OTT LAW

Jason Kaufold, Appellant v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, d/b/a Chesterfield Village Apartments, LP and McCormack Baron Ragan Management Services, Inc., Respondents.

Decision date: UnknownSD28179

Syllabus

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court. Opinion Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District Case Style: Jason Kaufold, Appellant v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, d/b/a Chesterfield Village Apartments, LP and McCormack Baron Ragan Management Services, Inc., Respondents. Case Number: 28178 Handdown Date: 07/16/2007 Appeal From: Circuit Court of Greene County, Hon. J. Miles Sweeney Counsel for Appellant: David W. Ansley and Steven J. Blair Counsel for Respondent: Randy Scheer and Jacob Sappington Opinion Summary: None Citation: Opinion Author: Daniel E. Scott, Judge Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. Parrish, J. – Concurs. Rahmeyer, P.J. – Concurs In Part and Dissents in Part Opinion: Plaintiff sued a property owner and management company for his mother's wrongful death in an apartment fire. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. This case involves the same defendants, fire, lease form, exculpatory clause, claims, issues, and attorneys as, and was orally argued together with, Milligan v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, et al., No. 28179. Our reasoning in Milligan, decided today, applies equally here and compels similar results. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment herein for defendant Chesterfield, but reverse the judgment for defendant McCormack and remand plaintiff's claims against that defendant for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Milligan.

Separate Opinion: Opinion Dissenting in Part and Concurring in Part by Judge Rahmeyer: For the reasons set forth in my

dissent in Milligan v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, et al., No. SD28179, I respectfully dissent to the majority's opinion

that Paragraph 27 is unambiguous, but concur in the majority's opinion that Paragraph 27 does not preclude Plaintiff's claims against McCormack. In light of Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) and Alack v. Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 1996), I would find Paragraph 27 of the apartment lease to be ambiguous because its general language would include intentional torts and other causes of action which one may never use to exonerate oneself from future liability. This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

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