L.J.F. vs. J.F.G.

L.J.F., ) ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD87987 ) J.F.G., ) Filed: March 10, 2026 ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County The Honorable Aaron J. Martin, Judge

Before Division Four: Anthony Rex Gabbert, C.J., and Alok Ahuja and Thomas N. Chapman, JJ. J.F.G. ("Father") appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Cole County, which renewed a full order of protection previously entered against Father. The renewal judgment, which is effective for Father's lifetime, prohibits him from communicating with, or coming within 100 feet of, L.J.F. ("Mother"), except for communication concerning the child they share. On appeal, Father contends that the evidence was insufficient to justify renewal of the order of protection. He also argues that the judgment failed to include sufficient findings to support renewal of the protection order for more than one year. We affirm.

2 Factual Background On August 25, 2022, Mother filed a Petition for Order of Protection – Adult against Father. Mother's Petition indicated that Father was her former boyfriend, and that they were co-parents of a child who was then six years old. Mother's Petition alleged that Father coerced, stalked and harassed her. In particular, the Petition alleged that Father had "[r]epeatedly failed to comply [with the] previous agreement in [a separate] paternity action on what type of communication is appropriate," including by texting Mother on a daily basis, and by "stalking [her] virtually in dating apps." The Petition alleged that Father was harassing Mother's father, mother and sister in similar ways. The Petition alleged that Mother feared for her safety because Father's "delusions & hostile behavior continue to escalate[,] showing signs of severe mental instability." The circuit court issued an ex parte order of protection on the same day. On September 22, 2022, the parties consented to the circuit court's entry of a full order of protection with a one-year duration. The September 2022 judgment prohibited Father from communicating with Mother, "except to discuss the minor child in common for purpose of exercising custody" under the orders entered in a separate paternity action. In addition, the September 2022 judgment prohibited Father from coming within 100 feet of Mother, and from harassing, stalking, or threatening Mother, or "engag[ing] in other conduct that would place [Mother] in reasonable fear of bodily injury."

3 On August 18, 2023, Mother filed a motion seeking to have the order of protection renewed. As authorized by § 455.040.1(3), 1 the circuit court entered an ex parte order of protection pending its disposition of Mother's renewal motion. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the renewal motion on October 30, 2023. On November 9, 2023, the court renewed the full order of protection for a period of one year. The November 2023 judgment found that Mother "has proven allegations of domestic violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault against" Father, and that Father "cannot show that his . . . actions alleged to constitute abuse were otherwise justified under the law." The November 2023 judgment also found that Father "poses a serious danger to the physical or mental health of [Mother] or of a minor household member of [Mother]." The November 2023 renewal judgment continued the restrictions imposed by the original full order of protection; the November 2023 judgment also specified that Father could only communicate with Mother concerning their child through a specific text messaging application. Father appealed the November 2023 renewal judgment; his appeal was assigned Docket No. WD87061. Father moved to dismiss the appeal before the record on appeal was filed. This Court entered its order dismissing Father's appeal of the November 2023 judgment on August 27, 2024. On October 22, 2024, Mother filed her second motion to have the order of protection renewed. The circuit court once again entered an ex parte order of protection while it considered the renewal motion. The court conducted an

1 Unless otherwise noted, statutory citations refer to the 2016 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, updated by the 2025 Cumulative Supplement.

4 evidentiary hearing on March 31, 2025, at which Father appeared pro se. We discuss the evidence adduced at that hearing in detail in § I.B of our Discussion below. The circuit court renewed the full order of protection in a judgment entered on April 2, 2025. Like the November 2023 judgment, the April 2025 judgment found that Mother had "proven allegations of domestic violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault against" Father, and that he had failed to show any legal justification for his abusive actions. Like its predecessor, the April 2025 judgment also found that Father "poses a serious danger to the physical or mental health of" Mother. The April 2025 renewal judgment ordered that the full order of protection would remain in effect for Father's lifetime. The April 2025 judgment placed the same restrictions on Father as the November 2023 renewal judgment. In addition, however, the April 2025 judgment prohibited Father from entering into Mother's place of employment. The April 2025 judgment also made factual findings which triggered the prohibition on firearm possession found in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Father appeals. Discussion I. In his first Point, Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the renewal of the order of protection. On appeal of a judgment renewing an order of protection, "[t]he decree or judgment of the trial court will be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the

5 evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." K.C. v. Chapline, 635 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (cleaned up). "Substantial evidence is competent evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably decide the case. In determining whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence, we defer to the trial court's determinations regarding credibility and view all facts and any inferences therefrom favorably to the judgment." Id. at 229-30 (cleaned up). A. In arguing that Mother failed to present sufficient evidence to support the April 2025 renewal judgment, Father relies on caselaw holding that, "[t]o obtain renewal of a protective order, 'the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that expiration of the full order will place the petitioner in an immediate and present danger of abuse.'" K.C. v. Chapline, 635 S.W.3d at 230 (emphasis added; quoting Vinson v. Adams, 192 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006)). Father notes that, under § 455.010(1), "abuse" is defined to include "abusing a pet," "assault," "battery," "coercion," "harassment," "sexual assault," and "unlawful imprisonment," each of which is subject to its own definition under §§ 455.010(1)(a) through (g). Father contends that the only species of "abuse" arguably applicable in this case is "harassment"; his Brief then argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he harassed Mother. Father's argument fails to acknowledge that the circuit court's judgment did not renew the order of protection on the basis that Father had engaged in "abuse." Instead, the court found that Father had engaged in acts of "domestic

6 violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault." Any one of those actions would be sufficient to support the judgment. We acknowledge that, in a series of cases, this Court has stated that an order of protection may only be renewed when the petitioner makes a showing of "an immediate and present danger of abuse." In addition to K.C. v. Chapline and Vinson, see, e.g., C.B. v. J.B., 356 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011), and Cook v. Cook, 97 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). The principle that renewal of an order of protection requires evidence of "an immediate and present danger of abuse" traces back to the Eastern District's decision in Capps v. Capps, 715 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986). Capps held that, [g]iven the fundamental purpose of the Adult Abuse Act, the prevention of further acts of abuse, we conclude that the legislature intended that a renewal of a Full Order of Protection be granted to a petitioner who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the expiration of the Full Order will place petitioner in an immediate and present danger of abuse. Id. at 552. Capps was decided under an earlier – and differently worded – version of the Adult Abuse Act. At the time Capps was decided, the Adult Abuse Act only permitted the issuance of full orders of protection in cases of "abuse." Section 455.020.1, RSMo 1986, specified that "[a]ny adult who has been subject to abuse by a present or former adult household member may seek relief" under the Act. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, § 455.040.1, RSMo 1986, provided that, "if the petition has proved the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence,

7 the court may issue a full order of protection for a definite period of time." (Emphasis added.) Since 1986, the grounds which can support an order of protection have been substantially expanded. Most notably, statutory amendments in 1993 and 2015 authorized the issuance of orders of protection in cases of stalking, and in cases of sexual assault outside a domestic relationship. See H.B. 476 & 194, 87th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session, 1993 MO. LAWS 1162, 1163-64 (authorizing issuance of orders of protection in cases of "stalking"); S.B. 321, 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session, 2015 MO. LAWS 669, 671 (specifying that sexual assault may serve as the basis for an order of protection, even if committed by a non-household member). In addition, "abuse" as a basis for issuance of an order of protection has been subsumed within the broader category of "domestic violence." See H.B. 215, 97th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session, 2013 MO. LAWS 512, 537-38. Thus, unlike in 1986, § 455.020.1 now allows any person to seek an order of protection if they "ha[ve] been subject to domestic violence by a present or former family or household member, or . . . ha[ve] been the victim of stalking or sexual assault." Similarly, § 455.040.1(1) now provides that "the court shall issue a full order of protection" if, after hearing, "the petitioner has proved the allegation of domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence." Although § 455.040.1(2) authorizes the renewal of full orders of protection, it does not specify a substantive standard for renewal of such orders. Instead, § 455.040.1(2) merely provides that, "[u]pon motion by the petitioner, and after a

8 hearing by the court, the full order of protection may be renewed annually and for a period of time the court deems appropriate . . . ." Despite Capps, and the cases following it, a petitioner seeking renewal of a full order of protection today is not limited to proving "abuse." Nothing in § 455.040.1(2) suggests that renewal of an order of protection is limited to more narrow circumstances than those which can justify a full order in the first place. We presume instead that an order of protection may be renewed based on evidence of the same types of conduct which would have justified the issuance of an original order – namely, "domestic violence, stalking, or sexual assault." Although we need not decide the issue, we also question whether a petitioner seeking renewal of an order of protection must prove, in all cases, an "immediate and present danger" that the acts supporting issuance of the order will recur. Section 455.035.1 specifies that an ex parte order of protection may only be issued where "[a]n immediate and present danger of domestic violence" is shown. But no similar requirement appears in §§ 455.040.1(1) or (2) with respect to the issuance of full orders of protection, or in connection with the renewal of orders of protection. The fact that an "immediate and present danger" requirement appears in § 455.035.1, but not in §§ 455.040.1(1) or (2), would typically be considered significant. Generally, "'[w]e presume that the legislature acts with knowledge of statutes involving similar or related subject matters and that it acts intentionally when it includes language in one section but omits such language from another.'" Woody v. Clark, 725 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting Selleck v. Keith M. Evans Ins., Inc., 535 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)).

