IN THE ESTATE OF: IRENE LAMBUR a/k/a VERNA IRENE LAMBUR, Deceased, JOYCE BAXTER, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Irene Lambur, and RUTH BECKER, ROLAND PAYNE, and JOHN PAYNE, Petitioners-Respondents v ANNA STIDHAM and MATT STIDHAM, Respondents-Appellants

IN THE ESTATE OF:

IRENE LAMBUR a/k/a VERNA IRENE LAMBUR, Deceased,

JOYCE BAXTER, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Irene Lambur, and RUTH BECKER, ROLAND PAYNE, and JOHN PAYNE,

Petitioners-Respondents, v.

ANNA STIDHAM and MATT STIDHAM,

Respondents-Appellants.

No. SD39143

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RIPLEY COUNTY Honorable Harvey S. Allen, Special Judge REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Anna and Matt Stidham, husband and wife (hereinafter referred to collectively as the Stidhams and individually by their given names), appeal from an order reviving a judgment entered against them and in favor of petitioners Joyce Baxter, personal

In Division

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representative of her decedent sister's estate, and other of decedent's siblings (collectively Petitioners). 1 The Stidhams present two points on appeal. In Point 1, the Stidhams contend the trial court erred by reviving the judgment against Anna. They argue that the motion to revive the judgment against Anna was untimely because it was filed more than ten years after entry of the judgment against her. In Point 2, the Stidhams argue that the trial court erred by reviving the judgment against both of them because the show cause orders were entered by a judge who was not assigned to the case. With respect to Point 1, we agree that the motion to revive was untimely as to Anna. Point 1 is granted. With respect to Point 2, this issue is not preserved for appellate review, as it was never presented to, and decided by, the trial court. We deny Point 2. Therefore, we reverse the order of revival as to Anna and affirm the order of revival as to Matt. We remand with directions for the trial court to enter an amended order reviving the judgment as to Matt only. Factual and Procedural Background In recounting the background, we borrow from this Court's prior opinions in the following cases: In re Estate of Lambur v. Stidham, 317 S.W.3d 616 (Mo. App. 2010) (Lambur I); and In re Estate of Lambur v. Stidham, 397 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. App. 2013) (Lambur II). During the time period relevant to this appeal, Irene Lambur (Lambur) suffered from health problems that prevented her from caring for herself and living independently in her home. Lambur was not married and had no children. She contacted Anna, the wife of her

1 We refer to the Stidhams individually by given names for purposes of clarity. No familiarity or disrespect is intended.

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nephew, Matt, for advice regarding her situation. Anna contacted an attorney, who ultimately drafted a Power of Attorney that Lambur executed on February 16, 2005, granting Anna and Jackie Johnson (Johnson) the authority to make certain decisions on Lambur's behalf. Lambur I, 317 S.W.3d at 617. Pursuant to Lambur's Power of Attorney, Anna and Johnson opened two bank accounts, which they co-owned with Lambur. Both accounts included rights of survivorship. Id. at 618. On May 18, 2005, Lambur died intestate. At the time of her death, the combined value of the accounts co-owned with Anna and Johnson was $129,134.46. Anna subsequently withdrew all the money and closed the joint accounts. She proceeded to dispose of the sum entirely, with the majority of the money being used to purchase various personal items and repay debt. Id. On June 30, 2005, Lambur's sister, Joyce Baxter, was appointed personal representative of Lambur's estate. On April 3, 2006, Petitioners filed a Petition for Discovery of Assets against the Stidhams. The petition requested that the trial court determine the title and right of possession to the proceeds of the two jointly owned bank accounts. Id. Following a jury trial that resulted in a mistrial, the trial court granted Petitioners' "Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law[.]" Id. On June 26, 2009, the court entered its judgment against the Stidhams in the amount of $118,134.46. Id. at 620. The Stidhams appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 621.

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After remand, the trial court, the Honorable William Clarkson, entered a summary judgment on February 17, 2012, against the Stidhams. The judgment against the Stidhams was for the same amount, plus post-judgment interest. The Stidhams appealed again. Lambur II, 397 S.W.3d at 56. In the second appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to Anna, and we vacated the summary judgment as to Matt and remanded for further proceedings against him. Id. at 69. Our mandate stated: On this day, the Court, being sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises, does consider and adjudge that the part of the judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Ripley County granting summary judgment as to Matt Stidham is reversed and said cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Ripley County for further proceedings against Matt Stidham. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

On July 28, 2014, a jury trial was held regarding the claims against Matt. The jury returned a verdict against Matt in the amount of $78,000. On August 13, 2014, the trial court, the Honorable Harvey Allen, entered a judgment which, in relevant part, stated as follows: Respondents Matt Stidham and Anna Stidham are jointly and severally liable to Petitioners on their Petition for Discovery of Assets for the principal sum of this Judgment up to $78,000, plus interest at the statutory rate of 9% per annum from and after May 25, 2005.

The Court reaffirms the grant of Summary Judgment entered on June 26, 2009 against Anna Stidham and enters Judgment in favor of Petitioners and against Respondent Anna Stidham in the amount of $118,134.46. It is further the Judgment of this court that Anna Stidham is solely responsible for the balance of this Judgment rendered against her in the amount of $118,134.46 in excess of the $78,000 awarded in favor of Petitioners and against [the Stidhams] jointly and severally herein, which totals the principal sum of $40,134.46, plus interest at the statutory rate of 9% per annum from and after May 25, 2005.

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This Judgment is to be a final Judgment, superseding and supplanting any and all prior Judgments entered by the Court.

No payments duly entered on the record were made by either of the Stidhams. On June 7, 2024, Petitioners filed a motion to revive the judgment against the Stidhams. On June 11, 2024, the Honorable John Shock entered show cause orders against Anna and Matt. Matt did not file an objection to the show cause order. Anna did so, but the only issue raised in her objection was that the motion to revive was untimely as to her. On August 1, 2025, Judge Allen overruled Anna's objection to the motion to revive. In doing so, the judge stated: On August 4, 2014, this Judge signed the Judgment of the jury against Matt Stidham, declaring the extent to which [the Stidhams] were jointly and severally liable, reaffirming the grant of Summary Judgment against Anna Stidham, and declaring the Judgment then entered by this Judge to be a "... final Judgment, superseding and supplanting any and all prior Judgments entered by the Court." In its Order filed September 29, 2014, denying the motion of Matt Stidham for a new trial, the Court found that the Judgment previously entered by the former judge "... did not dispose of all issues against all parties and consequently said Judgment was interlocutory in nature and Anna Stidham is still a party to this action." Further, this Court found that Anna Stidham was married to Matt Stidham and continued to have " ... an interest in the outcome of the litigation at issue against her husband." ....

The Court finds that the Court of Appeals affirming the original judgment as to Anna Stidham did not conclude her continuing legal and financial interest in the remaining claims of the case and the issue of joint and several liability of herself with the remaining party, her husband.

Therefore, the Court finds that the final judgment was entered as to [the Stidhams] by this Court on August 4, 2014, and filed on August 13, 2014. Petitioner's Motion to Revive Judgment, which was filed on June 7, 2024, was timely filed.

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On August 11, 2025, Judge Allen entered an order reviving the judgment against the Stidhams. The Stidhams filed their notice of appeal on August 18, 2025. Standard of Review The only issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly applied the law governing motions to revive a judgment. This is an issue of law, which we review de novo. Crockett v. Polen, 225 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Mo. banc 2007). Discussion and Decision We first consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. A party is permitted to appeal from "any special order after final judgment in the cause[.]" § 512.020(5). 2 A circuit court's order regarding revival of a judgment is appealable as a "special order after judgment" pursuant to § 512.020(5). See Unifund CCR Partners Assignee of Citibank v. Abright, 566 S.W.3d 594, 594 n.2 (Mo. banc 2019); J & M Securities, LLC v. Benner, 717 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Mo. App. 2025); Unifund CCR Partners v. Cobbins, 637 S.W.3d 372, 374 n.3 (Mo. App. 2021). The order reviving the judgment was final upon entry, and the Stidhams appealed within 10 days as required by Rule 81.04(a). See Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cnty. Plan. Comm'n, 660 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Mo. App. 2023). Point 1 In Point 1, the Stidhams contend the trial court erred by reviving the judgment against Anna because the motion to revive was untimely. We agree.

