STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. PHILIP A. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant

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STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. PHILIP A. COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. SD38247

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUTLER COUNTY Honorable Michael M. Pritchett, Judge AFFIRMED Philip A. Cooper ("Cooper") appeals his convictions of voluntary manslaughter, armed criminal action, tampering with physical evidence, and abandonment of a corpse following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Missouri ("the trial court"). 1

Cooper raises three points on appeal alleging that the trial court erred in: 1) failing to

1 See sections 565.023; 571.015, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2020; 575.100; and 194.425. All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, including changes effective January 1, 2017, unless otherwise indicated.

In Division

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grant Cooper's motion for new trial "and dismiss the Information in enforcement of [] Cooper's Speedy Trial rights," 2) admitting into evidence Cooper's extra-judicial statements confessing to the killing of J.O. ("Victim") , and 3) allowing Victim's brother to testify in the sentencing phase as to his opinion on Cooper's sentence, including his desire for Cooper to "suffer like we're suffering[.]" We affirm the trial court's judgment. Factual Background and Procedural History Following his confession to killing Victim, Cooper was charged by Felony Information with the class A felony of murder in the first degree (Count I), 2 the unclassified felony of armed criminal action (Count II), the class E felony of tampering with physical evidence (Count III), and the class E felony of abandonment of a corpse (Count IV). The evidence adduced at trial showed the following: Victim was last seen on the property of B.S. in Dunklin County, Missouri, on Sunday, October 24, 2021, by L.F., another visitor who was on B.S.'s property at the time. Victim was driving a four-wheeler towards the woods in the general direction of an adjacent property belonging to Cooper to confront a suspected trespasser or squatter on B.S.'s property at B.S.'s request. L.F. left and went to church and, upon returning to B.S.'s property that afternoon, noticed that Victim's truck was still there but Victim had not returned. L.F. subsequently submitted a report to the county sheriff's office indicating that Victim had been missing for approximately three to four hours. L.F. testified at trial

2 At trial, the jury was also instructed on lesser, alternative homicide charges under Count I – murder in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, and involuntary manslaughter in the second degree.

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that he smelled smoke coming from the woods that same afternoon. A deputy sheriff received L.F.'s report at around midnight on Monday, October 25, 2021, when he responded to B.S.'s property to investigate. The deputy spoke with L.F. at the property but was unable to immediately commence a search of the area for Victim due to the heavy rain. The responding deputy later returned to B.S.'s property at approximately 4 or 5 a.m., on October 25, 2021, and began searching for Victim with two other individuals. Despite a multi-day search of the subject area by members of multiple government agencies and civilian volunteers in the several days following his disappearance, no direct trace of Victim was ever recovered and he had not been seen again at the time of Cooper's trial two years later. During the course of the search for Victim, a search party did encounter a then- unidentified male camping in the woods on Cooper's property, later revealed to be Cooper's son. When law enforcement initially contacted Cooper and asked if he had encountered Victim or knew the stranger camping in the woods, Cooper responded in the negative to both inquiries. On October 27, 2021, Cooper encountered a search party which included conservation agents and Victim's brother. Upon learning of brother's identity, Cooper became agitated and accused Victim of a being a "thief" and a "doper." After the civilian members were escorted away, Cooper remained belligerent before finally stating to the remaining agents "you need to get the sheriff and [the Chief Deputy], and I'll tell you what happened to your god damn missing man." Cooper thereafter confessed to encountering Victim in the woods on his property and shooting

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Victim three times with his shotgun, killing Victim. Cooper also admitted to erecting a burn pit, burning Victim's body, disposing of the remains, and concealing various items of evidence related to the killing and burning of Victim. Subsequent investigation by law enforcement uncovered various items of evidence corroborating the details of Cooper's confession, though evidence of Victim's body was never recovered. Cooper was arrested and charged with the crimes. At trial, Cooper's extrajudicial statements where he confessed to killing Victim and the destruction and concealment of evidence related to the incident were admitted into evidence over the defense's objections. Following the presentation of evidence by the State in the guilt phase of trial, Cooper exercised his right not to testify and presented no evidence or witnesses on his behalf. A jury found Cooper guilty of voluntary manslaughter under Count I, armed criminal action under Count II, tampering with physical evidence under Count III, and abandonment of a corpse under Count IV. After the trial court accepted the jury's verdicts, the jury heard evidence from the parties in the penalty phase of trial. The State presented testimony from Victim's father, brother, and cousin while Cooper presented testimony from his second son, D.C. During Victim's brother's testimony, the following exchange occurred: [Prosecutor]: Do you have any suggestion for the jury in sentencing in this case?

