State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Demarcus A. Spates, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. DEMARCUS A. SPATES, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ED113216

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County The Honorable Robert W. Cornejo, Judge Introduction Demarcus Spates ("Appellant") appeals the circuit court's judgment entered after a jury convicted him of driving while intoxicated, operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility, and exceeding the posted speed limit by 11-15 miles per hour. In his sole point on appeal, Appellant argues the circuit court clearly erred in admitting statements he made during a traffic stop because he was not informed of his Miranda rights before being questioned. 1 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). He contends he was "in custody" during the traffic stop because his freedo m of movement was curtailed. Because the traffic stop was brief,

2 conducted in public, and involved only limited questioning by the officer, the roadside detention resembled a Terry stop rather than an arrest. 2 2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Accordingly, this Court holds Miranda does not apply. The circuit court did not clearly err in admitting this testimony. Point One is denied. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. Factual and Procedural Background Missouri State Highway Patrol Troopers Nathan Downs and Esteban Reynoso were patrolling westbound Interstate 70 in St. Charles County. At 2:40 a.m., Trooper Downs was driving in the middle lane when he noticed headlights rapidly approaching from the left lane. Using the rear radar unit in the patrol car, Trooper Downs clocked the vehicle traveling 72 miles per hour in a 60 mile per hour zone. Trooper Downs took his foot off the accelerator to pull the vehicle over. In response, the vehicle also slowed down and moved into the right lane. Trooper Downs decelerated to 35 miles per hour, but the vehicle refused to drive in front of him, remaining on his right rear fender. At this point, Trooper Downs quickly applied his brakes and moved parallel to the vehicle. Both Trooper Downs and Reynoso testified they saw a male driving the vehicle. The vehicle abruptly drove onto the highway's shoulder and stopped. Trooper Downs pulled onto the shoulder about a quarter mile ahead of the vehicle and waited. 3

3 Trooper Downs testified he did not walk up to the approaching vehicle because it would be unsafe. He stated when another vehicle's headlights are facing an officer, he cannot see who is in the vehicle nor if they have anything in their hands. Additionally, the driver may try to accelerate and hit the officer. He testified he could not have gotten behind the driver without either breaking the traffic laws or losing sight of the vehicle.

3 The vehicle remained on the shoulder for 10 minutes. No one entered or left the vehicle while on the shoulder. After 10 minutes, the vehicle re-entered the highway. As the vehicle passed his patrol car, Trooper Downs drove off the shoulder and pulled the vehicle over. The traffic stop began around 2:56 a.m. Trooper Downs approached the vehicle from the driver's side and stood outside the driver-side door. Trooper Downs observed a female now driving the vehicle, with the male in the passenger seat. Trooper Downs smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Trooper Downs asked the occupants for identification and discovered the male was Appellant. Appellant claimed he had not been driving. He stated he had recently bought the vehicle, or was in the process of purchasing it, but had not yet bought insurance for the vehicle. Once Trooper Downs learned the vehicle was not insured, he told them they could not drive the vehicle and someone else would have to pick them up. Trooper Downs then asked the female to exit the vehicle, and she complied. Trooper Downs questioned her in his patrol car. 4 4 Trooper Downs testified he removed the female from the approaching vehicle for three reasons: (1) it is safer to sit in the patrol car than stand on the highway, (2) it is easier to obtain observations to ensure the motorist is not impaired, and (3) it is easier to hear in the patrol car. He observed nothing about her that concerned him, so she returned to the vehicle. Trooper Downs re-approached the vehicle at 3:07 a.m. and spoke with Appellant. Appellant claimed he did not know what was going on and insisted he had never been driving. At 3:14 a.m., Trooper Downs asked

4 Appellant to exit the vehicle, and he complied. Trooper Downs questioned him in his patrol car. Appellant stated he had been at the club 20 or 30 minutes beforehand and had taken a couple shots. As Appellant spoke, Trooper Downs noticed Appellant had glassy eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, mumbled, repeated himself, and seemed to have difficulty completing a thought. Appellant refused a field sobriety test twice. Trooper Downs arrested Appellant at 3:19 a.m. and issued three citations: driving while intoxicated, operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility, and exceeding the posted speed limit by 11-15 miles per hour. After he was arrested, Appellant refused a field sobriety test once more. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress his statements to Trooper Downs, alleging he was not informed of his Miranda rights before being questioned. The circuit court conducted a pre-trial suppression hearing on the morning of trial and overruled Appellant's motion to suppress. During trial, Appellant objected to the statements and the circuit court overruled the objection. The jury convicted him on all three counts. The circuit court scheduled the sentencing hearing for September 23, 2024. Appellant failed to appear for the hearing, and the circuit court issued a warrant for his arrest. Appellant was arrested in Cole County and brought to St. Charles County for his sentencing hearing on December 16, 2024, causing a delay of 12 weeks. He was sentenced to one year in the St. Charles County Jail for driving while intoxicated, 15 days for operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility, and ordered to pay a $250 fine for speeding. This appeal follows.

