Overview of Summary Judgment in Missouri Law on Car Crash Cases

United Missouri Bank v. City of Grandview, 105 S.W.3d 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)

This case from the Missouri Court of Appeals discusses the importance of genuine issues of material fact in the context of summary judgment, and specifically addresses the issue of causation in a car crash case.

“This court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate in this case because genuine issues of material fact exist on the issue of causation.”

“Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party establishes a right to judgment as a matter of law and that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 378.”

“Larison , 998 S.W.2d at 196 .”

“If the movant requires an inference to establish the right to summary judgment, “and the evidence reasonably supports any inference other than (or in addition to) the movant’s inference, a genuine dispute exists” and the movant is not entitled to summary judgment.”

“Indeed, “[c]ircumstantial evidence is viewed no differently from direct evidence when determining whether there was a genuine issue as to any material fact so as to preclude summary judgment.””

Savage v. Dittrich, 589 S.W.3d 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019)

This case discusses a motion for summary judgment in a negligence case, and specifically addresses the issue of whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to fault.

“On August 13, 2018, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment.”

“In this response, Appellant argued first that Respondents’ motion failed to properly and sufficiently set forth uncontroverted facts to allow the trial court to conclude his “violation of traffic laws and regulations” was the direct, proximate, and immediate cause of the accident.”

“Appellant raises one point on appeal, alleging the trial court erred in granting Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.”

“The standards we employ to determine if summary judgment was proper are no different than those employed by the trial court: moving parties must show there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and based on those facts they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

“Genuine Issue As to Whether Appellant was Negligent Per Se Respondents argue that even if Savage was negligent, Appellant still cannot prove the element of proximate cause because he was negligent per se in violating Section 304.016.4(2) and Jefferson County Traffic Code Regulations 315.080(B)(3) and (E)(2), and those violations were an independent and intervening cause breaking the chain of causation.”

Ivey v. Nicholson-McBride, 336 S.W.3d 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)

This case discusses the standard for summary judgment under Missouri law and finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the defendant’s driving was negligent.

“Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the motion, the response, the reply, and the sur-reply show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 74.04(c)(6). Ms. Ivey raises three points and argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because: (1) case law imputes a duty of care upon drivers to their passengers, thereby rendering the implied primary assumption of risk doctrine inapplicable; (2) Ms. Ivey’s injuries were caused by Ms. Nicholson-McBride’s negligence, thereby precluding the implied primary assumption of risk doctrine from completely barring her action; and (3) whether a risk is a “well-known incidental risk” is an issue for the jury.”

“Thus, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because whether the abrupt stop was the consequence of negligent driving remains a genuine issue of material fact.”

Robinson v. Health Midwest Development, No. WD 58290 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001)

This case discusses the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in the context of a summary judgment motion on a negligence claim, which is directly relevant to the research request.

“”[W]here the record contains competent evidence of ‘two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts,'” a genuine issue of fact exists which would defeat summary judgment based on such an account. Williams v. Mo. Highway and Transp.”

“As such, summary judgment would not lie in that a genuine issue of a material fact would exist as to what caused Schmidt to drive across the center line of the road. Id .”

Dilley v. Valentine, 401 S.W.3d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)

This case discusses the standard for summary judgment in Missouri, including the requirement that there be no genuine issues of material fact in order for summary judgment to be granted.

“Appellate review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.”

“Summary judgment will be upheld on appeal if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. at 377.”

“Id. at 381. Once the movant has established a right to judgment as a matter of law, the non-movant must demonstrate that one or more of the material facts asserted by the movant as not in dispute is, in fact, genuinely disputed. Id. The non-moving party may not rely on mere allegations and denials of the pleadings, but must use affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. “The non-movant never needs to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law; the non-movant needs only show that there is a genuine dispute as to the facts underlying the movant’s right to judgment.” Id. at 381–82.”

Block v. North American Savings Bank, 59 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)

The case discusses the standard for summary judgment under Missouri law, specifically noting that a “genuine issue” exists where the record contains two plausible but contradictory accounts of the essential facts. This is directly relevant to the research request, which seeks to argue that a material fact dispute exists in a car crash case.

“Rule 74.04(c)(3) permits a trial court to enter summary judgment as a matter of law on any claim where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” A “genuine issue” exists where the record contains competent evidence that indicates two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Supply Corp . , 854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo.banc 1993). The movant bears the burden of establishing his right to judgment on the record submitted. Carlton v. Phillips, 926 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Mo.App.W.D. 1996).”

Moody v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 539 S.W.3d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)

This case discusses the importance of fact-specific analysis in determining proximate cause in police-pursuit cases, which is relevant to the research request’s focus on material fact disputes.

“We agree with Mr. Moody that proximate cause, even in police-pursuit cases, is fact specific and, at least in some cases, may be submitted to a jury. When the trial court denied in part the Board’s motion for summary judgment here, it distinguished the facts from Stanley and like cases by stating the following: True the police cars were some distance behind Fields when he crashed and a police car was not involved in the collision.”

“The trial court’s observation serves as an appropriate distinguishing factor, as Stanley , Frazier , and Dilley turned on the courts’ determination before trial that the question of whether the collisions would have been avoided had the officers abandoned the pursuits was based “only on speculation” because no facts showed that the pursued driver’s erratic driving may or may not have ended in a crash with an innocent third party had the pursuit ceased. Frazier , 467 S.W.3d at 334-35.”

“In Frazier , the question of causation had been decided by the circuit court on a summary-judgment motion.”

Sanders v. Slayden, 944 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)

This case discusses the standard for summary judgment in Missouri, and specifically addresses the question of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in the context of a negligence claim arising from a car accident.

“Appellate review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993).”

“Bickerton, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co. , 898 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Mo. App. 1995). A question of fact exists when “fairminded people, exercising reasonable judgment, could reach different conclusions on the issue in controversy.””

“Because reasonable people could reach different conclusions regarding whether Mr. Slayden was driving the vehicle that collided with Ms. Long’s vehicle, the issue is genuinely disputed.”

Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, WD75141 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2013)

This case discusses the standard for granting summary judgment in a negligence case in Missouri, and specifically addresses the issue of whether there is a material fact dispute.

“Image Flooring and Rapp also argued, in the alternative, that the claims for negligent hiring and negligent entrustment failed as a matter of law insofar as there was a disconnect between Rapp’s alleged dangerous propensities and the type of harm that resulted. Wilson filed suggestions in opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the general rule in McHaffie, which would bar the separate negligence claims against Image Flooring, was subject to a punitive damages exception; in other words, when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages based upon the separate negligence claims against the employer, those claims are not barred. The trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, stating: After reviewing the pleadings and hearing argument on this issue, this Court fails to see factual evidence showing that Defendant exhibited any conscious disregard for the safety of others, that Defendants’ conduct was outrageous or that such conduct was the result of an evil motive or reckless indifference. . . . As such, a “punitive damages exception” to the majority rule set forth in McHaffie, if any, would not be triggered under the facts of this case.”

Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)

This case discusses the grant of partial summary judgment in a negligence case, and also addresses the standard for determining whether an intervening cause breaks the chain of causation.

“Before trial, Image Flooring and Rapp moved for partial summary judgment on Wilson’s direct liability negligence claims against Image Flooring. The trial court granted the motion, and the case proceeded to jury trial on the general negligence and vicarious liability claims, resulting in a verdict in favor of Wilson.”

“The trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, stating: After reviewing the pleadings and hearing argument on this issue, this Court fails to see factual evidence showing that Defendant exhibited any conscious disregard for the safety of others, that Defendants’ conduct was outrageous or that such conduct was the result of an evil motive or reckless indifference…. As such, a “punitive damages exception” to the majority rule set forth in McHaffie, if any, would not be triggered under the facts of this case. Where the issue involves a right of recovery as opposed to a question of liability, the domicile of the parties becomes a highly significant contact, as states have a great interest in applying their own compensation-related laws to their own residents, but very little interest in applying those same laws to non-residents.”

Schoedinger v. Beck, 557 S.W.3d 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018)

“”Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 119-20 (Mo. banc 2010) ; Rule 74.04(c)(6). “A ‘genuine issue’ that will prevent summary judgment exists where the record shows two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts and the genuine issue is real, not merely argumentative, imaginary, or frivolous.” Hibbs v. Berger , 430 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). “A fact is ‘material’ if “it has legal probative force as to a controlling issue in the litigation.””

Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113 (Mo. 2020)

“Because the Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses demonstrated there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Marcia was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in entering partial summary judgment in Marcia’s favor.”

“In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

“Only genuine disputes as to material facts preclude summary judgment. A material fact in the context of summary judgment is one from which the right to judgment flows. …. The record below is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.”

ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1993)

“Missouri’s Rule 74.04 sets out a procedure for granting summary judgments in cases in which the movant can establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. From its inception, such a procedure has been regarded as “an extreme and drastic remedy and great care should be exercised in utilizing the procedure.””

“Our courts have found a “genuine issue” whenever there is the “slightest doubt” as to a material fact. Elliott, 423 S.W.2d at 835.”

“For purposes of Rule 74.04, a “genuine issue” exists where the record contains competent materials that evidence two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts.”

