Sharon L. Peyton, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Bellefontaine Gardens Nursing & Rehab, Inc., John Doe Administrator, John Doe Management Entity, and John Doe Entity, Defendants/Respondents.

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court. Opinion Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Case Style: Sharon L. Peyton, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Bellefontaine Gardens Nursing & Rehab, Inc., John Doe Administrator, John Doe Management Entity, and John Doe Entity, Defendants/Respondents. Case Number: ED88689 Handdown Date: 04/17/2007 Appeal From: Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. John J. Riley Counsel for Appellant: Newton G. McCoy and Rodney J. Boyd Counsel for Respondent: Susan Ford Robertson Opinion Summary: After Sharon Peyton's petition was overruled for lack of standing, she sought leave to file an amended petition in which her mother, not Peyton, would be the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff appeals. DISMISSED. Division Four holds: Peyton was not aggrieved by the trial court overruling her motion for leave to file an amended petition in which Peyton's mother, not Peyton, would be the plaintiff. A party has no statutory right to appeal unless he or she is aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court. Citation: Opinion Author: Kathianne Knaup Crane, Judge Opinion Vote: DISMISSED. Richter, P.J., and Sullivan, J., concur. Opinion: Plaintiff granddaughter filed a petition in her own name against defendant nursing home owners and operators to

recover damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's grandmother, and trial court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. After the three-year statute of limitations had run, plaintiff, in her individual capacity, filed a motion in which she sought leave to file a second amended petition in which plaintiff's mother would be the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion and entered judgment in defendants' favor. Plaintiff, again acting in her capacity as an individual, appeals from the denial of leave to file the second amended petition. We dismiss because plaintiff was not aggrieved by the trial court's denial of leave to file a petition in which plaintiff's mother, not plaintiff, was the plaintiff. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Decedent, Ruby L. Lane, died on July 26, 2002. She was survived by her adult natural daughter, Mary Jo Williams, and her granddaughters, Jennifer Degraffenreid and Sharon Peyton. On July 15, 2005, Ms. Peyton filed a petition styled as "Sharon L. Peyton, as surviving heir of Decedent Ruby Lane, Plaintiffs" to recover damages for decedent's wrongful death against defendants, Bellefontaine Gardens Nursing & Rehab, Inc. and several "John Doe" defendants. Paragraph five of the petition alleged: "Mary William[s], adult natural daughter of Ruby L. Lane; Jennifer Degraffenreid, adult natural granddaughter of Ruby L. Lane although they are not named plaintiffs in this action, they have been notified of this cause of action pursuant to RSMo. 537.080 and 537.095." In her prayer for relief for each count, Ms. Peyton sought relief "as surviving heir of decedent Ruby Lane." Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing on the grounds that only Ms. Williams had standing under section 537.080(1) RSMo (2000). After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and Ms. Peyton now agrees she had no standing. On March 6, 2006, Ms. Peyton, acting in her individual capacity, filed a motion for leave to file a second amended petition or, in the alternative, to enter final judgment. The style of the proposed second amended petition showed the plaintiff as "Mary Jo Williams, by and through Sharon Peyton, her attorney in fact."(FN1) The trial court thereafter entered an order and judgment in which it denied Ms. Peyton's motion to file a second amended petition because Ms. Peyton had no standing to file the original petition. It concluded that Ms. Williams' claim for the wrongful death of decedent was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations for wrongful death,(FN2) and Ms. Williams' claim could not relate back to the original petition filed by Ms. Peyton. The trial court entered final judgment in

defendants' favor. Ms. Peyton appeals. DISCUSSION For her sole point on appeal, Ms. Peyton contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave to file the proposed second amended petition because the trial court based its decision on the erroneous conclusion that the amended petition would not relate back to Ms. Peyton's original petition. We do not reach the merits of this claim because Ms. Peyton is not aggrieved by the trial court's denial of leave to file the proposed second amended petition in which Ms. Williams, not Ms. Peyton, was the plaintiff. A party has no right to appeal unless he or she is aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court. Section 512.020 RSMo (2000); Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Dodson Int'l Parts, Inc., 155 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Mo. banc 2005). "A party is aggrieved 'when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interests and such effect is immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence.'" Ameristar, 155 S.W.3d at 57 (quoting Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 793 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Mo. banc 1990)). If a party has no standing to appeal, we have no jurisdiction to address that party's claims. In Re Q.M.B., 85 S.W.3d 654, 660-62 (Mo.App. 2002); Warren v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., 11 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Mo.App. 1999). Ms. Peyton is not a party to the proposed second amended petition in her capacity as an individual. However, Ms. Peyton has filed this appeal in her individual capacity. Ms. Peyton is not an aggrieved party on appeal because the denial of leave to file the second amended petition does not directly affect her personal or property rights or interests but only those of Ms. Williams. The relief Ms. Peyton requests on appeal would not personally benefit her. Because she is not aggrieved, Ms. Peyton has no right to appeal in her individual capacity, and we have no jurisdiction to address her claim. Appeal dismissed. Footnotes: FN1. On August 8, 2002, Ms. Williams had executed a power of attorney naming plaintiff her attorney-in-fact. This instrument gave plaintiff the power to file lawsuits for Ms. Williams and in her name for claims to which she was entitled.

FN2. Section 537.100 RSMo (2000). Separate Opinion: None This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.