Collector of Revenue, et al., Respondents, v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens, Defendant, Roland Hill, Jr., Appellant.

COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, et al.,

Respondents,

v.

PARCELS OF LAND ENCUMBERED WITH DELINQUENT TAX LIENS,

Defendant,

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. ED113445

ROLAND HILL, JR., ) ) Appellant. ) Filed: December 9, 2025 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis The Honorable Patrick E. Richmond, Judge Roland Hill, Jr. ("Appellant") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis ("trial court") confirming a sheriff's sale of a parcel of property located at 4522 Holly Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri 63115 ("the Parcel"). Because Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to section 92.845, 1 we must dismiss this appeal.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016.

2

Factual and Procedural Background In October 2023, the Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis filed a List of Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens which included the Parcel at issue in this case. In January 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure on the Parcel, and Appellant did not appeal this judgment. In October 2024, L.K. ("Purchaser") purchased the Parcel at a sheriff's sale, and he later filed a motion to confirm the sheriff's sale. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion claiming he had an interest in the Parcel and requested that the trial court deny Purchaser's motion to confirm the sheriff's sale. On December 4, 2024, the trial court denied Appellant's motion and entered a judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel. Appellant filed a notice of appeal forty days later, on January 13, 2025. Our Court then issued an order directing Appellant to show cause as to why his appeal should not be dismissed due to his failure to appeal the judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel within twenty days after the date of the judgment as required by section 92.845. 2 After Appellant filed a response and amended response to this Court's order to show cause on July 30-31, 2025, 3 the issue of whether our Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed was ordered taken with the case by this Court. Subsequently, our Court took the case under submission.

2 Section 92.845 is set out in full and examined in detail below in the discussion portion of this opinion. 3 To avoid unnecessary repetition, Appellant's primary assertions in his responses to this Court's order to show cause will be set forth below.

3

Discussion Appellant raises multiple points on appeal arguing the trial court's judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel was erroneous. However, before we can consider the merits of Appellant's points, we must determine whether our Court lacks appellate jurisdiction because Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely filed. General Law and Analysis The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a necessary prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction and a required step for perfecting an appeal. Godfrey v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 688 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). When a notice of appeal is untimely filed, our Court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appellant's appeal. Id. Sections 92.700 to 92.920, 4 referred to as the "the Municipal Land Reutilization Law," govern the foreclosure and resale of property which is delinquent for taxes in the City of St. Louis, such as the Parcel at issue in this case. See S & P Properties, Inc. v. Daly, 330 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010); In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Land Taxes Big Action in REM, 672 S.W.2d 730, 730-31 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984); see also section 92.705. Section 92.845 of the Municipal Land Reutilization Law

4 We note some of the statutes found in sections 92.700 to 92.920 were amended after 2016, and those amendments appear in various RSMo supplements.

4

provides in relevant part: "... appeal[s] from [a] judgment confirming ... [a] sheriff's sale ... must be taken within twenty days after the date of such judgment." 5

In this case, the judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel was dated December 4, 2024. Accordingly, under section 92.845, Appellant's notice of appeal was due no later than twenty days thereafter, on December 24, 2024. See id. However, Appellant did not file his notice of appeal of the judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel until January 13, 2025. Accordingly, Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely under section 92.845. See id. Therefore, our Court does not have appellate jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed. See Collector of Revenue of City of St. Louis v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens, 350 S.W.3d 840, 841-42, 842 n.2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (similarly holding); see also Godfrey, 688 S.W.3d at 102.

5 Section 92.845 provides in full: The collector or any interested person or anyone on behalf of any disabled person as defined in chapter 475 may appeal from the judgment confirming or disapproving the sheriff's sale and the distribution made thereafter; provided, however, no question can be raised upon such appeal that could have been raised upon an appeal from the judgment of foreclosure. Such appeals must be taken within twenty days after the date of such judgment. The necessity for giving bond and the provisions thereof shall be the same as in cases of appeal from a judgment of foreclosure. (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant did not appeal the judgment of foreclosure of the Parcel, and we need not reach the question of whether any of the issues in Appellant's points on appeal could have been raised in an appeal of the judgment of foreclosure under the circumstances of this case because Appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal under section 92.845 is dispositive of this appeal.

5

Appellant's Assertions Regarding the Timeliness of His Notice of Appeal In Appellant's responses to our Court's order to show cause, Appellant primarily makes two assertions regarding the timeliness of his notice of appeal. First, Appellant argues his notice of appeal was timely. Second, and in the alternative, Appellant requests leave to file a late notice of appeal. Appellant's Argument That His Notice of Appeal Was Timely Has No Merit Appellant argues his notice of appeal was timely under Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure 6 and that the timeframe for filing a notice of appeal in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) supersedes the timeframe in section 92.845. Under Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a), the timeframe to file a notice of appeal is forty days from entry of a final judgment where no timely authorized after-trial motion is filed. 7,8

6 All references to Rule 81.05(a)(1) are to the version of the Rule effective from January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2025. All references to Rule 81.04(a) are to the version of the Rule effective from January 1, 2017, to the present. 7 Rule 81.05(a)(1) provides in relevant part that: "... [f]or the purpose of ascertaining the time within which an appeal may be taken[,] ... [a] judgment becomes final at the expiration of thirty days after its entry if no timely authorized after-trial motion is filed." Additionally, Rule 81.04(a) provides in relevant part that: "... [n]o [] appeal shall be effective unless the notice of appeal shall be filed not later than ten days after the judgment ... appealed from becomes final."

8 Whether there is any authorized after-trial motion that may be filed after a court enters a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale of property under the Municipal Land Reutilization Law, which is unique and operates very differently from a traditional civil proceeding, see, e.g., section 92.845, is an issue of first impression which need not be reached in this case because Appellant did not file an after-trial motion after the judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel at issue here.

6

In determining whether the twenty-day timeframe in section 92.845 or the forty-day timeframe in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) governs when ascertaining the timeliness of an appeal from a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale, we are guided by both the Missouri Constitution and principles of statutory interpretation. See section 92.845; Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a). "Article V, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution vests th[e] [Missouri Supreme] Court with the power to 'establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and effect of law.'" Goldsby v. Lombardi, 559 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Mo. banc 2018) (modified on December 4, 2018) (quoting Mo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 5)). However, the Missouri Constitution "... specifically prohibits th[e] [Missouri Supreme] Court from adopting rules that 'change ... the right of appeal.'" Id. "... [T]he right of appeal is purely statutory and when [a] statute[] do[es] not give such right, no right exists." Goldsby, 559 S.W.3d at 881 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, when the legislature has provided a timeframe for an appeal in a statute, that time controls over the timeframe in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; In Interest of T. P. S., 595 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Mo. App. S.D. 1980) (en banc) (similarly holding); see also Grant v. Monsanto, 200 S.W.3d 566, 567 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) ("... failure to comply with [a] statutory time for appeal results in a lapse of ... the right of appeal"). Therefore, we hold the twenty-day timeframe in section 92.845 governs when ascertaining the timeliness of an appeal from a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale, rather than the forty-day timeframe in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a).

7

Our holding is consistent with principles of statutory interpretation, an issue of law subject to de novo review. See Maue v. Fiedler Acres Subdivision, 614 S.W.3d 601, 610 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). "The primary rule in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to the intent, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning." Id. Two principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to the interpretation of section 92.845 in this appeal. See id. (similarly holding with respect to a different statute). First, our Court must read the statute as a whole and give all words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Second, in determining legislative intent, a statute must be read in a manner that can be harmonized with the other statutory provisions in the same chapter. State v. Seymour, 570 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019); see also Executive Board of Missouri Baptist Convention v. Missouri Baptist University, 569 S.W.3d 1, 17-18 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). Section 92.800 of the Municipal Land Reutilization Law applicable to this case states: Except as herein provided, the rules of civil procedure in equity cases, in force at the time when any proceeding is had in the suit, shall be followed in all suits brought pursuant to the provisions of sections 92.700 to 92.920 [, i.e., the Municipal Land Reutilization Law set forth in Chapter 92].

