State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Danielle Lechocki, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED112696 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Warren County v. ) Cause No. 23BB-CR00071-01 ) DANIELLE LECHOCKI, ) Honorable Thomas J. Frawley ) Appellant. ) Filed: November 12, 2025

Introduction Danielle Lechocki (Defendant) appeals the judgment entered upon her conviction of one count of attempted unlawful use of a weapon. She argues the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding self-defense. Because we find there was substantial evidence in the record to require such an instruction, we reverse. Background The State charged Defendant with one count of unlawful use of a weapon for exhibiting a knife in an angry or threatening manner, and one count of assault in the fourth degree for pointing and walking toward K.B. (Complainant) with a knife. These charges arose from an incident that took place between Defendant and Complainant on November 6, 2022. Approximately one week prior to the incident, Defendant moved into Anchor

2

House, a facility that helps veterans in need of assistance. Defendant had served in the Marines from 2009 through 2012, and she suffered from remittent multiple sclerosis, which periodically affected the left side of her body with numbness and her vision in her left eye. She testified these issues were present on the day of the incident, and she had planned to go to the hospital. Complainant was also a resident of Anchor House. She testified that on the day of the incident, she had a broken elbow, a sprained shoulder, and a strained neck, for which her right arm was in a sling. On November 6, 2022, Defendant was sitting outside the front doors of Anchor House with two other residents, when Complainant came outside and asked to join them. Defendant testified she was upset with Complainant because of some things Complainant had been saying about Defendant, and she wanted to talk to Complainant about it. Defendant testified Complainant was angry that Defendant disagreed with her, and Complainant was threatening Defendant, saying she would "mollywock" her, which meant she would hit her, and that Defendant would be sorry she came to Anchor House. Defendant testified Complainant had a sling on, but she had taken it off. Defendant felt intimidated by Complainant because Complainant often threatened people, and Defendant was aware Complainant had gotten into physical altercations in the past at Anchor House because Complainant had told her about them. Defendant testified she carried a knife in her backpack for protection, due to her physical limitations and the fact that she had been attacked before on an evening walk and was unable to defend herself. Defendant testified that as Complainant was threatening to "mollywock" her, Complainant lunged toward Defendant. One of the residents, Erin (Resident), who was outside with Defendant, got in between Complainant and Defendant

3

and tried to push Complainant back inside the building. However, Defendant testified that Resident was small and had her own physical issues, and Defendant was not certain Resident could hold Complainant back. Defendant testified she felt "extremely threatened" by Complainant, and she was afraid her medical condition would prevent her from physically defending herself, so Defendant retrieved her knife from her backpack. Defendant believed she would suffer serious physical injury if she did not take steps to defend herself. Defendant testified she did not intend to harm Complainant, but to scare her. Defendant told the responding officer that she drew the knife to show she was not a pushover. Complainant testified she had been trying to help Defendant since Defendant moved into Anchor House, at the direction of Anchor House management. Complainant testified that when she came outside, Defendant yelled at her about what Complainant had been saying about her, and then Defendant pulled out a knife. Complainant testified Defendant was close enough to stab Complainant at one point, but Resident jumped in to push Defendant back so Complainant could get away. Complainant stated she eventually went back into the building. Complainant denied telling Defendant she was going to "mollywock" Defendant, but explained the term meant to hit someone and that it was a joke. Resident testified that Complainant and Defendant were arguing, and Resident got up and tried to push Complainant back inside the building. Resident said she could not remember who started the argument, but Resident got in between Complainant and Defendant because she did not want anything else to happen.

4

Video surveillance footage showed Defendant retrieving the knife from her backpack, but Complainant was off-screen. Resident's feet were visible in the video as she pushed Complainant back toward the building. Defense counsel submitted a self-defense instruction, which the trial court denied. The jury acquitted Defendant of fourth-degree assault. On the charge of unlawful use of a weapon, the jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted unlawful use of a weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two days in jail and a fine of $1,000, the latter of which would be waived upon Defendant's completion of 25 hours of community service. Discussion Defendant's sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense because there was substantial evidence in the record supporting an instruction. The State argues the trial court correctly denied Defendant's self-defense instruction because as a matter of law, deadly force cannot be used to repel a simple battery. Defendant disputes that displaying the knife as she did here constituted deadly force, but she argues that if the degree of force was in dispute, it was up to the jury to determine both the degree of force used and whether it was justified under the circumstances. We agree substantial evidence supported giving a self-defense instruction here, and that the level of force and its justification were questions for the jury to decide. We review a trial court's refusal of a requested jury instruction de novo. State v. Hurst, 663 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2023). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the submission of the instruction, taking "the defendant's testimony regarding

5

the facts and circumstances of the defense to be true and consider[ing] whether those facts are legally sufficient to support the instruction." Id. The quantum of proof necessary to require a self-defense instruction is "substantial evidence," which is "evidence putting a matter in issue." State v. Bruner, 541 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Mo. banc 2018) (discussing State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280 n.7 (Mo. banc 2002), and subsequent cases). "If the evidence tends to establish the defendant's theory, or supports differing conclusions, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on it." Westfall, 75 S.W.3d at 280. Such evidence "may come from the defendant's testimony alone as long as the testimony contains some evidence tending to show that [s]he acted in self-defense." Id. Section 563.031 1 contains the elements of self-defense a defendant must show by substantial evidence to merit an instruction:

1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subsection 2 of

this section, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself . . . from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person, unless:

(1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable . . .

1. A person shall not use deadly force upon another person

under the circumstances specified in subsection 1 of this section unless:

(1) He or she reasonably believes that such deadly force is necessary to protect himself, or herself . . . against death, serious physical injury, or any forcible felony[.]

Section 563.011(2) defines "deadly force":

1 All statutory references are to RSMo. Supp. 2024, unless otherwise indicated.

6

[P]hysical force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he or she knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury.

Regarding the use of deadly force in self-defense under Section 563.031, "subsection 2 is always qualified by the reasonableness requirements in subsection 1." State v. Whipple, 501 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (citing State v. Clinch, 335 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). Thus, any use of deadly force "also requires reasonable belief in either the use or imminent use of unlawful force to justify the use of deadly force in the specific enumerated circumstances[.]" Clinch, 335 S.W.3d at 586. Likewise, the reasonable belief in the necessity to use force required in subsection 1 applies to the use of deadly force, along with the corollary that "[a] defender is not entitled to use 'more force than he [or she] reasonably believes necessary to prevent harm to the defended person,' and the force used 'may not exceed that which the defended person would be justified in using.'" State v. O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d 615, 627 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting State v. Caldwell, 655 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)) (internal quotation omitted). We first consider the State's argument that, as a matter of law, deadly force cannot be used to repel a simple assault and battery. This phrase appears in a number of Missouri cases, including the Supreme Court of Missouri's 2018 opinion in Bruner. 541 S.W.3d at 538 (citing State v. Dorsey, 113 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003)). While certainly the principle is true that a relatively minor attack does not justify the use of deadly force, and that principle is reflected in the language of the self-defense statute, parsing the

7

meaning of "simple assault and battery" 2 has become complicated, especially in light of the many changes to the criminal code over the years. Thus, we prefer to tether our analysis to the plain language of the statute, and in doing so, seek to follow Bruner's directive that the elements of the self-defense statute, rather than common law, should govern our analysis. 541 S.W.3d at 536-37. In 2007, the Missouri General Assembly amended Sections 563.031 and 563.011. Before 2007, Section 563.031 prohibited the use of deadly force unless a person reasonably believed it was "necessary to protect himself or another against death, serious physical injury, rape, sodomy, or kidnapping, or serious physical injury through robbery, burglary, or arson." Section 563.031.2, RSMo. 2000. In 2007, the General Assembly replaced the list of specific criminal offenses, stating instead that deadly force may be justified where a person reasonably believes it is necessary to protect himself or herself or a third person "against death, serious physical injury, or any forcible felony." Section 563.031.2 (emphasis added). The General Assembly also added a corresponding definition of "forcible felony" to Section 563.011: [A]ny felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual, including but not limited to murder, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, assault, and any forcible sexual offense[.]

Section 563.011(3), RSMo. Supp. 2007 (emphasis added). 3 Thus, this language allows for the possibility that a person could use deadly force to protect from a forcible felony, separate from the risk of death or serious physical injury.

2 Our criminal statutes have never used this language, neither is "simple assault and battery" specifically defined in Missouri case law. Even if it was, we have statutory definitions that should guide our analysis in any event. 3 This is also the current definition, now codified in Section 563.011(4), RSMo. 2016.

8

Both our case law and the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions acknowledge this possibility. MAI 406.06, the self-defense instruction, includes the following paragraph: But a person is not permitted to use deadly force unless he reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to protect himself against (death or serious physical injury) (the commission of a forcible felony).

MAI-CR 4th 406.06[4] (2017). The drafter chooses which parenthetical language to include that best fits the facts of the particular case, meaning not every deadly-force instruction will include the words "death or serious physical injury." The Notes on Use indicate that "forcible felony" should be defined if used, as well as any felony that is specifically named in the instruction. MAI-CR 4th 406.06, Notes on Use 8 ("A defendant is entitled to defend himself from the use of unlawful force and is entitled to use deadly force if he reasonably believes such physical force is necessary to protect himself from a forcible felony. Deference should be given to the defendant's preference on the choice of the forcible felony that describes the victim's conduct"); 12 (requiring definitions of "forcible felony" or any named felony). Additionally, each district of the Missouri Court of Appeals has acknowledged that an imminent "forcible felony" is its own basis potentially justifying the use of deadly force in self-defense, but in each of these cases, the courts have found even if the victim's conduct amounted to a forcible felony, the felony was not actually occurring or imminent. See O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d at 632 (noting self-defense statute "justif[ies] the use of deadly force only if the defending person reasonably believes that death, serious physical injury, or a forcible felony is actually occurring or is imminent"; concluding even assuming arguendo victim's conduct "rose to the level of felony assault, that assault was not occurring or imminent" at time defendant shot victim); see also Spradling v. State, 708

9

S.W.3d 185, 194 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025) (discussing self-defense instruction with forcible- felony language; concluding defendant failed to provide substantial evidence that robbery he feared was imminent); State v. Roberts, 715 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (finding "no evidence Victim was threatening imminent use of additional force that could cause [defendant's] death or physical injury, or that would qualify as a forcible felony"). Moreover, the Southern District has found reversible error where the court failed to use the "forcible felony" language in a self-defense instruction where the evidence supported it, in absence of a threat of serious physical injury or death. State v. Comstock, 492 S.W.3d 204, 211-212 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (where evidence showed victim's conduct in stabbing Defendant could amount to second-degree domestic assault, court found "[t]he jury here could have found that Defendant used deadly force to protect himself from a forcible felony that involved [victim]'s attempt to inflict only physical injury upon him, not serious physical injury or death"). A cknowledging the possibility that a person may use deadly force to protect him- or herself from an imminent felony assault does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a person is permitted to kill someone whose conduct amounts to what has previously been labeled merely a "simple assault and battery." It is true that the most recent relevant changes to the criminal code, effective in 2017 and discussed below, have broadened the conduct that is classified as felony assault, but it is important to note that the reasonableness requirements of Section 563.031 have not changed. A person must have an objectively reasonable belief not only that physical force is necessary, but that the amount of force the person chooses to use is reasonably necessary to prevent the imminent harm or felony. See Section 563.031.1-2; O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d at 627 (quoting Caldwell, 655 S.W.3d at 378

10

("A defender is not entitled to use 'more force than he reasonably believes necessary to prevent harm to the defended person'"). Every jury will be instructed as such, given that MAI 406.06 includes the statement that a person "can only use physical force to the extent that he reasonably believes it is necessary to defend himself." MAI-CR 4th 406.06[3]. This statutory reasonableness requirement brings a proportionality consideration to the longstanding principle prohibiting deadly force to repel a simple assault. The amendments to the criminal code effective in 2017 brought two major changes relevant here: (1) the Missouri General Assembly created a new class of felonies: the lowest class, class E; and (2) the Missouri General Assembly recategorized many offenses. For example, most of the conduct that previously constituted third-degree assault has now been recategorized as fourth-degree assault, and it remains classified as a misdemeanor except for repeat offenses against certain victims. The current offense of third-degree assault is now a class E felony, and is defined as "knowingly caus[ing] physical injury to another person." Section 565.054. Thus, felony assault can now include relatively minor conduct so long as it causes physical injury and was done knowingly, raising the question, how does this affect the use of deadly force in self-defense? One answer is that our task as courts is to apply the law faithfully as written by the legislature. We assume the Missouri General Assembly is aware of current case law when it amends statutes, and we assume each statutory word is purposeful. See Hadlock v. Director of Revenue, 860 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Mo. banc 1993) ("Every word, clause, sentence and section of a statute should be given meaning"); Clinch, 335 S.W.3d at 587 (we presume legislature was aware of court interpretations of prior versions of statutes). When the Missouri General Assembly amended felony classifications, it could have amended other

11

general references to felonies in the criminal code, including in the self-defense statutes. It did not do so. Should the Missouri General Assembly, upon seeing the implications of applying the plain statutory language of the current code, decide that such statutory language does not actually reflect their legislative intent, the Missouri General Assembly should redraft and clarify this statutory language. We cannot do so for them by effectively rewriting their statute through judicial interpretation. The Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (MAPA) has filed an amicus curiae brief in this case, arguing that our interpretation of the statute broadens the law of self-defense, allowing unprecedented justified killings in situations involving minor assaults. While this Court is empathetic to the concerns raised by MAPA, even prior versions of the self-defense statute authorized deadly force in situations beyond protecting oneself against death or serious physical injury. See State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 282 n.13 (Mo. banc 2002) (stating "deadly force may only be used in self-defense when necessary to protect oneself against death or serious physical injury," then acknowledging in a footnote that "[t]he statute also allows for the use of deadly force in instances of . . . kidnapping, . . ."). Moreover, there has always been a range of potential harm from particular acts in Missouri case law. For example, some cases have called a punch a "simple battery," whereas other cases have acknowledged that a single punch can cause serious physical injury or even death. Compare Bruner, 541 S.W.3d at 538 ("being grabbed or even punched" equated with "simple assault and battery") with O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d at 631 (citing cases, noting Missouri cases have acknowledged "a punch may, in some circumstances, cause death or serious physical injuries"). What has remained constant is that self-defense cases are very fact-intensive and fact-dependent, and the statute requires

12

reasonableness and proportionality anytime a person uses force in self-defense. It is this reasonableness requirement that ensures that among the range of permissible force in self- defense, when compared to the broadening range of potential imminent threats that could justify self-defense, the force actually used matches the level of threat actually present. This consideration is particularly important here, where even if Defendant's actions can be said to constitute deadly force, the actual amount of force used was minimal. Turning to the predicate question in the instant case, the parties dispute whether Defendant's display of the knife here constituted deadly force, which again, is "physical force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he or she knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury." Section 563.011(2). "The question of whether deadly force was used depends not only on the amount of force used but also on the defendant's purpose to cause, or awareness of the likelihood of causing, death or serious physical injury." Westfall, 75 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting MAI-CR 3d 306.06, Notes on Use 4(b) 4 ). Here, the evidence showed Defendant retrieved a knife from her backpack and held it in her hand. Complainant testified Defendant switched the knife from her left to her right hand and "start[ed] coming like she's going to come at me with it." The parties agree the surveillance video showed Defendant retrieving and holding the knife. The State emphasizes that the knife here was a weapon readily capable of deadly force. While this is true, it does not automatically follow that Defendant actually used deadly force with the knife. 5 Defendant testified her intention was not to hurt Complainant, but to convey that

4 Identical language appears in the notes on use of the current version of the instruction, applicable here: MAI-CR 4th 406.06, Notes on Use 7. 5 The converse is also true: because someone uses an ordinary object, such as a broom handle, it does not necessarily follow that the person cannot use an ordinary object to exert deadly force. See MAI-CR 4th

13

the Defendant was not a pushover. Additionally, the jury found Defendant not guilty of fourth-degree assault for pointing and walking toward Complainant with a knife, and they did not find her guilty of the completed offense of unlawful use of a weapon by exhibiting the knife in an angry or threatening manner. Rather, the jury only found Defendant guilty of attempting such unlawful use. On this record, we cannot say definitively that Defendant's actions here constituted deadly force, but it is ultimately irrelevant to the broader question of whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense. The Supreme Court of Missouri has made it abundantly clear that if a factual issue regarding the degree of force used arises from the evidence, the jury should determine the level of force used and accordingly, whether such force was justified under the circumstances. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d at 283 (noting factual issue regarding whether deadly force was used is province of jury); O'Keefe, 681 S.W.3d at 630; see also MAI 406.06, Notes on Use 7. Thus, the question before us here is whether there was substantial evidence of the elements of self-defense under either subsection 1 or 2 of Section 563.031. The State argues even if Defendant did not use deadly force, she failed to present substantial evidence of two elements: (1) that she was not the initial aggressor, and (2) that she had a reasonable belief she was in danger of the imminent use of unlawful force. First, on the issue of who was the initial aggressor, there was conflicting evidence in the record. Both Defendant and Complainant testified the other person started the confrontation, and Resident testified she could not remember. However, so long as some evidence tends to establish that Defendant was not the initial aggressor, even if other evidence contradicts it,

406.06, Notes on Use 7 (discussing example of striking someone with a broom handle; noting "it may depend on whether or not death or serious injury resulted").

14

Defendant is entitled to an instruction. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d at 280 ("If the evidence tends to establish the defendant's theory, or supports differing conclusions, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on it"). Here, Defendant's testimony provided substantial evidence that she was not the initial aggressor. Second, regarding Defendant's belief that she needed to defend herself from the imminent use of unlawful force, the State argues there was no evidence Complainant had a weapon or had made a fist, and Complainant was not close enough to Defendant for any threat of force to be imminent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the requested self-defense instruction, Defendant testified that Complainant was yelling at her, threatening to "mollywock" her, and lunging at her. Defendant knew Complainant had previously been involved in physical altercations, and Defendant was unsure Resident could hold Complainant back given Resident's size and physical condition. While the video does not show Complainant, Complainant testified they were close enough to cause harm for at least part of the incident. Given these circumstances along with evidence of Defendant's condition, that she did not have the use of half of her body, including impaired eyesight, a jury could find she reasonably feared the imminent use of unlawful force. While it is also possible the jury could believe Complainant's version of events or conclude from the evidence that the threat was not imminent, it was and is ultimately for a jury to decide. Defendant properly injected the issue of self-defense, and the trial court should have so instructed the jury. Point granted. Conclusion

15

We reverse the judgment of conviction for attempted unlawful use of a weapon and remand to the trial court for retrial.

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J.

Rebeca Navarro-McKelvey, P.J., and James M. Dowd, J., concur.