2 All statutory references are to RSMo (2016). All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2024).

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We begin by noting that "[e]very judgment, order or decree ... shall be presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition thereof[.]" § 516.350.1. A judgment is rendered when entered. Rule 74.01(a). "A judgment is entered when a writing signed by the judge and denominated 'judgment' or 'decree' is filed." Id. "A judgment may be revived by order of the court ... within ten years after entry of the judgment, the last payment of record, or the last prior revival of the judgment." Rule 74.09. A document denominated "Order and Judgment" was both signed by the trial court, Judge Clarkson, and filed on February 17, 2012. Therefore, that is the date of the original rendition of the judgment. See § 516.350.1. Because the motion to revive was not filed until June 7, 2024, it was untimely as to Anna. Id.; Rule 74.09(a). We reject as incorrect the trial court's rationale that this judgment against Anna was interlocutory and capable of being amended until August 13, 2014. The 2012 judgment was final because it disposed of all claims against both Anna and Matt. See § 512.020(5) (authorizing an appeal from a final judgment which resolves all claims against all parties); State ex rel. Henderson v. Asel, 566 S.W.3d 596, 598-99 (Mo. banc 2019) (recognizing the same principle). Had that not been the case, this Court would have had no jurisdiction over the prior appeal. See Barnett v. Forster, 687 S.W.3d 21, 24-25 (Mo. App. 2024) (an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an appeal of an interlocutory order that does not resolve all claims and lacks a proper Rule 74.01(b) certification). The trial court's stated rationale ignores jurisdictional limits on its authority, as well as law-of-the-case considerations. We consider each in turn.

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First, after entry of the judgment against the Stidhams on February 17, 2012, no party filed any after-trial motions. A trial court retains jurisdiction for 30 days after entry of a final judgment. Rule 75.01. The trial court is then "divested of jurisdiction unless a party timely files an authorized after-trial motion." Spicer v. Donald N. Spicer Revocable Living Trust, 336 S.W.3d 466, 468-69 (Mo. banc 2011). "Following divestiture, any attempt by the trial court to continue to exhibit authority over the case, whether by amending the judgment or entering subsequent judgments, is void." Id. at 469. Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction in 2014 to enter a new judgment against Anna that purportedly superseded the final judgment entered against her in 2012, which had been affirmed by this Court on appeal. "Even in the absence of an intervening appeal, a circuit court loses jurisdiction to substantively amend a judgment after that judgment becomes final." All Star Awards & AD Specialties, Inc. v. HALO Branded Solutions, 675 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Mo. App. 2023). Second, a previous holding constitutes the law of the case and precludes relitigation of issues on remand and subsequent appeal. City of Normandy v. Kehoe, 709 S.W.3d 327, 333 (Mo. banc 2025). Both by opinion and mandate in Lambur II, we affirmed the final judgment entered against Anna on February 17, 2012. "After an appellate court renders a final decision and issues its mandate, any subsequent orders by the circuit court must be confined to those necessary to execute the appellate court's judgment as set forth in the mandate." All Star Awards & AD Specialties, 675 S.W.3d at 557 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, "once the appellate court enters its mandate, the trial court only has the authority to alter its judgment to the extent that such authority has been granted

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in the appellate court's mandate." Schumacher v. Austin, 400 S.W.3d 364, 369 (Mo. App. 2013). Although the trial court may have intended for the August 13, 2014, judgment to supersede and supplant all prior judgments, the judge had no jurisdiction to do so. The trial court had long been divested of any jurisdiction to amend the judgment as to Anna, and this Court's mandate did not give the trial court any basis to do so. Thus, insofar as the August 13, 2014, judgment attempted to make substantive changes with respect to Anna's liability, it was void. Because it was void as to her, it had no effect with respect to the timeliness of the motion to revive. For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred by ordering revival of the judgment as to Anna. Accordingly, we grant Point 1. Point 2 In Point 2, the Stidhams contend the trial court erred by reviving the judgment as to both of them because a judge not assigned to the case signed the show cause orders. As Petitioners correctly argue, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. Matt filed no objection to the show cause order. We have examined the objection filed by Anna, and it does not raise this issue. Nothing in the trial court's docket entries or orders demonstrates that this issue was ever presented to, and decided by, the trial court. As we explained in Bell-Kaplan v. Schwarze, 712 S.W.3d 836 (Mo. App. 2025): "An issue that was never presented to or decided by the trial court is not preserved for appellate review." State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., 34 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Mo. banc 2000). "[I]t simply is not the role of the court of appeals or [the Supreme Court of Missouri] to grant relief on arguments that were not presented to or decided by the trial court[.]" Barkley v. McKeever Enters., Inc., 456 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Mo. banc 2015).

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Bell-Kaplan, 712 S.W.3d at 847 (final alteration added). Accordingly, Point 2 is denied. The part of the order reviving the judgment with respect to Anna is reversed. The part of the order reviving the judgment with respect to Matt is affirmed. We remand with directions for the trial court to enter an amended order reviving the judgment as to Matt only.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCUR BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCUR