Mandie Brown, Appellant, v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Respondent.

MANDIE BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. ED113169

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County The Honorable Travis D. Partney, Judge Mandie Brown ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") on Appellant's claim for breach of contract. The trial court's decision in favor of State Farm upheld an uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage exclusion in three of Appellant's automobile insurance policies covering vehicles not involved in an automobile collision between Appellant and an uninsured driver. We affirm.

2 Background The Events Giving Rise to Appellant's Claim Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellant, the party against whom summary judgment was entered, the facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. 1

In December 2019, Appellant sustained bodily injuries while driving a Toyota Camry when she was hit by an uninsured driver. At the time of the collision, Appellant was insured under four separate automobile policies issued by State Farm for four vehicles she owned: (1) the Toyota Camry involved in the collision; (2) a Chevrolet Camaro; (3) a Toyota 4-Runner; and (4) a Toyota Tundra. Each of the four automobile policies issued by State Farm provided a UM coverage policy limit of $100,000 per person. After the collision, Appellant made a claim for UM coverage under the Toyota Camry policy and stacked claims for UM coverage under the other three automobile policies, requesting a total of $400,000 in UM coverage. In response, State Farm paid Appellant the full UM coverage policy limit of $100,000 under the Toyota Camry policy and also paid Appellant $75,000 in UM coverage under Appellant's other three automobile policies ($25,000 per policy) for a grand total of $175,000 in UM coverage. State Farm asserted that Appellant was only entitled to a total of $75,000 under the other three automobile policies because each of the policies included a 6128CP Amendatory Endorsement containing a UM coverage exclusion which limited Appellant's recovery to the mandatory minimum UM coverage

1 See Kroner Investments, LLC v. Dann, 583 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

3 amount required by the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law of $25,000 for each of her UM stacking claims. Appellant sued State Farm for breach of contract, arguing State Farm owed Appellant a total of $400,000 in UM coverage based on the full policy limit under the Toyota Camry policy and stacking the full policy limits under the other three automobile policies she had at the time of the collision. The Insurance Policies and Policy Language Relevant to this Appeal Each of Appellant's four separate automobile policies issued by State Farm include a "DECLARATIONS PAGE" 2 which lists one vehicle under the "YOUR CAR" heading. As relevant to this appeal, Appellant's policy for the Toyota Camry includes a "DECLARATIONS PAGE" with the Toyota Camry listed under the "YOUR CAR" heading. Notably, the Toyota Camry "DECLARATIONS PAGE" lists no other vehicles owned by Appellant under the "YOUR CAR" heading. All four of the separate "DECLARATIONS PAGE[s]" have a subsection titled, "EXCEPTIONS, POLICY BOOKLET & ENDORSEMENTS" which states, "YOUR POLICY CONSISTS OF THIS DECLARATIONS PAGE, THE POLICY BOOKLET – FORM 9825A, AND ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT APPLY, INCLUDING THOSE ISSUED TO YOU WITH ANY SUBSEQUENT RENEWAL NOTICE."

2 The emphasis in all insurance policy language set forth in this opinion reflects the emphasis found within the insurance policies at issue on appeal.

4 The policy booklet for each of the four separate automobile policies issued by State Farm includes a provision titled, "THIS POLICY," which states in relevant part:

1. This policy consists of:

a. the most recently issued Declarations Page; b. the policy booklet version shown on that Declarations Page; and c. any endorsements that apply, including those listed on that Declarations Page as well as those issued in connection with any subsequent renewal of this policy.

1. This policy contains all of the agreements between all named insureds who

are shown on the Declarations Page and all applicants and: a. us; and b. any of our agents.

In addition, each of the four separate automobile policies issued by State Farm includes the UM coverage exclusion, providing such UM coverage is limited to a mandatory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law of $25,000 if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a car she owns but was not labeled as "YOUR CAR" or a "NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR." 3 "Your Car" is defined as "the vehicle shown under 'YOUR CAR' on the Declarations Page. Your Car does not include a vehicle that you no longer own or lease."

3 The UM coverage exclusion pertinent to this appeal states in relevant part:

1. THERE IS NO COVERAGE TO THE EXTENT THE UNINSURED

MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE LIMITS OF THIS POLICY EXCEED THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGE LIMITS REQUIRED BY THE MISSOURI FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW FOR AN INSURED WHO SUSTAINS BODILY INJURY: a. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU IF IT IS NOT YOUR CAR OR A NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR. [...].

5 The policy booklet also includes separate definitions for the words, "You or Your" and "Car." "You or Your" is defined in relevant part as "the named insured or named insureds shown on the Declarations Page." "Car" is defined in relevant part as "a land motor vehicle with four or more wheels, designed for use primarily on public roads." The Relevant Procedural Posture After Appellant filed suit against State Farm, State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing the UM coverage exclusion unambiguously limited UM coverage to $25,000 for each of Appellant's other three automobile policies because under the Toyota Camry policy, the only vehicle listed under the "YOUR CAR" heading on the "DECLARATIONS PAGE" was the Toyota Camry, not the Chevrolet Camaro, the Toyota 4-Runner, or the Toyota Tundra. According to State Farm, when Appellant made stacking claims for UM coverage under the insurance policies for the Chevrolet Camaro, the Toyota 4-Runner, and the Toyota Tundra, the UM coverage exclusion was triggered because Appellant was not occupying any of those vehicles at the time of the collision. Appellant opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing the Toyota Camry was "YOUR CAR" for purposes of UM coverage under all four of the automobile policies Appellant was issued, thus not triggering the UM coverage exclusion. Appellant additionally argued the definitions of "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" were ambiguous and created conflicting interpretations within the automobile policies, and therefore must be construed in favor of Appellant. The trial court granted State Farm summary judgment. Appellant now appeals.

6 Discussion Appellant raises two points on appeal, challenging the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm. First, Appellant argues the trial court erred in enforcing the UM coverage exclusion which limited Appellant's UM coverage to $25,000 under each of her other three automobile insurance policies with State Farm. Second, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm because the policy language defining "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" is ambiguous as the definitions create conflicting interpretations of "YOUR CAR" within the UM coverage exclusion and "YOUR CAR" on the "DECLARATIONS PAGE." The General Standard of Review This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Becker v. Schenck, 716 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Purk v. Farmers Ins. Company, Inc., 628 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). In order to demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact exist, the movant is required to show no plausible contradictory account of essential facts. Becker, 716 S.W.3d at 356. We will affirm a trial court's grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, whether relied upon by the trial court or not. Id. Moreover, this Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and affording that party all reasonable inferences. Id. However, we accept facts contained in affidavits or otherwise in support of the moving party's motion

7 as true, unless they are contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the motion for summary judgment. Id. The General Law Regarding the Interpretation of an Insurance Policy "The interpretation of an insurance policy, and the determination whether coverage and exclusion provisions are ambiguous, are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo." Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Mo. banc 2010). When construing language within an insurance policy, we apply the meaning an ordinary person of average understanding would attach to the policy if purchasing insurance. Id. "The general rules for contract interpretation apply to insurance contracts, and the key is whether the contract language is ambiguous or unambiguous." Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 604 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting in part Todd v. Missouri United School Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. banc 2007)). Ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty as to the meaning of language in the insurance policy. Burns, 303 S.W.3d at 509. Insurance policy language is ambiguous when it is reasonably open to different conclusions. Id. When insurance policy language is ambiguous, we resolve that ambiguity in favor of the insured. Id. However, an insured cannot create an ambiguity by only reading a portion of the policy and claiming that, read in isolation, that portion of the policy suggests a greater level of coverage than the policy actually provides when read in its entirety. Johnson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, S.I., 694 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citing Owners Insurance Company v. Craig, 514 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Mo.

8 banc 2017)). Insurance policies are read as a whole, and the risk insured against includes both the general insuring agreement together with the exclusions and definitions. Id. For that reason, the mere presence of an exclusion does not render an insurance policy ambiguous. See Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo. banc 2014); Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880. We must construe the exclusion in harmony with other policy provisions and give effect to the exclusion as far as its language reasonably permits. See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221; Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 719, 722-23. The General Law Regarding UM Coverage "Under Missouri law, an automobile liability insurance policy must provide UM coverage." Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722; section 379.203.1 RSMo 2016. "The purpose of UM coverage is to take the place of the liability coverage the insured would have received had they been injured in an accident with an insured motorist." Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722 (citing Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 220). The minimum amount of UM coverage required by law is $25,000 per person. Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722; section 303.030.5 RSMo Cum. Supp. 2019. Additionally, Missouri law permits an insured to stack multiple UM coverages, and insurers are prevented from including policy language that prohibits stacking. 4 Purk,

4 Stacking is permitted to allow a person to obtain multiple benefits based upon her personal injuries sustained in a collision rather than based upon which vehicle is involved in a collision. See First Nat. Ins. Co. of America v. Clark, 899 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. banc 1995) (explaining that section 379.203.1, the statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage, unambiguously establishes a minimum amount of coverage to persons and not to particularly described vehicles).

9 628 S.W.3d at 722. "Stacking refers to an insured's ability to obtain multiple benefits for an injury, either from more than one policy, such as when a policyholder insures separate vehicles under separate policies, or from multiple coverages provided within a single policy, such as when a policyholder insures multiple vehicles on one policy." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While insurers are prevented from including policy language that prohibits stacking, insurers may include stacking limitations, consistent with the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law, by providing the minimum amount of coverage – $25,000 per person, per policy. See id. at 722-23; see also Copling v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, S.I., 612 S.W.3d 226, 230-32 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020); Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 881. Point One: The UM Coverage Exclusion Unambiguously Applies to Appellant In Appellant's first point on appeal, she argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm because the court erred in enforcing the UM coverage exclusion, which limited Appellant's UM coverage to $25,000 under each of her other three automobile insurance policies with State Farm. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. Consistent with Missouri law, all four of State Farm's policies issued to Appellant permit an insured to receive UM coverage, providing up to $100,000 in coverage per person. See section 379.203.1 RSMo 2016; Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722. Additionally, the UM coverage exclusion in all four State Farm policies issued to Appellant allow for stacking claims for UM coverage, providing such UM coverage is limited to the mandatory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law of

10 $25,000 if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a car she owns but was not labeled as "YOUR CAR" or a "NEWLY ACQUIRED CAR." See Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 722-23. The mere presence of an exclusion does not render an insurance policy ambiguous and the exclusion will be enforced when it is clear and unambiguous within the context of the policy as a whole. See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221; Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 719, 722-23; Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880-81. Appellant attempts to evade the UM coverage exclusion by arguing all four of the separate automobile policies she owns are unified under the "THIS POLICY" provision. Specifically, Appellant points to the clause which states:

1. This policy contains all of the agreements between all named insureds who

are shown on the Declarations Page and all applicants and: a. us; and b. any of our agents.

When looking at each of Appellant's automobile policies in their entirety, we cannot find the clause within the "THIS POLICY" provision to mean what Appellant desires it to mean. See Whelan Sec. Co. v. Kennebrew, 379 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Mo. banc 2012) ("[t]he primary rule of contract construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties and give effect to that intention") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. American Family, 694 S.W.3d at 532 (citing Owners, 514 S.W.3d at 617). Instead the clause within the "THIS POLICY" provision simply establishes, particularly within the context of the Toyota Camry policy, that the Toyota Camry policy is the only agreement between the parties and that separate or contemporaneous agreements regarding the Toyota Camry are not a part of the Toyota Camry policy. See Jennings v.

11 SSM Health Care St. Louis, 355 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011); see also RLI Ins. Co. v. Southern Union Co., 341 S.W.3d 821, 830 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). In other words, the clause within the "THIS POLICY" provision is a standard integration clause between Appellant and State Farm. See Jennings, 355 S.W.3d at 532. Furthermore, when viewing the UM coverage exclusion in harmony with all four of Appellant's automobile policies issued by State Farm, the UM coverage exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies to Appellant. See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221; Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 719, 722-23; Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880. Like the appellant in Purk v. Farmers Insurance, Appellant derives her figure of $100,000 per person, per policy in UM coverage from the "DECLARATIONS PAGE[s]" of all four policies at issue. See Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 723. However, it is well established that declarations pages contained within insurance policies do not grant any coverage, as they are introductory and merely summarize the essential terms of the policy. See id. When reviewing the policy as a whole, it is clear and unambiguous that a reader must look elsewhere to determine the scope of coverage. See id. Here, all four of the policies' "DECLARATIONS PAGE[s]" contain a section stating in relevant part, "YOUR POLICY CONSISTS OF THIS DECLARATIONS PAGE, THE POLICY BOOKLET – FORM 9825A, AND ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT APPLY." See id. "ANY ENDORSEMENTS" includes the 6128CP Amendatory Endorsement containing the UM coverage exclusion at issue on appeal. See id. The UM coverage exclusion in the State Farm policies specifically provides that UM coverage is limited to a mandatory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Financial

12 Responsibility Law of $25,000 if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a vehicle she owns but was not labeled as "YOUR CAR." Looking to the definition of "Your Car" in all four automobile policies which is defined in relevant part as "the vehicle shown under 'YOUR CAR' on the Declarations Page[,]" insureds, such as Appellant, are clearly and unambiguously informed that the UM coverage exclusion applies when the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a vehicle she owns but is not covered by the same policy covering the vehicle involved in the collision. See id. at 724 (similarly holding). Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to a grand total of $175,000 in UM coverage consisting of: (1) the full UM coverage policy limit of $100,000 under the Toyota Camry policy; and (2) the mandatory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law of $25,000 pursuant to the UM coverage exclusion under each of her other three automobile policies. Based on the foregoing, we find the UM coverage exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies to Appellant. Therefore, Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm because the court erred in enforcing the UM coverage exclusion has no merit. Appellant's first point on appeal is denied. Point Two: The Policy Language Defining "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" Is Clear and Unambiguous Appellant's second and final point on appeal argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm because the policy language defining "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" is ambiguous as the definitions create

13 conflicting interpretations of "YOUR CAR" within the UM coverage exclusion and "YOUR CAR" on the "DECLARATIONS PAGE." For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. In this case, State Farm's four policies specifically include a definition for the phrase "Your Car" separate from the definitions of "You or Your" and "Car." "Your Car" is defined in relevant part as "the vehicle shown under 'YOUR CAR' on the DECLARATIONS PAGE." The terms "You or Your" and "Car" are separately defined as "the named insured or named insureds shown on the Declarations Page" and "a land motor vehicle with four or more wheels, designed for use primarily on public roads," respectively. Based on the inclusion of three separate definitions of these words, it is clear State Farm intended the definition of "Your Car" to apply any time the words "your" and "car" appeared together in phrase. See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221 (finding that, inter alia, the use of definitions is not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent and when they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the policy as a whole, they will be enforced); see also Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 217) ("[w]e are bound to enforce unambiguous policy language as written"). Similarly, any time the words "you," "your," or "car" appeared separately and not together in a phrase, State Farm intended for the definitions of "You or Your" and "Car" to apply. See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221; see also Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 217). We hold the definitions of "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" are clear and unambiguous when read together in harmony with the use of "YOUR CAR" in the UM

14 coverage exclusion and the use of "YOUR CAR" on the "DECLARATIONS PAGE[s]." See Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880 (similarly holding with respect to the same exact policy language at issue in this case); see also Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221; Purk, 628 S.W.3d at 719, 722-23. Here, the UM coverage exclusion in all four of Appellant's automobile policies states in relevant part that it applies to an insured who sustains bodily injury "WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU IF IT IS NOT YOUR CAR." See Johnson v. State Farm, 604 S.W.3d at 880. Since the words "your" and "car" appear together, the definition of "Your Car" applies which means "the vehicle shown under 'YOUR CAR' on the Declarations Page." See id. The "DECLARATIONS PAGE" identically contained within each of Appellant's four automobile policies, lists only one vehicle under the "YOUR CAR" heading: (1) the Toyota Camry; (2) the Chevrolet Camaro; (3) the Toyota 4-Runner; or (4) the Toyota Tundra. See id. Appellant was occupying the Toyota Camry at the time of the collision. Consequently, under the policies for the Chevrolet Camaro, Toyota 4-Runner, and Toyota Tundra, the Toyota Camry is not "YOUR CAR" for purposes of UM coverage, based on the definition of "Your Car." See id. Therefore, the UM coverage exclusion applies under the policies for the Chevrolet Camaro, Toyota 4-Runner, and Toyota Tundra, and Appellant is only entitled to the mandatory minimum coverage required by the Missouri Financial Responsibility Law of $25,000 for each of these three policies. See id. We must enforce unambiguous policy language as written and cannot unreasonably distort policy language or exercise inventive

15 powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity that does not exist. See id. (citing Floyd- Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 217 and Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 163). Thus, we find the terms "Your Car," "You or Your," and "Car" clear and unambiguous within the context of the UM coverage exclusion ("YOUR CAR") and the "DECLARATIONS PAGE[s]" ("YOUR CAR"). Therefore, Appellant's second point on appeal is denied. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm on Appellant's breach of contract claim is affirmed.

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge

Lisa P. Page, Judge and Michael E. Gardner, Judge, concur.