State of Missouri, ex rel., State Tax Commission vs. County Executive of Jackson County, Missouri, Assessor of Jackson County, Missouri, Jackson County Board of Equalization, through its Members in their Official Capacities, Clerk of the Jackson County, Missouri, Legislature

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel., ) STATE TAX COMMISSION, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) WD87831 ) COUNTY EXECUTIVE OF ) Opinion filed: December 30, 2025 JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, ) ASSESSOR OF JACKSON COUNTY, ) MISSOURI, JACKSON COUNTY ) BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) THROUGH ITS MEMBERS IN THEIR ) OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, CLERK OF ) THE JACKSON COUNTY, ) MISSOURI, LEGISLATURE, ) ) Respondents. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI HONORABLE JACQUELINE A. COOK, JUDGE

Division Two: Anthony Rex Gabbert, Chief Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

The 2023 assessment of real property in Jackson County, Missouri prompted many lawsuits, including two filed by the State Tax Commission ("the Commission") against Jackson County and county officials. This appeal is from one of those lawsuits.

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In December 2023, the Commission and the Missouri Attorney General initiated an action against Jackson County, Missouri ("the County"), alleging the County's 2023 real property assessment violated Missouri law. The Commission and the Attorney General sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and a writ of mandamus directing the County to comply with the law. In August 2024—while that matter was still pending—the Commission issued its own order finding the County's 2023 real property assessment violated Missouri law and directing the County to alter the assessed values of real property. The following day, the Commission and Attorney General moved to voluntarily dismiss their lawsuit; the suit was dismissed with prejudice. When the County did not comply with the Commission's order, the Commission initiated the present action, requesting the Circuit Court of Jackson County ("the trial court") issue a writ of mandamus directing county officials and the Jackson County Board of Equalization to comply with the order. The trial court dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 67.01, finding the lawsuit was barred under res judicata principles because the Commission's earlier action had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The Commission appeals. Because the present mandamus action asserts a different claim than that asserted in the earlier action, the trial court erred in finding res judicata barred this case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Background The Commission is an administrative agency within the Department of Revenue that "deal[s]" with the "specialized field" of property tax law. Cuivre River Elec. Coop.,

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Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n of Mo., 769 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Mo. banc 1989). "[I]t is a primary duty of the State Tax Commission to exercise general supervisory power over county assessors and boards of equalization to the end that . . . property tax laws are complied with by the assessors and boards of equalization." State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S.W.2d 325, 330 (Mo. banc 1979) (opinion on rehearing, per curiam); see also § 138.410, RSMo

1. The Commission "may issue orders designed to enforce the law." Riney, 576 S.W.2d

at 330. "In Jackson County, Missouri—as in all Missouri counties—real property is assessed for tax purposes on a two-year cycle, with values being placed on properties by the Assessor in odd-numbered years." Westside Neighborhood Ass'n v. Beatty, 643 S.W.3d 539, 540 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). "By law, the Assessor is prohibited from increasing the value of any property 'by more than fifteen percent since the last assessment'—excluding increases due to new construction or improvements—unless the Assessor 'conduct[s] a physical inspection of such property.'" Id. at 540-41 (quoting § 137.115.10, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2018). 1 "If a physical inspection is required, 'the assessor shall notify the property owner of that fact in writing and shall provide the owner clear written notice of the owner's rights relating to the physical inspection.'" Id. at 541 (quoting § 137.115.11, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2018). "If a physical inspection is required, the property owner may request that an interior inspection be performed during the physical inspection," and the owner "shall have

1 Section 137.115.10 and .11 have not been amended or altered since 2018. All statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2023 unless otherwise noted.

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no less than thirty days to notify the assessor of a request for an interior physical inspection." § 137.115.11. Turning to the underlying facts, in December 2023, the Commission and the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief ("the first case") against the County, the Jackson County Board of Equalization, and county officials. The Commission and Attorney General alleged that the County's 2023 real property assessment violated Missouri law in various ways, including that the County did not perform physical inspections of property before increasing the assessed value of property by more than fifteen percent since the last assessment, nor did the County provide accurate and timely notice of physical inspections. They also alleged the County's appeal process—by which property owners could challenge their valuation—was defective, and thus owners were being denied access to statutorily mandated administrative remedies. As relief, the Commission and Attorney General requested—among other things—an injunction limiting the assessed valuations of residential property to an increase of no more than fifteen percent from the previous assessment and an "order in mandamus compelling [the County and county officials] to comply with Missouri law in executing their mandatory ministerial duties in making taxation assessments of real property in Jackson County, Missouri and in providing administrative remedies." The first case proceeded to a bench trial, which occurred on June 27, June 28, and July 8, 2024. The trial was set to continue on August 9th. However, on August 6th, the Commission issued an order ("August 6 Order") finding the County failed to comply with the law when completing its 2023 real property assessment and ordering that:

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1. Jackson County assessing officials shall correct the 2023 Assessment

Roll to reflect assessed valuations of all parcels of subclass (1) real property, excluding increases due to new construction or improvements, that equal the valuations determined by Jackson County assessing officials, or valuations that do not exceed fifteen percent since the last assessment, whichever is less.

1. With respect to 2023 appeals that are still pending before the Board of

Equalization, the Board of Equalization shall assess all parcels of subclass (1) real property, excluding increases due to new construction or improvements, at their true value in money or at valuations that do not exceed fifteen percent since the last assessment, whichever is less.

1. Within 30 days from the date of this Order, Jackson County assessing

officials shall review all 2023 subclass (1) real property stipulations that have been submitted to the State Tax Commission for approval and shall notify the State Tax Commission of all stipulated amounts that exceed the valuation limit described in paragraphs 1 and 2, above.

1. The assessed valuations for 2024 subclass (1) real property shall remain

the same as the assessed valuations in the 2023 assessment roll, as corrected by this Order, excluding increases due to new construction or improvements. The following day (August 7, 2024), the Commission and Attorney General moved to voluntarily dismiss the first case. On August 8th, the trial court dismissed the first case with prejudice. On August 30th, the Commission sent a letter to the Jackson County Executive, the Jackson County Assessor, the Jackson County Board of Equalization, and the Clerk of the Jackson County Legislature ("County Respondents") requesting that they "respond in writing by email to this letter no later than Wednesday, September 4, 2024, at 4:30 p.m., describing [their] plans for implementing the August 6, 2024 Order." The Commission advised that it would "construe a non-response or a negative response as [County Respondents'] indication that [they did] not plan to comply with the Order."

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County Respondents did not respond to the letter by September 4th, and instead, on that date, the County and county officials filed an action against the Commission ("County case"). They alleged the Commission's August 6 Order was invalid, unlawful, unconstitutional, and unenforceable. They sought judicial review, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari, requesting the trial court prohibit the Commission from taking any action to enforce the August 6 Order. Shortly after, on September 9th, the Commission initiated the present case by filing a petition for writ of mandamus. The Commission sought an order in mandamus from the trial court compelling County Respondents to comply with the August 6 Order. The trial court entered a preliminary order in mandamus, directing County Respondents to "file [their] pleadings" to the Commission's petition. County Respondents responded by filing a motion to dismiss, asserting the Commission's petition for writ of mandamus should be dismissed under Rule 67.01 because the Commission was bringing the same cause of action as it brought in the first case, and the first case was dismissed with prejudice. Rule 67.01 provides that a "dismissal without prejudice permits the party to bring another civil action for the same cause, unless the civil action is otherwise barred," however a "dismissal with prejudice bars the assertion of the same cause of action or claim against the same party." After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered judgment on November 20, 2024 denying County Respondents' motion to dismiss but also dismissing the Commission's petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court found that because County Respondents attached materials to their motion to dismiss in support of their argument that res judicata applied, the trial court was required to treat the motion as one for summary

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judgment, which would entail giving the parties time to present additional materials. But based on the parties' expressed "need to expedite these proceedings," the trial court denied County Respondents' motion and instead conducted a "sua sponte review of res judicata and Rule 67.01." 2

The trial court determined that the cause of action asserted in the pending case was the same as that asserted in the first case, and thus "the pending case [was] barred" by res judicata. The trial court dismissed the Commission's petition for writ of mandamus with prejudice. The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Commission then appealed to this Court. Meanwhile, the County case proceeded to trial, after which—on March 31, 2025— the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Commission and against the County. The trial court determined that the Commission acted lawfully and within its authority when it issued the August 6 Order and the Commission issued the August 6 Order upon substantial and competent evidence. Standard of Review "Appellate review of the trial court's grant or refusal of a writ of mandamus is for an abuse of discretion." State ex rel. Peters v. Fitzpatrick, 681 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Mo. App.

2 As authority for its ability to conduct this "sua sponte review," the trial court relied on Patrick V. Koepke Construction, Inc. v. Woodsage Construction Co., 119 S.W.3d 551, 555 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) ("[I]f a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste." (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000))) and Montanari v. McKay-Montanari, 699 S.W.3d 567, 573-74 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (affirming trial court's sua sponte dismissal based on res judicata).

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W.D. 2023). "The trial court necessarily abuses its discretion where its ruling is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law." Id. "The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Id.; see also Montanari v. McKay-Montanari, 699 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (applying de novo review to trial court's judgment sua sponte dismissing petition on res judicata grounds). Analysis The Commission raises four points on appeal, however we find the first point dispositive. In its first point, the Commission asserts the trial court erred in dismissing the petition on res judicata grounds because the present case "was premised on new ultimate facts that were not in issue at the time the prior judgment was rendered." We agree. "The common-law doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of a claim formerly made." 3 Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. banc 2002). Therefore, key to any res judicata analysis is determining what is the "claim" that was previously litigated. "A claim is the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court." Id. (internal marks omitted). Similarly, a cause of action is defined as "a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing." Id. Both

3 Under the common-law doctrine, res judicata only bars a claim or cause of action where the earlier claim or cause had been decided on the merits. Williams v. Rape, 990 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). However, Rule 67.01 extends "res judicata principles to cases which had been previously dismissed with prejudice without reaching the merits." Id. (internal emphasis omitted); see also Boehlein v. Crawford, 605 S.W.3d 135, 142 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) ("Missouri courts have held that the purpose of Rule 67.01, as revised in 1973, is to extend res judicata principles to cases which are dismissed with prejudice but where the merits were not reached." (footnote omitted)).

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definitions "center[] on 'facts' that form or could form the basis of the previous adjudication." Id. The doctrine of res judicata "precludes not only those issues on which the court in the former case was required to pronounce judgment, but to every point properly belonging to the subject matter of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time." Id. (internal marks omitted). Thus, the doctrine "prevents reassertion of the same claim even though additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced to support it." State ex rel. Lewis v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, Platte Cnty., 688 S.W.3d 29, 49 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Chesterfield Vill., 64 S.W.3d at 320). However, a subsequent claim may proceed if it is based on "new ultimate facts." See id. ("There must be 'new ultimate facts, as opposed to evidentiary details, that form a new claim for relief.'" (quoting Chesterfield Vill., 64 S.W.3d at 320)). "To constitute 'new' ultimate facts, those facts that form the basis of a new claim for relief must be unknown to plaintiff or yet-to-occur at the time of the first action." Boehlein v. Crawford, 605 S.W.3d 135, 142 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). "Indeed, res judicata extends only to the facts in issue as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and does not prevent a reexamination of the same questions between the same parties where in the interval the facts have changed or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of litigants." State ex rel. Lewis, 688 S.W.3d at 49 (internal marks and emphasis omitted). Res judicata does not bar the present mandamus action because the factual bases for this case and the first case were different. In the first case, the Commission asserted the

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County's 2023 property assessment was unlawful; the factual basis for the Commission's claim was the County's conduct in assessing real property and providing property owners an appeal from that assessment. This action for a writ of mandamus is premised on County Respondents' refusal to comply with the August 6 Order directing them to alter the 2023 property tax assessments. 4 Although the first case and present mandamus action are undoubtedly related, res judicata does not prevent reexamination of related—or even the same—issues between the same parties "where in the interval the facts have changed or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of litigants." State ex rel. Lewis, 688 S.W.3d at 49 (internal marks and emphasis omitted) (finding res judicata did not apply to bar a second action: "While the present case and the 2017 proceedings both dealt with applications for [special use permits] for the same type of use at the same Property, the respective cases were not dealing with the same application," as changes were made to the application after 2017 that required "reexamination" of whether a permit should be granted). After the first case was dismissed, new facts occurred that altered the legal rights and relations of the parties: County Respondents definitively refused to comply with the August 6 Order and, in fact, filed their own action challenging the order's validity. County Respondents' refusal to comply with this order was a new ultimate fact that formed the basis of a new claim for relief: an independent cause of action in mandamus.

4 "[F]or a writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must establish a public official failed to perform a ministerial duty." Curtis v. Mo. Democratic Party, 548 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Mo. banc 2018). "A ministerial duty is a duty of a clerical nature which a public officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed." Id. at 915 (internal marks and emphasis omitted).

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In finding res judicata barred this action, the trial court relied on State ex rel. Shea v. Bossola, 827 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). However, we find Bossola distinguishable. In Bossola, the plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the city of St. Louis. 827 S.W.2d at 723. He filed a § 1983 action in federal court alleging unlawful termination and then filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, which was stayed pending his federal action. Id. After judgment was entered against the plaintiff in federal court, he sought to activate his appeal in front of the Civil Service Commission. Id. The circuit court issued a writ prohibiting the Civil Service Commission from hearing the appeal on res judicata grounds, and the Eastern District affirmed on appeal, finding that the plaintiff's cause of action in federal court and in his appeal to the Civil Service Commission were "identical," in that in both actions he claimed "a right to a remedy of damages for loss of wages based upon his allegedly wrongful layoff." Id. Unlike in Bossola, here, the causes of action in the first case and the present mandamus case are not identical. As stated above, the present mandamus action asserts a new claim that arose after County Respondents refused to comply with the August 6 Order. Whether County Respondents were required to comply with the August 6 Order was not at issue in the first case. This matter, therefore, is distinguishable from Bossola, where the plaintiff litigated his employment action in federal court, lost, then attempted to bring the same claim seeking the same relief in a different forum. For these reasons, we find res judicata does not bar this action for mandamus, and thus the trial court erred in dismissing the Commission's petition. Point I is granted.

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Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

__________________________________ EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE All concur.