Robert Sharp, Movant-Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Decision date: Unknown
Slip Opinion Notice
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Opinion
This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court. Opinion Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District Case Style: Robert Sharp, Movant-Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. Case Number: 22225 Handdown Date: 12/30/1998 Appeal From: Circuit Court of Phelps County, Hon. John D. Wiggins Counsel for Appellant: Rosalynn Koch Counsel for Respondent: Anne E. Hawley Opinion Summary: None Citation: Opinion Author: James K. Prewitt Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. Garrison, C.J., and Montgomery, J., concur. Opinion: Movant instituted this postconviction proceeding, relying upon Section 547.360, RSMo Supp. 1997. Movant had previously entered pleas of guilty and was convicted of first-degree burglary, two counts of sodomy, assault in the third degree, and armed-criminal action. Thereafter, he sought postconviction relief, pursuant to Rule 24.035. The trial court denied that motion and the denial was affirmed on appeal. The motion in the present case was denied without an evidentiary hearing, apparently on the basis that Section 547.360 did not create a second and independent avenue for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court of Missouri recently so held in Schleeper v. State, No. 80601, slip op. (Mo.banc Dec. 22, 1998). Although none of the three movants in Schleeper had previously filed a motion under Rule 24.035, they had filed motions under Rule 29.15 or Rule 27.26. The Supreme Court, however, made its holding "also applicable to Rule 24.035." Schleeper, slip op. at 3, n.2. The order denying Appellant's motion is affirmed. Separate Opinion:
None This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.
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