State of Missouri vs. Greg Hallgrimson

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD86680 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) NOVEMBER 12, 2025 GREG HALLGRIMSON, ) ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri The Honorable Timothy Flook, Judge

Before Division Two: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, Alok Ahuja, Judge and Cynthia L. Martin Judge

Following a jury trial, Greg Hallgrimson ("Hallgrimson") was convicted of first- degree domestic assault in violation of section 565.072. 1 He appeals, claiming the trial court erred by admitting generalized expert testimony about domestic abuse, limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim, and submitting an incomplete definition of "knowingly" in the jury instructions. Finding no error, we affirm.

1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented to June 13, 2020, the day of Hallgrimson's charged offense, unless otherwise indicated.

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Factual and Procedural Background 2

Hallgrimson and S.H. ("Victim") married in 2010 and divorced in 2017. By 2020, they had reunited and started living together again. On June 13, 2020, the couple had an argument about why Victim did not want to remarry Hallgrimson. Victim recorded the disagreement on her phone, which she regularly did because Hallgrimson often did not recall the details of their arguments later. Hallgrimson badgered Victim about why she did not want to remarry him for over twenty minutes. Victim explained that she did not want to remarry him because he had cheated on her during their prior marriage. Victim left the house twice during the disagreement and sat quietly outside their house. Each time she returned inside, Hallgrimson restarted the argument despite Victim's attempts to not engage. The dispute escalated, and Hallgrimson called Victim belittling names. The conversation turned to a sleep diary that Victim had started at Hallgrimson's request to track his sleep habits, which was a point of contention for the couple. Victim left the room to retrieve the diary, and Hallgrimson muttered under his breath that he should shoot and kill Victim. When Victim returned, Hallgrimson demanded to read the diary. Victim refused, and he accused her of cheating on him. Angered by the accusation, Victim slapped Hallgrimson. In response, Hallgrimson punched Victim hard enough to knock her briefly unconscious. While she

2 When reviewing a jury-tried case, "we view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Warren, 702 S.W.3d 48, 50 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Putfark, 651 S.W.3d 869, 874 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)).

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laid unresponsive, Hallgrimson yelled at her, "You want to play, b****? Don't f****** punch me. I'll defend my f****** self, dumb f****** c***." He demanded her to get up five times without response. When Victim regained consciousness, she saw a pool of blood on the floor and heard Hallgrimson yelling at her to get up. As the pain set in, she began hyperventilating and sobbing. Hallgrimson told her not to act like that. Once he realized the seriousness of Victim's injuries, he repeatedly said that he was going to shoot himself, proclaimed that he did the "worst thing in the world," and expressed concern about going to prison. While continuing to threaten to kill himself, Hallgrimson eventually helped Victim up to the sink. Victim could barely hold herself up as she bled into the sink. From the pain, she lost control of her bladder and vomited repeatedly. Meanwhile, Hallgrimson told Victim to call his children to tell them that he loved them and that they were not at fault for his suicide. He asked Victim not to tell anyone about what had happened. He also asked her to tell him if she decided to call the police so that he could kill himself in advance. Later, Hallgrimson called his sister for help because she was a nurse. After seeing the extent of Victim's injuries, his sister took Victim to the hospital. There, Victim told the medical team that she was injured from falling down the stairs since she did not want Hallgrimson to harm himself. Victim was diagnosed with multiple fractures to her facial bones, deep into the bones that extended to the base of her skull. Her nose was displaced, creating a depression in her face. The medical team had to rush Victim to the trauma center

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because her eye socket had broken into pieces with part of it lodging in her sinus, which was a potentially fatal injury. But the trauma center had to wait to perform surgery for two weeks since Victim's face was too swollen to undergo an operation. Victim had extensive reconstructive surgery, involving three plates and seventeen screws. One of the plates became infected, leading to a follow up surgery. Victim may require further surgery due to a deviated septum and droopiness in her eye. She also continues to experience popping in her jaw, numbness on half her face, and blurriness in her eye. Victim stayed in the relationship with Hallgrimson for another year after the incident. She continued to tell people that she was injured from falling down the stairs because she was embarrassed that the incident had occurred and that she had stayed in the relationship afterward. She was also scared that Hallgrimson would retaliate against her or her family if she told the truth. However, she started feeling physically ill from lying, and, over a year later, she told the truth to her brother who urged her to report what had happened to the police. Victim made an incident report in November 2021. The State charged Hallgrimson with one count of domestic assault in the first degree. At trial, defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement that Hallgrimson had acted in self-defense. He asserted that Victim was the one at fault for her injuries because she escalated the argument by hitting Hallgrimson first. Defense counsel stated that Victim repeated her "elaborate tale" that she was injured from falling down the stairs for a year and half because she knew that she was the "proximate cause of herself being struck" given that "she had instigated and caused this fight." He noted that Victim had

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initially refused medical treatment, told the hospital that she was safe at home, and stayed with Hallgrimson for another year after the incident. Defense counsel asserted that Victim only reported Hallgrimson to the police in November 2021 to retaliate against him for marrying another woman in August 2021. Defense counsel stated that Victim "decide[d] that she was not guilty of being the initial aggressor, but that somehow she had transmuted herself into a victim." The State called a domestic violence expert ("Expert") 3 who testified generally about domestic abuse patterns without commenting on the facts of the case. She testified that the cycle of abuse involves "a period of stress building that precipitates an incident of violence, and then a period of apologies, . . . called the honeymoon cycle, that ends the abuse." She described the different types of abuse: physical, psychological, emotional, sexual, and financial. Expert explained that power is at the center of domestic abuse, and abusers are abusive only when necessary to control the victim's behavior. Expert testified that it is "very common" for victims of domestic violence to protect their abuser and not to report incidents due to shame, denial, and humiliation. She explained that a victim may not leave an abuser because abuse generally starts after the couple has already fallen in love and an abuser usually apologizes after an incident, promising to change. Expert further testified that a victim may not want to get medical attention for injuries in order to prevent the abuser from having consequences, to

3 All witnesses and others who are not parties are referred to by their initials or by other non-identifying references in accordance with the redaction requirements of section 509.520 and Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c) to not provide the names of any non- party witnesses.

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minimize what had happened, or to avoid being forced to choose whether to leave the relationship. Expert also explained that an abuser may threaten self-harm to manipulate and control a victim by making the victim feel guilty. The State presented Victim's testimony about the events surrounding the physical altercation though she had no memory of how Hallgrimson had hit her. She explained that she delayed reporting the incident due to the shame of staying with Hallgrimson and the fear that he would harm himself or retaliate against her. During her testimony, the State played the recording of the incident, which included the couple's argument leading up to the physical altercation, the sounds of punching, Victim's severe response to her injuries, and Hallgrimson's repeated claims of self-harm. After the State rested, Hallgrimson testified that he acted out of self-defense because Victim had hit him in a part of the kitchen where he had nowhere to retreat. He stated that he had struck her with the back of his arm or hand to get Victim away from him and that she was injured when her face hit an ottoman. On cross-examination, Hallgrimson testified, "I don't think any amount of force that [Victim] used or I used was reasonable; however, I can't tell you what injuries were from me and what injuries were from hitting the ottoman. I have no doubt I caused an injury." He further testified that he was not afraid of Victim physically hurting him and had not been scared for his safety during their fight. Rejecting Hallgrimson's claim of self-defense, the jury found him guilty of first- degree domestic assault. Hallgrimson waived sentencing by the jury, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years' incarceration in the Missouri Department of Corrections.