[Victim's Brother]: I don't know the law in Missouri. I mean, I just want to, and I-- it sounds gruesome, I don't mean it. I just want [Cooper] to suffer like we're suffering, if that makes sense. We never wanted the death penalty. I don't want the man to die. It's just, I think they [sic] need to suffer. He needs to suffer like we're suffering. It's just an everyday thing

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that we suffer. I mean, there's nothing. I mean, you can't not think of your brother. You just can't.

Following the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase, the State argued in closing argument: No matter what you do, you're not going to bring [Victim] back to [his family]. But you can give them some justice. And so that's why I'm asking you to remember this crime. He shot somebody, decided it wasn't self-defense, burned his body. This isn't any other abandonment of a corpse. He didn't just find a corpse and abandon it. He destroyed it. Obliterated it. And so that's why I'm asking you to sentence him to the maximum on each of those counts.

The jury thereafter assessed sentences of 15 years' imprisonment under Count I, three ye ars' imprisonment under Count II, four years' imprisonment under Count III, and four years' imprisonment under Count IV. The trial court accepted the jury's recommended sentences on the convictions and ordered the sentences for Counts II and IV to run consecutively to the sentence for Count I and the sentence for Count III to run concurrently to the sentence for Count I, for a total of 22 years' imprisonment. This timely appeal follows the trial court's entry of written judgment and denial of Cooper's Motion for New Trial. Additional facts relevant to each point on appeal are included in the analysis portion of this opinion. Analysis Point I Cooper's first point on appeal contends: The trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for new trial and dismiss the Information in enforcement of Mr. Cooper's Speedy Trial rights, because he was deprived of his constitutional right to a Speedy Trial and Due Process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

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to the United States Constitution, Article I, §§ 10 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, and §545.780, in that Mr. Cooper consistently and vociferously invoked his Speedy Trial rights and the unreasonable trial delays were the result of the state, which ultimately led to an oppressive pretrial detention that almost killed Mr. Cooper that maximized anxiety and concern within Mr. Cooper, and prejudiced Mr. Cooper's defense.

We disagree. Instead, we conclude that, for the following reasons, Cooper has waived or otherwise failed to preserve any claim of error arising from his statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights for appellate review. Because Point I alleges violations of constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights, we analyze the preservation of each issue separately. See generally State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 725-29 (Mo. banc 2007) (analyzing the invocation of defendant's speedy trial rights under section 545.780 separately from the invocation of his constitutional speedy trial rights). Constitutional Speedy Trial Claim In order to preserve a constitutional issue for appellate review, a party must (1) raise the issue at the first available opportunity, (2) state the constitutional provision claimed to be violated by specifically referencing the article and section of the constitution or by quoting the constitutional provision itself, (3) state the facts that comprise the constitutional violation, and (4) preserve the constitutional issue throughout the criminal proceeding.

State v. Newlon, 216 S.W.3d 180, 184 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). "[R]ais[ing] the [constitutional] issue at the first available opportunity" requires the constitutional claim to be set forth in a pre-trial motion. State v. Keathley, 707 S.W.3d 718, 728-31 (Mo. App.

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S.D. 2024); Rule 24.04(b)(2); 3 see also State v. Estes, 659 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) ("To preserve his [speedy trial] claim for review, [defendant] needed to file a motion to dismiss and include the speedy trial issue in his motion for new trial."). Failure to do so waives the claim. Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 730. Here, Cooper does not direct us to, and we have been unable to locate, any pre- trial motion to dismiss in the record at all, much less a pre-trial motion requesting dismissal based on alleged violations of Cooper's right to speedy trial. 4 Consequently, because Cooper failed to timely and properly raise his constitutional speedy trial claim, the claim is waived. Id. Further supporting our conclusion that Cooper failed to preserve his constitutional claim is that neither Cooper's motions for judgment of acquittal nor his motion for new trial specified that he was claiming a violation of his constitutional right

3 Rule 24.04(b)2 (emphasis added), states:

Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.

4 The State's briefing on appeal does construe Point I as a challenge to the trial court "overruling [Cooper's] motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy trial." However, the State's briefing contains neither record citation nor any specific discussion of any such motion to dismiss.

