While I do not believe that the appeal in this case should be dismissed, I am constrained by the state of the law at this time and thereby, must concur with the result. However, I write separately in order to highlight various pitfalls of dismissal of a case in which suspended imposition of sentence occurs. Bassam A. Saffaf (hereinafter, "Movant") pleaded guilty to a class D felony of non-support of a child and was sentenced to five years probation with imposition of sentence suspended. Movant filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 29.07(d). In that motion Movant claimed that he did not voluntarily enter a guilty plea as he did not fully comprehend the proceedings in the trial court because he had not discussed the consequences of pleading guilty with his attorney and his translator was removed from the courtroom. Further, Movant denied paternity of the child for which he is ordered to support. The trial court denied his motion, and Movant appeals from that denial. In theory, if a defendent receives a suspended imposition of sentence and fulfills the requirements set forth by the trial court, the conviction would be eradicated; thereby, relieving the defendant from the stigma of a conviction. See, State ex rel. Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo. App. E.D. 1981). Prior to legislative changes, the suspended
imposition of sentence did not act as a conviction nor was it used to impeach a witness. Id. However, the stigma, equivalent to that of a conviction, attaches to a defendant with a suspended imposition of sentence in specific instances. See, Section 491.050 RSMo (2000), State v. Lynch, 679 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo. banc 1984) (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (FN1). No final judgment exists until the imposition of sentence, and a defendant cannot appeal without a final judgment. State v. Shambley-Bey, 989 S.W.2d 681, 681 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). By maintaining that no appeal lies from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea on a suspended imposition of sentence, the defendant loses any possibility to remove the stigma of a conviction. Under this current logic, the only way Movant may seek review by this Court is to have the suspended imposition of sentence revoked by violating the conditions of his probation and have sentence imposed. Public policy dictates that the courts do not encourage defendants to violate their probation only for the purpose of having sentence imposed in order to receive a final appealable judgment. As well, Rule 29.07(d) is essentially nullified by the current case law for although a defendant may file the motion, it may be denied with or without a hearing and appellate review is foreclosed. In this case, there is an inference that Movant did not fully understand the nature of the proceedings in the trial court without the aid of his interpreter. Movant's ability to speak and understand some English does not automatically enable him to understand the scope or language used at the trial court. Further, Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective in assisting him, so we cannot assume that the presence of counsel protected him from these adversary proceedings. Rule 29.07(d) as enacted permits the defendant to seek relief where "manifest injustice" occurs. Currently, appellate review of any such allegation shall be denied, allowing the claim to fester without review. I would urge the appropriate body to take remedial measures to protect the rights of the citizens of this state. Footnotes: FN1. Yale v. City of Independence, 846 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1993) overrules Lynch, in part, in that collateral consequences of a conviction do not attach as a matter of course before the sentencing and final judgment. Yale, 846 S.W.2d at 196. However, a suspended imposition of sentence is not a conviction because there has been no final judgment. Id. at 194, 195; Lynch, 679 S.W.2d at 859-61; M.A.B. v. Nicely, 909 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo. banc 1995). Yet, even without a conviction, the legislature has carved out exceptions to the general rule that collateral consequences do not attach following suspended imposition of sentence. See also, Section 558.016 RSMo (2000) and Section 577.051 RSMo (2000). This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.