5 Discussion Escape Rule Party Positions The State argues this Court should apply the escape rule and dismiss Appellant's appeal because he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing, causing a 12-week delay in the proceedings. Appellant requests this Court exercise its discretion and not invoke the escape rule because the delay in proceedings was relatively short. Analysis The escape rule is a "judicially-created doctrine" which "denies a criminal defendant who escapes justice the right to appeal." Int. of B.J., 679 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). "The relevant inquiry is the adverse impact on the criminal justice system, not solely the effect of the escape upon the appellate process." Id. The escape rule applies to defendants who fail to appear for a sentencing hearing. State v. Brown, 676 S.W.3d 349, 351 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). Whether to apply the escape rule is "left to the sound discretion of the appellate tribunal." State v. Logan, 687 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting State v. Troupe, 891 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. banc 1995)). This Court has applied the escape rule for escapes of less than a month. See State v. Kelsall, 545 S.W.3d 355, 357 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018) (three weeks). However, appellate courts generally apply the escape rule after a more substantial delay in the proceedings and/or with extensive and significant work on law enforcement's part to capture the fugitive. See State v. Shields, 696 S.W.3d 469, 476–77 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (applied when a defendant fled to Colorado, was apprehended over a year later, and extradited to

6 Missouri); Logan, 687 S.W.3d at 685 (approximately six-month delay); Brown, 676 S.W.3d at 351 (nearly seven-month delay). Here, Appellant delayed the proceedings by 12 weeks, or roughly two-and-a-half months. The circuit court issued a warrant for Appellant's failure to appear at sentencing. Appellant was arrested in Cole County and transported to St. Charles County for the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the proceedings were delayed by less than half the time as in Shields, Logan, and Brown, and law enforcement did not need to engage in interstate extradition to apprehend Appellant. Thus, this Court exercises its sound discretion to review Appellant's sole point on appeal. See B.J., 679 S.W.3d at 541. Point One: Miranda Violation Party Positions Appellant argues the circuit court erred in admitting his statements to Trooper Downs because they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The State argues Miranda does not apply because Appellant was not "in custody" when he made the statements. Standard of Review "Review of a denial of a motion to suppress is limited to a determination of 'whether there is substantial evidence to support the ruling.'" State v. McClain, 698 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Fernandez, 671 S.W.3d 856, 861 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). "In making that determination, [this Court] review[s] the suppression hearing and the trial." Id. "This Court defers to the [circuit] court's credibility determinations and factual findings, inquiring only whether the decision is

7 supported by substantial evidence, and reverses only if the [circuit] court's decision is clearly erroneous." State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Mo. banc 2015). Analysis "A criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings once the suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation." State v. Stricklin, 558 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). A suspect must be "in custody" before the police are required to provide him with Miranda warnings. Id. at 62. Appellant's Miranda argument was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States over four decades ago in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). Like Appellant, the defendant in Berkemer argued he was "in custody" for Miranda purposes during a traffic stop because his freedom of movement was curtailed. Id. at 435–36. The Berkemer court refused to so strictly construe Miranda. Id. at 437. Instead, Berkemer held traffic stops are generally more like Terry stops than arrests because they are relatively brief and occur in public, as opposed to stationhouse interrogations, which are extended and typically occur in a secluded questioning room. Id. at 437–40. Berkemer has since been applied to traffic stops for driving while intoxicated investigations. State v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 473–74 (Mo. banc 2011). In Schroeder, the officer formed a reasonable suspicion the defendant was intoxicated because the motorist had slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and could not maintain his balance. Id. at 474. These factors gave the officer reasonable suspicion the defendant was driving while intoxicated. Id. This allowed the officer to ask limited questions to "confirm his suspicions." Id. Because the traffic stop and subsequent

8 questioning were brief, limited, and public, the restraint more resembled a Terry stop than an arrest, so the defendant was not "in custody," and no Miranda warnings were required. Id. Here, as in Schroeder, Trooper Downs formed a reasonable suspicion Appellant, whom he observed driving initially, was intoxicated because he had glassy eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, mumbled, repeated himself, and seemed to have difficulty completing a thought. These factors gave Trooper Downs reasonable suspicion and allowed him to ask limited questions to confirm his suspicions. Although the entire traffic stop lasted roughly 23 minutes, Trooper Downs only spoke with Appellant alone for 12 minutes, five of which occurred in his patrol car before his arrest. This Court has held longer restraints were permissible. See State v. Ybarra, 637 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) ("This limited restraint of Defendant for 25 minutes is permitted under Terry ...."). As in Berkemer and Schroeder, although Appellant's freedom of movement was curtailed, Trooper Downs briefly detained him in public and asked only limited questions to confirm his suspicions. Because these actions during the traffic stop resembled a Terry stop rather than an arrest, Appellant was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda, and no warnings were required. See State v. Steele, 454 S.W.3d 400, 404–06 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). Despite this well-settled law, Appellant tries to make a factual distinction. He argues he was "in custody" because Trooper Downs told him he was not free to leave during the stop. As discussed above, whether a motorist's freedom of movement is curtailed is generally not a relevant factor in determining custody because a driver is

9 rarely, if ever, free to leave during a traffic stop. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436–37. Even were this a relevant factor—which it is not—Appellant omits important context from Trooper Downs' testimony. Trooper Downs told Appellant he was not free to leave in that vehicle because the car was not insured. Thus, had Trooper Downs not arrested Appellant, he would have been free to leave in another vehicle, just not the uninsured one he was previously operating. The circuit court did not clearly err in admitting Appellant's statements to Trooper Downs. Point One is denied. Conclusion The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. _____________________________________ Philip M. Hess, Judge Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.