STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN ODOM, Defendant-Appellant

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STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN ODOM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. SD38871

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POLK COUNTY Honorable D. Chuck Replogle AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS One evening, on or about January 17, 2024, twenty-three-year-old C.G. ("Adult Victim") was driving to Walmart with his seventeen-year-old girlfriend ("Minor Victim"). 1 Adult Victim's vehicle had modifications that made it highly distinguishable via "[c]arbon fenders, under glow, wing on [the] trunk, ... rims, a little bit of everything." On their way to Walmart, Victims observed a vehicle tailgating them so closely that they

1 When an event affects both Adult Victim and Minor Victim, we refer to them collectively as "Victims."

In Division

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knew it could not have been accidental. The tailgater was Christopher Allen Odom ("Defendant"), who had taken it upon himself to confront Adult Victim about his relationship with Minor Victim, who is the daughter of a friend of Defendant's wife. When Victims arrived at the Walmart parking lot, Defendant pulled in behind them and got out of his car. Victims also got out of Adult Victim's vehicle to tell the tailgater to "slow down[,]" but when Minor Victim realized that the tailgater was Defendant, she told Adult Victim to get back into his vehicle because Defendant was "very dangerous." Defendant was intoxicated, angry, and "very loud" as he approached Adult Victim's car window and called Adult Victim a "child molester[.]" Minor Victim stated that Defendant needed to mind his own business and called Defendant a "[t]weaker." Defendant responded by claiming to be the "sheriff in this town" and "a king" as he pointed to his chest. Minor Victim hurriedly got back into Adult Victim's vehicle, and the couple drove off. Defendant returned to his vehicle and continued to pursue Victims. Defendant "was very, very, very close" to Adult Victim's vehicle, "like, literally on [Adult Victim's] bumper." Adult Victim testified that he was driving approximately 120 miles per hour in an attempt to escape from Defendant. Minor Victim called 9-1-1 while Defendant was chasing them, and an audio recording of that call was played to the jury at trial. Minor Victim told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that she knew their aggressor to be Defendant, and she said that he "just got out of jail." The dispatcher directed Victims to drive to the local police station. They did so, with Defendant following them all the way.

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Adult Victim circled the police station several times before Defendant rammed his vehicle into Adult Victim's vehicle multiple times while Adult Victim and Minor Victim were inside the vehicle. Defendant then exited his vehicle, still in an angry, intoxicated state, and approached Adult Victim's damaged vehicle. When Defendant began that approach, law enforcement officers promptly apprehended Defendant without further issue. Adult Victim's vehicle was "basically totaled." Defendant was convicted after a jury found him guilty of ten counts of the State's 11-count amended felony information. 2 At Defendant's sentencing hearing, the circuit court orally pronounced Defendant's sentences as follows: [Defendant], it is now the judgment and sentence of this court on Count 1 that you be committed to the Missouri Department of Corrections [("MDOC")] for a term of seven years. On Count 2 ... that you be committed to [MDOC] for a term of 13 years. On Count 3 ... to [MDOC] for a term of seven years. On Count 4 ... committed to [MDOC] for a term of 13 years. On Count 5 ... committed for a term [of imprisonment] of six months[.] On Count 7 ... that you serve a term of imprisonment of six months. On Count 8 ... that you be committed to [MDOC] for a term of four years. On Count 9 ... that you be committed to [MDOC] for a term of 13 years. On Count 10 ... that you be committed to [MDOC] for a term of four years. And on Count 11 ... that you be committed to [MDOC] for a term of 13 years. With regard to the sentences for armed criminal action [counts 2, 4, 9, and 11], those sentences are to be served consecutive to

2 Defendant was convicted of the following crimes: two counts of second-degree assault (see section 565.052, counts 1 and 3); four counts of armed criminal action (see section 571.015, counts 2, 4, 9, and 11); one count of first-degree property damage (see section 569.100, Count 5); one count of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated (see section 577.010, Count 7); and two counts of first-degree harassment (see section 565.090, counts 8 and 10). The jury found Defendant not guilty of Count 6, which charged Defendant with felony resisting arrest (see section 575.150). References to sections 565.052, 565.090, and 575.150 are to RSMo 2016, including, as applicable, statutory changes eff. Jan. 1, 2017. References to section 571.015 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2020. References to section 569.100 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2023. References to section 577.010 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2017, eff. Aug. 28, 2017.

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other sentences but concurrent with each other. All other sentences to be concurrent. And just to make sure we're clear that – the sentence would be 20 years total. With regard to the misdemeanor sentences, it's ordered that [Defendant] serve those sentences while he is in [MDOC]. And [Defendant] be granted credit for time served. Analysis Points Requesting Plain-Error Review Defendant asserts four points on appeal. The first three claim that the circuit court plainly erred in "admitting" certain evidence at trial. Point 1 challenges the "admission" of Minor Victim's testimony that she called Defendant a "tweaker[.]" 3 Point 2 claims the 9-1-1 audio recording should not have been played for the jury because it contained Minor Victim's statement that she knew her assailant "just got out of jail." Point 3 challenges the "admission" of Adult Victim's testimony that he was going to approach Defendant but ultimately did not do so because Minor Victim warned Adult Victim to return to his vehicle because she knew Defendant to be "very dangerous." None of these points are preserved for appellate review as the complaints they raise were never presented in some manner during the trial. See State v. Blurton, 484 S.W.3d 758, 777 (Mo. banc 2016) ("For an allegation of error to be preserved for appellate review, the error must be presented to or decided by the trial court"). "Because

3 The primary definition of "tweaker" is "one who makes minor adjustments to something (such as electronic equipment) to improve its performance or effectiveness : a person who tweaks something[.]" See https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/tweaker (last visited Jan. 15, 2026). However, a recognized "slang" definition of "tweaker" is "a person who illicitly uses methamphetamine and especially crystal meth[.]" See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tweaker (last visited Jan. 15, 2026).

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the circuit court cannot be convicted of error for something it was never asked to do, appellate courts do not generally review unpreserved claims of error." State v. Burkett, No. SC 101071, 2025 WL 3758773, at *3 (Mo. banc Dec. 29, 2025). "Rule 30.20 alters this guiding principle, providing 'plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.'" Id. (quoting Rule 30.20). 4

"[P]lain errors affecting substantial rights" are not ordinary errors. They involve important and essential legal rights fundamental to our system of justice. By their very definition, they are plainly erroneous, inherently self- evident, discernible, and undeniable, affecting the basic rights of a litigant. They are the type of errors on which the circuit court should have taken corrective action because, left uncorrected, a manifest injustice may result. State v. Jones, No. SC 101104, 2025 WL 3758789, at *3 (Mo. banc Dec. 29, 2025). "Even if an appellant can establish the alleged error constitutes plain error affecting substantial rights, Rule 30.20 does not mandate appellate courts review an unpreserved claim of error." Id. at *4. "An appellate court will conduct review under Rule 30.20 'only when the appellant's request for plain error review establishes facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court's error was evident, obvious, and clear and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 427 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Mo. banc 2014)). "Unless the appellant makes this facial showing, this Court will decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20." Id. (quoting Jones, 427 S.W.3d at 195-96).

4 Unless otherwise stated, all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

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By claiming that the trial judge should not have "admitted" the complained-of evidence (which Defendant never objected to), Defendant actually claims "that the trial judge had a duty to, sua sponte, take some kind of 'action' to interrupt the testimony at issue, presumably by cutting off the witness's answer and either issuing a curative instruction or declaring a mistrial." State v. Pettijohn, 693 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024). "The trial court should take independent action only in the most unusual or exceptional circumstances." State v. Paine, 631 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). "Thus, an appellate court will rarely find plain error where a trial court has failed to act sua sponte with regard to the proceedings." Id. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that unusual or exceptional circumstances required sua sponte intervention by the circuit court in this case. Accordingly, we decline to engage in plain-error review of Defendant's first three points. See Jones, 2025 WL 3758789, at *5 ("Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error, i.e., evident, obvious, and clear error" is "one of five ways" that an appellate court may resolve a request for plain- error review). The Requested Nunc Pro Tunc Order Defendant's fourth point seeks a remand to the circuit court with a direction to enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in the circuit court's written judgment. Defendant contends, and the State agrees, that the written judgment erroneously states that Defendant's sentence for Count 10 (first-degree harassment) is 13 years imprisonment and is to run consecutive to all other sentences. Defendant correctly

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points out that the circuit court's oral pronouncement of sentence for Count 10 was four years imprisonment, to run concurrently with counts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. "[T]he written sentence and judgment of the trial court should reflect its oral pronouncement of sentence before the defendant." State v. Robinson, 685 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Mo. banc 2010), overruled on other grounds by Branson v. Shewmaker, 710 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Mo. banc 2025)) (internal citation omitted). "[I]f a material difference exists between the written judgment and oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Zinna, 301 S.W.3d at 514). "The failure to accurately memorialize the decision of the trial court as it was announced in open court is a clerical mistake." Id. "Clerical errors in the sentence and judgment in a criminal case may be corrected by order nunc pro tunc if the written judgment does not reflect what was actually done." Id. (quoting State v. Davie, 638 S.W.3d 514, 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). In addition, because failing to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of sentence is an obvious and clear error that produces a manifest injustice, we direct the circuit court to amend other portions of the written judgment that also conflict with the oral pronouncement of sentence. The circuit court used a form judgment that has text boxes to be filled-in. For counts 2, 4, 9, and 11 (the armed- criminal-action offenses), the circuit court filled the text boxes titled "Conc/Cons" with "CONSECUTIVE TO ALL OTHER SENTENCES[.]" 5 For counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10,

5 We have omitted insignificant grammatical variances that appear in the circuit court's text boxes.

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the circuit court filled out the form judgment text box titled "Conc/Cons" with "CONCURRENT TO ALL OTHER SENTENCES[.]" These descriptions materially differ from the circuit court's oral pronouncement of sentence as counts 2, 4, 9, and 11 are to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, which are to be served concurrently with each other. The circuit court was also clear in its oral pronouncement that the Defendant's "sentence would be 20 years total." However, issuing four sentences of 13-years imprisonment that are to be served "consecutive to all other sentences" materially differs from the oral pronouncement that the sentence "would be 20 years total" (emphasis added). Further, the italicized portion of the following description filled out by the circuit court in the text box titled, "The Court further orders[,]" also materially differs from the oral pronouncement of sentence. It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that Defendant be committed to (1) 7 years in [MDOC] on Count I; (2) 13 years [MDOC] on Count II; (3) 7 years [MDOC] on Count III; (4) 13 years [MDOC] on Count IV; (5) 6 months Polk County Jail on Count V; (6) 6 months Polk County Jail on Count VI; (7) 4 years [MDOC] on Count VIII; (8) 13 years [MDOC] on Count IX; (9) 4 years [MDOC] on Count X; and (10) 13 years [MDOC] on Count XI. The sentences on Counts I, III, V, VII, VIII and X are concurrent to all other sentences. The sentences on Counts II, IV, IX and XI shall be consecutive to all other sentences, but concurrent with each other. The sentences on Counts V and VII shall be served in [MDOC], if any of the terms remains to be served. Defendant is granted credit for time served. [(Emphasis added.)] Defendant's fourth point is granted.

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The case is remanded to the circuit court for the sole purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc order correcting the clerical errors in the written judgment consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS