Celestina Gamez, Respondent, v. Easyex Mo OFallon, LLC, Appellant.

CELESTINA GAMEZ,

Respondent,

v.

EASYEX MO OFALLON, LLC,

Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ED113623

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County The Honorable Christopher McDonough, Judge EasyEx MO Ofallon, LLC appeals the circuit court's judgment overruling its motion to set aside the default judgment entered against it. EasyEx claims that once it learned of the default judgment, it acted promptly to set it aside. Celestina Gamez filed a motion for attorney's fees on appeal, which was taken with the case. Because EasyEx did not seek to set aside the default judgment within the one-year time limit provided by Rule 74.05(d), the circuit court did not err. The judgment is affirmed. Similarly, because Gamez prevailed on her claims against EasyEx and successfully defended the judgment on appeal, she is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. The case is remanded to the circuit court for determination of reasonable attorney's fees.

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Factual and Procedural Background In November 2023, Gamez filed a petition against EasyEx, her former employer, asserting violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") and Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law. EasyEx's registered agent was served in December 2023. The circuit court conducted a hearing and entered a default judgment against EasyEx on March 8, 2024. The judgment awarded Gamez actual damages, attorney's fees, and pre- judgment interest. One year later, in March 2025, Gamez sought to collect on the judgment. Gamez sent letters to EasyEx's headquarters and its registered agent demanding payment of the judgment. When EasyEx failed to make payment, Gamez instigated garnishment proceedings in April 2025. 1

EasyEx filed a motion to set aside the default judgment on April 18, 2025. Following a hearing on EasyEx's motion, the circuit court entered its judgment overruling the motion to set aside the default judgment. EasyEx appeals. Motion to set aside the default judgment EasyEx claims the circuit court erred by overruling its motion to set aside the default judgment because EasyEx did not have notice of the default judgment until more than one year after entry of the judgment. Pointing to its prompt action upon notice of the judgment, EasyEx argues that it acted within a reasonable time.

1 EasyEx asserts that it did not learn of the default judgment until April 9 when it received the garnishment paperwork and post-judgment discovery requests from Gamez.

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Standard of Review A judgment overruling a Rule 74.05(d) motion to set aside a default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192, 196-97 (Mo. banc 2024). Because there is "a strong preference for deciding cases on the merits" rather than by default, "courts have broader discretion when sustaining a motion to set aside a default judgment than when overruling such a motion." In re Marriage of Callahan, 277 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Mo. banc 2009) (quotation omitted). "[W]hile disposition on the merits is favored, this general policy 'must be carefully applied to the facts of each case in the interest of justice; for, the law defends with equal vigor the integrity of the legal process and procedural rules and, thus, does not sanction the disregard thereof.'" Steele, 688 S.W.3d at 197 (quoting Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Mo. banc 1989)). Analysis Rule 74.05(d) allows a party to set aside a default judgment by filing a motion and demonstrating there are "facts constituting a meritorious defense" and "good cause." Id. Rule 74.05(d) also provides a temporal limitation for filing the motion. The motion must "be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the entry of the default judgment." Id. The moving party's failure "to prove any of these requirements mandates denying the motion to set aside the default judgment." 4021 Iowa, LLC v. K&A Delmar Prop., LLC, 681 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Mo. App. 2023). The plain language of Rule 74.05(d) required EasyEx to file its motion to set aside within one year of the entry of the default judgment. EasyEx did not do so, and as a

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result, the circuit court did not err in overruling the motion to set aside the default judgment. EasyEx argues that Rule 74.05(d)'s one-year limitation should be measured from the date on which the party has notice of the judgment. This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Rule 74.05(d) specifies that the one-year limitation runs from the "entry of the default judgment." The Supreme Court has directed that courts must apply the plain language of a Rule as written, in the same manner courts evaluate statutes. Olofson v. Olofson, 625 S.W.3d 419, 434 (Mo. banc 2021). As a result, Rule 74.05(d) requires a motion to set aside a default judgment to be filed no more than one year from the date the judgment is entered at the absolute latest. Second, when EasyEx was found to be in default, it was no longer entitled to notice of the proceedings or any judgment entered. Irvin v. Palmer, 580 S.W.3d 15, 20 (Mo. App. 2019). Rule 43.01 provides that all parties are entitled to service of documents filed in a lawsuit, except for "parties in default for failure to appear." Rule 74.03 extends that same exception to orders and judgments entered by the court, providing that the court clerk shall immediately provide notice of the entry of an order or judgment by mail to "each party that is not in default for failure to appear and who was not present in court in person or by attorney at the time of the entry of such order or judgment." These principles flow naturally from the court's interest in vigorously defending the integrity of the legal process and procedural rules. When a party is served properly and fails to appear, as is undisputed here, the party faces the consequences of that failure. One such consequence is that the party is charged with notice of all future proceedings,

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including any judgment entered. Irvin, 580 S.W.3d at 20; Rule 74.03. Because EasyEx failed to file its motion within one year from the entry of the default judgment as required by Rule 74.05(d), the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by overruling the motion to set aside. Attorney's fees Gamez filed a motion for attorney's fees on appeal that was taken with the case. The MHRA allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party. Section 213.111.2, RSMo 2020. "A prevailing party is one that succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Wilson v. City of Kansas City, 598 S.W.3d 888, 898 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Kader v. Bd. of Regents of Harris-Stowe Univ., 565 S.W.3d 182, 190 n.7 (Mo. banc 2019)). This includes successfully defending a default judgment entered on MHRA claims. See Harris v. Department of Corrections, 717 S.W.3d 251 (Mo. App. 2025) (entering award of attorney's fees in similar case). Gamez prevailed on her claims that EasyEx violated the MHRA and successfully defended the judgment on appeal. Because Gamez succeeded on a significant issue, she is a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees. Gamez's motion for attorney's fees on appeal is sustained. The circuit court, however, "is better equipped to hear evidence and argument on this issue and determine the reasonableness of the fee requested." Wilson, 598 S.W.3d at 898 (quoting Berry v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Mo. banc 2013)). Accordingly,

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this case is remanded to the circuit court to determine Gamez's reasonable attorney's fees arising from the appeal. Conclusion The circuit court's judgment overruling EasyEx's motion to set aside the default judgment is affirmed. Gamez's motion for attorney's fees on appeal is remanded to the circuit court.

_____________________________________ J OHN P. TORBITZKY, CHIEF JUDGE

James M. Dowd, Judge Brice Sechrest, Special Judge, concur.