Gregory Steins vs. Missouri Department of Agriculture

GREGORY STIENS, ) ) Appellant, ) v. ) WD87634 ) ) OPINION FILED: MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF ) October 28, 2025 AGRICULTURE, ) ) Respondent. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Nodaway County, Missouri The Honorable Joel Miller, Judge Before Division One: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge, and Karen King Mitchell, Judge Gregory Stiens, acting pro se, appeals a Nodaway County Circuit Court judgment affirming the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) to deny Stiens interest on back pay owed to him by the Missouri Department of Agriculture (MDA). On appeal, Stiens argues that the AHC should have awarded him interest because: (1) the back-pay award constituted liquidated damages, entitling him to nine percent interest under § 408.020; 1 (2) a prior circuit court judgment directing the AHC to award Stiens

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Cum. Supp. 2016, unless otherwise noted.

2 back pay "with interest at the statutory rate" was the law of the case; and (3) MDA waived or is estopped from contesting the award of interest because MDA did not appeal the circuit court's judgment awarding interest. 2 Finding no error, we affirm. Background 3

Stiens was employed by MDA for seventeen years. Following an unsatisfactory performance evaluation in 2016, Stiens was suspended for violating MDA policy and was given a detailed list of expectations to be met during a probationary period of conditional employment. By letter dated March 8, 2017, MDA's Human Resources (HR) director terminated Stiens for misconduct and violating the terms of his conditional employment. On April 3, 2017, Stiens filed, pursuant to §§ 36.390.5 and 621.075, 4 a pro se complaint with the AHC challenging his termination as well as the HR director's legal authority to terminate him. The MDA and Stiens both moved for summary decision; the

2 In his opening brief, Stiens designates these three arguments as Points II-IV, respectively. His Point I addresses this court's jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Our initial review of Stiens's notice of appeal raised a question as to whether the appeal was timely filed and, thus, whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Ort v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 138 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) ("Our jurisdiction depends upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal."). We directed the parties to address this issue in their briefing. Stiens designated his reply to the issue as Point I in his opening brief. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we conclude that the appeal was timely filed and, thus, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 3 Unless otherwise noted, we incorporate the factual and procedural background from our prior opinions in Stiens v. Missouri Department of Agriculture, 587 S.W.3d 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) and Stiens v. Missouri Department of Agriculture, 653 S.W.3d 138 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022), without further attribution. 4 In pertinent part, both §§ 36.390.5 and 621.075 allow certain employees who are dismissed for cause to appeal in writing to the AHC within thirty days after the effective date of their dismissal.

3 AHC granted MDA's motion and denied Stiens's corresponding motion. On May 15, 2018, Stiens filed a pro se petition for judicial review of the AHC's decision. On October 9, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment affirming the AHC's decision sustaining Stiens's termination. Stiens appealed the circuit court's judgment to this court, asserting, among other things, that genuine issues of fact precluded a summary decision in favor of MDA on the issue of his termination and that the HR director lacked legal authority to terminate him. While we found no dispute as to any material facts pertaining to whether Stiens was subject to termination, we concluded that, as of March 8, 2017, the HR director lacked statutory or delegated termination authority. Stiens v. Mo. Dep't of Agric., 587 S.W.3d 666, 674 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (Stiens I). Accordingly, we remanded the case to the AHC to determine the effective date of Stiens's termination, a date that could not have occurred later than the date the MDA director, who had statutory termination authority, opposed Stiens's administrative appeal. Id. On remand, the AHC conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that the first date upon which the MDA director opposed Stiens's administrative appeal of his termination was April 19, 2017, when the AHC held a pre-hearing conference on Stiens's original administrative appeal and Stiens learned that his complaint would be challenged by the MDA director. Neither party offered evidence of any other attempted termination communication to Stiens between March 8, 2017 (the date of the HR director's letter), and April 19, 2017 (the date of the pre-hearing conference before the AHC). Nonetheless, in a decision issued January 11, 2021, the AHC again concluded that the