9 Notably, this Court has held that no "immediate and present danger" requirement applies to the renewal of orders of protection entered under the Child Protection Orders Act, even though that statute contains a similar renewal provision (§ 455.516.1) as the one found in § 455.040.1(2). In Woodard v. Conde, 648 S.W.3d 760 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022), the Southern District held that it was unnecessary for a petitioner seeking renewal of a child protection order to show that the child was in "immediate and present danger of abuse." The Court noted that "nothing in [§ 455.516.1] requires the circuit court to find that expiration of the original full order of child protection would place the child in imminent present danger of abuse." Id. at 762. Although the appellant in Woodard pointed to the requirement for "[a]n immediate and present danger of domestic violence" for issuance of an ex parte child protection order (see § 455.513), the Court emphasized that the renewal provision "clearly, plainly, and unambiguously does not" contain a similar requirement. 648 S.W.3d at 763. The Court refused "to judicially graft into section 455.516.1 . . . an invisible and unexpressed renewal requirement for a finding that the expiration of the full order of child protection would place the child in imminent present danger of abuse." Id. Given the similarity in the wording of the renewal provisions of the Adult Abuse Act and the Child Protection Orders Act, it would seem that Woodard's analysis should apply equally to the renewal provisions found in both §§ 455.040.1(2)and 455.516.1. Even if a showing of an "immediate and present danger" of abusive conduct were necessary before renewal of a full order of protection, proof of recent abusive conduct would be sufficient to satisfy that standard. This Court

10 has held that, "once a petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that an act [justifying issuance of an order of protection] occurred, a presumption of immediate and present danger arises" – at least if the act justifying the order occurred relatively recently. McAlister v. Strohmeyer, 395 S.W.3d 546, 554 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013); accord, N.J.D. v. R.O.D., 582 S.W.3d 116, 123-24 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). Thus, at least where (as here) a petitioner seeking renewal of an order of protection presents evidence of additional acts since the issuance of the original order, it would appear that no further showing would be necessary to satisfy any "immediate and present danger" requirement. B. We turn, then, to the merits of Father's sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. At the outset, we note that Father has failed to provide this Court with a complete record of the evidence before the circuit court. Although Father has provided this Court with a transcript of the March 31, 2025 evidentiary hearing, he has failed to provide us with the two exhibits admitted at that hearing. One of those exhibits was Mother's Exhibit 1, which contained text messages exchanged between Father and Mother, which Mother contended were threatening and abusive. The second exhibit, denominated Father's Exhibit A, consisted of the probable cause statements prepared by law enforcement officers on two occasions when Father was arrested for violating the earlier orders of protection. Exhibit A also apparently included Father's narrative responses to the probable cause statements, which the circuit court admitted in lieu of live testimony.

11 We recognize that Mother read into the record extended excerpts from the text message exchanges contained in her Exhibit 1. Nevertheless, we cannot assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support the April 2025 judgment without complete copies of the exhibits which were before the circuit court when it entered that judgment. "When exhibits necessary to the determination of a point on appeal are omitted from the record, 'such evidentiary omissions will be taken as favorable to the trial court's ruling and unfavorable to the appeal.'" Tycon Co. v. Tyson, 726 S.W.3d 707, 713 n.6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting City of Kansas City v. Cosic, 540 S.W.3d 461, 464 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)); accord, Johnson v. City of Kansas City, 695 S.W.3d 165, 178 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). "Moreover, where an appellant's failure to file a complete record on appeal results in an appellate court being unable to give meaningful review to his claims of error, his appeal will be dismissed." City of St. Louis v. Hill, 488 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Besides the incomplete record, Father's Brief argues only that the evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in "harassment" (as discussed in § I.A above). As we have explained, however, the renewal judgment found that Mother had "proven allegations of domestic violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault," and her original Petition alleged that Father had committed acts constituting both harassment and stalking. In these circumstances, it would normally be incumbent on Father, as the appellant, to challenge both the finding of harassment and the finding of stalking, since a stalking finding would be sufficient – standing alone – to sustain the judgment. It is the Appellants' burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court's judgment was incorrect on any basis supported by the record

