State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Dustin Robinson, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED113160 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Warren County vs. ) ) Honorable Jason H. Lamb DUSTIN ROBINSON, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: January 6, 2026

Following a bench trial, Dustin Robinson appeals the judgment entered on his conviction for the class E felony of resisting arrest. In his sole point on appeal, Robinson challenges the classification of this offense as a felony. The judgment is affirmed. The relevant evidence is undisputed, and the issue before us is straightforward. Robinson was arrested on an outstanding warrant issued for burglary in the first degree, a felony offense. He resisted that arrest by fleeing. On appeal, Robinson contends this evidence was insufficient to elevate the resisting-arrest offense from a misdemeanor to a class E felony under section 575.150.5. 1 We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Milazzo, 711 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Mo. banc 2025). A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if, among other things, he or she resists an arrest by fleeing. Section 575.150.1(1). The statute expressly applies to arrests "with or without

1 All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

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warrants," arrests "for any offense, infraction, or ordinance violation," and arrests "for warrants issued by a court or a probation and parole officer." Section 575.150.2(1)-(3). "The offense of resisting arrest can be either a felony or misdemeanor." State v. Shaw, 592 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Mo. banc 2019). Section 575.150.5 provides: The offense of resisting or interfering with an arrest is a class E felony for an arrest for a: (1) Felony; (2) Warrant issued for failure to appear on a felony case; or (3) Warrant issued for a probation violation on a felony case.

According to Robinson, the only warrant-based arrests that can support enhancement under section 575.150.5 are those set forth in subparagraphs (2) and (3) for a failure to appear or a probation violation in a felony case. In his view, only a warrantless arrest can constitute an arrest "for a . . . [f]elony" under subparagraph (1). When the arrest for a felony is effectuated by a warrant, Robinson claims, resisting that arrest is only a misdemeanor. We disagree. While no case has directly addressed this particular question, the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the plain meaning of "for a . . . [f]elony" in section 575.150.5(1) requires that the arrest be "because of" or "on account of" an offense that constitutes a felony as a matter of law. Shaw, 592 S.W.3d at 359-60. "This common meaning indicates section 575.150.5(1) requires there to be a nexus between the commission of a felony and the officer's attempt to make an arrest." Id. at 359. We conclude that this nexus can be established irrespective of whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant. An arrest made pursuant to a warrant is not an arrest for the warrant; it is an arrest for the offense that gave rise to the warrant. The warrant is merely the legal instrument indicating there is probable cause to believe the individual committed that offense and commanding his or her arrest. See State v. Adams, 791 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990). The warrant alerts law

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enforcement of the need to arrest the individual, but the arrest is still "because of" or "on account of" the offense that led to issuance of the warrant. See Shaw, 592 S.W.3d at 359. The required nexus between the commission of that offense and the arrest is not broken by the intervening issuance of a warrant. See id. It is the nature of the offense for which the individual is arrested that matters under section 575.150.5(1), not the means by which the officer came to make the arrest. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shaw, which focused solely on whether the offense that gave rise to the arrest was a felony, not on the means by which the arrest was effectuated. See id. at 359-62. The Shaw Court hypothesized a scenario to demonstrate why an officer's subjective intent for making an arrest need not be established for purposes of section 575.150.5(1). Id. at 360 n.10. In this hypothetical, a victim complains to a law enforcement agency that an individual committed an assault, and the agency, finding probable cause to believe the complaint, places a "pick-up order" for that individual in its database. Id. An officer then attempts to arrest the individual based on that pick-up order, without knowing why it was issued. Id. "If the individual resists the officer's attempted arrest," the Supreme Court reasoned, "that individual could be guilty of felony resisting arrest because the arrest was prompted by the pick-up order and, therefore, 'because of' or 'on account of' the underlying offense of felony assault." Id. Using the same logic, the Southern District in State v. Johnson, 613 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020), found that an arrest on a warrant for parole violations was not "for a felony" under section 575.150.5(1). While the defendant's parole stemmed from a felony offense, the officer did not arrest him "'because of' or 'on account of' that underlying felony offense" but "for

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violating the conditions of his parole[.]" 2 Johnson, 613 S.W.3d at 521; see also State v. Cross, 672 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (concluding in dicta that a resisting arrest charge constituted felony resisting arrest under section 575.150.5(1) because the outstanding warrant on which defendant was arrested was for a felony). Robinson resisted an arrest that was "because of" or "on account of" the commission of a felony, which gave rise to the warrant that prompted his arrest. See Shaw, 592 S.W.3d at 359-60. Therefore, his arrest was "for a felony," and resisting that arrest was properly classified as a class E felony under section 575.150.5(1). See id. Point denied. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

_______________________________ MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge, concurs. Lisa P. Page, Judge, concurs.

2 The Johnson court also found that the arrest plainly did not constitute an arrest on a warrant for failure to appear or for a probation violation under subparagraphs (2) and (3) of section 575.150.5. 613 S.W.3d at 520-21.