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to a speedy trial. 5 Id. It is a well-established "principle of law that an appellate court will not convict a trial court of an error not put before it to decide." State v. Tilley, 104 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Statutory Speedy Trial Claim (Section 545.780) Point I's preservation statement fails to explain how Cooper's section 545.780 claim was preserved for appellate review, and the corresponding argument is devoid of analysis showing the statute applied in this case and was violated. This portion of Point I therefore presents nothing for appellate review and is deemed abandoned. 6 See Luft v. Schoenhoff, 935 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) ("Arguments raised in the points relied on which are not supported by argument in the argument portion of the brief are deemed abandoned and present nothing for appellate review."). "We cannot become advocates for an appellant by speculating about facts and arguments that have not been made." Pearson v. Keystone Temp. Assignment Group, Inc., 588 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

5 We reject Cooper's bare assertion that generic references to constitutional rights other than his right to speedy trial in his motion for new trial were sufficient to notify the trial court that he was alleging a violation of his speedy trial rights and preserve the claim for ap pellate review. See Keathley, 707 S.W.3d at 730-31. (holding that defendant's failure to, inter alia, "specify" in his motion for new trial that he was claiming violations of his constitutional right to free speech preserved nothing for appellate review).

6 Even if we were to review Cooper's nominally alleged section 545.780 claim for plain error or otherwise reach the merits, the claim would fail. "[S]ection 545.780, in requiring that defendant announce that he is 'ready for trial,' clearly contemplates that it is counsel, not the represented defendant, who must invoke this statutory protection." Riley, 240 S.W.3d at 727 (emphasis added). Here, Cooper concedes his counsel ultimately waived the section 545.780 motion for speedy trial and thereafter took no subsequent action to "specifically request a remedy for Mr. Cooper's Speedy Trial rights."

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Plain Error Review Cooper's briefing requests that we review Point I for plain error in the event we determine his speedy trial claims were not preserved. The Supreme Court of Missouri has cautioned that "[t]he plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review." State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Jones, 427 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Mo. banc 2014)). "Plain error review is discretionary, and this Court will not review a claim for plain error unless the claimed error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." State v. Yount, 710 S.W.3d 49, 64-65 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 687 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Mo. banc 2024)). A plain error is one which is "evident, obvious, and clear." State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). To demonstrate manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice in the context of plain error review, "the appellant must show the error was outcome determinative." State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019) (quotations and citation omitted). "The party seeking plain error review bears the burden of proving plain error occurred and that it resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice." Yount, 710 S.W.3d at 65. Here, Cooper requests plain error review and recites the corresponding legal standard, but neglects to provide any legal authority or analysis connecting the specific facts of this case to the elements of the applicable standard of review. Cooper's briefing fails to identify, much less show, that the challenged ruling or action by the trial court in

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this case (which Point I does not clearly identify) amounted to "evident, obvious, and clear" error. More significantly, Cooper's briefing fails to present authority, analysis, or even nominal argument supporting the proposition that the trial court's alleged error in this case was in fact "outcome determinative" – i.e., that there was a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different in the absence of error by the trial court. 7 State v. Roper, 136 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). Instead, Point I exclusively argues the application of Missouri's four-factor balancing test for evaluating prejudice arising from an alleged speedy trial violation. See generally State v. Jackson, 681 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023); State v. Smith, 849 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). However, even accepting Cooper's balancing of the four factors at face value, not all prejudicial error is also plain error. 8 Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 607; see also State v. Varvera, 897 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) ("Plain error and prejudicial error are not synonymous terms."). To the contrary, the burden of establishing manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice "is much greater than the burden of proving prejudicial error." State v. Calahan, 589 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019). Accordingly, in the absence of any plain error analysis or attempt to facially

7 We note that Cooper has not contested the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions on appeal, further undermining any notion that he suffered some manifest injustice a result of a delay in bringing him to trial. State v. Jones, 530 S.W.3d 525, 534 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017).

8 We are skeptical of the proposition that the "difficult and sensitive balancing process" for evaluating an alleged speedy trial violation – in which there are no "bright-line[s]" and "[n]o individual factor is dispositive," State v. Wright, 551 S.W.3d 608, 618 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) – will typically lend itself to a finding of "evident, obvious, and clear" error.

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establish substantial grounds for manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice by Cooper, we decline to exercise our discretion to apply plain error review. Point II In his second point on appeal, Cooper contends that the trial court erred in admitting his extrajudicial statements where he confessed to killing Victim into evidence over his objections at trial because the admission violated the rule of corpus delicti. Broadly, Cooper contends the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti in his case (i.e., that Victim died and his killing was committed by someone) independent of Cooper's confession, and that there was "counterevidence" introduced at trial which further precluded the admission of his confessions. 9 We disagree. Standard of Review Admission of Evidence The trial court has "broad discretion" in the admission of evidence at trial and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse. State v. Madorie, 156 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Mo. banc 2005). Indeed, "[a] trial court's discretionary ruling to admit evidence is presumed correct, and the burden is on [the appellant] to overcome that presumption." State v. Gott, 523 S.W.3d 572, 578 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's ruling is "clearly against the logic of the

9 Cooper additionally asserts violations of his constitutional rights under Point II but wholly fails to develop these contentions in his corresponding argument. These unpreserved claims of error are therefore abandoned. Luft, 935 S.W.2d at 687.

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circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 n.6 (Mo. banc 1997) (quoting Shirrell v. Missouri Edison Co., 535 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo. banc 1976)). "[I]f reasonable [persons] can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion." Id. at 883-84. Even where we find an abuse of discretion, this Court reviews "for prejudice, not mere error[.]" State v. Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2011) (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, reversal will only be warranted where "there is a reasonable probability that the [trial] court's error affected the outcome of the trial." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Corpus Delicti "The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidence which determines whether a defendant's confession may be considered as substantive evidence of guilt." State v. Troyer, 663 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). In evaluating whether the State sufficiently established the corpus delicti, we "must view the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, disregarding any evidence or inferences to the contrary." State v. Bullington, 684 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984). As applied to extrajudicial confessions, 10 the Supreme Court of Missouri has explained the rule of corpus delicti as follows: Extrajudicial admissions or statements of the defendant are not admissible in the absence of independent proof of the commission of an

10 "Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by a party elsewhere than before a magistrate or in court." State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218, 230 (1859).

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offense, i.e. the corpus delicti. Evidence, however, that the defendant was the criminal agent is not required before the defendant's statement or confession is admitted. In addition, absolute proof independent of his statement or confession that a crime was committed is not required. All that is required is evidence of circumstances tending to prove the corpus delicti corresponding with the confession. Slight corroborating facts are sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. The determination of whether there is sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti of an offense is fact specific and requires a case-by-case evaluation.

Madorie, 156 S.W.3d at 355 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "[T]he State is not required to present independent proof of the defendant's criminal agency, outside of the defendant's admissions, to establish the corpus delicti." Madorie, 156 S.W.3d at 356. "The State is only required to prove that someone committed the crime with [i]ndependent evidence of circumstances which correspond and interrelate with the circumstances described in the statement or confession." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original). Even in a homicide case, this burden on the State "may be proven solely by circumstantial evidence." State v. Schmidt, 630 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). Moreover, evidence sufficient to establish the corpus delicti "need not be absolutely conclusive of guilt or demonstrate impossibility of innocence, and the mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the case from the jury." State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 544 (Mo. banc 2003) (quoting State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Mo. banc 1991)). Discussion

We presume the trial court's admission of Cooper's extrajudicial statements to be correct. Gott, 523 S.W.3d at 578. Point II's argument section in Cooper's brief recites various general statements of law and argues portions of the record, but presents no legal

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authority or analysis actually connecting the two. This is indicative of the fact that "the corpus delicti rule does not require a high level of proof[,]" Jones, 427 S.W.3d at 196, and "[c]ourts in Missouri have rarely found that the State failed to sufficiently prove the corpus delicti of an offense," Troyer, 663 S.W.3d at 857. Viewing the record here in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the State met its burden to prove the corpus delicti and admitting Cooper's confession. In a homicide case, the corpus delicti consists of two elements: "(1) proof of the death of the victim and (2) evidence that the criminal agency of another was the cause of the victim's death." Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 544. The State in this case was therefore required to adduce evidence which at least slightly corroborated that Victim had died and his "death was not self-inflicted nor due to natural causes or accident." Id. The State met this burden. The evidence adduced at trial clearly demonstrated that Victim had disappeared under suspicious circumstances. In addition to the general circumstances of Victim's last sighting and the ensuing search discussed above, Victim left behind a father and brother, both with whom he had regular contact with up until the time of his disappearance. Victim further left behind his vehicle, his house, and two dogs that witnesses testified he considered to be his children. Notably, Victim's brother also testified at trial that Victim was "very good in the woods, [and did not] go missing." Thus, even initially setting aside Cooper's confession and the evidence obtained therefrom, Victim's permanent and total disappearance in the course of a relatively short errand (anticipated to involve

