Director, Missouri Department of Revenue vs. George S. Miller

DIRECTOR, MISSOURI ) DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD87937 ) GEORGE S. MILLER, ) Filed: December 16, 2025 ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NODAWAY COUNTY THE HONORABLE COREY K. HERRON, JUDGE

BEFORE DIVISION FOUR: ANTHONY REX GABBERT, CHIEF JUDGE, PRESIDING, LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE, AND KAREN KING MITCHELL, JUDGE

George Miller appeals the circuit court's judgment denying his motion to quash a garnishment filed by the Missouri Department of Revenue ("DOR") to enforce a tax lien. Miller contends the tax lien on which the garnishment was based was unenforceable because it was more than ten years old and had never been refiled. He also argues the tax lien was a judgment and, as such, was unenforceable because it was more than ten years old and had never been revived. For reasons explained herein, we reverse and remand the case to the circuit court with directions to enter a judgment quashing the garnishment.

2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On February 22, 2010, the DOR filed a certificate of tax lien against Miller's real and personal property with the circuit clerk of the Nodaway County Circuit Court. Miller's debt to the DOR was $9,641.47. In 2012 and 2018, the DOR attempted to garnish the funds from Miller's accounts at three different banks but was unsuccessful in collecting any payments on the tax debt. In January 2025, the DOR issued a garnishment application and order to Miller's employer to garnish his wages. At that time, interest and penalties had increased Miller's outstanding debt to $11,120.27. Shortly after the garnishment application and order was served on his employer, Miller moved to quash it, arguing the DOR could no longer collect on the 2010 certificate of tax lien because Section 516.350.1 1 limits collection of a judgment to ten years. In its suggestions in opposition to the motion to quash, the DOR stated that it filed the certificate of tax lien with the clerk of the circuit court under Section 143.902.1(2), which does not have a limitations period, and the tax lien is not a court judgment subject to the ten-year statute of limitations in Section 516.350.1. After hearing arguments on the motion to quash and allowing the parties to file supplemental suggestions, the circuit court entered its judgment in favor of the DOR. The court explained that, while the certificate of tax lien had the full force and effect of a default judgment once it was filed with the circuit clerk pursuant to Section 143.902.1(2), it was not

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016.

3 transformed into a circuit court judgment and, therefore, was not subject to Section 516.350.1's ten-year statute of limitations. Miller appeals. 2

STANDARD OF REVIEW We will affirm a judgment denying a motion to quash a garnishment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. State ex rel. Koster v. Cain, 383 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Mo. App. 2012). ANALYSIS In Point I, Miller contends the circuit court erred in denying his motion to quash because the tax lien on which the garnishment was based was unenforceable. He asserts that,

2 The DOR filed a motion to transfer the appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, alleging the case involves the construction of revenue laws of this state and, as such, falls under the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. The Supreme Court, however, has previously determined it did not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over an appeal raising a similar issue. After the circuit court dismissed their petition for a declaration that a tax lien filed against them pursuant to Section 143.902.1(2) was barred by Section 516.120(2)'s five-year statute of limitations for civil actions, the plaintiffs in Kohn v. Missouri Department of Revenue, 565 S.W.3d 716 (Mo. App. 2018), filed their appeal in the Supreme Court. The DOR filed a motion to transfer the appeal to this court, arguing the case did not fall within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction because: (1) the case was directly and primarily about the scope of the statute of limitations; (2) Section 143.902.1(2) is a tax collection provision that does not fit within the Court's definition of a "revenue law" as stated in Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 989 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Mo. banc 1997); and (3) Section 516.120(2) is a general statute of limitations law, not a revenue law. The Supreme Court transferred the case to us, finding jurisdiction was properly vested in this court. Kohn, 565 S.W.3d at 719 n.3. Because we find no basis to distinguish Kohn from this case on the issue of appellate jurisdiction, we deny the DOR's transfer motion.

4 pursuant to Section 143.902, 3 the February 22, 2010 tax lien expired on February 22, 2020, and, because the lien was not refiled, it could not be enforced after that time. Resolution of this point requires us to interpret Section 143.902. "The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent, which is most clearly evidenced by the plain text of the statute." Weeks v. St. Louis Cty., 696 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Mo. banc 2024) (citation omitted). When the legislature's intent is clear and unambiguous, then we are "bound by that intent and cannot resort to any statutory construction in interpreting the statute." Id. (citation omitted). In determining legislative intent, we do not read a portion of a statute in isolation but instead read it in the context of the entire statute, "harmonizing all provisions." Aquila Foreign Qualifications Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 362 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. banc 2012). Section 143.902 is an income tax enforcement provision. Section 143.902.1 states that, when an assessment of tax, interest, additions to tax, or a penalty has been made and become final, the DOR may file a certificate of tax lien in the recorder's office of any county in which the taxpayer owns property. Section 143.902.1(1) provides that the lien attaches to real or personal property or the interest in real or personal property owned by the taxpayer and expires ten years after the certificate of tax lien was filed in the recorder's office, unless the DOR has refiled the lien within the original ten-year period.

3 In his brief, Miller cites both Section 143.902.1(1) and Section 144.380.1(1) as authority for his contention that the tax lien is unenforceable. Section 144.380 pertains to the collection of sales tax and provides the same remedies as Section 143.902. The tax lien the DOR filed against Miller's property clearly states that it was filed pursuant to Section 143.902, hence, that is the operative statute in this case.

5 Here, the certificate of tax lien indicates the DOR filed it in the recorder of deeds office of Nodaway County. However, the DOR also filed the certificate of lien in the office of the circuit clerk of Nodaway County. Section 143.902.1(2), in pertinent part, sets out this remedy: If any taxpayer fails to pay any tax, interest, additions to tax or penalties imposed by this chapter when due and the assessment for which has become final, the director may file for record in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of any county in which the taxpayer resides, or has a place of business, or owns property, the certificate of lien specifying the amount of the tax, interest, additions to tax and penalties due and the name of the liable taxpayer. The clerk of the circuit court shall file such certificate and enter it in the record of the circuit court for judgments and decrees under the procedure prescribed for filing transcripts of judgments. . . . From the time of the filing of the certificate of lien or certificate of delinquency with the clerk of the circuit court, the amount of the tax, interest, additions to tax and penalties specified therein shall have the full force and effect of a default judgment of the circuit court until satisfied. Execution shall issue at the request of the director of revenue or his agent as is provided in the case of other judgments.

(Emphasis added.) Unlike the certificate of tax lien filed in the recorder's office under Section 143.902.1(1), once the certificate of tax lien is filed with the clerk of the circuit court under Section 143.902.1(2), it has "the full force and effect of a default judgment of the circuit court until satisfied." Section 143.902.1(2) does not refer back to Section 143.902.1(1). Additionally, Section 143.902.1(3) is clear that Section 143.902.1(1) and Section 143.902.1(2) contain two distinct remedies: The remedies in this subsection are cumulative and in addition to other collection methods given the director of revenue. No action taken shall be construed as an election on the part of the state or any of its officers to pursue any remedy or action hereunder to the exclusion of any other remedy or action for which provision is made.

6 (Emphasis added.) Thus, Section 143.902.1(2) is not governed by Section 143.902.1(1)'s ten-year statute of limitations. Instead, a certificate of tax lien filed with the clerk of the circuit court under Section 143.902.1(2) "shall have the full force and effect of a default judgment of the circuit court until satisfied." Additionally, execution on the certificate of tax lien is to issue "as is provided in the case of other judgments." Section 143.902.1(2). This does not transform the certificate of tax lien into a circuit court judgment but merely allows the tax lien to be enforced using the statutory mechanisms prescribed for the enforcement of judgments. See State ex rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 91 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Mo. banc 2002); Henry v. Manzella, 201 S.W.2d 457, 460-61 (Mo. banc 1947). The certificate of tax lien "derives the qualities of a circuit court judgment, but it does so only to the extent necessary to permit its enforcement by the court." Hilburn, 91 S.W.3d at 610. Section 143.902.1(2)'s language expresses the legislature's clear intent that certificate of tax liens are to be enforced and executed like a circuit court judgment. Thus, the certificate of tax lien against Miller, filed with the clerk of the circuit court on February 22, 2010, is to be treated like a circuit court default judgment for purposes of enforcement and execution. The dispositive issue, then, is how a default judgment entered on that same date would be enforced and executed. The legislature addresses the enforcement and execution of judgments in Section 516.350.1. Section 516.350.1 provides, in pertinent part: Every judgment, order or decree of any court of record of the United States, . . . which mandates the making of payments over a period of time or payments in the future, shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten

7 years from the date of the original rendition thereof, or if the same has been revived upon personal service duly had upon the defendant or defendants therein, then after ten years from and after such revival, or in case a payment has been made on such judgment, order or decree, and duly entered upon the record thereof, after the expiration of ten years from the last payment so made, and after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition or revival upon personal service, or from the date of the last payment, such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no execution, order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever.

Pursuant to this statute, judgments for the payment of money are "presumed to be paid and satisfied" after ten years unless the judgment has been revived or a payment was made on the judgment. § 516.350.1. Without a revival of the judgment or a payment on the judgment, "no execution, order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever." Id. Treating the certificate of tax lien against Miller like a circuit court's default judgment under Section 516.350.1 for purposes of enforcement and execution, the DOR did not revive the certificate of tax lien before February 22, 2020. Likewise, Miller never made a payment on the certificate of tax lien. Hence, the certificate of tax lien was presumed to be paid and "satisfied" – the same term used in Section 143.902.1(2) – on February 22, 2020. Consistent with Section 143.902.1(2)'s mandate that execution be "as is provided in the case of other judgments," the DOR could not execute a garnishment on the certificate of tax lien after February 22, 2020. Any argument that the statute of limitations in Section 516.350.1 does not apply to a certificate of tax lien is contrary to the legislature's expressed intent in Section 143.902.1(2) that, once filed with the clerk of the circuit court, the certificate is to be treated like a circuit

8 court judgment for purposes of enforcement and execution. A statute of limitations is a matter of enforcement and execution. There is no language in Section 143.902.1(2) exempting a certificate of tax lien from statutes of limitations pertaining to judgments. 4 To write such an exemption into Section 143.902.1(2) would not only violate the rules of statutory construction, but it would essentially allow the DOR all of the benefits of treating the certificate of tax lien like a judgment without imposing upon it any of the responsibility necessary to ensure the certificate of tax lien's continued enforcement after ten years. The DOR argues Section 516.350.1's statute of limitations applicable to judgments cannot be applied to a certificate of tax lien filed under Section 143.902.1(2) because doing so violates Article III, Section 39(5), of the Missouri Constitution, which provides: The general assembly shall not have power:

(5) To release or extinguish or to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, without consideration, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or individual due this state or any county or municipal corporation[.]

4 Our determination that the statutes of limitations in Sections 516.350.1 and 513.020 apply to a certificate of tax lien filed with the clerk of the circuit court under Section 143.902.1(2) is consistent with a footnote in our opinion in Kohn v. Missouri Department of Revenue, 565 S.W.3d 716, 721 n.6 (Mo. App. 2018). The issue in Kohn was whether a certificate of tax lien filed pursuant to Section 143.902.1(2) was a "civil action" subject to Section 516.120(2)'s five-year statute of limitations. Id. at 720-23. After finding it was not, we stated in a footnote, "Although a judgment does not expire, there is a time limitation on its enforcement." Id. at 721 n.6. We then quoted the ten-year statute of limitations in Section 516.350.1 and Section 513.020, which provides, "Executions may issue upon a judgment at any time within ten years after the rendition of such judgment." Id. We recognize this footnote from Kohn is dicta because it is not essential to the court's decision; therefore, it is not binding precedent. Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Mo. App. 2003). Nevertheless, "dicta can be persuasive when supported by logic." Id. Because the dicta in Kohn is supported by a logical interpretation of the statutes, we find it persuasive.

9 Because Section 516.350.1 presumes the judgment is paid and extinguishes any right to execute on the judgment after ten years if it was not revived, the DOR contends applying Section 516.350.1's statute of limitations to a certificate of tax lien constitutes the legislature's extinguishment of a public debt in violation of Article III, Section 39(5). While the application of Section 516.350.1's statute of limitations extinguishes the DOR's right to execute on the certificate of tax lien like a judgment, it does not extinguish Miller's tax debt. Instead, Section 516.350.1 precludes the DOR from continuing to use Section 143.902.1(2) as a remedy to collect the debt after ten years unless the certificate of tax lien was revived like a judgment, just as Section 143.902.1(1) precludes the DOR from continuing to use that provision as a remedy to collect the debt after ten years unless the certificate of tax lien was refiled in the recorder's office. Section 516.350.1 does not, and cannot, preclude the DOR from using any other remedies to collect Miller's tax debt. As stated supra, Section 143.902.1(3) provides that the remedies in Section 143.902.1(1) and 143.902.1(2) are cumulative and in addition to other remedies, and "[n]o action taken shall be construed as an election on the part of the state or any of its officers to pursue any remedy or action hereunder to the exclusion of any other remedy or action for which provision is made." Indeed, the DOR acknowledged in its suggestions in opposition to Miller's motion to quash that, "[u]nlike money judgments obtained by private parties, the collection of delinquent taxes is not solely reliant upon the certificate of tax lien as its basis for collection," and there are other remedies available to the DOR. Because the DOR did not revive the certificate of tax lien in this case within ten years after filing it with the clerk of the circuit court, Section 516.350.1 barred the DOR from

10 enforcing and executing the certificate of tax lien like a judgment under Section 143.902.1(2). Therefore, the circuit court erred in denying Miller's motion to quash the garnishment. Point I is granted. Having found in favor of Miller on Point I, we need not address his claim in Point II that Rules 74.08 and 74.09 require the garnishment to be quashed. CONCLUSION The judgment denying the motion to quash the garnishment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a judgment quashing the garnishment. _____________________________ LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE All Concur.