State of Missouri, Appellant, v. Alexander T. Kalk, Respondent.
Decision date: UnknownED92326
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Syllabus
3Jntbe;!ffilissouri<!Courtof~ppeaIs <!Eastern1JBistrict DIVISIONFOUR Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.ED92326 STATEOFMISSOURI, Appellant, AppealfromtheCircuitCourt ofSt.LouisCounty v. ALEXANDERT.KALK, HonorableGloriaC.Reno
Introduction TheStateofMissouri(State)appealsthetrialcourt'sjudgmentgrantingdefendant AlexanderKalk'sMotionforJudgmentofAcquittalfollowingthejury'sverdictofguiltonthe chargethatDefendantviolatedanorderofprotection.Weaffirmthetrialcourt'sjudgment. Background InJanuary2006,duringthependencyoftheirdissolutionaction,JulieKalk(Wife) obtainedanexparteorderofprotectionagainstAlexanderKalk(Defendant),thenherhusband. TheorderofprotectionprohibitedDefendantfromenteringthepremisesat19BlackCreek Lane,wherehepreviouslyresidedwithWifeandtheiryoungchildren.Defendantwasserved withtheorderofprotectionbyhisdivorceattorneyJackEisen(Eisen),whopersonallyhandeda copyoftheordertoDefendantonJanuary20,2006. OnFebruary17,2006,Wife'sattorneyandEisenwerenegotiatinga dismissalofthe orderofprotection.EiseninformedDefendantofthenegotiationsthroughemailandtelephone.
Wifeofferedtodismisstheadultabusepetitionandorderofprotectionif Defendantagreedto, amongotherthings,giveWifeexclusivepossessionofthemaritalresidence,refrainfrom disturbingherpeace,andfollowa parentingplanrecommendedbytheguardianadlitem.After DefendantandEisendiscussedWife'sofferandDefendant'scounterproposal,Defendanttold Eisenhewould"sleeponit."Thereafter,EisensentWife'sattorneyanotheremailstating,"I just receivedyourfaxofa memodismissingtheadultabusematter.Hasthisbeenfiledtoday?" Eisentestified,however,thatthedismissalmusthavebeensignedbythejudgetobeeffective. Thatsameday,at 4:51p.m.,DefendantsentEisenanemailstating,"I wantconfirmation rightnowthattheadultabusewasdropped."DefendanttestifiedthatEisentoldhimheobtained thedismissaloftheorderofprotectionin writing,andto"justtakeit easy."Eisentestifiedthat hereceiveda copyofa dismissaloftheorderofprotection,informedDefendantofhisreceiptof thecopy,butfurtheradvisedDefendantthatthedismissalwasnotyeteffectivebecauseit had notbeensignedbythejudge.EisenfurthertestifiedthatheadvisedDefendantnottogoto Wife'sresidence. OnMonday,February20,DefendantsentEisenane-mailstating,"FaxmeASAPbefore 4:30a copyofthenoticeoftheappointmentof[theguardianadlitem]aswellasa copyofthe formaldismissalofadultabuse." Eisentestifiedthat,onFebruary21,2006,hereceiveda faxfromWife'sattorneystating, "AttachedpleasefindTXreportsshowingthedismissalnoticebeingfaxedtocourtonFriday [February17,2006]asI represented.DismissalwassentandRCVDto615-4519at 5:13p.m. and615-8280at 5:07.Notsurewhysenttobothnumbersorwhatthosenumbersarefor. DivisionfifthfloorAB."TheStatepresentednoevidencetothecontrarythatwould demonstratethatWife'sattorneyhadnotfiledbyfacsimilethedismissalnoticeto thecourton 2
February17,2006,norevidencethatthecourthadnotreceivedit at thattimeandday.Alsoon February21,2006,EisenreceivedanemailfromWife'sattorneystatingthatthedismissalwas notin thecourtfileand"maystillbewanderingaroundthecourt"becausethedivisionnumber hadbeenlistedincorrectly.Additionally,EisenunderstoodWife'sattorneytostatethatWifeno longerwoulddismisstheorderofprotection.Wife'sattorneyfileda withdrawalofthedismissal thatday,February21,2006.ThecourtminutesshowthatonFebruary21,2006,a motionto withdrawthedismissalwasfiledbyWifeandgrantedoverDefendant'sobjections. OnFebruary21,2006,Defendantenteredthehousethatwasthesubjectoftheexparte orderofprotection. OnMarch2,2006,DefendantwaschargedbyInformationwithCountI,a classA misdemeanor,violationofanorderofprotection,in violationofSections455.010,455.045and 455.085,RSMo2000,I andCountII,a classB misdemeanor,makinga falsereport,in violation ofSection575.080.Theinformationallegedthat,onFebruary21,2006,at approximately12:30 p.m.,Defendant"knowinglyviolatedthetermsandconditionsoftheorder[ofprotection]by enteringthepremisesat19BlackCreekLane"andthat,at approximately12:56p.m,he "knowinglymadea falsereportto. . . lawenforcementofficers,thata crime,namely,anassault on[Defendant]byher[Wife'smother]grabbinghisrightupperarmapplyinga crushingforceto histricepsandbicepsandbyherbeatinghimabouttheshoulders,headandbackwithherarms andhandshadoccurred." EisenwithdrewasDefendant'sattorneyonFebruary22,2006,informingDefendantthat thecourthadreinstatedtheadultabusecasebecauseDefendanthadgonetotheresidence. A jurytrialtookplacefromOctober20throughOctober22,2008,duringwhichevidence wasadducedasoutlinedin theInformationabove;furtherevidenceregardingDefendant's IAllsubsequentstatutorycitationsaretoRSMo2000,unlessotherwiseindicated. 3
allegedviolationoftheorderofprotectionandmakinga falsereportonFebruary21,2006,was presented. AfterthecloseoftheState'sevidence,Defendantfileda motionforjudgmentof acquittal,whichthetrialcourtdenied.Atthecloseofalltheevidence,Defendantagainfileda motionforjudgmentofacquittal,whichthetrialcourtalsodenied. OnOctober22,2008,thejuryfoundDefendantguiltyofbothcounts.Thejuryassessed punishmentofsixmonthsofimprisonmentin thecountyjailfortheviolationoftheorderof protection,andrecommendeda fineof$500forthechargeofmakinga falsereport.Thetrial courtacceptedthejury'srecommendedjudgmentandsentence. OnOctober31,2008,afterthejurywasdischarged,Defendanttimelyfileda Motionfor JudgmentofAcquittal(Motion)pursuanttoRule27.07(clInhisMotion,Defendantalleged thatthe"evidenceat trialwasinsufficienttosustaintheconviction,andthereforetheverdict shouldbesetasideasa matteroflaw,anda judgmentofacquittalsubstitutedtherefor." Defendantalsofileda motionfornewtrialonthesameday,allegingthatthetrialcourterredin denyingDefendant'spretrialmotiontodismissCountI.Insupportofhismotionfornewtrial, Defendantallegedthathecouldnotbeprosecutedforviolatingtheorderofprotectionon February21,2006,becausetheorderofprotectionwasanexparteorderthathadbeen voluntarilydismissedbyWifeunderRule67.02(a)onFebruary17,2006.Defendantarguedin hismotionfornewtrialthatWife'sdismissaloftheorderofprotectionbecameeffectiveupon herfilingthedismissalwiththetrialcourtonFebruary17,2006,becausetheexparteorderwas a civilaction,andWifevoluntarilydismissedherpetitionforanorderofprotectionpriorto the takingofanyevidence. 2AllrulecitationsaretoMissouriSupremeCourtRules(2008),unlessotherwisenoted. 4
OnNovember17,2008,thetrialcourtenteredanorderdenyingDefendant'smotionfora newtrial,butgranting"Defendant'sMotionforJudgmentofAcquittalNot-with-standingthe jury'sverdictofguilt"astoCount1.Thetrialcourtfurtherorderedthatthejudgmentbe suspendedfortendays.OnDecember1, 2008,thetrialcourtentereditsjudgmentgranting Defendant'sMotionforJudgmentofAcquittalNotwithstandingtheJury'sverdictofguiltasto Count1.3 OnDecember11,2008,theStatefileditsnoticeofappealwiththisCourt.Thisappeal follows. PointonAppeal Initssolepointonappeal,theStatecontendsthetrialcourterredwhenit granted Defendant'sMotionbecausethereis nolegalorfactualbasisin thecaseat handtosupportsucha decision.4 StandardofReview Anappellatecourtreviewsa judgmentofacquittaltodeterminewhethertheState adducedsufficientevidencetomakea submissiblecase.Statev.Richardson,22S.W.3d753, 755(Mo.App.E.D.2000).Indeterminingwhethertheevidenceis sufficienttosupporta 3 CounselfortheStatenotedduringoralargumentthata judgment"notwithstandingthejury'sverdict"is permitted onlyincivilcases,andis nota remedyavailabletodefendantsincriminalmatters.Therecordshowsthat Defendanttimelyfileda motionforjudgmentofacquittalpursuanttoRule27.07(c)oftheMissouriRulesof CriminalProcedure,whichallowsa motionforjudgmentofacquittaltobemadeorrenewedwithinfifteendaysof thejury'sguiltyverdict.Suchmotionis distinctfroma motionforjudgmentnotwithstandingtheverdictauthorized underRule72.01oftheMissouriRulesofCivilProcedure.Whilethetrialcourtinadvertentlyreferredtoits judgmentasa "JudgmentofAcquittalNot-with-standingtheJury'sVerdict,"suchmisnomerdoesnotrenderthe trialcourt'sjudgmentvoid.Thetrialcourt'srulingandjudgmentwasenteredin responsetoDefendant'sproperly filedMotionforAcquittal. 4 TheState'sbrieffailstocomplywiththerequirementsofRule84.04.TheState'spointonappealdoesnotstate thelegalreasonsfortheclaimoferror,nordoesit explainwhy,inthecontextofthecase,thelegalreasonssupport itsclaimthaterroroccurred.Further,theStatehasfailedtolistthecasesandotherlegalauthorityuponwhichthe Stateprincipallyrelies.Rules30.06(d)and84.04(d).TherequirementsofRule84.04aremandatory.Statev. Slaughter,267S.W.3d841,845(Mo.App.S.D.2008).DespitetheState'sfailuretoadheretothebriefing requirementssetforthinRule84.04,wewillreviewtheState'sclaimexgratia. 5
conviction,thisCourtacceptsastrueallreasonableinferencesdrawnfromtheevidenceand disregardsallevidenceandinferencestothecontrary.Id. Discussion Whetherthetrialcourterredinsettingasidethejuryverdictandenteringa judgmentof acquittalis dependantupontheanswertooneseeminglysimplequestion:Wastheorderof protectionin effectat thetimeDefendantenteredWife'shome? It is undisputedthatDefendantenteredWife'shomeonFebruary21,2006.Therecord containsevidencethatDefendanthadbeencounseledbyhisdivorceattorneythattheorderof protectionwasin effect,andthatWife'svoluntarydismissaloftheorderofprotectionwasnot effectiveuntilthedismissalwassignedbya judge.SuchevidenceasadducedbytheState establishesa submissiblecasesufficienttosustainDefendant'sconviction,butonlyif theorder ofprotectionwasindeedin effectonFebruary21,2006,whenDefendantenteredWife'shome. Theanswertothisquestionis foundwithinSection455.060,andmandatesouraffirmanceofthe trialcourt'sjudgment. Section455.060.5provides,in pertinentpart,that"[a]nyorderofprotectionS. . . entered undersections455.010to455.085shallterminateuponthefilingofa motiontoterminatethe orderofprotectionbythepetitioner;"andmakesexceptiononlyincaseswheretheordergrants custodyofa minorchildtotherespondent.Section455.060.5. Theevidenceshowsthatthedismissalwasfaxedto thecourtonFriday,February17, 2006,at 5:07and5:13p.m.,andthuswaseffectiveimmediately.EisentestifiedthatonFebruary 21,2006,hereceiveda faxfromWife'sattorneystating,"AttachedpleasefindTXreports showingthedismissalnoticebeingfaxedtocourtonFriday[February17,2006]asI represented. 5 Inreferringto"any"orderofprotection,Section455.060.5doesnotdifferentiatebetweenexparteordersandfull ordersofprotection.Neitherdowe. 6
DismissalwassentandRCVDto615-4519at 5:13p.m.and615-8280at 5:07.Notsurewhy sentto bothnumbersorwhatthosenumbersarefor.DivisionfifthfloorAB."TheState presentednoevidencetothecontrarythatwoulddemonstratethatWife'sattorneyhadnotfiled byfacsimilethedismissalnoticetothecourtonFebruary17,2006,norevidencethatthecourt hadnotreceivedthedismissalat thattimeandday.Inlightofourstandardofreview,wemust acceptastrueallreasonableinferencesdrawnfromtheevidencepresented,includingthe evidencethatWife'sattorneyhadindeedfaxedtothecourta dismissaloftheorderofprotection onFebruary17,2006.SeeRichardson,22S.W.3dat 755. TheTwenty-firstJudicialCircuitCourtRule3.4(2)provides,"Adocumentreceivedby facsimiletransmissionwillbedeemedfiledasofthedateandtimerecordedbythefacsimile. Thepartytransmittingthedocumentis responsibleforthecompletenessofthetransmission." AccordingtoSection455.060.5,theorderofprotectionwastherebyterminateduponthefiling ofthemotiontoterminate,or"dismissalnotice,"asit wasreferencedhere.Therefore,the actionstakenbyDefendantontheafternoonofFebruary21,2006,allegedbytheStatetohave constituteda violationoftheorderofprotection,wouldnothaveviolatedanorderofprotection thathadbeendismissedpriortothattime.Accordingly,thetrialcourtproperlygranted Defendant'smotionforjudgmentofacquittalafterthejuryreturneda verdictofguiltonCountI, theviolationoftheorderofprotection.TheState'sappealis denied. Conclusion Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtis affirmed. ~A-L~ KurtS. Odenwald,PresidingJudge GeorgeW.DraperIII,J.,Concurs RoyL.Richter,J.,Concursinresult 7
3Jntbemissouri~ourtof~ppeaIs (!Eastern1!\istri!t DIVISIONFOUR STATEOFMISSOURI, No.ED92326 Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) AppealfromtheCircuitCourt ofSt.LouisCounty Appellant, vs. ALEXANDERT.KALK, HonorableGloriaC.Reno
I concurintheresultbutwritetobringattentionto theproblemscreatedbythe
statutesandlocalcourtrulesofSt.LouisCounty.Here,thewifefileda Petition requestinganOrderofProtection,whichtheCourtgranted,exparte.PartoftheCourt's responsibilityis detailedinSection455.040.3,whichreads: 3.Acopyofanyorderofprotectiongrantedpursuanttosections455.010 to455.085shallbeissuedtothepetitionerandtothelocallaw enforcementagencyinthejurisdictionwherethepetitionerresides.The clerkshallalsoissuea copyofanyorderofprotectiontothelocallaw enforcement'agencyresponsibleformaintainingtheMissouriuniformlaw enforcementsystemoranyothercomparablelawenforcementsystemthe samedaytheorderis granted.Thelawenforcementagencyresponsiblefor maintainingMULESshallenterinformationcontainedintheorderfor purposesofverificationwithintwenty-fourhoursfromthetimetheorder isgranted.Anoticeofexpirationorofterminationofanyorderof protectionshallbeissuedtothelocallawenforcementagencyandtothe lawenforcementagencyresponsibleformaintainingMULESoranyother comparablelawenforcementsystem.Thelawenforcementagency responsibleformaintainingtheapplicablelawenforcementsystemshall
entersuchinformationinthesystem.Theinformationcontainedinan orderofprotectionmaybeenteredintheMissouriuniformlaw enforcementsystemorcomparablelawenforcementsystemusinga direct automateddatatransferfromthecourtautomatedsystemtothelaw enforcementsystem.(emphasisadded) Asa practicalmatter,theCourtenterstheExParteOrder,andCourtClerksenter thefactofthatOrder'sexistenceintotheMissouriUniformLawEnforcement System(MULES).Thelocallawenforcementagencywherethepetitioner residesalsoreceivesa copyoftheOrder.Theentryofthisinformationpermits lawenforcementofficerstodetermineif anOrderexistswhenviolationsof Ordersarealleged.LawenforcementofficersroutinelyrelyonMULESfor verificationofoutstandingarrestwarrantsandOrdersofProtection. Inthiscase,Petitionerapparently!fileda MotiontoDismisstheOrderon Friday,February17,2006.TherewastestimonythattheMotionwasfaxedtothe Courtsometimeafter5:00p.m.ontheeveningofFebruary1ih.TheTwenty-first JudicialCircuitCourtRule3.4(2)provides,"Adocumentreceivedbyfacsimile transmissionwillbedeemedfiledasofthedateandtimerecordedbythe facsimile.Thepartytransmittingthedocumentis responsibleforthe completenessofthetransmission."Sincethefaxwouldnothavebeenseenby Courtpersonnelafterbusinesshoursona Fridayevening,MULESwasnot notifiedofthetermination.Courtpersonnelwouldnothavebeenawareofthe intendedterminationuntiltheCourtopenedonTuesdaymorning,February21st, asFebruary20wasthePresidents'DayHolidayandtheCourtwasclosed. 1Thelegalfiledoesnotincludeanydocumentindicatingthata MotiontoTenninatethe Orderof ProtectionorMotionto DismissthePetitionwasfaxedtotheCourt. 2
Lawenforcementis thereforeplacedin theunenviablepositionofbeing unabletodeterminewhethera Court'sOrderofProtectionis valid,orif it has beenterminatedbythefaxedfilingofa MotionbythePetitionerwhichhasnot beenseenbyCourtpersonnelandthereforehasnotbeenenteredintoMULES. Thestatuteallowsa Petitionertodissolvea CourtOrderwithoutjudicialaction, andtheLocalCourtRulesofSt.LouisCountyexacerbatethesituationby deemingsomethingfiledwhenCourtpersonnelareunawareofthe"filing." Nightsandweekendsare"primetime"forviolationsofOrdersofProtection,and lawenforcementwillalwayswonderif theinformationfromMULESis accurate, orif thereis a MotiontoDismisssittingin thetrayofa faxmachine,waitingtobe seenbycourtpersonnelat thestartofthenextbusinessday. Innootherareaofthelawis a partygiventhepowertounilaterally dissolvea Court'sOrder;permittinga partytodosowhentheexistenceofsuch anOrderis requiredtobeenteredintoa databaserelieduponbylawenforcement invitesarreststhatmaylaterbedeterminedtohavebeenunnecessary.The LegislaturemaywishtochangethestatutetorequireCourtapprovalbeforea Court'sorderis dissolved. ~(~ RoyL.Riter,Judge 3
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