See section 92.800 (emphasis added); see also section 92.705. In other words, considering the words of section 92.800 in their plain and ordinary meaning, the legislature intended that except as provided in the Municipal Land Reutilization Law set forth in Chapter 92, the Rules of Civil Procedure shall be followed in suits brought

8

pursuant to sections 92.700 to 92.920. See section 92.800; Maue, 614 S.W.3d at 610; see also section 92.705. As previously stated, section 92.845 of the Municipal Land Reutilization Law provides a timeframe for filing a notice of appeal in cases, like the one at bar, where an appellant is appealing a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale of property: "... appeal[s] from [a] judgment confirming ... [a] sheriff's sale ... must be taken within twenty days after the date of such judgment." Giving all words in section 92.845 their plain and ordinary meaning and harmonizing this statutory provision with section 92.800, we hold the legislature intended the twenty-day timeframe in section 92.845 to govern when determining the timeliness of an appeal from a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale rather than the forty-day timeframe in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure. See section 92.845; section 92.800; Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a); Maue, 614 S.W.3d at 610; Seymour, 570 S.W.3d at 645; see also Missouri Baptist University, 569 S.W.3d at 17-18. Our holding is consistent with the legislature's intent for a quick resolution of cases in which, like the one at bar, a court enters a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale of property delinquent for taxes in the City of St. Louis. See section 92.835.2 RSMo Cum. Supp. 2023 (providing in relevant part that when "[t]he title to any real estate which shall vest in any purchaser, upon confirmation of such sale by the court, ... the court shall order immediate possession of such real estate be given to such purchaser") (emphasis added); see also Daly, 330 S.W.3d at 132; In re Foreclosure of Liens, 672 S.W.2d at 730-31.

9

In sum, Appellant's argument that the timeframe for filing a notice of appeal in Rules 81.05(a)(1) and 81.04(a) supersedes the timeframe in section 92.845 has no merit. This Court is Unable to Grant Appellant Leave to File a Late Notice of Appeal Appellant also requests our Court grant him leave to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 81.07(a) of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 Rule 81.07(a) allows a party to "... seek a special order of the appropriate appellate court permitting a late filing of the notice of appeal[]" when, inter alia, the party files a "... motion ... within six months from the date the judgment appealed from became final for purposes of appeal ...." 10

9 All references to Rule 81.07(a) are to the version of the Rule effective from January 1, 2007, to the present. 10 Rule 81.07(a) provides in full: When an appeal is permitted by law from a judgment in the trial court, but the time prescribed for filing an ordinary notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court as set forth in Rule 81.04 has expired, a party may seek a special order of the appropriate appellate court permitting a late filing of the notice of appeal. The special order may be allowed by the appellate court only upon motion with notice to the adverse parties filed within six months from the date the judgment appealed from became final for purposes of appeal and only upon a showing by affidavit, or otherwise, that the delay was not due to appellant's culpable negligence. A copy of the judgment from which the appeal is sought shall be attached to any such motion. When notified of the issuance of a special order by the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court in which the judgment was entered shall permit the appellant to file a notice of appeal within ten days after such notification, or such other time as specified in the order, and the appellant shall then proceed to prepare the record on appeal as if the appeal had been allowed without a special order.

10

Assuming for purposes of this opinion only that Rule 81.07(a) applies to an appeal from a judgment confirming a sheriff's sale of property, 11 our Court is unable to grant Appellant leave to file a late notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 81.07(a) because the six-month window for requesting leave provided in the Rule has expired. The judgment confirming the sheriff's sale of the Parcel at issue in this case was dated December 4, 2024, and pursuant to section 92.845, Appellant's notice of appeal was due no later than twenty days thereafter, on December 24, 2024. Six months from December 24, 2024 was June 24, 2025. However, Appellant did not request our Court to grant him leave to file his notice of appeal until over a month later, when he filed his first response to our Court's order to show cause on July 30, 2025. Because the six-month window for requesting leave provided in the Rule 81.07(a) has expired, we are unable to grant Appellant relief under the Rule. See Rule 81.07(a). Conclusion as to the Timeliness of Appellant's Notice of Appeal Based on the foregoing, Appellant's notice of appeal was untimely under section 92.845. See section 92.845. Therefore, our Court does not have appellate jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed. See Collector of Revenue, 350 S.W.3d at 841-42, 842 n.2; see also Godfrey, 688 S.W.3d at 102.

11 Nothing in this opinion should be construed as holding that Rule 81.07(a) applies to appeals from judgments confirming a sheriff's sale of property.

11

Conclusion The appeal is dismissed.

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge Lisa P. Page, Judge and Michael E. Gardner, Judge, concur.