Phoenix Hospitality, INC. vs. Timothy Teddy

PHOENIX HOSPITALITY, INC., ) ) Appellant, ) WD87596 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) November 18, 2025 TIMOTHY TEDDY, ) ) Respondent. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri The Honorable Joshua C. Devine, Judge Before Division Three: Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and Karen King Mitchell, Judge Appellant Phoenix Hospitality, Inc. (Phoenix), appeals, following the circuit court's denial of its petition for writ of mandamus requesting that respondent Timothy Teddy, in his capacity as the Director of Development for the City of Columbia, be ordered to approve Phoenix's May 2024 application for a tract split of real property in Columbia, Missouri. Phoenix raises one point on appeal: that the circuit court erred in finding that the applicable law provided Teddy with discretion to deny Phoenix's application rather than finding that approval of the application was a required ministerial act.

2 Respondent Teddy moved to dismiss the petition on two grounds: (1) that Phoenix's request for a writ of mandamus is moot because a portion of the property identified in the tract split application was condemned by court order on March 26, 2025, upon the petition of the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission (MoDOT) regarding a highway improvement project affecting the subject property; and (2) that Phoenix lacks standing to pursue its claim on appeal because its option to purchase part of the property was never finalized and the property owner revoked Phoenix's authority to pursue a tract split application. We grant Teddy's motion and dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness. Background On September 2, 2022, Phoenix entered into a contract entitled "Option to Purchase Real Estate" (Contract) with Charlene Kavanaugh (Owner), who owned approximately 22.5 acres of real property located at 3810 Clark Lane, Columbia, Missouri (Property). The Contract provided that Phoenix could exercise an option to purchase approximately half of the Property, identified as Tract A, and that Phoenix had a right of first refusal to purchase the remainder of the Property, identified as Tract B, in the event Owner offered Tract B for sale. For the sale of Tract A to occur, the Property had to be legally divided into separate tracts by the City of Columbia. The Contract gave Phoenix authority to seek approval for the tract split. 1 The Contract included a deadline of September 2024 for Owner's sale of Tract A to Phoenix to be completed.

1 In Section III, the Contract authorized Phoenix "to obtain[] from appropriate local government authority necessary zoning changes and final approval" of the

3 In his capacity as Director of Development, Teddy is authorized by Columbia's Unified Development Code (UDC) § 29-5.2(f) to review and approve or disapprove applications for tract splits to subdivide property for separate parcel sale. In February 2024, at Phoenix's request, 2 Teddy had conducted a concept review 3 of both the proposed tract split application and Phoenix's future development plans for Tract A. In May 2024, on Owner's behalf and with her authorization, an engineering and survey company hired by Phoenix submitted an application to the City of Columbia for an "administrative tract split" to subdivide the Property into two tracts, pursuant to UDC § 29-5.2(f), as required for Owner to sell Tract A to Phoenix. The tract split application did not include Phoenix's plans for the future development of the property. Under UDC § 29-5.2(f)(2)(i), in addition to the requirement that Teddy, as the Director of Community Development, conduct a "concept review" before determining if the application should be approved, Teddy was required to "consult with other city departments and public . . . agencies as he may deem necessary to confirm compliance with this chapter and other city ordinances and regulations." Teddy consulted with, among others, Columbia's Director of Public Works, who testified that he opposed the

subdivision, and Owner agreed to "cooperate in every way possible to "obtain[] . . . subdivision approval." 2 By letter of January 19, 2024, Phoenix requested "a concept review with City staff in order to discuss a tract split, preliminary plat, final plat, and rezoning of a property located south of the intersection of Clark Lane and Hanover Boulevard." This was an informal request, with the formal application not coming until May of 2024. 3 In UDC § 29-5.2(c)(3)(i), the term "concept review" is described as "an informal discussion" with the director [here, Teddy] that is "made available to the subdivider."

4 tract split due to safety issues and proposed roadway projects, including a proposal for I-70 improvements. In June 2024, Teddy notified Phoenix that the tract split could not be approved, stating I cannot sign a tract split at this time. The timing is unfortunate, and it took us additional time to understand what was happening. The reality is MoDOT secured approval from the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission (in February) and presented a design (on May 1-2) to the public that involves this tract in their $420 million first-phase plan to improve I-70. The split crosses the path of the planned improvement. Until right-of-way plans are completed, we cannot know where the tract can be split. The property, as you are aware, is zoned Agriculture and not zoned for a hotel-conference center at this time. On June 18, 2024, Teddy also provided Phoenix with detailed comments explaining that he had concluded that two of UDC § 29-5.2(f)(3)'s three "criteria for approval" of a tract split request were not met. Teddy determined that approval for a tract split was premature due to pending plans to improve I-70 4 and Phoenix's future plans to develop Tract A as "a commercial subdivision featuring a hotel-conference center and multiple lots." Specifically, in his comments about the decision, Teddy stated that the pending roadway improvements would directly affect the Property due to the construction of "new westbound entrance and exit ramps" for I-70 at Highway 63 in Columbia, along with "an

4 Teddy testified that "the Improve I-70 project" was referred to in the City's "Long- Range Transportation Plan."

5 extension of Hanover Boulevard" where it bisects Clark Lane, 5 "a new roundabout at Hanover Boulevard and Clark Lane," and "an associated underpass, including traffic lanes and a public sidewalk." Teddy also noted that Missouri's commitment to the roadway improvements "would render this two-tract split and a subdivision plan obsolete, as the extension of Hanover Boulevard would replace the [current] private street and require additional right of way for the roadway, sidewalk, retaining wall, ramps, and roundabout." Teddy testified that, although Phoenix's future development plans for Tract A were not specifically part of the tract split application, he had to consider such factors as "[w]hether [the tract split] was compatible with our long-range planning expressed in [the City's] comprehensive plan." Phoenix claims that it exercised its option to purchase Tract A from Owner on May 8, 2024; Owner claimed the option was exercised later, on August 30, 2024. However, under the terms of the Contract, Tract A could not be sold to Phoenix because the Property had not been legally subdivided to create Tracts A and B. The Contract's 6

September 2024 deadline to close the sale of Tract A from Owner to Phoenix then passed without the sale being closed because the tract split was not approved.

5 Teddy testified that "the tract split is more or less centered on Hanover Boulevard, so . . . the Hanover Boulevard extension [and] parts of the roundabout will be on portions of both tracts as proposed [by the tract split application]." 6 The Contract's closing deadline of September 1, 2024, was extended several weeks, and Owner delivered a warranty deed into escrow on September 16, 2024. Phoenix instructed the escrow agent that closing had to be postponed until the tract split had been approved. Owner then instructed the escrow agent that the Contract's "closing deadline" would be extended to September 30, 2024, the maximum extension allowed under the Contract. The sale failed to close by that deadline and remains unclosed.

6 Phoenix filed its petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court on June 25, 2024, requesting that respondent Teddy be ordered to approve Phoenix's application for a tract split; following a hearing, the circuit court denied Phoenix's petition on October 24,

1. Phoenix appealed the denial. On October 1, 2024, while the petition was pending

in the circuit court, Owner sued Phoenix, seeking a declaratory judgment that Owner owed Phoenix no further obligations under the Contract; Phoenix counterclaimed seeking specific performance of the Contract. In February 2025, however, both parties dismissed their claims with prejudice. Also in early 2025, while this appeal was pending, the circuit court, in a separate case, ordered portions of the Property (covering both proposed tracts) condemned, and the resulting monetary award was determined and then paid into the circuit court's registry in March 2025. That same month, Phoenix jointly consented to the distribution to Owner of a portion of the condemnation award for purposes of living expenses and loan repayment, which the circuit court ordered on March 26, 2025. On April 19, 2025, Owner gave written notice to Teddy of her withdrawal of the application for tract split and revocation of Phoenix's agency to act on her behalf, stating that the tract split application was withdrawn "immediately." Teddy's Motion to Dismiss the Appeal Teddy argues that Phoenix lacks standing and that the issue raised on appeal is moot. In support, Teddy states that the Contract's deadline to close the sale of Tract A has passed, Owner has withdrawn both the tract split application made on her behalf and Phoenix's authority to act for her, the circuit court ordered the condemnation of a portion

7 of the Property covering both proposed Tracts A and B, and changes to the Property have begun. At this point, there is no pending tract split application for Teddy to approve and, even if there were, the proposed split is now impossible due to the condemnation affecting the ownership of the proposed tracts. "The mootness of a controversy is a threshold question in any appellate review of that controversy." State ex rel. Chastain v. City of Kansas City, 968 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). A claim of mootness "raises the issue of justiciability"; a judgment is moot if it "would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy." WMAC 2013, LLC v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 714 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001)). Even a once-vital issue "may be mooted by an intervening event which so alters the position of the parties that any judgment rendered merely becomes a hypothetical opinion." Id. (quoting Reardon, 41 S.W.3d at 473). "When an event occurs that makes a decision on appeal unnecessary or makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief, the appeal is moot and generally should be dismissed." Chastain, 968 S.W.2d at 237 (declining to "decide questions of law disconnected from the granting of actual relief"). For example, the appeal of a potential mayoral candidate from denial of a writ to force city officials to place his name on an April 3, 2007 ballot was moot once the election date had passed. State ex rel. Davis v. City of St. John, 230 S.W.3d 351, 352-53 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (finding that any decision the court made "could have no effect").

8 In considering a motion to dismiss based on mootness, the court may consider facts outside the record. W. Plains Reg'l Animal Shelter v. Schnurbusch, 615 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). If the appeal is determined to be moot, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to decide the appeal on the merits only if "one of two narrow exceptions" exists: (1) the appeal becomes moot "after submission and argument"; or (2) "the issue raised is one of general public interest and importance, recurring in nature, and will otherwise evade appellate review." In re Williams, 618 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Norton v. McDonald, 590 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). The Property can no longer be split into the proposed Tracts A and B because portions of both proposed tracts, having been condemned, no longer belong to Owner. 7

We note that, after Teddy's denial of the tract split, Phoenix did not undertake to seek approval for a major subdivision, as allowed by UDC § 29-5.2(f)(2)(iii) (treating a denied tract split application as one for a "minor or major subdivision"), by complying with UDC § 29-5.2(c)(3)'s procedures to obtain such approval. Although Phoenix urges us to consider its interest in and damages from the Contract and its filing of a lis pendens in the action below, this appeal concerns only whether Teddy should be forced, through the granting of a writ of mandamus, to approve Phoenix's tract split application. Teddy cannot be ordered to grant a tract split application that is no longer pending before him, and even if the application were still pending, it addressed property the character of which has changed so that the original application could no longer be granted. In oral

7 In fact, Teddy's most recent briefing shows that MoDOT has already begun road work on the condemned portion of the Property.

9 argument, Phoenix claimed that Teddy had exceeded the authority provided in the UDC, and it appears that what Phoenix really wants is a determination that the original application should have been granted, so that Phoenix can pursue an action against Owner under the Contract or to support a claim for a portion of the condemnation proceeds. But mandamus is not the appropriate avenue to obtain such relief. The appeal is dismissed as moot. We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of the appeal notwithstanding its mootness, as we find no issues here of general public interest, nor is the matter one that, should it arise in the future, will evade appellate review. Conclusion The respondent's motion is granted and the appeal dismissed.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, concur.

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