Magellanic Seven, LLC, Respondent, vs. Wentzville Church of God, Appellant.

Eastern District

MAGELLANIC SEVEN, LLC, ) No. ED112660 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Charles County vs. ) 2111-CC00108 ) WENTZVILLE CHURCH OF GOD, ) Honorable Brittney R. Smith ) Appellant. ) Filed: November 19, 2024

Wentzville Church of God ("Defendant") appeals the trial court's May 2024 nunc pro tunc order 1 correcting a typographical error in the legal description of a parcel of real property set out in an October 2022 judgment awarding Magellanic Seven, LLC ("Plaintiff") fee simple title to the property. After Defendant filed the instant appeal, the issue of whether the nunc pro tunc order is appealable was ordered taken with the case by this Court. For the reasons discussed below, we hold: (1) although the trial court's nunc pro tunc order in this case is not an appealable "[f]inal judgment in the case" under section 512.020(5) RSMo 2016, 2 the order is an appealable "special order after final judgment in the cause" under the statute, see id.; and (2) the trial court did not err in entering the nunc pro tunc order. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's nunc pro tunc order.

1 We note the nunc pro tunc order in this case was denominated a "judgment." 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references to section 512.020 are to RSMo 2016 (effective from August 28, 2004, to the present).

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I. BACKGROUND

The underlying case began in February 2021, when Plaintiff filed a petition to quiet title against Defendant with respect to a parcel of real property commonly known as 9970 Highway N, Lake St. Louis, MO, 63367 ("the Property"). Plaintiff's petition alleged: (1) Defendant was the fee simple title owner of the Property pursuant to a general warranty deed recorded in April 1976; (2) Plaintiff obtained ownership of the Property after a lawful tax sale in August 2019; (3) Plaintiff received a Certificate of Purchase for the Property, which was recorded in September 2019; (4) Plaintiff received a Collector's Deed for Taxes for the Property ("Collector's Deed"), which was recorded in October 2020; and (5) Plaintiff complied with all statutory requirements to obtain legal title to the Property. The petition requested the court to quiet title to the Property, terminate all rights held by Defendant, and award fee simple title to Plaintiff. In addition, Plaintiff's Collector's Deed was attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's petition to quiet title. Notably, the alleged legal description of the Property in Plaintiff's petition omitted one number (a number "1" ) from the legal description of the Property set forth in Plaintiff's Collector's Deed; in other words, the petition contained a typographical error. Specifically, Plaintiff's petition alleged the legal description of the Property was, in relevant part: "North 80 degrees 16 minutes West along the Northern line of [a tract conveyed to Clifford Brownlee and wife by deed recorded in Book 388, page 473 ("Brownlee property")], a distance of 83.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property[.]" (emphasis added). However, Plaintiff's Collector's Deed provided the legal description of the Property was, in relevant part: "North 80 [degrees] 16 [minutes] West along the Northern line of the [Brownlee property], a

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distance of 183.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property[.]" 3

(emphasis added). Defendant did not file an answer or assert any affirmative defenses in response to Plaintiff's petition to quiet title. In September 2022, a bench trial on the petition took place before the Honorable Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey ("Judge Navarro-McKelvey") of the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. At the bench trial, Plaintiff presented evidence in support of its petition to quiet title, including the following. Defendant was the fee simple title owner of the Property pursuant to a general warranty deed recorded in April 1976. Plaintiff purchased the Property at an August 2019 tax sale after taxes levied on the Property for 2017 and 2018 were unpaid by Defendant. 4

Subsequently, the St. Charles County Collector issued Plaintiff a Certificate of Purchase, which was recorded in September 2019 and admitted into evidence at trial without objection. Additionally, Defendant was served with a written notice of redemption. Defendant failed to redeem the Property, and Plaintiff obtained a Collector's Deed to the Property from the St. Charles Collector of Revenue, which was recorded in October 2020 and admitted into evidence at trial without objection. After hearing the evidence, Judge Navarro-McKelvey entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarding it fee simple title to the Property on October 4, 2022 ("the Original

3 For simplicity and ease of reading, all further references to the legal description alleged in the petition and as set forth in the Collector's Deed will refer to, respectively, "83.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property" and "183.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property[.]" 4 The issue of why Defendant, a church, was subject to property taxes in 2017 and 2018 is not before this Court and is not addressed in the record before us. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Mo. banc 2011) ("religious institutions typically are exempt from taxes"); section 137.100(5) RSMo 2016 (providing a tax exemption for, inter alia, " [a]ll property, real and personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship . . . except that the [tax] exemption . . . does not include real property not actually used or occupied for the purpose of the organization but held or used as investment even though the income or rentals received therefrom is used wholly for religious . . . purposes"); see also Mo. Const. Art. 10, Sec. 6.1 (providing in relevant part that "all property, real and personal, not held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship . . . may be exempted from taxation by general law").

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Judgment" or "Judgment"). Defendant then appealed the Original Judgment, and it was affirmed by this Court. Magellanic Seven, LLC v. Wentzville Church of God, 671 S.W.3d 390 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) ( "Magellanic I"). Subsequently, in April 2024, Plaintiff filed a nunc pro tunc motion pursuant to Rule 74.06(a). 5 The motion alleged Plaintiff's petition to quiet title and the Original Judgment contained a small typographical error because: (1) both documents stated the legal description of the Property was, in relevant part, "83.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property[;] " and (2) the Collector's Deed, which was attached as an exhibit to Plaintiff's petition and was admitted into evidence at the bench trial, had the correct legal description, in relevant part, of "183.71 feet to an iron pipe at the Northwest corner of [the] Brownlee property[.]" (emphasis added). Defendant filed suggestions in opposition which admitted the petition contained the typographical error and that the Collector's Deed set forth the correct legal description. Nevertheless, Defendant argued there was no clerical error in the Original Judgment and Plaintiff's nunc pro tunc motion should be denied on this basis. The Honorable Brittney R. Smith of the Circuit Court of St. Charles County ("the trial court") subsequently granted Plaintiff's motion and entered a nunc pro tunc order in May 2024, correcting the typographical error in the legal description of the Property set out in the Original Judgment by listing the correct legal description as provided in the Collector's Deed. Defendant appealed the trial court's nunc pro tunc order, and the issue of whether the order is appealable was ordered taken with the case by this Court. Subsequently, this Court took the case under submission.

5 All references to Rule 74.06(a) are to the version of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 74.06(a) effective from January 1, 1988, to the present.

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II. DISCUSSION In this case, Defendant appeals the trial court's nunc pro tunc order purporting to correct a clerical error in the Original Judgment pursuant to Rule 74.06(a). See id. (providing in relevant part that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders"). A. Whether This Court Has Authority to Review Defendant's Appeal of the Trial Court's Nunc Pro Tunc Order

Before our Court can address the merits of this case, we must determine whether we have the authority to review Defendant's appeal. See Lane House Construction, Inc. v. Sithole, 504 S.W.3d 102, 105 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). "In Missouri, the right [to] appeal is purely statutory." Id. Accordingly, absent statutory authority, no right to appeal exists, and an appellate court has no authority to consider the merits of an appeal. Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 769 n.7 (Mo. banc 2020); Sithole, 504 S.W.3d at 105 (citing Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 2011)). Furthermore, if our Court does not have authority to consider the merits of an appeal, we should dismiss the case. Sithole, 504 S.W.3d at 105. Section 512.020 governs the right to appeal in civil cases and provides in relevant part that an aggrieved party may appeal from "any . . . [f]inal judgment in the case or from any special order after final judgment in the cause[.]" 6 Section 512.020(5) (emphasis added). For

6 Section 512.020 also provides an aggrieved party in a civil case may appeal from any: (1) Order granting a new trial; (2) Order refusing to revoke, modify, or change an interlocutory order appointing a receiver or receivers, or dissolving an injunction; (3) Order granting or denying class action certification provided that: (a) The court of appeals, in its discretion, permits such an appeal; and (b) An appeal of such an order shall not stay proceedings in the court unless the judge or the court of appeals so orders; [or] (4) Interlocutory judgments in actions of partition which determine the rights of the parties[.] Section 512.020(1)-(4). It is undisputed the trial court's nunc pro tunc order in this case does not constitute any of the aforementioned rulings.

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the reasons discussed below in Sections II. A.1.-2. and B. of this opinion, we hold the trial court's nunc pro tunc order in this case corrected a clerical error in a previously-entered final judgment and the correction is supported by the record in the underlying case. Whether a trial court's nunc pro tunc order is an appealable "[f]inal judgment in the case" or "special order after final judgment in the cause" under these circumstances are issues of first impression for Missouri Courts. See section 512.020(5). 7

1. Whether the Trial Court's Nunc Pro Tunc Order is an Appealable Final Judgment in the Case Under Section 512.020(5)

In determining whether the trial court's nunc pro tunc order in this case is an appealable "[f]inal judgment in the case" under section 512.020(5), see id., we find the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 447 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. banc 2014) to be instructive. McGuire holds in relevant part: "[U]nlike an amended judgment under Rule 75.01, [8]

a correction by a nunc pro tunc [order under Rule 74.06(a)] do