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The trial court entered a written judgment of conviction and sentence on October 20, 2023 ("Judgment"). Hallgrimson timely appealed. Other facts will be addressed as pertinent to Hallgrimson's points on appeal. Analysis Hallgrimson raises three points on appeal. Hallgrimson's first point contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Expert's testimony about the general tendencies of abusers and victims in relationships involving domestic abuse ("Point One"). His second point argues that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of defense counsel's cross examination of Victim ("Point Two"). His third point asserts that the trial court plainly erred when it submitted an incomplete definition of "knowingly" in the jury instructions for first-degree domestic assault ("Point Three"). Point One: Admission of Generalized Expert Testimony about Domestic Abuse Hallgrimson's first point on appeal contends that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his objection to the admission of Expert's testimony. Hallgrimson argues that Expert's generalized testimony about domestic abuse was logically and legally irrelevant as Hallgrimson admitted striking Victim, but alleged doing so in lawful self-defense. Hallgrimson argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of Expert's testimony because it "functioned to mislead the jury from the central issue of self-defense and [to] inflame the jury." The State maintains that Hallgrimson failed to preserve this claim of error. Before addressing the merits of Hallgrimson's claim, we first determine whether it has been preserved for our review.

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Hallgrimson argues that Expert's testimony was both logically and legally irrelevant. These are distinct objections, as evidence must be both logically and legally relevant to be admissible. State v. Dodd, 711 S.W.3d 619, 626 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). Logically relevant evidence "tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable." Id. (quoting State v. Banks, 582 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). Legal relevance presumes the logical relevance of evidence, but requires the trial court to balance the evidence's probative value against its potential costs of "unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness." Id. (quoting Banks, 582 S.W.3d at 925). Thus, logically relevant evidence can be excluded if its costs outweigh its benefits. Id. Hallgrimson argues that he preserved the claim of error raised in his first point on appeal because he "filed a pre-trial motion to exclude any expert testimony relating to the behavior of domestic abuse victims." 4 In his pre-trial motion, Hallgrimson argued that expert testimony about the behavior of domestic abuse victims would not assist the jury as a trier of fact, would encroach on the jury's role in determining credibility, and would unnecessarily divert the jury's attention away from relevant issues. Fairly interpreted, Hallgrimson's pre-trial motion challenged both the logical and legal relevance of expert testimony regarding the behavior of domestic abuse victims. However, "[o]bjecting to

4 Hallgrimson did not allege in his opening brief that his pre-trial motion to exclude expert testimony was directed to testimony about the behavior of domestic abusers, an observation that is noteworthy in light of Hallgrimson's contention during oral argument that Expert's testimony was inadmissible propensity evidence because it addressed the generalized behavior of domestic abusers.

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the admission of evidence in a pretrial motion 'is not sufficient to preserve for appeal any error in failing to exclude it.'" Petersen v. State, 658 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting State v. Hughes, 563 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Mo. banc 2018)). Instead, a party must object at trial in order to preserve a claim of error in the admission of evidence. Id. At trial, after Expert testified about her credentials, defense counsel approached the bench and objected "on the grounds of relevancy." Counsel argued that Expert would be "talking about generic, general concepts that don't apply to this case," and that her testimony would "not aid the jury in their understanding of the issues." Counsel asked for his objection to be shown as a continuing objection for the entirety of Expert's testimony. The State responded that Expert's testimony was relevant because defense counsel's opening statement expressed an intent to focus entirely on Victim's behavior. The trial court overruled Hallgrimson's objection, but granted counsel's request that it be shown as a continuing objection. Hallgrimson's objection at trial challenged the logical relevance of Expert's testimony, as it contested whether the testimony was probative on a contested issue in the case. Hallgrimson's objection at trial did not challenge the legal relevance of Expert's testimony, as it did not argue that the testimony should be excluded even if logically relevant because it would be unfairly prejudicial to him or would mislead the jury. A party claiming error in the admission of evidence at trial "must stand or fall on the record made in the [trial] court." Petersen, 658 S.W.3d at 516 (quoting State v. Davis, 348 S.W.3d 768, 770 (Mo. banc 2011)). An objection at trial to the admission of evidence "must be specific, and on appeal, the same grounds must be relied upon." Id. at 515

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(quoting State v. Tisius, 362 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Mo. banc 2012)). "An objection presented to the [trial] court cannot be broadened on appeal." Id. at 516 (citing State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 426 (Mo. banc 2015)). Consequently, we agree with the State that Hallgrimson has not preserved the entirety of the claim of error asserted in his first point on appeal. Although Hallgrimson did preserve his claim that Expert's testimony was not logically relevant, he has not preserved the claim that Expert's testimony was not legally relevant. We do not review unpreserved claims of error. Id. (citing State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020)). Because Hallgrimson has not requested plain error review, he has advanced no argument supporting a finding of plain error, though it would have been his burden to do so. As a result, we decline to exercise our discretion to afford plain error review of Hallgrimson's claim that the admission of Expert's testimony was an abuse of discretion because the testimony was not legally relevant. See Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526 (observing that "[p]lain error review is discretionary"). We turn our attention, therefore, to the only issue that is preserved for our review. We review Hallgrimson's challenge to the admission of Expert's testimony over his logical relevancy objection for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scott, 676 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). "An abuse of discretion is found when the decision to admit or exclude the challenged evidence is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. at 340-41 (quoting State v. Barriner, 210 S.W.3d 285, 296 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). "If we find that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse only if the prejudice resulting from the improper

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admission is outcome-determinative." Id. (citing State v. McGee, 284 S.W.3d 690, 701 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Expert's testimony over Hallgrimson's logical relevancy objection. Generally, expert testimony is logically relevant if it consists of specialized knowledge that helps the jury "understand the evidence or [] determine a fact at issue." § 490.065.2(1)(a); see State v. Loper, 609 S.W.3d 725, 736 (Mo. banc 2020). Hallgrimson does not dispute that Expert had specialized knowledge, but contends that Expert's testimony did not tend to prove or disprove whether Hallgrimson acted reasonably in defending himself, or whether he knowingly caused serious physical injury to Victim. We disagree. During opening statement, Hallgrimson advised the jury that it would hear evidence that Victim had lied for a year and a half about the source of her injuries, and that Victim did so because she knew that she was at fault as the initial aggressor. Defense counsel asserted that Victim "transmuted" herself from the initiator to the victim by reporting Hallgrimson to the police, even though she initially refused medical treatment, affirmed that she was safe at home to the hospital staff, and stayed with Hallgrimson for another year after the incident. Hallgrimson suggested that Victim did so in retaliation for his marriage to another woman. Hallgrimson's theory that Victim's delayed reporting was attributable to her awareness that she was responsible for her injuries was intended to bolster Hallgrimson's claim of lawful self-defense. Evidence can become admissible when "a party has opened the door to it with a theory presented in an opening statement . . . ." State v. Shockley,

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410 S.W.3d 179, 194 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 714, 727 (Mo. banc 2002)). Thus, even if Expert's testimony about the behavior of domestic abuse victims would not otherwise have been logically relevant, (an issue we need not address or decide), the testimony became logically relevant to counter Hallgrimson's effort to characterize Victim's delayed reporting as Victim's admission that Hallgrimson acted in self-defense when he struck her. "Where 'the defendant has injected an issue into the case, the State may be allowed to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to explain or counteract a negative inference raised by the issue defendant injects.'" Id. (quoting State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Mo. banc 1987) (abrogated on other grounds)). It was not an abuse of discretion, therefore, for the trial court to permit Expert to provide generalized testimony about other explanations for delayed reporting by domestic abuse victims beyond a victim's acknowledgment of responsibility for being attacked. 5

Furthermore, there is no indication that Expert's testimony was outcome- determinative, even if it should not have been admitted, which we do not find. "In a criminal trial involving improperly admitted evidence, the test for prejudice is whether the error was outcome-determinative." State v. Dodd, 712 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Mo. App.

5 During oral argument, Hallgrimson characterized Expert's testimony as primarily focused on predator profiling, and thus as inadmissible propensity evidence. We disagree with this characterization. Expert's testimony, read in context, explained in generalized terms why domestic violence victims often delay reporting, including because of the cyclical conduct of an abuser. This testimony was not offered to establish that Hallgrimson was likely a domestic abuser, but was instead relevant to diffuse Hallgrimson's reliance on Victim's delayed reporting to bolster his claim of self-defense.