Moyer v. St. Francois Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 449 S.W.3d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)

“In their first point on appeal, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of County because there is a genuine issue of fact on the issue of causation. We agree. The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo.”

“Id. (internal quotation omitted).”

“Carman v. Wieland, 406 S.W.3d 70, 76 (Mo.App.E.D.2013).”

“The defendant’s conduct must simply be a contributing cause of the plaintiff’s injury rather than the sole cause, and the connection may be proven by reasonable inferences from proven facts or by circumstantial evidence.”

Moyer v. St. Francois Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 449 S.W.3d 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)

“In their first point on appeal, Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of County because there is a genuine issue of fact on the issue of causation. We agree. The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo.”

“Although one would have to speculate that an officer’s termination of a pursuit would cause a fleeing suspect to cease driving recklessly within a short period of time and distance, as was the case in Stanley and Dilley, common sense supports an inference that, as the time and distance between an officer and a fleeing suspect grows, the more likely it becomes that the suspect will cease fleeing in a reckless manner. Stated another way, at some point following an officer’s termination of his or her pursuit of a suspect, a fleeing suspect will no longer feel it is necessary to continue driving recklessly to evade capture.”

“It is sufficient to conclude that the circumstances in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, support a reasonable inference that the suspect would have ceased driving in a reckless manner and would have avoided the collision with Plaintiffs had the deputy abandoned the pursuit.”

Laws v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 615 S.W.3d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)

“Similarly, whether a particular writing constitutes an “offer” can be a “disputed material fact” precluding a grant of summary judgment when one party’s interpretation of the writing requires an inference to substantiate it. Olson v. Curators of Univ. of Mo. , 381 S.W.3d 406, 411-12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). “Where the evidence regarding a contract is conflicting or is capable of more than one inference, the question raised is one of fact for the trier of fact to determine.””

“”Because the record supports two plausible but competing inferences,” regarding whether or not the March 8, 2019 letter was a $50,000 offer, “the trial court should have found that a genuine dispute of material facts exists.” Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo. , 316 S.W.3d at 347.”

Clark v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, No. ED110638 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2023)

“Standard of Review Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes there are no genuine issues of material fact and are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

“A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is competent evidence of two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of essential facts. Armoneit v. Ezell, 59 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). Thus, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment when he shows facts that negate any one of the necessary elements of the plaintiff’s claim. Blackwell Motors, Inc. v. Manheim Services Corporation, 529 S.W.3d 367, 379 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).”

Roberts v. Sokol, 330 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)

“Thus, “[t]he moving party has the burden of establishing a right to judgment as a matter of law and that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Johnson, 958 S.W.2d at 47. “To enter summary judgment, the circuit court must determine that the parties are not disputing any issue of material fact and that the party seeking summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Collins, 157 S.W.3d at 731; see Rule 74.04(c)(6). “The key to summary judgment is the undisputed right to judgment as a matter of law; not simply the absence of a fact question.'” Id. (quoting ITT, 854 S.W.2d at 380).”

Strout Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 703 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)

“The only question to be resolved by this court is whether there existed a genuine question of a material fact which would bar the entry of a summary judgment. This court concludes there remains a genuine question of material fact.”

“In no case shall a summary judgment be rendered on issue triable by jury or the court without a jury unless the prevailing party is shown by unassailable proof to be entitled thereto as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(h).”

“It must be shown on the record that no genuine issue of fact exists and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is entered.”

“A genuine issue of material fact remains to be determined by the trier of fact, and therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate in this case.”

By v. John Doe, 456 S.W.3d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015)

“David Richard, as plaintiff ad litem for decedent Joyce Richard, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Bi–State Development (Bi–State) and Valtrance Kendrick (collectively, Defendants) on his claims of negligence. Mr. Richard contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Ms. Richard was a passenger of Defendants’ van at the time of her injury.”

Sauvain v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 339 S.W.3d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)

“Given the standard for determining whether the parties intended to transfer ownership described in Gulf Insurance Co. and Trull, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because the trial court erroneously focused on whether the purchase agreement was fully executed, and not on the relevant test — whether the uncontroverted facts indicated the parties intended to transfer ownership at the time Bowman, Sr. took possession of the vehicle. As noted in Gulf Insurance Co., “after an agreement is reached and delivery is made, the buyer, and not the seller, has control over the vehicle.” 595 S.W.2d at 848 (emphasis added).”

“”The court accords the non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in the record.” Id. “Generally, an order denying a party’s motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is therefore not subject to appellate review.””

“Care and Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d 836, 844 (Mo. banc 2005).”