4 effective date of Stiens's termination was March 8, 2017, and, therefore, he was not entitled to back pay. Stiens sought judicial review of the AHC's January 11, 2021 decision, arguing, in part, that the decision had exceeded the scope of our remand instructions in Stiens I. MDA did not file a responsive pleading. Stiens then filed a motion for default judgment, an d MDA filed suggestions in opposition. Following oral argument, the circuit court entered an order denying Stiens's motion for default judgment, noting that a responsive pleading to Stiens's petition for judicial review was not required. Stiens again appealed to this court, claiming that the AHC erred in finding the effective date of his termination was March 8, 2017. We determined that the circuit court's order denying the motion for default judgment was not a final judgment disposing of all pending issues between the parties, and we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Stiens v. Mo. Dep't of Agric., 653 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (Stiens II). On December 29, 2022, the circuit court entered an order and judgment determining that the AHC had erred in calculating the effective date of Stiens's termination, which the court determined was April 19, 2017. Accordingly, the court held that Stiens was entitled to "back wages and foregone fringe benefits including but not limited to the employer's contribution to social security and the reasonable value of insurance benefits from the date of March 8, 2017, to April 19, 2017, with interest at the statutory rate until this judgment is satisfied." The court reversed the AHC's decision and remanded the case to the AHC.

5 On remand to the AHC, both parties moved for summary decision on the issue of whether Stiens was entitled to interest on his back-pay award and, if so, in what amount. Stiens argued that he was entitled to interest and, under § 408.020, the appropriate rate was nine percent which equaled $1.475 per day. MDA asserted that, in hearing Stiens's administrative appeal of his termination, the AHC was acting under §§ 36.390 and 621.075. And, as this court previously held in Gan v. Schrock, 640 S.W.3d 451, 460 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022), those sections do not authorize the AHC to award interest. The AHC agreed with MDA and determined that the AHC could not, as a matter of law, award Stiens interest on his back pay. The AHC ruled that Stiens was entitled to $5,983.01 in back pay for the period March 8 to April 19, 2017, but was not entitled to interest on that amount. Stiens appealed the AHC's denial of interest on his back-pay award to the circuit court. 5 On August 28, 2024, the court entered judgment finding that the AHC correctly awarded Stiens $5,983.01 in back pay with zero (0) percent interest. In so ruling, the court noted that, when it issued its December 29, 2022 decision remanding the case to the AHC, the court "did not believe that a specific statute other than those governing this proceeding would apply." The court then stated the proceedings "arose from an appeal of a state agency's termination decision under Section 36.390 and Section 621.075, RSMo." And, because "other statutes setting interest rates are irrelevant" to an action under §§

5 Stiens did not appeal the amount of his back-pay award.

6 36.390 and 621.075, the court held that the AHC did not err in determining that Stiens was not entitled to interest because the AHC lacked authority to award interest. On September 10, 2024, Stiens filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the circuit court erred when it upheld the AHC's denial of interest. On November 6, 2024, Stiens requested a hearing on his motion, a request the court denied two days later by docket entry stating: [Stiens's] request for a hearing is denied. "[Stiens's] Motion for Reconsideration" filed September 10, 2024 has no legal effect, because no Missouri rule provides for such a motion. Thus, holding a hearing on it would serve no purpose. Judgment became final September 29, 2024 (30 days after judgment on August 28, 2024), and this Court lost jurisdiction thereafter. Clerk, please send a copy of this docket entry to [the] parties. So ordered. This appeal, filed November 15, 2024, follows. 6

