciary duties to their insureds.”

Allen v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 585 S.W.3d 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019)

“In the present case, the question of whether the June 2017 judgment was final, is inextricably linked with Allen’s point on appeal which asks whether the Supreme Court’s mandate left open the possibility for those claims to be ruled on by the circuit court. Thus, we must address the merits of Allen’s point on appeal. Cf. Est. of Shaw , 256 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Mo. banc 2008) (appellate court has jurisdiction to determine whether circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a challenged judgment).”

“In his sole point on appeal, Allen argues that the circuit court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address Allen’s bad faith claims against Atain.”

“Allen argues that the Supreme Court’s mandate was specific to his wrongful refusal to defend claim, and that no court, including the Supreme Court, definitively ruled on his bad faith claim.”

“”Where the judgment of an appellate court calls for the remand of the cause to the trial court for further action the judgment is not self-executing but must be certified back to the trial court for execution.”

State ex rel. Key Ins. Co. v. Roldan, 587 S.W.3d 638 (Mo. 2019)

“This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V, § 4.1. A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted.”

“Section 506.500, provides in pertinent part: Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts: …. (3) The commission of a tortious act within this state[.] Nash’s cross-claim alleges the tort of bad faith refusal to settle against Key. In Missouri, bad faith refusal to settle is a tort action. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Addison Ins. Co. , 448 S.W.3d 818, 829 (Mo. banc 2014).”

Stacy v. The Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co., No. ED110678 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2023)

“Witt was insured by The Bar Plan. The Stacys demanded The Bar Plan settle the lawsuit by paying the policy limit ($500,000) for two claims.”

“Thereafter, the Stacys and Witt executed a settlement agreement pursuant to section 537.065, RSMo 2000 (hereinafter “Agreement”). The Agreement assigned to the Stacys all of Witt’s rights, claims, and causes of action against The Bar Plan.”

“Sprint Lumber, Inc. v. Union Ins. Co., 627 S.W.3d 96, 119 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).”

Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mabie, 652 S.W.3d 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022)

“We agree. Interpleader is governed by Section 507.060 and Rule 52.07. Section 507.060 states in part: All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as updated by supplement unless otherwise indicated. 1. Persons having claims against the plaintiff or plaintiff’s insured may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to multiple liability, including multiple claims against the same insurance coverage.”

“None of these claims have been settled, despite the parties engaging in settlement discussions. Therefore, Decedent, T.M., and Lee each continue to possess independent claims subject to the $25,000 bodily injury Policy limit, yet the overall coverage extends to only $50,000 per accident.”

“Farmers’ amended petition alleged that, as a result of the September 12, 2020 accident, Mabie, T.M., and Lee all have actual or potential individual claims subject to the Policy’s $25,000 bodily injury limit, and that those claims could exceed the Policy’s $50,000 per accident limit.”

Bowden v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 658 S.W.3d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022)

“Plaintiffs’ first and fourth points claim the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against Defendants because their respective motions for summary judgment failed to make a prima facie case that negated any essential element of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim or established the existence of any affirmative defense. We agree. Standard of Review and Summary-Judgment Requirements The trial court makes its decision to grant summary judgment based on the pleadings, record submitted, and the law; therefore, this Court need not defer to the trial court’s determination and reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo.”

“To prevail on their breach of contract claim, Plaintiffs would have to prove “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the defendants’ obligation under the contract; (3) a breach by the defendants of that obligation; and (4) resulting damages.” C-H Bldg. Assocs., LLC v. Duffey , 309 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).”

“Smith v. R.B. Jones of St. Louis, Inc. , 672 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984).”

Hyatt Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. of N.C., 801 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)

“II. Analysis A. Rescuer Claims The rescuer claims are within the scope of both the 1981 declaratory judgment action and this Court’s prior decision. Crown Center I unanimously held that the Columbia policy covered all hazards and risks with respect to the hotel: The policies in both lines were general comprehensive, covering all hazards and risks.”

“Herman v. Western Casualty Sur. Co., 271 F. Supp. 502, 505-06 (E.D.Mo. 1967), aff’d, 405 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1968); Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 564-66 (Mo.App. 1965). This good faith obligation exists regardless of whether the insurer actually undertakes the defense of its insured.”

Statutes (2)

Section 537.058 – Personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death, time-limited demand to settle, requirements, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.058

This statute directly addresses the requirements for time-limited demands to settle claims for personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death in Missouri, and specifically references Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.058, which is cited in the research request.

“1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean: (1)”Extracontractual damages”, any amount of damage that exceeds the total available limit of liability insurance for all of a liability insurer’s liability insurance policies applicable to a claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death; (2)”Time-limited demand”, any offer to settle any claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death made by or on behalf of a claimant to a tort-feasor with a liability insurance policy for purposes of settling a claim against such tort-feasor within the insurer’s limit of liability insurance, which by its terms must be accepted within a specified period of time; (3)”Tort-feasor”, any person claimed to have caused or contributed to cause personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death to a claimant. 2. A time-limited demand to settle any claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or wrongful death shall be in writing, shall reference this section, shall be sent certified mail return-receipt requested to the tort-feasor’s liability insurer, and shall contain the following material terms: (1) The time period within which the offer shall remain open for acceptance by the tort-feasor’s liability insurer, which shall not be less than ninety days from the date such demand is received by the liability insurer; (2) The amount of monetary payment requested or a request for the applicable policy limits; (3) The date and location of the loss; (4)”

Section 537.065 – Claimant and tort-feasor may contract to limit recovery to specified assets or insurance contract, when – procedure – applicability to covenant not to execute, requirements – insurer defined, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.065

This statute is directly on-point, as it is one of the two statutes specifically mentioned in the research request. It outlines the conditions under which a claimant and tort-feasor may contract to limit recovery to specified assets or an insurance contract.

“1. Any person having an unliquidated claim for damages against a tort-feasor, on account of personal injuries, bodily injuries, or death may enter into a contract with such tort-feasor or any insurer on his or her behalf or both if the insurer has refused to withdraw a reservation of rights or declined coverage for such unliquidated claim, whereby, in consideration of the payment of a specified amount, the person asserting the claim agrees that in the event of a judgment against the tort-feasor, neither such person nor any other person, firm, or corporation claiming by or through him or her will levy execution, by garnishment or as otherwise provided by law, except against the specific assets listed in the contract and except against any insurer which insures the legal liability of the tort-feasor for such damage and which insurer is not excepted from execution, garnishment or other legal procedure by such contract. Execution or garnishment proceedings in aid thereof shall lie only as to assets of the tort-feasor specifically mentioned in the contract or the insurer or insurers not excluded in such contract. Such contract, when properly acknowledged by the parties thereto, may be recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds in any county where a judgment may be rendered, or in the county of the residence of the tort-feasor, or in both such counties, and if the same is so recorded then such tort-feasor’s property, except as to the assets specifically listed in the contract, shall not be subject to any judgment lien as the result of any judgment rendered against the tort-feasor, arising out of the transaction for which the contract is entered into. 2. If any action seeking a judgment on the claim against the tort-feasor is pending at the time of the execution of any contract entered into under this section, then, within thirty days after such execution, the tort-feasor shall provide his or her insurer or insurers with a copy of the executed contract and a copy of any such action.”

“If no action seeking a judgment on the claim against the tort-feasor is pending at the time of the execution of any contract entered into under this section, then, within thirty days after the tort-feasor receives notice of any subsequent action, by service of process or otherwise, the tort-feasor shall provide his or her insurer or insurers with a copy of the executed contract and a copy of any action seeking a judgment on the claim against the tort-feasor. 3.”

Analyses (2)

Triable Issue of Fact Exists As to An Insurer’s Failure to Settle Where Subrogation Demand Letter Represented an Opportunity to Settle Within Policy Limits

Seventh Circuit: No Bad Faith Failure to Settle Where Insurer Did Not Believe Adverse Judgment Was Reasonably Probable Despite Recognizing Possibility of Exposure to Damages Beyond Policy Limits

“The Seventh Circuit relied uponHaddick ex rel. Griffith v. Valor Insurance, 198 Ill. 2d 409 (2001), in which the Illinois Supreme Court announced that the duty to settle arises when a third party demands settlement within policy limits and there is a reasonable probability of a finding of liability against the insured and of recovery in excess of the limits. While the Haddick court did not articulate a definition of the reasonable probability standard, a subsequent intermediate appellate court decision explained that “reasonable probability” requires that liability be more likely than not but not completely certain.”