American Family Mut. v. Hoffman, 46 S.W.3d 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)

“To demonstrate a right to summary judgment on its petition for declaratory judgment, American Family, as the claimant, must establish that there were no genuine issues upon which it would have had the burden of persuasion at trial, and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . at 381. In his first point, Michael claims that the trial court erroneously applied the law by concluding that he was a resident of both Mr. Hoffman’s and Ms. Toebben’s households at the time he sustained his injuries, and was thereby excluded from coverage under Ms. Toebben’s policy.”

“These factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment in this case. Neal , 992 S.W.2d at 211 .”

“”`Disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment.'” Id . (quoting Podlesak v. Wesley , 849 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Mo.App. 1993)).”

Brown v. Nat. Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)

“Summary judgment is granted if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c). Home Building Company v. City of Kansas City, 609 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Mo.App. 1980).”

“Based on the legal theory approved in Meadows and Nappier, that a business owner may have a duty to patrons summary judgment as to National was error.”

“Summary judgment was inappropriate because questions of fact remain.”

Tompkins v. Cervantes, 917 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)

“Motion denied. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no dispute as to any material fact, and judgment is proper as a matter of law. The analysis of the present case falls within the second branch of this test, because the only dispute is whether the evidence which appellants now present would have been sufficient to satisfy the causation element of the medical malpractice tort; if so, then appellants have pleaded a submissible case of legal negligence.”

“However, we do credit all evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, which tend to support the case of the party against whom summary judgment was granted. To prevail in a legal negligence action, a plaintiff must prove four elements: 1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; 2) the attorney acted negligently or in breach of contract; 3) such acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages; and 4) but for attorney’s negligence, plaintiffs would have been successful in the underlying suit.”

Nance v. Morris Motors, Inc., 863 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)

“Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals.”

“The appellate court accords the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record. Id. at 376[3]. Summary judgment is designed to permit the trial court to enter judgment without delay where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 376[7].”

“Id. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and allowing him the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we nonetheless hold the record demonstrates Plaintiff has been unable to produce, and will be unable to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of the third element of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that Defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the steering failure.”

Kinnaman-Carson v. Westport Insurance Corp., No. WD68761 (Mo. Ct. App. Sep. 9, 2008)

“”The Court will uphold summary judgment if `there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (quoting Hayes v. Show Me Believers, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 706, 707 (Mo. banc 2006)). The Carsons’ first three Points Relied On argue that the Westport Policy did not exclude their claim against ABC Tow from coverage.”

“Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1992). “If a policy is found unambiguous, the rules of construction will not be applied and absent public policy to the contrary, the policy is enforced as written.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ballew, 203 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Mo.App.W.D. 2006).”

“At least according to Eighth Circuit decisions applying Missouri law, a “concurrent cause” is one which “could have independently brought about the injury.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Blount, 491 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Co Fat Le, 439 F.3d at 439); but see Byars v. St. Louis Pub.”

Reed v. American Standard Ins. Co., 231 S.W.3d 851 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)

“Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Havner, 103 S.W.3d 829, 831 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). We assume all properly pled facts and supporting inferences by the nonmoving party are true, thereby reading the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id. at 831-32. A summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material facts and the moving party has a right to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 831.”

“A genuine dispute exists when the record has two plausible but contrary accounts of key facts. Id. Mr. Reed argues that a summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the deceased children were living in the Teegardens’ household at the time of the accident.”

Watts v. EFCO Corp., 583 S.W.3d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019)

“When considering appeals from summary judgments, the Court will review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Facts set forth by affidavit or otherwise in support of a party’s motion are taken as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the summary judgment motion. We accord the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.”

“The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.”

“The underlying material facts are not in dispute.”

Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. 1991)

“The accident occurred December 15, 1984, at approximately 8:15 p.m. as Julia Reidlinger drove north on Highway 71. She lost control of her car, hit the median, and blocked the passing lane adjacent to the median where her car was struck by another vehicle.”

“Lauderdale testified that he and Oldaker were standing in the safety area by the median, but other testimony placed Oldaker in the traffic lane.”

“After trial of the claim as to the remaining party during the week of August 15, 1989, the jury assessed zero percent fault to defendant Reidlinger and one hundred percent fault to decedent Oldaker. I. The Case Against the Highway Commission Plaintiffs first contend the trial court erred in granting the Highway Commission summary judgment on the basis of the state’s sovereign immunity because § 537.600, RSMo, waives sovereign immunity in this instance.”

Kesterson v. State, 242 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2008)

“State Farm also filed a motion for summary judgment on Kesterson’s claim for uninsured motorist coverage based on Wallut’s negligence. The trial court granted Wallut’s motion to dismiss and State Farm’s motion for summary judgment based on the court’s determination that workers’ compensation was Kesterson’s exclusive remedy for injuries resulting from Wallut’s negligence.”

“On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Kesterson v. Wallut, 157 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Mo.App. 2004).”

🟥 McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995)

“Jefferies v. Saalberg, 448 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Mo.App. 1969). If reasonable minds could differ as to when a driver knew or could have known of a reasonable likelihood of collision, the question of when the duty arises to take evasive action is for the jury. See Myers v. Karchmer, 313 S.W.2d 697, 704 (Mo. 1958); Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, 266 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Mo. 1954); Kuehle v. Patrick, 646 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Mo.App. 1982). Furthermore, a driver has a duty to keep a careful lookout for approaching vehicles with sufficient care to appreciate and apprehend the danger of going on without taking precautionary measures. Young v. Grotsky, 459 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Mo. 1970).”

Premier Golf Missouri v. Staley Land, 282 S.W.3d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)

“”Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record demonstrates that there are no genuine disputes regarding material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Biegel, 204 S.W.3d at 356 (internal quotation omitted). “A `material fact’ is a fact of such significance or probative value as to control or determine the outcome of the litigation.” Id. “If the record contains competent evidence that two plausible, but contradictory accounts of essential facts exist, then a genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved, because fair minded people, exercising reasonable judgment could reach different conclusions on the issue in controversy.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).”

State v. Hughes, 281 S.W.3d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)

“In reviewing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, our review is essentially de novo: The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially. The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law.”

“”To be entitled to summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to the material facts on which he relies for summary judgment; and (2) based on those facts, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Rule 74.04(c)(6)).”

“When the moving party is the defendant, he can establish summary judgment in one of three ways: [A] prima facie case for summary judgment can be established by employing one or more of three means: (1) showing undisputed facts that negate any one of the plaintiffs required proof elements; (2) showing that the plaintiff, after an adequate period of discovery, has not produced and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of one or more of the plaintiffs proof elements; or (3) showing that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to prove the movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense. `Regardless of which of these three means is employed by the “defending party,” each establishes a right to judgment as a matter of law.'”

Hemme v. Bharti, 183 S.W.3d 593 (Mo. 2006)

“The Bhartis and RJ Reynolds filed motions for summary judgment, asserting that Rule 55.32(a) and res judicata barred the Hemmes from raising their claims in the new lawsuit. The Hemmes argued that, pursuant to Jacobs v. Corley, 732 S.W.2d 910 (Mo.App. 1987), the filing of permissive cross-claims does not make co-defendants “opposing parties” and, thus, does not trigger the compulsory counterclaim rule. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bhartis and RJ Reynolds and dismissed the Hemmes’ claims, finding that Rule 55.32(a) barred the Hemmes’ suit because the claims were compulsory counterclaims to cross-claims in the original suit. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. The compulsory counterclaim rule does not require a defendant against whom a cross-claim for indemnity, contribution or apportionment of fault is asserted to set forth her claim for injuries against her cross-claiming co-defendant in a response.”

Winchester v. Allison Sunshine, 446 S.W.3d 278 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014)

“Kurt S. Odenwald, Presiding Judge Appellant Allison Sunshine (“Sunshine”) appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting Respondent Ericka Winchester’s (“Winchester”) motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only. Winchester brought suit against Sunshine, Respondent George Johnson (“Johnson”), and Respondent Paul Achenbach (“Achenbach”) for damages resulting from a car accident. A jury returned verdicts in favor of Johnson and Achenbach, finding each zero percent at fault for Winchester’s damages. The jury also returned a verdict against Sunshine, finding Sunshine 100 percent at fault for Winchester’s damages but assessing Winchester’s damages at zero dollars. The trial court granted Winchester’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages only, and only as to Sunshine, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.”

Hughes v. Maritz, Wolff & Co., 601 S.W.3d 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)

“Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and statement of uncontroverted facts. Plaintiff failed to timely respond to each paragraph of Defendants’ stated facts as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2).”

“Id. For each material fact that the non-movant claims is genuinely disputed, the non-movant must direct the trial court to a particular numbered paragraph in movant’s statement of uncontroverted material facts that is denied in the non-movant’s response and support any denial with specifically referenced evidence.”

“We will affirm the judgment of the trial court if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 377 ; Rule 74.04(c)(6).”

Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Moore, No. ED110432 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2023)

“On January 26, 2021, after the parties had conducted discovery, Givands moved for summary judgment on the crossclaims for negligence and wrongful death. In response, Moore moved for an enlargement of time in which to respond to Givands’s summary-judgment motion.”

“The circuit court found that Moore did not attach a supporting affidavit with his motion requesting more time as required by Rule 74.04(f) and failed to specify what evidence of a factual dispute would have been presented had the circuit court granted the motion. The circuit court further noted that because Moore did not object or otherwise respond to Givands’s statement of uncontroverted facts, the facts therein would be taken as true.”

“The circuit court also ruled there was no material dispute of fact preventing judgment as a matter of law in that the evidence in the summary-judgment record did not establish that the automobile accident contributed to or caused the death of Decedent.”

Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 S.W.3d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Dutton v. American Family Mut.”

“We will uphold a ruling on summary judgment only if there is “no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Missouri Pros. Att’ys & Cir. Att’ys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot Cty. , 256 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. banc 2008).”

Cox v. Callaway Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. WD85350 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2023)

“Cox argues that genuine issues of material fact precluded the trial court’s entry of summary judgment to: (1) Individual Defendants on the basis of official immunity; (2) Defendants on the grounds that they were not the proximate cause of Cox’s injuries; and (3) Callaway County on the basis of sovereign immunity. Finding no error, we affirm.”

“Show-Me Inst. v. Off. of Admin., 645 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 74.04(c)(6).[ “In determining whether the entry of summary judgment was appropriate, we ‘review[] the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and give[] the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.'” Show-Me Inst., 645 S.W.3d at 607 (quoting Estes as Next Friend for Doe v. Bd. of Trs. of Mo. Pub.”

🟥 Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205 (Mo. 1935)

“It is to be observed first that in the dissenting opinion of BLAIR, J., no authority is cited in support of the position taken therein and that the present divisional opinion finds no support in its citation for its criticism of said majority opinion.”

“I concede that the general and well-established rule is, in effect, that each party to a cause at law has a right to instructions hypothesizing the facts which, if found by the jury to be true, would on the one hand sustain the cause or, on the other hand, sustain the defense.”

“The classes of facts referred to above are evidential or subordinate facts in the one class, and ultimate or essential facts in the other. In the Parker case, supra, the evidential facts were the only facts supporting the defense made and were sufficient to fully establish it.”

“So that it is obvious that the opinion in the Parker case is not in principle in conflict with the majority opinion in the Causey case but is in complete harmony therewith.”

Federal Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 162 S.W.3d 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)

“The California appellate court in Travelers based its decision in part on the fact that no judicial determination of active or intentional negligence had been made, so no right to indemnity had been established. Id. No other jurisdiction to consider this issue has held that summary judgment is precluded in the absence of a judicial determination of fault.”

“Whether the undisputed facts showed that Aqualon was or was not solely at fault is an issue that the trial court could decide on a motion for summary judgment in this case. Federal also argues that Aqualon waived its right to indemnification from Sachs by agreeing in the parties’ Settlement Agreement and Full and General Release to release Sachs from any causes of action for indemnity, and therefore the indemnification agreement no longer controls the allocation of insured liability.”

🟥 Goerlitz v. City of Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450 (Mo. 2011)

“Id. Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The facts contained in affidavits or otherwise in support of a party’s motion are accepted “as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s response to the summary judgment motion.” Id. Only genuine disputes as to material facts preclude summary judgment. Id. at 378. A material fact in the context of summary judgment is one from which the right to judgment flows. Id. A defending party, such as the City, may establish a right to summary judgment by demonstrating: (1) facts negating any one of the elements of the nonmovant’s claim; (2) “that the non-movant, after an adequate period for discovery, has not been able and will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one” of the elements of the non-movant’s claim; or (3) “that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to support movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.””

Analyses (12)

Western District of Pennsylvania Denies Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Where Disputed Facts Exist on Claims of a “Low-Ball” Initial Settlement Offer and Unreasonable Delay in Tendering Policy Limits

“The Court denied both motions, finding that there were questions of material fact as to whether State Farm’s failure to offer the $100,000 policy limit during the period of May 2014 through November 2016 constituted unreasonable delay and whether the initial $17,000 offer was a “low-ball” offer.”

“The Court first held that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that State Farm was not unreasonable, and therefore not acting in bad faith, when it delayed making its offer to settle for the $100,000 UIM policy limit.”

“At the time of the $17,000 offer, Parisi had only proffered evidence of $12,000 in damages.”

“The Court also dispensed with State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but noted that its ruling in this regard was “a close call.””

“Lastly, regarding the $17,000 offer, the Court ruled that a fact-finder could determine that the $17,000 figure constituted a “low ball” settlement proposal.”

Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Give Flight School and its President a One-way Ticket to Trial

“Because there were genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment was inappropriate. [View source.]”

CRAs, but Not Creditor, Granted Summary Judgment on Voluntary Surrender Reporting Claims

“The court, however, refused to grant AmeriCredit summary judgment on Chijioke-Uche’s FCRA claims that AmeriCredit failed to reasonably investigate and correct inaccurate information it provided to the CRAs, finding that material facts were in dispute. First, the court cited with approval a series of cases holding that such claims are best settled by a trier of fact and are not appropriate to be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to the accuracy of AmeriCredit’s reporting of a voluntary surrender, especially because Chijioke-Uche was current on his payments at the time AmeriCredit took possession of the car and had evidence in the form of emails and phone recordings instructing him to leave his car at Chapman Ford until the new turbocharger was installed and advising him that he would not be charged storage fees.”

Zubillaga v. Allstate Indemnity Company

“The Court noted the problem with Allstate’s reliance on its expert: the expert rendered his opinions in October and November 2012, yet Allstate continued to rely on the opinions through arbitration in September 2013, without consulting him again or conducting further investigation, particularly as to the injections Plaintiff was receiving. Because it never asked Legome [Allstate’s expert] to review Soni’s [the doctor administering the injections] epidural treatments and recommendations, Allstate’s continued reliance upon Legome’s opinions as the basis for disputing the medical necessity or reasonable value of those treatments and recommendations may have been unreasonable. And, leaving aside Legome’s reports and opinions, Allstate has not directed us to any other medical reports or opinions that could reasonably support its ongoing denial of plaintiff’s claim.”

“Allstate’s assertion it reasonably continued to rely on Legome’s opinions, or that it had inadequate time to have him reexamine those opinions or conduct further investigation, merely inform our conclusion plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by summary judgment.”

“Once more, an insurer is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could conclude that the insurer acted unreasonably. [Citation.] Considering the objective facts known to Allstate at the time its final decision to deny plaintiff’s $35,000 demand was made, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as required, we are convinced “‘a jury could conclude that the insurer acted unreasonably.’” [Citation.] Specifically, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find Allstate’s continued insistence she did not need expensive epidural injections was, “‘“prompted not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.”’” [Citation.] Related Attorneys Partners Michael Velladao Partner Los Angeles, CA 213.580.7958”

When Form Meets Substance: Two Fifth Circuit Decisions Chart the Boundary Lines of Summary Judgment

“Murky waters swirl in the legal gulf that separates the absence of any “genuine dispute[s] as to any material fact” (in which case summary judgment is appropriate); and the presence of non-speculative “evidence [on which] a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” (in which case summary judgment is not appropriate and the case must be fully tried to the fact finder). Two recent Fifth Circuit decisions, however, have plumbed these depths and charted a truer course (if only slightly) for navigating maritime summary judgments – although the two decisions resulted in diametrically opposed outcomes.”

“The Fifth Circuit affirmed and did so by clarifying/reaffirming two important procedural points for summary judgment practice in a Jones Act claim. First, after setting out the well-known summary judgment standard (i.e., no genuine dispute as to any material fact, non-movant must present actual evidence to show a genuine dispute and cannot rely on speculation, improbable inferences, or unsubstantiated assertions), the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed a critically important procedural aspect of summary judgment practice in non-jury bench tried cases (which includes many types of admiralty cases): We have held that [i]n a non-jury case, such as this one, a district court has somewhat greater discretion to consider what weight it will accord the evidence.”

“Finally, as to Jones’ unseaworthiness claim, the Fifth Circuit confirmed the intuitive result that because he was unable to “show [causation] under the lighter Jones Act standard” he likewise could not do so for his unseaworthiness claim (even though a greasy deck would be an unseaworthy condition), because that claim requires the heightened showing of “proximate causation.””

Valve Defendants Obtain Summary Judgment Due to Lack of Causation Evidence

“Court: United States District Court for the Central District of California In this action, the plaintiffs alleged that the decedent, John Carpenter, contracted and died from mesothelioma due to exposure to asbestos, which occurred in part during his service in the Navy. Before the court are two motions: defendant Nibco Inc.’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication (the “Nibco Motion”); and defendant Asco Valve Inc.’s (“Asco”) motion for summary judgment (the “Asco Motion”).”

“While the defendants’ motions discuss various issues, the dispositive question is whether the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of triable fact regarding the causation for the decedent’s injury. Regarding Nibco valves, the court held that the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact regarding exposure to Nibco valves.”

“Based on the evidence presented, a rational jury could not find in the plaintiffs’ favor on the issue of exposure attributable to Asco’s valves, as there was no genuine dispute of material facts as to exposure or whether Asco’s valves were a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s injuries.”