6 At our request, both parties included in their briefs a discussion of whether Stiens's appeal was timely filed. The answer depends on whether his Motion for Reconsideration is properly considered an "authorized after-trial motion" that would extend the time before the Court's August 28, 2024 judgment became final and an appeal would be due, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 81.05(a)(2) (2024). The parties agree that Stiens's Motion for Reconsideration was an authorized after-trial motion and, thus, his appeal was timely filed. Based on our review of Stiens's Motion for Reconsideration and relevant case law, we agree. "[A] motion to reconsider operates as a motion for a new trial in a court-tried case, and is therefore an authorized after-trial motion." Ort, 138 S.W.3d at 779 (holding plaintiffs' motion to reconsider partial denial of petition for attorney's fees operated as an authorized after-trial motion for new trial); see also Coffer v. Wasson-Hunt, 281 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. banc 2009) (finding a motion for reconsideration alleging factual and legal errors in the circuit court's judgment qualified as a motion for new trial and, thus, was an authorized after-trial motion for purposes of Rule 81.05(a)). Accordingly, Stiens's appeal was timely filed and we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal.

7 Standard of Review "On appeal from the circuit court's review of an agency decision, [we] review[] the action of the agency, not the action of the circuit court." Stiens I, 587 S.W.3d at 670 (quoting State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Trueblood, 368 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). "[W]e must consider whether the AHC decision was unsupported by competent and substantial evidence based upon a review of the whole record, was unauthorized by law, was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or involved an abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting St. Charles Cnty. Ambulance Dist., Inc. v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 248 S.W.3d 52, 53 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). "We review the AHC's conclusions on the interpretation and application of the law . . . de novo." Schrock v. Gan, 563 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting Cash v. Mo. Dep't of Revenue, 461 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)). Analysis On appeal, Stiens argues that the AHC should have awarded him interest because (1) the back-pay award constituted liquidated damages, entitling him to nine percent interest under § 408.020; (2) the circuit court's December 29, 2022 order and judgment directing the AHC to award Stiens back pay "with interest at the statutory rate" was the law of the case; 7 and (3) MDA waived or is estopped from contesting the award of

7 Although it is not entirely clear from his briefing, it appears that Stiens seeks both pre- and post-judgment interest. We interpret the circuit court's order and judgment as referring to statutorily authorized post-judgment interest only and not to pre-judgment interest.

8 interest because MDA did not appeal the circuit court's order and judgment. Because all of these arguments raise essentially the same issue, we address them together. The crux of Stiens's argument on appeal is that the circuit court's December 29, 2022 order and judgment entitled him to back pay from March 8 to April 19, 2017, "with interest at the statutory rate until this judgment is satisfied" and § 408.020 sets a default interest rate when no other rate is agreed upon. In relevant part, § 408.020 states, "Creditors shall be allowed to receive interest at the rate of nine percent per annum, when no other rate is agreed upon, for all moneys after they become due and payable, on written contracts, and on accounts after they become due and demand of payment is made." 8 Although not cited by Stiens, § 408.040.2 is also relevant here. That statute states, In all nontort actions, interest shall be allowed on all money due upon any judgment or order of any court from the date judgment is entered by the trial court until satisfaction be made by payment, accord or sale of property; all such judgments and orders for money upon contracts bearing more than nine percent interest shall bear the same interest borne by such contracts, and all other judgments and orders for money shall bear nine percent per annum until satisfaction made as aforesaid. In arguing that Chapter 408 entitles him to interest on his back-pay award, Stiens ignores the procedural history of this case. The present appeal stems from Stiens's complaint filed with the AHC under § 36.390, challenging his termination. After two

8 As used in § 408.020, the term "account" "is not limited to its traditional meaning. The term is considered equivalent to a 'claim' or 'demand.'" Children Int'l v. Ammon Painting Co., 215 S.W.3d 194, 202 n.11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (quoting Chouteau Auto Mart, Inc. v. First Bank of Mo., 148 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)).

9 prior appeals to this court, he now challenges the AHC's decision to deny him interest. But, as we held in Gan, no statute empowers the AHC to award interest. Like the present case, Gan involved an action brought under the State Personnel Law, § 36.010 et seq., governing employment of State employees. 640 S.W.3d at 454 n.1. Among other relief, Gan sought pre-and post-judgment interest on back pay awarded to him following reinstatement to his job with the Missouri Department of Social Services after improper dismissal. Id. at 460. As we explained in Gan, "because the AHC is a creature of statute, its authority is limited by the legislature." Id. Similarly, on the issue of interest, "[a]n allowance of interest must be based upon either a statute or a contract, express or implied." Id. (quoting In re Estate of Young, 185 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006)). Thus, in order for the AHC to award interest, there must be a statute authorizing the AHC to do so. In Gan, we concluded that, "because § 621.075 does not expressly allow for an award of interest, the AHC did not err in refusing to award either pre- or post-judgment interest on Gan's back-pay award." Id. The same result applies here. "[W]e cannot read authority to award interest into [a] statute where the statute, itself, provides for none." Id.; see State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., Inc., 254 S.W.3d 31, 37 (Mo. banc 2008) (noting that "the legislature's failure to provide for prejudgment interest in the statute authorizing [relief] indicated the legislature's intent that interest not be available"); Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697, 705 (Mo. banc 2008) ("This Court will not read into the statute an additional recovery of prejudgment interest.").

10 Stiens contends that Gan is distinguishable because, unlike Gan, Stiens was not a merit employee. But the version of § 36.390.6 9 in effect when Stiens was terminated allowed nonmerit agencies, like MDA, to adopt the AHC's appeal procedures, which MDA did. Sections 36.390.5 and .6 established both Stiens's right to appeal his dismissal to the AHC and, in concert with § 621.075, the AHC's authority to hear and decide the appeal and award back pay. Thus, Stiens's appeal of his termination is based on the same statutory provisions as those at issue in Gan. 10

Likewise, we reject Stiens's remaining arguments that he is entitled to interest because (1) the circuit court's December 29, 2022 order and judgment directing the AHC to award him back pay "with interest at the statutory rate" was the law of the case and (2) MDA waived or is estopped from contesting the award of interest because MDA did not appeal that order and judgment. The circuit court did not award Stiens interest. The court simply said that he would be entitled to interest if it were statutorily authorized in this case, which we conclude it is not. MDA's decision not to appeal the circuit court's judgment has no bearing on the issue at hand—whether the AHC is empowered to award interest on back pay.

9 The relevant version of § 36.390.6 stated, "The provisions for appeals provided in subsection 5 of this section for dismissals of regular merit employees may be adopted by nonmerit agencies of the state for any or all employees of such agencies."

10 To be clear, Gan did not expressly mention §§ 408.020 or 408.040, but, in Gan, we concluded that other statutes setting interest rates are irrelevant to an action under §§ 36.390 and 621.075, which includes Stiens's appeal of his termination to the AHC. See Gan v. Schrock, 640 S.W.3d 451, 460 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022).

11 We also reject Stiens's estoppel and waiver arguments. "[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is rarely applied in cases involving a governmental entity, and then only to avoid manifest injustice." MO CANN Do, Inc. v. Mo. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 686 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting Lynn v. Dir. of Revenue, 689 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Mo. banc 1985)). To support a claim of estoppel, "the governmental conduct complained of must amount to affirmative misconduct." Id. (citation omitted). Because the circuit court's December 29, 2022 judgment did not award interest to Stiens, MDA's failure to appeal that judgment cannot estop it from now challenging Stiens's right to interest. The same is true for Stiens's waiver claim: MDA did not waive its right to challenge an award of interest by failing to appeal a ruling which did not award interest. Points II-IV are denied. Conclusion Because the AHC lacked statutory authority to award interest to Stiens on the back pay MDA owed to him, the AHC did not err in declining to award interest. The judgment of the circuit court affirming the AHC's decision is affirmed.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Alok Ahuja, Judge, concur.

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