12 and the applicable law. As such, the Appellants' failure to properly challenge a finding and ruling of the trial court that would support its judgment would be fatal to their appeal. STRCUE, Inc. v. Potts, 386 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (cleaned up); see also City of Peculiar v. Hunt Martin Materials, LLC, 274 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) ("To reverse the circuit court's judgment, however, [appellants] would necessarily have to establish that all of the reasons that the circuit court articulated in its judgment were wrong."). Despite the omissions from the record on appeal, and Father's limited argument, we explain why the evidence was sufficient to support renewal of the order of protection based on Mother's allegation of stalking. "Stalking" is defined in § 455.010(15): "Stalking", is when any person purposely engages in an unwanted course of conduct that causes alarm to another person, or a person who resides together in the same household with the person seeking the order of protection when it is reasonable in that person's situation to have been alarmed by the conduct. As used in this subdivision: (a) "Alarm", to cause fear of danger of physical harm; and (b) "Course of conduct", two or more acts that serve no legitimate purpose including, but not limited to, acts in which the stalker directly, indirectly, or through a third party follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to a person by any action, method, or device. "Proof of alarm involves both a subjective and an objective component. The petitioner must present substantial evidence that the petitioner both subjectively feared physical harm and that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would have feared physical harm." L.E.C. v. K.R.C., 674 S.W.3d

13 97, 108-09 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (citing N.C. v. Y.Q.L., 609 S.W.3d 56, 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)). In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to establish "stalking," "it is the course of conduct, not each individual act, that must reasonably alarm the petitioner. Given the plain language of the statute, we conclude it would be incorrect to consider only whether each incident . . . was, in isolation, alarming." N.J.D. v. R.O.D., 582 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). In conducting our review of the evidence supporting the circuit court's renewal of the full order of protection, we are mindful that [t]here is real harm that can result in abusing the Act and its provisions, including the stigma that may attach to a respondent who is labeled a stalker. Thus, trial courts must exercise great care to ensure that sufficient evidence exists to support all elements of the statute before entering a full order of protection. "The Act is not, nor was it intended to be, a solution for minor arguments between adults." L.E.C., 674 S.W.3d at 111 (citing and quoting N.C., 609 S.W.3d at 59). The evidence before the circuit court on Mother's renewal motion established that Father had engaged in an unjustified course of conduct which reasonably caused Mother to fear physical harm at Father's hands. During the October 30, 2023 hearing on the first renewal of the order of protection, the court heard testimony that Father had been sending Mother "harassing, volatile messages" in violation of the original order of protection, and that he had been "making threats" in posts on a social media website. Mother testified that she was receiving treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression – all of which was attributable to Father's behavior. In his testimony, Father acknowledged that he had thrown a television set during a fight with

14 Mother, and that he had been charged with violating the original restraining order on three separate occasions. At the March 2025 hearing on Mother's latest renewal motion, Mother testified, without objection, that Father had been diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder by a psychologist who had examined him in their paternity case; Mother testified that Father had taken no steps to obtain treatment for this condition. Mother also testified to multiple specific instances where Father's conduct had been threatening to her, and to members of her family. Thus, Mother testified that, at one of their child's soccer games, Father "paraded back and forth" up and down the opposite side of the field, gesturing at Mother and her family with his middle finger. Mother testified that, "as soon as he caught me making eye contact with him, he changed his middle finger to a finger gun and pointed it directly at me." At another of their child's soccer games, Mother testified that as she was leaving the parking lot with her child and boyfriend in the car, Father "revved his [car's] engine and backed up really quickly like he was going to ram my vehicle." When the two vehicles got onto the highway, Father "was swerving back and forth, tailing me on the highway, and then eventually passed me and just sped off." Mother testified that the incident "was terrifying. . . . I thought he was coming after me. And I had my child in the car with me, and I feared for both of our safety." Mother testified that, at a soccer practice, Father approached Mother and her family members, in violation of the order of protection. Mother testified that Father "stuck his middle finger right in my father's face and said . . . 'Fuck you

15 [father's name]' and walked away." Mother testified that Father also harassed her father at custody exchanges, and was "[c]ontinually messaging my father, threatening him. Messaging my mom. Messaging my sister, threatening her." Mother also testified to a text message exchange with Father through the communications portal they had been ordered to use. Mother quoted extended passages from Father's messages to the court. Those messages berated Mother, using expletives, for purportedly having sexual relationships with multiple partners, which Father claimed had traumatized their child. Father also accused Mother of withholding parenting time to which Father was entitled. Father's text messages closed with this warning: I've held back [Mother's name] for roughly two years and three months, giving you the benefit of the doubt. I've given your attorney, the Judge, the GAL, the benefit of the doubt as well. I've not yet begun to fight. Now, I fight legally and through the court system. Now, your house of cards burns legally to the ground for what all of you have done to my beloved little boy. I truly pity all of you. Mother testified that she found Father's text messages to be threatening. She called law enforcement, who arrested Father for violating the terms of the order of protection. During the hearing, Father offered into evidence probable cause statements explaining the basis for his arrest on two separate occasions for violating the order of protection (one at a soccer practice, and one at a baseball practice). As explained above, Father has not provided this Court with those probable cause statements, although they were admitted into evidence at the March 2025 hearing. We presume that the probable cause statements provide additional evidence of unjustified behavior by Father causing Mother to

16 reasonably fear that he would physically harm her, their child, or other members of her family. In general, Mother described Father's demeanor during their interactions as "threatening," "menacing," and "volatile." Mother testified that Father's behavior caused her to fear for her own physical safety, and for that of her family members, and had "negatively impacted her mental health." In prior cases, we have held that "annoying" e-mails threatening a petitioner's job, "angry text exchanges without threats of physical violence," and "social media posts attacking someone's character or appearance," are insufficient to establish "stalking" as defined in § 455.010(14). See L.M.M. v. J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021); I.L.L. v. T.L.R., 537 S.W.3d 372, 376-77 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). But in this case, Mother presented evidence of communications, and actions, by Father which could reasonably be interpreted as physically threatening to her, her child, and her family members. For the same reasons, we conclude that Mother "presented evidence of more than just 'her bare statement of fear.'" K.C. v. Chapline, 635 S.W.3d 221, 230 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Father's ongoing course of threatening statements and actions must be viewed as a whole, and in the context of his repeated arrests, and convictions, for violating earlier orders. The evidence was sufficient to show that Father had engaged in stalking, and that renewal of the full order of protection was warranted. Father's first Point is denied.

17 II. Under § 455.040.1(2), a circuit court is authorized to renew an order of protection for the respondent's lifetime "[i]f the court has made specific written findings that the respondent poses a serious danger to the physical or mental health of the petitioner or of a minor household member of the petitioner . . . ." In his second Point, Father contends that the circuit court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact to supports the lifetime renewal of the order of protection. We reject Father's argument, because he failed to preserve any claim concerning the sufficiency of the circuit court's findings for appellate review. Rule 78.07(c) provides that, "[i]n all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review." Rule 78.07(c) is designed "'to ensure that complaints about the form and language of judgments are brought to the attention of the trial court where they can be easily corrected, alleviating needless appeals, reversals, and rehearings.'" McLeod v. McLeod, 681 S.W.3d 215, 234 n.13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting Est. of Hutchison v. Massood, 494 S.W.3d 595, 608 n.13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (in turn quoting Barth v. Barth, 372 S.W.3d 496, 517 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012))). We are unaware of any statute or rule which would exempt cases under the Adult Abuse Act from the requirements of Rule 78.07(c). "A case filed in circuit court pursuant to Chapter 455 seeking relief from adult abuse is a civil action." State ex rel. Meeks v. Reaves, 416 S.W.3d 351, 352 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). In Meeks, the Southern District held that parties to Adult Abuse Act cases were

18 entitled to conduct discovery, including depositions under Rule 57.03, as in other civil cases. The Court explained: Respondent has cited no rules or statutes that make Rule 57.03 inapplicable to Chapter 455 actions, and we have found none in our independent research. Respondent argues, however, that Chapter 455 "does not have to specifically exclude discovery in order to manifest the legislature's intent that the matter will proceed on a summary basis without the normal process of discovery envisioned in Rules 56 through 61." . . . We disagree. . . . . . . . In the absence of a civil rule or statute that makes Rule 57.03 inapplicable to Chapter 455 proceedings, we hold that Relator has the right to depose Petitioner and prepare his defense against the full order of protection which Petitioner is seeking. As this Court has noted, such an order can have "significant collateral consequences." Id. at 353 (citations omitted). The same reasoning applies here: in the absence of any statute or rule exempting proceedings under the Adult Abuse Act from the requirements of Rule 78.07(c), that Rule is fully applicable here. Rule 78.07(c) required Father to file a motion to amend the judgment to alert the circuit court to his claim that the judgment contained insufficient findings to justify a lifetime order of protection. Father did not file such a motion. He has therefore failed to preserve any alleged deficiencies in the circuit court's factual findings for our review. Point II is denied.

19 Conclusion The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

_________________________ Alok Ahuja, Judge All concur.