Andrew Shahan, Appellant/Respondent, v. Todd Shahan, Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, Respondent/Appellant.

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court. Opinion Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Case Style: Andrew Shahan, Appellant/Respondent, v. Todd Shahan, Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, Respondent/Appellant. Case Number: 53826 and 53825 Handdown Date: 04/14/1998 Appeal From: Circuit Court of Adair County, Hon. Garry D. Lewis Counsel for Appellant: Brent Mayberry Counsel for Respondent: Gary P. Paul Opinion Summary: On July 13, 1991, Appellant Andrew Shahan was riding in the back of a pickup truck driven by his half-brother, Todd Shahan, when Todd's negligent operation of the truck caused it to leave the roadway, hit a ditch, and overturn twice. Andrew was injured in the accident. At the time of the accident, Andrew was fourteen years old and resided with his mother, Nancy Hunolt, and his step-father, Leo Hunolt. Mr. Hunolt owned the pickup truck involved in the accident. Mr. and Mrs. Hunolt had two insurance policies which covered the truck -- an automobile insurance policy issued by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) which covered only the truck and a personal liability umbrella policy issued by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company which covered all of their vehicles. On March 9, 1992, Mrs. Hunolt, as next friend for Andrew, filed an action for personal injuries against Todd Shahan. On November 17, 1992, State Farm filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Todd Shahan, Andrew Shahan and Mrs. Hunolt asking the court to find that Todd did not have permission to use the pickup truck and, consequently, was not covered under the automobile insurance policy. On May 31, 1994, the declaratory judgment court found that Todd Shahan had the implied permission of Mr. Hunolt to use the pickup truck and was therefore covered by the automobile insurance policy. The underlying action for personal injuries then resumed in the trial court of Judge Bruce Normile. Todd Shahan

was represented individually by Attorney Jay Benson and by Attorney Hadley Grimm on behalf of State Farm. On August 15, 1995, State Farm tendered $25,000 to the court registry in compliance with "The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law," sections 303.010-303.370, RSMo 1994, and Attorney Grimm filed a motion for leave to withdraw asserting that State Farm had tendered its full policy limit in light of the household exclusion provisions in the automobile insurance contract. On October 19, 1995, the trial court issued a memorandum and order holding that the household exclusion was inapplicable and denying Attorney Grimm permission to withdraw. On November 16, 1995, Attorney Grimm filed a Supplemental Motion for Leave to Withdraw and a Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Order. The motion for reconsideration reiterated State Farm's position that the household exclusion applied to the facts of the case. The supplemental motion to withdraw indicated that State Farm was no longer willing to compensate Attorney Grimm for his services as counsel for Todd Shahan. On December 4, 1995, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration but granted permission for Attorney Grimm to withdraw based on State Farm's refusal to compensate him. The case was heard by the trial court on January 14 and 31, 1996. On February 9, 1996, the court entered judgment in favor of Andrew Shahan and against Todd Shahan for $225,000 with interest thereon at a rate of 9% per annum from the date of judgment until paid and the costs of suit. Subsequently, Andrew filed a Request and Order for Execution/Garnishment naming State Farm as the garnishee. On March 21, 1996, State Farm filed a Request for Change of Judge. On August 23, 1996, the garnishment court granted State Farm's request, and Judge Bruce Normile was replaced in the garnishment action by Judge Garry Lewis. On November 6, 1996, the garnishment court heard the parties' arguments. Andrew claimed that State Farm was liable under the automobile insurance policy on the truck and under the umbrella policy. State Farm maintained that it was not liable under either policy based on the exclusions in each of those policies. On November 21, 1996, the garnishment court held that the previous findings in the order denying the motion to withdraw and in the order granting the request for change of judge, both of which held that the household exclusion in the automobile insurance policy did not apply, were binding as the "law of the case" and ordered State Farm to pay the policy limit. However, the garnishment court found that no prior ruling had been made regarding the umbrella policy and that no coverage was afforded under the language of that policy. Both parties appeal from that judgment. AFFIRMED. Division Two holds: (1) The garnishment court's finding that the provisions of the umbrella policy barred recovery by Andrew Shahan was not barred by the principles of waiver, estoppel, or res judicata because the elements of

those doctrines were not met. Moreover, waiver and estoppel may not be employed to create coverage where it does not otherwise exist. (2) The garnishment court reached the correct result in holding the household exclusion in the automobile policy did not apply. Under that provision as interpreted by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. banc 1995), Todd Shahan was the only person qualifying as "the insured" under the exclusion, and therefore, the exclusion only applied to members of Todd Shahan's household. As Andrew Shahan was not a member of Todd Shahan's household, the exclusion did not apply. Citation: Opinion Author: Joseph M. Ellis, Presiding Judge Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. Ulrich, C.J. and Riederer, J., concur. Opinion: On July 13, 1991, Appellant Andrew Shahan was riding in the back of a pickup truck driven by his half-brother, Todd Shahan, when Todd's negligent operation of the truck caused it to leave the roadway, hit a ditch, and overturn twice. Andrew was injured in the accident. At the time of the accident, Andrew was fourteen years old and resided with his mother, Nancy Hunolt, and his step-father, Leo Hunolt. Mr. Hunolt owned the pickup truck involved in the accident. Mr. and Mrs. Hunolt had two insurance policies which covered the truck -- an automobile insurance policy issued by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") which covered only the truck and a personal liability umbrella policy issued by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company which covered all of their vehicles. On March 9, 1992, Mrs. Hunolt, as next friend for Andrew, filed an action for personal injuries against Todd Shahan in the Circuit Court of Adair County. On November 17, 1992, State Farm filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Todd Shahan, Andrew Shahan and Mrs. Hunolt asking the court to find that Todd did not have permission to use the pickup truck and, consequently, was not covered under the automobile insurance policy. On May 31, 1994, the declaratory judgment court found that Todd Shahan had the implied permission of Mr. Hunolt to use the pickup truck and was therefore covered by the automobile insurance policy. The underlying action for personal injuries then resumed in the trial court of Judge Bruce Normile. Todd Shahan was represented individually by Attorney Jay Benson and by Attorney Hadley Grimm on behalf of State Farm. On August 15, 1995, State Farm tendered $25,000 to the court registry in compliance with "The Motor Vehicle Financial

Responsibility Law," sections 303.010-303.370,(FN1) and Attorney Grimm filed a motion for leave to withdraw asserting that State Farm had tendered its full policy limit in light of the household exclusion provisions in the automobile insurance contract.(FN2) On October 19, 1995, the trial court issued a memorandum and order holding that the household exclusion was inapplicable and denying Attorney Grimm permission to withdraw. On November 16, 1995, Attorney Grimm filed a Supplemental Motion for Leave to Withdraw and a Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum and Order. The motion for reconsideration reiterated State Farm's position that the household exclusion applied to the facts of the case. The supplemental motion to withdraw indicated that State Farm was no longer willing to compensate Attorney Grimm for his services as counsel for Todd Shahan. On December 4, 1995, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, but granted permission for Attorney Grimm to withdraw based on State Farm's refusal to compensate him. The case was heard by the trial court on January 14 and 31, 1996. On February 9, 1996, the court entered judgment in favor of Andrew Shahan and against Todd Shahan for $225,000 with interest thereon at a rate of 9% per annum from the date of judgment until paid and the costs of suit. Subsequently, Appellant filed a Request and Order for Execution/Garnishment naming State Farm as the garnishee. On March 21, 1996, State Farm filed a Request for Change of Judge. On August 23, 1996, the garnishment court granted State Farm's request, and Judge Bruce Normile was replaced in the garnishment action by Judge Garry Lewis. On November 6, 1996, the garnishment court heard the parties' arguments. Appellant claimed that State Farm was liable under the automobile insurance policy on the truck and under the umbrella policy. State Farm maintained that it was not liable under either policy based on the exclusions in each of those policies. On November 21, 1996, the garnishment court entered its Findings, Order and Judgment. The court held that the previous findings in the order denying the motion to withdraw and in the order granting the request for change of judge, both of which held that the household exclusion in the automobile insurance policy did not apply, were binding as the "law of the case" and ordered State Farm to pay the policy limit. However, the garnishment court found that no prior ruling had been made regarding the umbrella policy and that no coverage was afforded under the language of that policy. Both parties appeal from that judgment. "In a court tried garnishment action, the judgment will be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law." M.A.B. v. Nicely, 911 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). In his sole point on appeal, Appellant claims the garnishment court erred in finding that he was not covered under

the personal liability umbrella policy. That policy contains a provision excluding coverage "[f]or personal injury to the named insured, spouse, or anyone within the meaning of part a. or b. of the definition of insured." The definition section of the policy provides, inter alia:

1. "insured" means:

a. the named insured; b. the following residents of the named insured's household:

1. the named insured's relatives; and
2. anyone under the age of 21 under the

care of a person named above. *** 7."named insured" means the person named in the Declarations and the spouse. *** 13."relative" means any person related by blood, adoption, or marriage to the named insured. The garnishment court found that no prior determination had been made regarding coverage under the umbrella policy. The garnishment court found that Appellant was under the age of 21 and in the care of Nancy S. Hunolt, who was a "named insured" within the meaning of the policy definition. Accordingly, the court ruled there was no coverage for Appellant under the personal liability umbrella policy. Appellant does not challenge the court's interpretation of the umbrella contract's provisions. Rather, Appellant claims the court erred in making any finding relating to coverage because "such a determination was barred under the rules of waiver, estoppel and res judicata." Appellant initially argues that by instituting its declaratory judgment action, in which it claimed that Todd Shahan was not a permissive user of the truck under the automobile insurance policy, State Farm waived the right to challenge coverage under any of the other contractual provisions found within either of the policies. Appellant also mentions, but does not argue, the theory of estoppel.(FN3) Waiver is defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Link v. Kroenke, 909 S.W.2d 740, 746 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). It involves both knowledge and intent. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Mo. banc 1989) (quoting Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Houle, 118 Vt. 154, 102 A.2d 326, 330 (1954)). If it is to be implied from conduct, the conduct must unequivocally and clearly show a purpose to relinquish the right. Link, 909 S.W.2d at 746. Equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, "is that condition that in justice precludes one from speaking the truth in his own behalf." Shaffer v. Hines, 573 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Mo. App. E.D. 1978). It rests on the rule of law that prevents

one from denying his own expressed or implied admission or statement that another in good faith pursuant to its purpose has accepted and acted upon. Warren v. Warren, 784 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989). Equitable estoppel requires three elements. First, there must be an admission, statement or act inconsistent with a claim later asserted and sued upon. Second, the other party must have acted in reliance on such admission, statement or act. And, third, injury to such other party, resulting from permitting the asserting party to contradict or repudiate the admission, statement or act. Id.; Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 386. From the foregoing, it is obvious that waiver and estoppel are separate and distinct legal doctrines. Waiver involves the act or conduct of one of the parties to the contract only. An estoppel involves the act or conduct of both parties to a contract. A waiver . . . involves both knowledge and intent. Estoppel may arise when there is not intent to mislead. A waiver does not necessarily imply that one has been misled to his prejudice or into an altered position. An estoppel always involves this element. Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 387 (quoting Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Houle, 118 Vt. 154, 102 A.2d 326, 330 (1954)). In the case at bar, Appellant's argument is premised on the general rule that "an insurer, having denied liability on a specified ground, may not thereafter deny liability on a different ground." Stone v. Waters, 483 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Mo. App. W.D. 1972). Our Supreme Court has held that the preferred theory supporting this rule is estoppel. Brown, 776 S.W.2d at 388. In doing so, the Court observed that the preference does not preclude the application of the waiver doctrine. However, "in the absence of either (1) an express waiver by the insurer or (2) conduct which clearly and unequivocally shows a purpose by the insurer to relinquish a contractual right, the insured must show prejudice before the rule may be invoked." Id. Here, State Farm did not expressly waive the right to challenge coverage under the umbrella policy based on the household exclusion. In addition, State Farm's conduct in bringing the declaratory judgment action did not clearly and unequivocally indicate that State Farm intended to relinquish any further contractual rights. Thus, the waiver doctrine could only be applicable upon a showing of prejudice by Appellant. This Appellant has not done. The mere expense and trouble of bringing suit is insufficient prejudice to support application of the doctrine. Id. For similar reasons, we cannot say that the preferred theory, estoppel, is applicable. Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that State Farm's filing of the declaratory judgment action was an act inconsistent with its subsequent assertion that there was no coverage under the umbrella policy because of the household exclusion, Appellant fails to establish the other two elements of estoppel. He fails to show that he acted in reliance on that conduct and, more importantly, he fails to show how he was injured. Again, the trouble and expense of bringing suit does not satisfy the latter element. Appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice or injury resulting from State Farm's position in the declaratory judgment action, and accordingly cannot invoke either the waiver or estoppel doctrines.

Moreover, "[w]aiver and estoppel are not available to bring risks within the coverage of an insured's policy that are not covered by its terms or are excluded from that policy." Lincoln County Ambulance Dist. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., No. ED 72333, slip op. at 13 (Mo. App. E.D. Jan. 20, 1998) (citing Holland Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 775 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989)). "Waiver and estoppel may not be employed to create coverage where it otherwise did not exist." Shelter Gen. Ins. Co. v. Siegler, 945 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997). "This rule is grounded in the idea that `estoppel and waiver do not themselves give a cause of action, and that the purpose of estoppel is to preserve rights previously acquired but not to create new ones.'" Id. (quoting Great West Cas. Co. v. Wenger, 748 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988)). In the case sub judice, the umbrella policy excluded coverage to Appellant. As noted by the trial court, Appellant was under the age of 21 and under the care of a named insured, his mother, Nancy S. Hunolt. Accordingly, even if the elements of waiver or estoppel existed in this case, they would be of no assistance to Appellant because he was excluded from coverage under the umbrella policy and neither waiver nor estoppel could act to create coverage when it did not otherwise exist. Appellant also argues that the doctrine of res judicata should have acted to bar State Farm from denying coverage in the garnishment action. The general rule of res judicata is that "an earlier judgment on the same cause of action ordinarily is conclusive between the parties, not only of every matter litigated but of every matter which could have been litigated." Winter v. Northcutt, 879 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994). However, suits for declaratory judgment do not fall within this general rule and are res judicata only to those matters actually declared. Id.; State ex rel. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gum, 904 S.W.2d 447, 452 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995); Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Mo. App. S.D. 1990); Farley v. Missouri Dep't of Natural Resources, 592 S.W.2d 539, 540-41 (Mo. App. W.D. 1979). The only matter addressed by the declaratory judgment court was whether Todd Shahan was "an insured" under the automobile insurance policy owned by Mr. and Mrs. Hunolt. The court found that Todd Shahan had implied permission to use the truck at the time of the accident, and therefore, Todd was covered under the terms of the policy. The declaratory judgment made no mention of the umbrella policy or Andrew Shahan's right to recover under either of the policies. Accordingly, the garnishment court was not bound by the principles of res judicata. Point denied. In its cross-appeal, State Farm claims the garnishment court erred in holding that the household exclusion in the automobile policy did not apply. The household exclusion in the automobile insurance policy provided, "THERE IS NO COVERAGE . . . FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO . . . ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSURED'S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED'S HOUSEHOLD." The policy defined "insured" as:

1. you;
2. your spouse;
3. the relatives of the first person named in the declaration;
4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of you or your

spouse; and

1. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds.

In its memorandum and order denying Attorney Grimm permission to withdraw, the trial court ruled that the household exclusion was inapplicable. That court found that the phrase "the insured's household" in the household exclusion could only mean the household of Todd Shahan since he came within the definition of an "insured" under paragraph 4 of the policy definition. The court reasoned that since Andrew Shahan did not live in the same house with Todd Shahan, the household exclusion did not apply. In its "Findings, Order and Judgment," the garnishment court stated: The court finds that Garnishee is subject to garnishment to the individual policy limit of [the automobile policy]. On three occasions . . . Hon. Bruce Normile ruled that the "household exclusion" of the liability policy does not apply and res judicata does apply. To be sure, these findings were made in connection with a Motion to Withdraw, presented on two occasions, and a Motion for Change of Judge. Nevertheless, the Judge's Orders undeniably and unambiguously declare his rulings to be the law of the case on this issue. *** In Butler, the household exclusion was found to bar the claim of a member of the named insured's household and State Farm owed no duty to defend. The incidents of driver, ownership, policy owner, and injured party in Butler were mirror images of our underlying factual case. Writing on a clean slate may well result in a different conclusion, however, Shahan v. Shahan has long since gone to Judgment and the determination of household exclusion under the [automobile] policy is now binding and ruled to be the law of the case. State Farm argues that the garnishment court erred in relying on Judge Normile's rulings in the trial court that the household exclusion in the automobile policy did not apply because Judge Normile's rulings were erroneous, were not res judicata, and the doctrine of law of the case was inapplicable. We first consider whether Judge Normile's rulings on the applicability of the automobile policy's household exclusion were erroneous. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. banc 1995), our Supreme Court addressed the identical policy language. In that case, Wilbur Ballmer was driving Sharon Kulenkamp's car with her permission when the automobile crashed, killing Daniel Ellis, who was a passenger in the car and Wilbur Ballmer's half-brother. At the time of the accident, Wilbur Ballmer resided with Daniel Ellis. Sharon Kulenkamp was Daniel Ellis' sister and Wilbur Ballmer's half-sister, but she did not reside in the same household. Sylvia Ballmer was the mother Wilbur, Daniel and Sharon. Sylvia Ballmer sued Wilbur Ballmer for the wrongful death of Daniel Ellis. State Farm filed a declaratory judgment

action asserting the household exclusion in its automobile insurance policy issued to Sharon Kulenkamp precluded liability coverage for the death of Daniel Ellis. The trial court ruled that the policy afforded no coverage by reason of the household exclusion, but that pursuant to section 303.190 as interpreted in Halpin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 823 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. banc 1992), State Farm was obligated to provide $25,000 in liability coverage. On appeal, our Supreme Court considered policy language identical to that in the instant appeal. The Court found the plain language of household exclusion clear and unambiguous when read in conjunction with the definition of "insured." Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d at 525-26. [A]s used in the household exclusion, "an insured" refers to any person . . . falling within the definition of "insured." . . . Because there are five categories included in the definition of "insured," the definite article "the" is used in the household exclusion to refer to the specific category of "insured" that applies to the situation. The term "the insured," therefore, refers to the person . . . identified previously in the exclusion as "an insured." Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d at 526 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Court held there was no coverage for Daniel Ellis. Wilbur Ballmer was "an insured" because Kulenkamp granted him permission to use the car. The deceased and Wilbur Ballmer, members of the same family, lived together. The deceased, therefore, was a "MEMBER OF AN INSURED'S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED'S HOUSEHOLD." Id. Applying Ballmer to the case at bar, we observe first that Todd Shahan had permission to use the vehicle and therefore was "an insured" by virtue of category four (4) of the policy definition of "insured." Todd Shahan and Appellant Andrew Shahan were brothers. However, Appellant did not reside in Todd Shahan's household. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in finding that the household exclusion was inapplicable. State Farm argues, nevertheless, that because Appellant lived with his mother, Nancy Hunolt, the exclusion does apply. It contends that Nancy Hunolt was "an insured" under category two (2) of the definition of "insured," Appellant was a member of her family, and resided in her household. Consequently, State Farm reasons that Appellant was a . . . "MEMBER OF AN INSURED'S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED'S HOUSEHOLD." State Farm relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Butler, 904 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995), to sustain its argument. In Butler, one Terrance Barnoski was a permissive user of a vehicle owned by Robert and Elizabeth Butler, when the vehicle overturned. The Butlers' daughter, Charlotte, who lived with them, was a passenger in the vehicle and was killed in the accident. State Farm insured the Butlers' and the policy contained a household exclusion identical to the one in Ballmer and in this case. In deciding whether the policy provided liability coverage for the daughter beyond the $25,000 required by the MVFRL, the Eastern District held:

In this case, Charlotte was the daughter of the named insured, Robert and Elizabeth Butler. The Butler's policy [contains the household exclusion]. Charlotte Butler fits squarely within the excluded category. As the daughter of the named insureds who resided with them, Charlotte was a ". . . MEMBER OF AN INSURED'S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED'S HOUSEHOLD." There is no coverage for bodily injury to her. Butler, 904 S.W.2d at 352. Butler was handed down two weeks after our Supreme Court decided Ballmer. The Butler court acknowledged the result reached in Ballmer, but did not discuss the analysis in its opinion. Moreover, Butler, and State Farm's argument herein, both overlook the plain language of the household exclusion as explained in Ballmer. As the Ballmer Court pointed out, "the definite article 'the' is used in the household exclusion to refer to the specific category of 'insured' that applies to the situation. The term 'the insured,' therefore, refers to the person . . . identified previously in the exclusion as 'an insured.'" Ballmer, 899 S.W.2d at 526 (emphasis added). We are, of course, constitutionally bound to follow the most recent controlling decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. Schumann v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 912 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995); Mo. Const. art. V, section 2 (1945). Ballmer is that decision, and for that reason we reject State Farm's argument and decline to follow Butler. Based on the garnishment court's "Findings, Order and Judgment," it appears the garnishment court reached the right result for the wrong reasons. Since this is an appeal from a court tried case, however, we are only concerned with the correctness of the result, not the route taken to reach that result. RCA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sanborn, 918 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996). As we hold that the trial court and the garnishment court were correct in ruling that the household exclusion in the automobile policy did not preclude coverage for bodily injury to Appellant, State Farm's other arguments on this point are moot. Accordingly, the point is denied. The judgment is affirmed. All concur. Footnotes: FN1.All statutory references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise noted. FN2.The State Farm automobile insurance policy on the 1987 Chevy pickup contained a limit of liability of $100,000 per person for bodily injury. While State Farm argued that the household exclusion in that policy excluded coverage for Appellant because he was a "member of the insured's family residing in the insured's household" as defined in the policy, it nevertheless tendered the $25,000 into the registry of the court in recognition of our Supreme Court's decision in Halpin v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 823 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Mo. banc 1992). In Halpin, the Court held that exclusionary provisions in insurance policies did not apply to the limits of liability required by sections 303.010-303.370. Id. at 482. Consequently, the Court ruled that the household exclusion in the American Family policy was inapplicable to the first $25,000 of coverage provided by the policy, but would apply to preclude liability with respect to coverage over and above that amount. Id. at 482-83.

FN3.Appellant sets forth three sentences of caselaw relating to the doctrine of estoppel, and then fails to apply the facts of this case to that doctrine or to make any argument at all under that theory. "If a party fails to support a contention with relevant authority or argument beyond conclusions, the point is considered abandoned." Luft v. Schoenhoff, 935 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). Separate Opinion: None This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.