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confronting a trespasser or squatter) despite the efforts of searchers in the days immediately following, sudden abandonment of his close family members and personal property (including the means of transportation by which Victim had arrived to the subject area in the first place on October 24, 2021), and attested-to competency in wooded terrain are all certainly suggestive of criminal agency being involved in Victim abruptly and completely vanishing. While not "absolutely conclusive," this evidence at minimum slightly corroborated that Victim had died and his death was the result of someone's criminal agency. Moreover, "[i]f there is evidence of corroborating circumstances which tends to prove the crime and corresponds with circumstances related in [the defendant's] confession, both the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved." Troyer, 663 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting State v. Bumbery, 492 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016)). Here, in addition to the circumstances discussed above, there was further evidence recovered by law enforcement following Cooper's extrajudicial statements which corroborated the details of Cooper's confession and, by extension, the killing of Victim. Cooper admitted to encountering Victim in the woods and killing him. In particular, Cooper described shooting Victim three times with a shotgun, killing Victim with the third shot while Victim was unarmed and on the ground. Law enforcement recovered a shotgun and three expended shells from Cooper's property that a State expert witness testified could have been fired from said shotgun. Cooper also claimed that Victim had been armed with a firearm that was blown into pieces by Cooper's second

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shot. Law enforcement recovered pieces of a pistol buried at the location identified by Cooper. Cooper additionally stated he had donned a ghillie suit 11 before going out to confront Victim in the woods. Law enforcement recovered such a suit from Cooper's property. Cooper's property was adjacent to B.S.'s property and Victim was last seen on B.S.'s property heading into the woods in the general direction of Cooper's property on a four-wheeler. A civilian searcher familiar with the local terrain, O.L., testified to observing signs of a four-wheeler's passage on a path through the woods that connected the B.S. and Cooper properties on the day after Victim's disappearance. In the days following Victim's disappearance, search parties also encountered Cooper in person in these woods. There was also testimony at trial that Cooper resided on his property as his bedridden wife's primary daily caretaker – feeding, bathing, and cleaning her. These facts corroborated Cooper's extrajudicial statements that he had encountered Victim in the woods on his property and the fact that Cooper had the opportunity to kill Victim. There was also evidence at trial that Cooper had previously submitted complaints to law enforcement alleging theft by B.S. Significantly, in the days following Victim's disappearance but prior to Cooper's confession, Cooper also accused Victim of being a "thief" and a "doper." Since Victim went into the woods at B.S.'s express request, these additional facts corroborated that Cooper had motive to kill Victim. They also

11 At trial, a deputy sheriff described a ghillie suit as "green leafy stuff" on "a moss growth looking suit" used by hunters to blend into the environment.

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corroborated Cooper's extrajudicial statements to law enforcement to the effect that if he had not killed Victim, all his personal property would have been stolen anyway. Cooper also told law enforcement that he had burned Victim's body. In particular, Cooper described choosing the location of a burn pit and stacking firewood there in such a manner as to maintain an air draft to keep the fire burning. Firewood was found next to the site of the original burn pit identified by Cooper. Law enforcement also testified to observing curled leaves in the area consistent with a burning fire and fresh shovel marks on the side of the pit. Cooper also described starting the fire at the original burn pit with burnt motor oil and a propane torch. Law enforcement recovered a propane tank and burner from Cooper's property. We further note O.L. testified at trial that he encountered a smoldering firepit containing a large amount of red-hot coals on the day after Victim's disappearance near a path in the woods that led up to Cooper's residence. Cooper additionally admitted to undertaking efforts to conceal the original burn pit as well as remove evidence from the scene. Specifically, Cooper described using various tools to gather Victim's ashes and topsoil into buckets which Cooper then discarded into a nearby river. At the location of the original burn pit identified by Cooper, law enforcement encountered a flat patch of fresh, sandy soil – distinct from ground surrounding the area – where the topsoil appeared to have been removed. Law enforcement also recovered the buckets and tools Cooper described as using to remove Victim's remains from Cooper's property. Cooper further admitted to concealing the location of the original pit by covering the pit with leaves and planting a smaller "decoy" fire next to the original pit. Law enforcement observed that the original burn pit site

