State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Isis S. Jones, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Opinion issued December 29, 2025 ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SC101104 ) ISIS S. JONES, ) ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS The Honorable Katherine M. Fowler, Judge Following a jury trial, Isis S. Jones was found guilty of unlawful use of a weapon. The circuit court accepted the jury's verdict and imposed sentence. Jones appeals, contending the circuit court plainly erred in accepting the jury's verdict and imposing the resulting sentence. Jones claims she was charged with the class B felony of unlawful use of weapon by shooting at a motor vehicle, but the instructions submitted to the jury alleged the class E felony of unlawful use of weapon by shooting into a motor vehicle. Despite her endorsement of the instructions the circuit court submitted during her trial, Jones claims for the first time on appeal that this variance resulted in manifest injustice warranting relief from this Court because the sentence the circuit court imposed, while authorized for a class B felony, far exceeded the sentence allowed for a class E felony. Jones requests this Court

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therefore, review her claim for plain error. Because Jones failed to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error accepting the jury's verdict for unlawful use of a weapon and sentencing her for violating a class B felony, despite the variance between the charged offense and the instruction given to the jury, this Court declines Jones' request for plain error review. Accordingly, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. Factual and Procedural Background On February 4, 2020, while D.W. and Victim were together at Victim's apartment, D.W. received multiple phone calls from Jones, consisting of short conversations over the span of approximately 20 minutes. Victim heard Jones yelling at D.W. during the conversations. Victim could sense D.W. growing upset by the interactions, so she offered to drop D.W. off at D.W.'s aunt's house. While Victim drove D.W. to her aunt's house, Jones repeatedly called D.W., and the two argued over the phone. As they neared D.W.'s aunt's house, Victim heard a gunshot, and she stopped her car. While the car was stopped, Jones ran up to the driver's side window with a gun in her hand and began hitting the window with the gun. D.W. got out of the vehicle and had a physical altercation with Jones. In the meantime, Victim drove away. As she fled, Victim heard a second gunshot. Away from the scene, she flagged down police. The police observed a bullet hole in Victim's vehicle and told Victim to make a report at the police station. At the station, Victim identified Jones as the shooter. The State charged Jones with unlawful use of a weapon and an accompanying

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charge of armed criminal action for committing unlawful use of a weapon with a firearm. 1

The unlawful use of a weapon charge read as follows: The defendant . . . committed the class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon . . . in that on or about February 4, 2020, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant, knowingly discharged a firearm at a 2014 Ford Focus, a motor vehicle.

(E mphasis added). At trial, the State presented photographs showing the damage to Victim's vehicle, as well as the testimony of Victim and two police officers who were involved in the investigation. Victim asserted there was no damage to her vehicle prior to the incident, further testifying she was positive Jones was the person who shot her vehicle. On cross- examination, Victim admitted she did not actually see the first gunshot or sense anything hit her vehicle, but stated she saw the flash from the second gunshot. Jones presented no evidence but attempted to establish, through cross-examination of the State's witnesses, that no weapon was ever discharged. At the close of the evidence, the circuit court read and submitted instructions to the jury. Jury Instruction No. 9 read as follows: [I] f you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: That on or about February 4, 2020, in the State of Missouri, the defendant knowingly discharged a firearm into a motor vehicle 2014 Ford Focus, then you will find the defendant guilty . . . of unlawful use of a weapon. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.

1 Jones was charged with other offenses not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

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(E mphasis added). Notably, Jones did not object to the circuit court submitting this instruction to the jury. 2

The jury returned verdicts finding Jones guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and the accompanying armed criminal action offense. Ultimately, Jones waived jury sentencing and entered into an agreement with the State with respect to the sentence to be imposed. Pursuant to the agreement, the circuit court sentenced Jones to 15 years' imprisonment for the unlawful use of a weapon offense but suspended ex ecution of the sentence and placed Jones on probation for three years. Also pursuant to the agreement, the circuit court sentenced Jones to three years' imprisonment for the armed criminal action offense. 3

Jones seeks relief from the judgment of conviction. Jones claims the circuit court erred in accepting the jury's verdict and entering judgment of conviction and sentence for the class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon in that the jury found her guilty of an offense different and distinct from the charged offense based on the jury instruction. Jones claims the judgment must also be vacated because she cannot be convicted of armed criminal

2 Jones' counsel stated he had "no objections" to any of the proposed instructions. When asked specifically whether there was "any objection" to Instruction No. 9, defense counsel responded, "No, your Honor." At the end of the conference discussing the instructions to be submitted to the jury, the circuit court again asked counsel whether there were "any objections to any of the instructions that [were] just discussed," and defense counsel again responded, "No, your Honor." 3 Prior to sentencing, Jones filed a motion for new trial alleging the circuit court erred in several respects entitling her to a new trial, but she did not allege the circuit court erred instructing the jury or accepting the jury's verdict based on the variance between the charged offense and the jury instruction. It is unclear from the record if the circuit court took up the motion for new trial in light of the agreement reached with the State.

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action unless she was found guilty of the underlying class B felony unlawful use of a weapon offense for which she was originally charged by the State. This appeal follows. 4

Plain Error Review Because Jones never objected to the instructions submitted to the jury nor raised the issue of any variance between the charged offense and the jury instruction, the circuit court never had the opportunity to correct the error she raises in her appeal. She concedes her claim is not properly preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, she requests this Court review her claim for plain error. Because a circuit court cannot be faulted for acting in a manner consistent with the behest of a party claiming error, appellate courts generally do not review unpreserved claims of error. State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20 alters this guiding principle, allowing appellate courts to review specified unpreserved claims of error in criminal proceedings. Id. at 526 (citing Rule 30.20). Rule 30.20 states: Allegations of error that are not briefed or are not properly briefed on appeal shall not be considered by the appellate court except errors respecting the sufficiency of the information or indictment, verdict, judgment, or sentence. Whether briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted therefrom. In these two sentences, Rule 30.20 provides the limited framework for appellate courts to consider unpreserved allegations of error. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 528-29.

4 This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal having transferred this case after an opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

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The plain language of Rule 30.20 demonstrates not every allegation of error is entitled to appellate review. Id. at 526. The first sentence of Rule 30.20 dictates "[ a]llegations of error that are not briefed or are not properly briefed on appeal shall not be considered by the appellate court." Rule 30.20. The rule provides an exception for errors involving the "sufficiency of the information or indictment, verdict, judgment, or sentence." Id. The second sentence of Rule 30.20 permits an appellate court to review "plain errors affecting substantial rights" that are not briefed or otherwise properly preserved for appellate review. Id. An appellate court "may" in its discretion review such claims if the court finds "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice" resulted from the error. Id. In this case, Jones alleges the circuit court "plainly erred" in accepting the jury's verdict. She does not allege the information or indictment was insufficient, nor that the verdict, judgment, or sentence was insufficient. Rather, she alleges the circuit court "plainly erred" and a "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice" resulted. This Court's review, if any, lies under the second sentence of Rule 30.20. The questions posed in this appeal, therefore, are (1) whether the circuit court committed "plain error affecting substantial rights"; (2) whether "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice" resulted; and (3) whether the Court in its "discretion" should review Jones' claim. Addressing the first question requires an understanding of the meaning of "plain errors affecting substantial rights." "Plain errors" have been defined as errors that are "facially evident, obvious, and clear." State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation omitted); see also State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 505, 513 (Mo.

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banc 2017). Requiring the error to be "facially evident, obvious, and clear" signifies the circuit court definitively should have recognized the error. See State v. Snyder, 592 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Mo. App. 2019). The flagrancy of the error is further highlighted when it affects "substantial rights." Rule 30.20. "Substantial rights are involved if, facially, there are significant grounds for believing that the error is of the type from which manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice could result if left uncorrected." Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 513 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). As such, "plain errors affecting substantial rights" are not ordinary errors. They involve important and essential legal rights fundamental to our system of justice. By their very definition, they are plainly erroneous, inherently self-evident, discernible, and undeniable, affecting the basic rights of a litigant. They are the type of errors on which the circuit court should have taken corrective action because, left uncorrected, a manifest injustice may result. Even if an appellant can establish the alleged error constitutes plain error affecting substantial rights, Rule 30.20 does not mandate appellate courts review an unpreserved claim of error. Rule 30.20 specifically provides plain error review is available only when appellate courts find manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. Rule 30.20. The existence of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice varies widely depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 513. Generally, the existence of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice depends on the strength of the evidence leading to conviction and whether "the error was outcome determinative." Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Mo. banc 2002). But this factor alone does not control the analysis. "Manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice may result even where the evidence of guilt is

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overwhelming." State v. Escoe, 548 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Mo. banc 1977). Nonetheless, mere prejudice alone fails to demonstrate manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d at 513. Appellant's substantive rights must suffer so substantially from the error that a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will occur if left uncorrected. Id. Having defined "plain error affecting substantial rights" and "manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice" as used in Rule 30.20, it is necessary to articulate who carries the burden of establishing these elements and what that burden entails. This Court has clearly stated the burden rests with the appellant. See Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526; State v. Jones, 427 S.W.3d 191, 195-96 (Mo. banc 2014). An appellate court will conduct review under Rule 30.20 "only when the appellant's request for plain error review establishes facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court's error was evident, obvious, and clear and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." Jones, 427 S.W.3d at 195 (internal quotations omitted). "Unless the appellant makes this facial showing, this Court will decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20." Id. at 195-96. In addition, plain error review is discretionary. Rule 30.20. This Court has a long history of refusing to exercise its discretion to review claims for plain error when the facts and circumstances so warrant. See State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 98 (Mo. banc 1990). Certain types of claims are particularly ill-suited for plain error review and justify declining to review for plain error. See State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196, 214 n.6 (Mo. banc 2015) (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting reasonable trial strategy may contribute to or cause an alleged error to occur, justifying denying plain error review). This is especially true when the appellant's actions or inactions caused or contributed to the

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error alleged. See State v. Bolden, 371 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Mo. banc 2012) ("[P]lain error review is discretionary" and "this Court will not use plain error to impose a sua sponte duty on the trial court to correct Defendant's invited errors."); State v. Anderson, 294 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Mo. App. 2009) (declining to conduct plain error review after a defendant affirmatively waived his claim of error by stating "no objection" to the finding he was a persistent offender); see also State v. Marr, 499 S.W.3d 367, 377 (Mo. App. 2016) (declining to review for plain error after finding defendant waived her claim of error by not attempting to strike a juror who was the spouse of the judge presiding over the trial); State v. Stevens, 949 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Mo. App. 1997) (declining plain error review after finding a defendant affirmatively waived his claim of error by indicating he had no objection to the circuit court's response to a jury question); Richardson v. State, 555 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Mo. App. 1977) (refusing to review for plain error when a defendant stated no objection would be advanced as to the waiver of jurisdiction (certification) of the case by the juvenile court). Nonetheless, discretion to review for plain error remains with the appellate court even when an appellant's actions or inactions may have caused or contributed to the error. Discretion also lies with the appellate court when the claimed error is ill-suited for plain error review. Under Rule 30.20, an appellate court is free to assess the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether to exercise its discretion to review for plain error. See State v. Wurtzberger, 40 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Mo. banc 2001) (extending plain error review under Rule 30.20 when a defendant waived or invited error by failing to object to the submission of a jury instruction). This is true because Rule 30.20 provides

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"[ u]npreserved claims of plain error may still be reviewed under Rule 30.20 if manifest injustice [or miscarriage of justice] would otherwise occur." Id. Importantly, however, the plain language of Rule 30.20 demonstrates not every allegation of error is entitled to discretionary review. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526. "The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify a review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review." Id. (internal quotation omitted). 5

Finally, it is important to recognize there are no special categories of plain error review. It matters not what the claim of error is, only that the claim is unpreserved. See Rule 30.20. This Court has soundly rejected the notion there are different frameworks for examining a request for plain error review. In Brandolese, the Court looked to its plain error precedent and the plain language of Rule 30.20 to reiterate the plain error framework, as set forth in Rule 30.20, applies to all claims of error – even serious constitutional and statutory violations. 601 S.W.3d at 529-30. In doing so, the Court affirmed its decision in State v. Howard, 540 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. banc 1976), which "stands for the proposition that all errors—whether statutory, constitutional, structural, or based in some other source—are subject to the same treatment under this Court's plain error framework." Brandolese, 601

5 While Rule 30.20 provides appellate courts with the discretion to determine whether certain claims should be reviewed for plain error, exercising this discretion is not without limits. Courts abuse their discretionary authority when they act "clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and [are] so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." State v. Emery, 701 S.W.3d 585, 598 (Mo. banc 2024) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, while an appellate court retains the discretion to review a claim for plain error, this authority must not be abused.

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S.W.3d at 529. Rule 30.20, therefore, remains the only means by which an appellant can seek review of any unpreserved claim of error. Id. at 530. 6

In summary, an appellate court confronted with a request to grant relief applying plain error review may resolve the claim in one of five ways under the Rule 30.20 framework:

1. Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish

substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error, i. e., evident, obvious, and clear error;

1. Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish

substantial grounds that the circuit court committed an error affecting substantial rights;

1. Declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish

substantial grounds that any alleged error the circuit court committed resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice;

1. Declining to exercise its discretionary authority to review for plain error; or
2. Determining an appellant facially established substantial grounds that the circuit

court committed plain error affecting substantial rights resulting in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, warranting exercise of the appellate court's discretion to review and grant relief.

6 Any cases utilizing a different framework for applying plain error review should no longer be followed.

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There is no requirement that an appellate court consider these alternatives in any given order, but an appellate court should not review and cannot grant relief pursuant to Rule 30.20 unless the court finds plain error affecting substantial rights and manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. This is the framework by which this Court reviews Jones' request for plain error review. Analysis Jones asserts the circuit court plainly erred in accepting the jury's verdict and entering judgment of conviction and sentence for the unlawful use of a weapon after the jury utilized Jury Instruction No. 9 to reach its verdict. Jones contends she was charged with the class B felony of unlawful use of a weapon for shooting at a motor vehicle, but the jury returned a verdict finding her guilty of a different and distinct unlawful use of a weapon offense, classified as a class E felony, because Instruction No. 9 required the jury to find she shot into a vehicle. 7 Jones claims this error resulted in manifest injustice because she was sentenced as a class B felony offender when the jury found her guilty of

7 Jones was charged with unlawful use of a weapon in violation of section 571.030.1(9), RSMo 2016, a class B felony. The version in effect at the time of the offense provided a person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapon if he or she knowingly: "Discharges or shoots a firearm at or from a motor vehicle . . ., discharges or shoots a firearm at any person, or at any other motor vehicle, . . . unless the person was lawfully acting in self- defense." 571.030.1(9), RSMo 2016 (e mphasis added). Jones contends Instruction No. 9 submits a violation of a separate unlawful use of a weapon offense, a class E felony, as set out in section 571.030.1(3), RSMo 2016, which provided a person commits the offense of unlawful use of a weapon if he or she knowingly: "Discharges or shoots a firearm into a dwelling house, a railroad train, boat, aircraft, or motor vehicle . . . ." (Emphasis added).

13 only a class E felony, and the sentence imposed exceeded the punishment allowed for a class E felony. A circuit court errs in submitting an improper jury instruction. State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 545 (Mo. banc 2010). By submitting Jury Instruction No. 9, which included the prepositional phrase of shooting "into" a motor vehicle instead of shooting "at" a motor vehicle, as Jones was charged, the circuit court erred. 8 This does not mean, however, Jones is automatically entitled to have her claim reviewed for plain error under Rule 30.20. While the circuit court may have erred, Jones must show facially substantial grounds the error constituted a "plain error." Jones, 427 S.W.3d at 195-96. A plain error is one that is "facially evident, obvious, and clear," such that the circuit court should have definitively recognized it and taken corrective action. See Snyder, 592 S.W.3d at 380. The error here was not plain because it was not evident, obvious, and clear. The prepositions "at" and "into" are related. To shoot "into" something, one must also necessarily shoot "at" that same thing. Because of this similarity, the jury's determination that Jones shot "into" the vehicle, as instructed in Instruction No. 9, subsumed a finding by the jury that Jones shot "at" the vehicle. In reaching its verdict, the jury could not have found Jones shot "into" the vehicle without shooting "at" that same vehicle. Because "into" encompasses "at" in this situation, there was no evident, obvious, and clear error. Jones 8 The proper instruction for submitting a violation of section 571.030.1(9), RSMo 2016, the offense charged, is Missouri Approved Instruction – Criminal 4th Edition (MAI-CR 4th) 426.16. The proper instruction for submitting a violation of 571.030.1(3), RSMo 2016, is MAI-CR 4th 426.10. Had the circuit court patterned Instruction No. 9 after MAI- CR 4th 426.16, the jury instruction would have had the jury determine if Jones shot "at," rather than "into," the motor vehicle.

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failed, therefore, to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error accepting the jury's verdict, entering a judgment of conviction, and imposing sentence for the class B felony of unlawful use of weapon in violation of section 571.031.1(9), RSMo 2016, despite the variance between the charged offense and Instruction No. 9. Because Jones failed to make this showing, this Court declines Jones' request for plain error review. No further analysis under the Rule 30.20 plain error framework is necessary. Jones' sole point is denied. Conclusion The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. 9

___________________________ W. Brent Powell, Chief Justice All concur.

9 The judgment is also affirmed as to Jones' armed criminal action conviction because Jones' appeal of this offense was dependent on this Court reversing or vacating the judgment as to her unlawful use of a weapon conviction.