State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Rodney Knox, Appellant.

STATE OF M ISSOURI, ) Opinion issued August 11, 2020 ) R e s ponde nt, ) ) v. ) No. SC98298 ) RODNEY KNOX, ) ) Appe llant. )

Appe al from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis The Honorable Clinton R. Wright, Judge

Rodney K nox alleges the circuit court erred in entering judgment against him for two counts of class A misdemeanor stealing because the jury found only the elements necessary to convict him of class D misdemeanors. This C ourt agrees. The jury instructions merely required the jury to find Mr. Knox retained the two vic tims ' personal ite ms without their consent and with the purpose of withholding this property from them. Absent proof of value, the offense s ub mitte d was a class D misdemeanor under section 570.030.7, 1 not a class A misdemeanor under section 570.030.8. Therefore, the c irc uit

1 Statutory references are to RSMo 2016; however, two versions of section 570.030 appear in RSMo 2016: (1) the version of section 570.030 that became effective January 1, 2017, along with the rest of the new criminal code; and (2) the version of section 570.030 in effect from August 28, 2016, through December 31, 2016. At the time Mr. K nox committed the offenses, the 2017 criminal code was (and re ma ins) in effect. Accordingly,

2 court erred in entering judgme nt for two class A misde mea no r stealing convict io ns. Mr. K nox a ls o appeals his judgment of conviction fo r one count of felony stealing. Because his third vic tim fa ile d to s p e c ific a lly s ta te Mr. Knox or an accomplice stole the $1,200 the intruders found while going through this victim's pockets in the course of stealing things of value from his apartment, he argues, the evidence was ins uffic ie nt to convict him o f s te a ling more than $750. This C ourt disagrees. The jury was free to infer Mr. K nox got the $1,200 fro m the vic tim ba s e d o n the vic tim's te s timo ny in c o mb ina tio n with the evidence that Mr. K nox and another man were caught while le a ving the vic tim's apartment complex immediately after the robbery with other stolen items, the vic tim's id e ntific a tio n o f Mr. K nox as one of the individuals who robbed him, and the fact Mr. K nox had $1,570 in his pocket when arrested. This evidence provided the jury with a sufficient basis to infer Mr. Knox stole the cash and to d is b e lie ve his alternative explanation for having so much cash in his pocket. But because violation of that section is a class D felony under the version of that statute in effect when the crime was c o mmitte d, the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Mr. K nox for a class C fe lo ny. This C ourt reverses the judgment and remands the case fo r entry of a corrected judgme nt consiste nt with this opinio n. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The State charged Rodney K nox with three counts of first-degree robbery and three counts of armed criminal action, 2 all stemming from a single event in January 2017.

for ease of reference, citations are to the 2017 criminal code unless otherwise indicated. 2 The State also charged Mr. Knox with resisting arrest but filed a memorandum of nolle

3 The evidence showed that several armed men with face coverings pushed their way into the apartment of Jabari Turner. The men forced Mr. Turner and his friends to lay on the floor while they searched the apartment. The State presented evidence the intruders took a laptop computer, a PlayStation controller, cellular telephones, headphones, a Bluetooth speaker, a watch, marijuana, and a Versace belt. Mr. Turner testified that he had $1,200 in rent money in his pockets and that the intruders went through his pockets and the pockets of the other victims. Mr. Turner called the p o lic e once the intruders left. The police arrived at the a p a rtme nt b uild ing within one minute and saw four men with face coverings and bags full o f ite ms getting out of the elevator. Upon seeing police, the men began to run, dropping some items as they went. Officers apprehended two of the suspects, later identified as Rodney K nox and Donnoven Williams. Mr. Turner identified Mr. K nox at the scene, telling police Mr. Knox had been the man with a black and silver pistol. Mr. K nox was found with a handgun, $1,570 in cash, and several items Mr. Turner identified as stolen, including the Versace belt, a watch, the Bluetooth speaker, and headphones. At tria l, the State did not present evidence of the value of the s to le n ite ms o f personal property. 3 Mr. Turner te s tifie d he had $1,200 in cash in his pockets, the intruders searched his pockets and those of his friends, and he thought at least one of his frie nd s had cash. But Mr. Turner was not s p e c ific a lly asked whether the men had taken

prosequi regarding this charge on the day of tria l. 3 The briefs suggest this was because the State believed it would obtain a conviction for firs t-degree robbery, which does not require proof of the value of the items stolen, although certain stealing offenses do so require.

4 the cash they found when going through his or the other victims' pockets. Mr. Knox testified in his own defense. He s a id he went with two of his uncles and another man to the apartment to purchase marijuana but did not know his three companions intended to rob the people in the apartment. Mr. Knox testified he waited for the three other men on a different floor of the apartment complex while he thought they were buying drugs and then went up to Mr. Turner's floor, where he saw his companions leaving the apartment while wearing face coverings. The three men each held bags fille d with various ite ms, and s o me ite ms fell out of the bags in the elevator. Mr. Knox said he picked up the dropped items at his uncle's direction. Mr. Knox testified that, when the police arrived, he did not run as the others did because he was unaware of the robbery and did not know the items he held had been s to le n. He explained the $1,570 in cash in his pocket wa s his life s a vings, whic h he carried with him because his mother was a drug addict and he did not want her to take the money. Mr. K nox said the gun he was carrying was registered to him and he always carried it because he had been robbed in the past. The c irc uit court instructed the jury on three counts of firs t-degree robbery and three counts of a rme d c rimina l a c tio n for use of a weapon in each robbery, one for each of the three robbery victims. Without objection from the State, as to the two victims who did not testify at trial, the court also instructed the jury that, if it d id no t find Mr. K nox guilty of robbery as to them, it should consider whether he was guilty of misdemeanor stealing for taking one victim's watch and misdemeanor stealing for taking the other victim's Bluetooth speaker without consent and with the intent to keep them. These

5 misdemeanor instructions did not require the jury to make any finding as to the value of the watch or speaker. The jury acquitted Mr. Knox of armed criminal action and, as to the s e two vic tims , fo und him guilty o nly o f the two mis d e me a no r s te a ling counts—the jury did not find him guilt y of these two firs t-degree robbery counts. As to Mr. Turner, again without objection from the State, the c irc uit court gave the jury two additional instructions that, if it did not find Mr. K nox guilty of the first-degree robbery count, it should consider whether (1) he was guilty of felony stealing by taking Mr. Turner's money and headphones with a value of more than $750 or (2) he was guilty of misdemeanor stealing for taking Mr. Turner's headphones without his consent and with the intent to keep them. The jury again did not return a guilty verdict on the s ub mis s io n o f firs t-degree robbery and acquitted Mr. Knox on the associated count of a rme d c rimina l a c tio n but did find Mr. K nox guilty of felony stealing for taking Mr. Turner's $1,200 and headphones. Mr. K nox appealed. The key question on appeal is whether, based on these jury verdicts, the circuit court properly entered judgment for one count of cla s s C fe lo ny s te a ling from Mr. Turner, for which Mr. Knox re ceived a five-year suspended sentence, and two counts of class A misdemeanor stealing fro m two o the r vic tims, for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in ja il and released for time served. After opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10. For the reasons discussed below, the C ourt holds the c irc uit court should have entered judgment for one count of class D felony stealing and two counts of class D misdemeanor s te a lin g and remands fo r furthe r proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW "An appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a c rimina l c o nvic tio n is limite d to d e te rmining whe the r the re is s uffic ie nt e vid e nc e fro m which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 2014). Evidence and inferences favorable to the State are accepted as true, and evidence to the contrary is rejected. Id. Ap p e lla te re vie w is limite d to whe the r, "in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. When an error is not objected to in the c irc uit court, on appeal "plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefro m. " Rule 30.20. The question of what the State mus t prove to support a conviction for a class A mis d e me a no r under section 570.030.8 is one of statutory interpretation and, therefore, is determined de novo. Finnegan v. Old Republic Title Co. of St. Louis, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 928, 930 (Mo. banc 2008). "The p rima ry rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute." State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Mo. banc 2007). The rule o f le nity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed against the State. Id. III. THE INSTRUCTIONS SUBMITTED CLASS D MISDEMEANOR STEALING Mr. K nox argues the circuit court improperly entered judgment against him on two counts of class A misdemeanor stealing because the misdemeanor instructions to the jury

7 proved only class D misdemeanors, not class A misdemeanors. He admits he failed to object to circuit court's error in entering judgment for two class A misdemeanors but argues doing so was plain error because the s ix -month sentences he received were in excess of the only authorized punishment for a class D mis d e me a no r, which under sections 558.002 and 558.004 is a fine not to exceed $500. Mr. Knox is correct. "Being sentenced to a punishment greater than the maximum sentence for an offense constitutes pla in e rro r re s ulting in ma nife s t injus tic e . " State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Mo. banc 2020). M is s o uri re vis e d its c rimina l c o d e effective January 1, 2017. Prior to this revision, section 570.030.1 4 provid e d: "A person c o mmits the c rime o f s te a ling if he or she appropriates property or services of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of deceit or coercion." The remainder of section 570.030 set forth various types of s te a ling whic h it categorized as class B or C felonies. Section 570.030.3(1), in p a rtic ula r, ma d e s te a ling a class C felony if "[t]he value of the property or services appropriated is five hundred dollars or more but less than twenty-five thousand dollars." 5 Section 570.030.9 made stealing of $25,000 or more a class B felony. Section 570.030.10 created

4 All statutory references in this paragraph are to the version of section 570.030 in effect from August 28, 2016, to December 31, 2016. 5 In State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Mo. banc 2016), this C ourt held that, because the definition of stealing in section 570.030.1, RSMo Supp. 2009, did not make value an element of the crime of stealing, and because section 570.030.3(1), RSMo Supp. 2009, stated that stealing was a class C felony only if value was an element of the offense, s te a ling under section 570.030.3(1), RSMo Supp. 2009, was a class A misdemeanor, not a class C felony. See also State ex rel. Fite v. Johnson, 530 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Mo. banc 2017). The revisions to the statute effective in January 2017 removed the language requiring value to be an element of the crime of stealing for the crime to be felony

8 a catch-all category of class A misdemeanors, stating, "Any violation of this section for which no other penalty is specified in this section is a class A misdemeanor." As the other sections of the statute provided no alternative penalty for stealing less than $500, ste a ling le s s than $500 was a crime for which "no other penalty is specified" and, therefore, was a c la s s A mis d e me a no r—t he lo we s t-le ve l s te a lin g o ffe nse . Id. Re vis io ns to section 570.030 o f the c rimina l c o d e that became effective January 1, 2017—13 days before the crimes at issue here—reduced stealing more than $25,000 from a class B felony to a class C felony under section 570.030.4 and replaced the class C fe lo ny of "stealing between $500 and $25,000" with the class D felony of "stealing property or services valued at "seven hundred fifty dollars or more" under section 570.030.5(1). The revised statute continued to have a "catch-a ll" category of class A misdemeanors fo r s te a ling "if no o the r p e na lty is s p e c ifie d in this s e c tio n. " § 570.030.8. Unlike its predecessors, however, the re vis io n effective January 1, 2017, fo r the firs t time created an offense of class D misdemeanor stealing, codified at section 570.030.7, providing: The offense of stealing is a class D misdemeanor if the property is not of a type listed in [the preceding subsections, 6 ] the property appropriated has a value of less than one hundred fifty dollars, and the person has no previous fin d ings of guilt for a stealing-related offense.

In attempting to apply these revised statutory provisions to the crimes of which the

stealing. § 570.030, RSMo 2016. 6 It is not disputed that the type of property stolen was not a type listed in and punishable under these preceding subsections.

9 jury found Mr. K nox guilty, both the State and Mr. K nox recognize the jury did not make a finding as to the value of the watch the jury found Mr. K nox stole in finding him guilty o f mis d e me a no r s te a ling in count III or of the wireless Bluetooth speaker the jury found Mr. K nox s to le in find in g him guilt y o f mis d e me a n o r s te a lin g in count V. Mr. K nox argues that, because section 570.030.8 specifically states that stealing is categorized as a class A misdemeanor only if no other penalty is specified in section 570.030 and because subsection 570.030.7 specifically states that stealing is categorized as a class D misdemeanor if a firs t-time stealing offender steals property valued at less than $150, this means the State must show the value of the property stolen was $150 or mo re to convict a person of class A misdemeanor stealing under the revised statute. See §§ 570.030.7-.8. Th e State makes the contrary argument that the revisions to section 570.030 effective January 1, 2017, simply changed the class A misdemeanor category to any theft o f less than $750 rather than any theft of less than $500 but left class A as the "default" category for any misdemeanor stealing of items with a value of less than $750. It recognizes the 2017 statutory revisions inc lud e d a new section 570.030.7 providing that s te a ling ite ms worth less than $150 is a class D misdemeanor fo r first-time s te a ling o ffenders. The State argues, however, that the legislature just intended this new section to give the State the option to charge a lesser offense if it wanted to do so and class A misdemeanor stealing still is the "default" offense if the value of the items s to le n is no t proved. The State says this gives it complete discretion whether to submit a class A misdemeanor just by choosing not to put on evidence of the amount s to le n or that

10 defendant has no previous s te a ling-related offenses. It argues that, if d efendant wants the offense "reduced" to a class D misdemeanor, it is up to defendant to prove he did not c o mmit a c la s s A mis d e me a no r b y s te a ling things o f $ 1 5 0 in va lue , a s the "C o ns titutio n places no burden on the State to disprove facts that serve to mitigate a defendant's sentence." This means, the State argues, the very lack of a finding of value by the jury means Mr. Knox was convicted of a class A rather than a class D mis d e me a no r. The State's argument igno re s two imp o rta nt le ga l p rinc ip le s . F irs t, "[t]he state has the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond reasonable doubt." State v. Seeler, 316 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Mo. banc 2010). The defendant never has the burden of introducing evidence to lower the category of his or her crime or to prove his or her innocence of a higher level of crime. 7 It is the State's burden to prove every element of a crime charged. The State's interpretation of section 570.030 defies common sense and the most basic precepts o f c rimina l la w. Second, an amended statute "should be construed on the theory that the legislature intended to accomplish a substantive change in the law." Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. banc 1983). The State's interpretation of the revision effective January 1, 2017, would give no effect or purpose to the legislature's adoption of a class D misdemeanor category of offense for stealing under $150. The re vis io n, lik e the prior versions of the statute, specifically requires that stealing qualifies as a class A mis d e me a no r o nly if no other penalty is specified in section 570.030. The legislature

7 There is no claim the statute makes lack of a prior offense or the value of items stolen an affirmative defense or that it requires defendant to inject the issue of value before a

11 amended section 570.030 to add a new subsection 7 that specifies the penalty for firs t-time offenders who steal items valued at less than $150 is conviction fo r a class D mis d e me a nor. "[A]ll provisions of a statute must be harmonized and every word, clause, sentence, and section thereof must be given some meaning." Id. The State's interpretation renders the classification of a class D misdemeanor a nullity. C ourts may not interpret statutes to render any provision a nullity because doing so would not give effect to the plain language of the statute. A construction of the version of section 570.030 effective January 1, 2017, that give s e ffe c t to a ll o f its p ro vis io ns is tha t section 570.030's subsections are plainly mutually exclusive—a penalty is either specified for certain conduct in the statute or the offense is a class A misdemeanor because "no other penalty is specified." The statute specifies that firs t-time s te a ling o ffe nders who are convicted of stealing an item with a value of less than $150 are guilty of a class D misdemeanor. § 570.030.7. Th e statute specifies that offenders who steal items worth $750 or more but less than $25,000 are guilty of a class D fe lo ny. § 570.030.5(1). The statute does not specify a penalty for stealing items with a value of $150 or more but less than $750. Nor does the statute specify a penalty for stealing less than $150 when a defendant has a previous finding of guilt fo r a s te a ling-rel ated offense. These, therefore, are the thefts that constitute class A mis d e me a no rs, for these are the thefts as to which "no o the r p e na lty is s p e c ifie d in this section." § 570.030.8. C onversely, if a penalty is specified—a s it is fo r s te a ling less than $150 when the defendant has no prior stealing convictions—then, by definition, that

class D misdemeanor can be considered; in fact, the statute does neithe r.

12 conduct is not a class A misdemeanor. There is no overlap. This is, indeed, exactly how MAI-CR 4th 424.02.1 provides that misdemeanor stealing offenses should be submitted. That instruction states that stealing is a class A misdemeanor when "the value of property or services appropriated is one hundred fifty dollars or more but less than seven hundred fifty dollars." To s ub mit a c la s s A misdemeanor, the instruction says to "specify that the property or service has a value of one hundred fifty dollars." Id. Note on Use 3. C onversely, the stealing is a class D misdemeanor when "property or services appropriated has a value of less than one hundred fifty dollars; and the person has no previous findings of guilt for a s te a lin g-related offense." Id. If the State wants to submit a class A misdemeanor when the property is valued at less than $150, "evidence of the prior pleas or findings of guilt shall be proved to the court outside the presence of the jury and the court must enter its findings thereon prior to submiss io n of the case to the jury." Id. Note on Use 4. The instructions offered by Mr. K nox and submitted to the jury without objection by the State followed exactly the fo rma t required by MAI-CR 4th 424.02. The State offered no evidence of the s to le n ite ms ' value, and the instructions a c c o rd ingly s ub mitte d s te a ling without requiring the jury to find the value of the watch in Instruction 10 or the value of the Blue tooth speaker in Instruction 13. Instruction 10 stated: As to C ount III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

F irs t, that on or about January 13, 2017 in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant retained a watch owned by [V.A.], and

13 Second, that defendant did so without consent of [V.A.], and Third, that defendant did so for the purpose of withholding it from the owner permanent l y, and [s ic ]

then you will find the defendant guilty under C ount III of misdemeanor stealing under this instruc t io n.

Instruct io n 13 stated: As to Count V, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that on or about January 13, 2017 in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant retained a wireless Bluetooth speaker owned by [R.P.], and Second, that defendant did so without the consent of [R.P.], and Third, that defendant did so for the purpose of withholding it from the owner permanent l y, and [s ic ]

then you will find the defendant guilty under Count V of misdemeanor stealing under this instruc t io n.

The jury found Mr. K nox guilty of these two offenses. The elements set out in these instructions do not submit the value of the watch and speaker the jury found Mr. K nox stole. The jury's verdict, therefore, supports only a judgment for two counts of class D misdemeanor stealing because the State failed to prove the items had a value of $150 or more. 8

Mr. Knox concedes the ins truc tio ns s ub mitte d the e le me nts o f class D misdemeanor stealing offenses and that the jury found him guilty of these offenses. He

8 On appeal, the parties spend substantial time arguing about the theoretical question whether a class D misdemeanor is a lesser-included offense of a class A misdemeanor. This C ourt does not address that argument because, below, both parties agreed on the instruction given to the jury without objection and the real issue on appeal is whether the circuit court could enter judgment against Mr. Knox for a class A misdemeanor based on the jury's verdict.

14 does not allege the evidence was insufficient to support these verdicts. He does correctly note, however, that the ma ximum punishment fo r a class D misdemeanor is a $500 fine, yet he was sentenced to six months on each count because the circuit court erroneously entered judgment for two class A misdemeanors. Accordingly, Mr. K nox's convictions for two class A misdemeanor stealing offenses are reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to resentence him for two counts of class D misdemeanor stealing. IV. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS CONVICTION OF A CLASS D FELONY The jury also found Mr. K nox guilty under Instruction 6, which stated that it should find Mr. K nox guilt y of felony stealing if it found: First, that on or about January 13, 2013 in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant retained US currency and headphones owned by Jabari Turner, and Second, that the defendant did so without the consent of Jabari Turner, and Third, that defendant did so for the purpose of withholding it from the owner permanent l y, and Fourth, that the property retained had a combined value of at least seven hundred fift y dollars[.]

As is e vid e nt, paragraph fourth of Instruction 6 required the jury to find "the property retained had a combined value of at least seven hundred fifty dollars." The State and Mr. Knox agree the State failed to present any evidence of the headphones' value. The State argues, however, that the evidence that Mr. Knox stole $1,200 from Mr. Turner's pocket is more than sufficient to show the combined value of the headphones and currency was $750 or more. Mr. K nox counters he is not arguing that $1,200 is not more than $750. Rather,

15 ci ting State v. McQuary, 173 S.W.3d 663, 668 (Mo. App. 2005), he argues that, while a jury may make reasonable inferences from the evidence, it cannot draw inferences from the total absence of evidence of an element of the offense. He argues that is what happened here, for the State failed to prove any money was stolen from Mr. Turner at all because it failed to ask Mr. Turner if the intruders stole the $1,200 they found in his pockets. Mr. K nox contends, absent such a statement, there is no factual basis upon which the jury could form an inference that any currency was stolen, as an inference cannot be based on speculation. The jury was not required to resort to speculation to convict Mr. Knox. While it is d iffic ult to perceive why the prosecutor did not specifically ask Mr. Turner whether the in truders stole the $1,200 they discovered while rummaging through his pocket, no magic words directly identifying the stolen property need be spoken if the theft of that property is otherwise shown by the evidence. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Mr. Turner's testimony was sufficient to support a reasonable inference by the jury that $1,200 was taken from his pocket. Mr. Turner testified he had $1,200 in his pockets and the intruders searched his pockets as they tore apart his apartment, taking things of value. Just a few minutes after the theft, the police apprehended Mr. Knox at the apartment complex with $1,570 in cash on his person, as well as a number of specific items of personal property belonging to Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner a ls o identified Mr. Knox as one of the intruders. Although Mr. K nox offered an alternative explanation for possessing a large amount of cash, appellate courts give "great deference to the trier of fact." State v.

16 Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. banc 2012). "All decisions as to what evidence the jury must believe and what inferences the jury must draw are left to the jury, not to judges deciding what reasonable jurors must and must not do." State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 399 (Mo. banc 2014). The jury was free to disbelieve Mr. K nox's explanation of the unusually large amount of cash he had on his person and to infe r s o me of the cash found in Mr. Knox's possession had just been stolen from Mr. Turner. But Mr. K nox and the State agree it was error to enter judgment against Mr. K nox for class C felony stealing based on the jury's finding that he s to le ite ms with a va lue o f $750 or more. Under the revision that went into effect January 1, 2017, s te a ling mo re than $750 is a class D felony. § 570.030.5(1). Because the five-year suspended sentence Mr. K nox received was within the range permitted for a class D felony, Mr. Knox does not ask for resentencing but merely for entry of a nunc pro tunc order correcting the judgment to reflect he was convicted o f a class D felony. "Clerical errors in the sentence and judgment in a criminal case may be corrected by order nunc pro tunc if the written judgment does not reflect what actually was done." State v. LeMasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 426 (Mo. banc 2015); Rule 29.12(c). This Court directs the circuit court on remand to correct the judgment to reflect that Mr. Knox was convicted of a class D, not a class C, fe lo ny. V. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, this C ourt reverses the judgment and remands the case with directions to the circuit court to correct the judgment to reflect convictions for a class D felony s te a ling and two class D misdemeanors and to resentence Mr. Knox as

17 prescribed in sections 558.002 and 558.004 to no more than a $500 fine for each misdemeanor offense.

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LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUD GE All c o nc ur.