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identified by Cooper had indeed been covered up with sticks and leaves. Evidence was also introduced at trial of law enforcement encountering the "decoy" described by Cooper next to the original burn pit. Additionally, there were also several other items of circumstantial evidence which corroborated the details of Cooper's confession. Notably, Cooper gave statements to law enforcement that he had recovered a spherical, metal object from Victim's ashes that appeared to possibly be an artificial joint. While this object was never recovered, Victim's father testified at trial that Victim had a shoulder replacement. While the joint- like object Cooper described finding in Victim's ashes was never recovered, Cooper's statement corroborated him having specific knowledge of Victim that Cooper was unlikely to have obtained through innocuous means. Cooper further described to law enforcement that his son, J.C., was also present at the killing of Victim in the woods and the burning of Victim's body. A woman who was dating J.C. at the time testified that she picked him up from Cooper's property the day after Victim's disappearance and smelled gasoline on him before transporting him to a local library to print passport papers. Moreover, several days after Victim's disappearance, J.C. was arrested in another county operating a four-wheeler with a damaged ignition. Victim was last seen operating a four-wheeler. Following the Victim's killing, Cooper described being unable to start the ignition of Victim's four-wheeler and transporting the vehicle and his son off his property by truck. We also note that Cooper's initial representations to law enforcement as to Victim's whereabouts and the then-unidentified stranger camping in the woods (later

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discovered to be J.C.) were directly contrary to his subsequent confession. This deliberate misleading and obstruction of law enforcement's investigation into Victim's disappearance further corroborated criminal agency on Cooper's part. Accordingly, considering Cooper's confession and the evidence obtained therefrom together with the totality of the other circumstances in the record, we determine the State adduced evidence which "correspond[ed] and interrelate[d] with the circumstances described in [Cooper's] statement or confession," and sufficiently proved the "[s]light corroborating facts" necessary to establish the corpus delicti. Madorie, 156 S.W.3d at 355-56. Again, corroborating evidence sufficient to establish the corpus delicti "need not be absolutely conclusive of guilt or demonstrate impossibility of innocence, and the mere existence of other possible hypotheses is not enough to remove the case from the jury." Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 544 (quoting Fears, 803 S.W.2d at 608). While Victim's body was never recovered, direct evidence of Victim's body is not strictly necessary to establish the corpus delicti in a homicide case or even to sustain a homicide conviction. See State v. Byrd, 389 S.W.3d 702, 710-11 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012) ("Sufficient evidence may support a finding that the defendant killed the victim in the manner charged even where the State does not produce evidence of the victim's dead body."; and finding defendant's incriminating statements and disposal of effects related to minor victim were sufficient to establish, inter alia, that victim had died despite the body never being recovered). The trial court's admission of Cooper's extrajudicial statements was therefore not "clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court [nor] so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate

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a lack of careful consideration." Brown, 939 S.W.2d at 883-84 n.6 (quoting Shirrell, 535 S.W.2d at 448). Cooper nonetheless insists that there was also "counterevidence" introduced at trial which purportedly negated the State's circumstantial corpus delicti evidence, citing to State v. Crabtree, 71 S.W. 127 (Mo. 1902). This reliance is misplaced. The Supreme Court in Crabtree addressed whether the State had adduced sufficient evidence to support the defendants' convictions for murder in the second degree; the decision did not examine the admissibility of a defendant's extrajudicial confession under the doctrine of corpus delicti. See id. at 127-29 ("The corpus delicti ... was shown; but to sustain a conviction there must be proof of the defendant's guilty agency in the production of such act."). Cooper's conclusory assertions regarding "counterevidence" are therefore inapt. Furthermore, the State argues, and we agree, that Cooper's position incorrectly ignores the applicable standard of review under which we, inter alia, "must view the evidence and all of its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, disregarding any evidence or inferences to the contrary." Bullington, 684 S.W.2d at 57. Point II is denied. Point III Cooper's third point on appeal contends the trial court erred by allowing improper testimony from Victim's brother during the penalty phase at trial. Specifically, Cooper alleges the State elicited testimony from Victim's brother opining on the sentencing Cooper should receive, including the desire for Cooper to "suffer like we're suffering," and the State argued in closing to "give [the family] some justice" and to "remember this