Dot the I’s and Cross the T’s: the Importance of Clarity in Claim Communications and the Availability of Punitive Damages for an Insurer’s Bad Faith Failure to Settle

“The court then explained, inter alia, that there was a question of fact as to whether the two letters constituted an offer to settle that the insurer could have accepted. It also ruled that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on punitive damages. II. The Existence of an Offer as a Jury Question The court determined that the letters, “at the very least, create genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the claimant] offered to settle her claims within the insured’s policy limits and to release the insured from further liability, and whether the offer included a 30-day deadline to respond.””

“Conclusions Now that the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that a particularly confusing communication — although undisputed in the record — can create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment, insurers must take care in their communications with claimants to maintain a clear record. It is important to keep communications concise, which includes asking the claimant to clarify communications that contain language merely suggesting settlement.”

Comparative Negligence No Longer Bars Plaintiff From Award of Summary Judgment in New York

“On April 3, 2018, a sharply divided Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs in comparative negligence cases do not need to show they are free of negligence to succeed on a summary judgment motion when determining a defendant’s liability.”

“In Rodriguez v. City of New York, [1] the court held that a plaintiff can be granted partial summary judgment even when his or her comparative fault is in question.”

“It raised the concern that a grant of summary judgment at the motion stage would be akin to forcing “the defendant into the batter’s box with two strikes already called.” [7] The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and the question posed was “Was the order of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by this Court, properly made?” [8]Judge Feinman, writing for the majority, ignored the insufficiencies regarding liability on causation and foreseeability and reframed the question presented as “Whether a plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of a defendant’s liability, when, as here, defendant has arguably raised an issue of fact regarding plaintiff’s comparative negligence.” [9] The court dismissed the other aspects of the motion and answered the question in the affirmative, finding that plaintiff does not bear the burden of showing he did not bear any negligence in causing his injuries. Although the court emphasized subsection (c) of CPLR 3212 (permitting grant of summary judgment on liability) and CPLR 1411 (“contributory negligence or assumption to risk shall not bar recovery…” [Emphasis added in the original]), neither statute suggests that the fault portion of a trial should be bifurcated. Nonetheless, the court noted that if plaintiff were denied the right to partial summary judgment when comparative fault is in question, it would result in “a possible windfall to defendants” because a jury could find in favor of defendant even if defendant was negligent per se. [10] The court acknowledged that there is no practical purpose to granting summary judgment in a comparative negligence case because “the jury is still tasked with considering the plaintiff’s and defendant’s culpability together.” [11] However, as Judge Garcia writing for the dissent pointed out, it is precisely that issue, assessing one party’s fault with a “preconceived idea of the other party’s liability that is inherently unfair,” as “determinations of degrees of fault should be made as a whole.” [12] Judge Garcia argued that the facts of this case highlight the unfairness of this new rule, as the two lower courts found an issue of fact as to any liability on the part of the defendant.”

Dot the I’s and Cross the T’s: the Importance of Clarity in Claim Communications and the Availability of Punitive Damages for an Insurer’s Bad Faith Failure to Settle

“The court then explained, inter alia, that there was a question of fact as to whether the two letters constituted an offer to settle that the insurer could have accepted. It also ruled that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on punitive damages. II. The Existence of an Offer as a Jury Question The court determined that the letters, “at the very least, create genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the claimant] offered to settle her claims within the insured’s policy limits and to release the insured from further liability, and whether the offer included a 30-day deadline to respond.””

Dot The I’s And Cross The T’s: The Importance Of Clarity In Claim Communications And The Availability Of Punitive Damages For An Insurer’s Bad Faith Failure To Settle

“The court then explained, inter alia, that there was a question of fact as to whether the two letters constituted an offer to settle that the insurer could have accepted. It also ruled that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on punitive damages. II. The Existence of an Offer as a Jury Question The court determined that the letters, “at the very least, create genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the claimant] offered to settle her claims within the insured’s policy limits and to release the insured from further liability, and whether the offer included a 30-day deadline to respond.””

Is Summary Judgment Still Possible in Kentucky?

New York’s Court of Appeals Clarifies the Burden of Proof in Summary Judgment Cases

“In Rodriguez v. City of New York, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 793, 2018 NY Slip Op. 02287 (Apr. 3, 2018), New York’s Court of Appeals, New York’s highest court, addressed the question of whether a plaintiff, in moving for summary judgment on the issue of the defendant’s liability, also needs to establish the absence of his or her own comparative negligence. In a 4-3 decision, a majority of the court held that, because the plaintiff’s comparative negligence is a matter of damages, not liability, the plaintiff does not bear that burden.”

“Pursuant to CPLR 3212, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant establishes that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, as noted in CPLR 3212(b), to secure summary judgment, the movant must also “show that there is no defense to the cause of action.””

“The trial court, moreover, should, as it does in cases where there is a bifurcated trial on the issue of liability, instruct the jury on the issue of the defendant’s negligence.”