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crime," thus improperly prejudicing the jury in assessing Cooper's sentence. Cooper further complains the trial court failed to issue a curative instruction sua sponte directing the jury to disregard the improper opinion testimony and the State's reference in closing argument. Cooper concedes he failed to properly preserve this issue for appellate review and requests we review his claim for plain error. As set forth in our discussion of Point I, such review is "discretionary" and is to be used "sparingly." To establish plain error, Cooper bears the burden of demonstrating both that the trial court committed "evident, obvious, and clear" error, Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 607 (quotations and citation omitted), and that such error "was outcome determinative," Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 579 (quotations and citation omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that Victim's brother's testimony regarding wanting Cooper to "suffer like we're suffering" and the prosecutor's question to him asking if he had any suggestion for the jury in sentencing Cooper were impermissible, 12 we find that Cooper has failed to uphold his burden to show that "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice" – i.e., "outcome determinative" error – occurred as result of such error. Cooper complains that the trial court should have issued a curative instructive to the jury to disregard the disputed opinion testimony of Victim's brother. However, the jury in this

12 We reject Cooper's bare assertion that the State's generic comments in closing argument requesting "justice" for Victim's family referenced or otherwise impermissibly amplified the specific testimony by Victim's brother that Cooper now challenges on appeal, and decline to exercise our discretion to review this portion of his claim for plain error.

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case was directed on assessing sentencing in the penalty phase of trial as follows under the relevant portion of Instruction No. 25: In assessing and declaring [Cooper's] punishment, you should consider the evidence presented to you in this case, the argument of counsel, and the instructions of the court. You may consider the evidence presented in either stage of the trial. Do not let any personal bias, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision.

(Emphasis added.) The jury is presumed to have properly followed this instruction. State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022). Moreover, we are unpersuaded that the record here sufficiently demonstrates that the disputed portion of Victim's brother's testimony in fact incited prejudice in the jury and actually improperly influenced the jury's recommendation of sentence. We reject Cooper's bare assertion that the testimony of Victim's family in the penalty phase was somehow impermissibly "emotionally charged." As explained by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Driskill: Victim impact evidence is admissible under the United States and Missouri Constitutions. The trial court has broad discretion to admit whatever evidence it determines may be helpful to the jury in assessing punishment. The [S]tate is permitted to show the victims are individuals whose deaths represent a unique loss to society and to their family and that the victims are not simply faceless strangers.

459 S.W.3d 412, 431 (Mo. banc 2015) (internal citations omitted). "Indeed, a certain level of emotion is to be expected when relatives of a murder victim discuss the impact of the crime on their lives." State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 196 (Mo. banc 2005). Missouri courts have "previously found no error in cases where victim impact testimony left witnesses and even jurors crying." Id.

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Here, Cooper confessed to shooting and killing Victim while Victim was already unarmed and on the ground. Then, instead of reporting the killing to the proper authorities, Cooper undertook extensive efforts to conceal and/or destroy all evidence of the homicide, not only obstructing law enforcement's investigation of Victim's disappearance but denying Victim's family the closure of having any trace of Victim's body for burial. Our review of the record does not reveal, and Cooper does not identify, any particular portion of the testimony submitted during the penalty phase that was excessively emotional given the facts in this case. 13 With respect to Victim's brother's testimony of wanting Cooper to suffer in particular, we are skeptical that the disputed testimony, while arguably improper, expressed any sentiments that the jury would not have already been generally aware of in a case such as this. Cooper ultimately points to the jury's assessment of the maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment for Cooper's Count I voluntary manslaughter conviction as evidence that the jury was in fact improperly influenced in its sentencing. However, the jury in this case was also informed during the penalty phase that Cooper's sentence for his Count II armed criminal action conviction would run consecutive to his sentence for voluntary manslaughter. With this knowledge, the jury only assessed the minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment for Cooper's armed criminal action conviction as opposed to the potential maximum 15-year penalty, which would have almost doubled the total

13 We further note that a son of Cooper's who was not involved in the facts of the underlying case also gave character testimony in support of Cooper in the penalty phase and also became emotional and cried at points during his testimony.

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length of Cooper's imprisonment. In light of these circumstances, we are satisfied that the jury appropriately considered and weighed the evidence and arguments of the parties in making its sentencing recommendations in this case, and was not improperly influenced by the testimony of Victim's brother. Point III is denied. Conclusion The Judgment is affirmed. JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – OPINION AUTHOR DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – CONCURS