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E.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Denham, 686 S.W.3d 357, 373 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)). "A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence." Id. (quoting Denham, 686 S.W.3d at 373). "Prejudice is not outcome-determinative when evidence of guilt is otherwise overwhelming." Id. (quoting Denham, 686 S.W.3d at 373). Any undue prejudice that may have stemmed from Expert's testimony did not outweigh the overwhelming evidence of Hallgrimson's guilt. During his testimony, Hallgrimson admitted that he did not think his use of force was reasonable and that he had "no doubt [he] caused an injury" when he hit Victim. He also conceded that he was not afraid that Victim could physically hurt him and had not feared for his safety during the disagreement. "The justification of self-defense requires that a defendant's use of force have been reasonable, in relation to the threat that the defendant faces." M.L.H. v. Juvenile Officer, 634 S.W.3d 667, 675 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Regardless of whether Expert's testimony had been admitted, Hallgrimson's own testimony overwhelmingly supported the jury's finding that he did not act in lawful self-defense. In addition, the recording of the incident gave the jury the opportunity to directly hear what had transpired. The jury heard in the recording that before the physical altercation, Hallgrimson goaded Victim when she tried to disengage, called her demeaning names, and stated that he should shoot and kill her. The jury then heard the sounds of punches, Hallgrimson's aggressive name calling after hitting Victim, and his

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antagonistic demands for her to get up. Once Victim's intensely visceral response to her injuries began, the jury heard Hallgrimson's admission that he did the "worst thing in the world," his concerns about going to prison, and his attempts to dodge consequences by asking Victim not to call anyone and repeatedly stating that he would kill himself while Victim was reeling in pain. This context of Hallgrimson's verbal abuse preceding the sound of punches, his threatening response immediately after hitting her, his acknowledgment of injuring her, and his fear of facing severe consequences for what he did further supported the jury's rejection of Hallgrimson's claims that he acted in self- defense and that he had not knowingly harmed Victim. As a result, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Hallgrimson of first-degree domestic assault based on the justification of self-defense but for the admission of Expert's testimony. 6

Point One is denied.

6 Even had Hallgrimson preserved his claim that Expert's testimony was not legally relevant, his claim would not have been successful under a similar analysis. He cannot show that Expert's generalized testimony prejudiced him by suggesting that he was a long-time abuser, as Victim testified that Hallgrimson had not previously struck her. Moreover, it was uncontested that Hallgrimson struck Victim on the occasion for which he was charged, and the recording revealed the violent nature of the incident. See State v. Livingston, 665 S.W.3d 363, 372-73 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a domestic violence expert because "given the overwhelming evidence [of the defendant's abusive behavior], there [wa]s no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result had the court not admitted the challenged expert testimony").

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Point Two: Limiting Defense Counsel's Cross-Examination of the Victim Hallgrimson contends in his second point on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's cross-examination of Victim about whether Victim would have been injured had she not struck Hallgrimson first. As previously explained, we review a trial court's alleged error in the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Scott, 676 S.W.3d at 340. Trial courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including the scope of cross- examination. State v. Palma, 719 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). If we find error, we will reverse only when there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial or deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. banc 2019). During cross-examination, Victim testified that there had been no other incidents of violence in her relationship with Hallgrimson. Victim affirmed that when she slapped Hallgrimson, it was the "first blow that was ever struck in this relationship." Defense counsel then asked Victim, "Can we agree, but for you striking Greg Hallgrimson, we never get to this?" The State objected that the question called for speculation because Victim was being asked "to comment on what the defendant was thinking, why he acted a certain way." Defense counsel responded, "She'd never been struck before, and I want to reiterate we never get to this without her striking." The trial court sustained the objection. Defense then asked Victim, "Can we agree we never get to this if you don't strike . . .," at which point the State interjected and repeated the objection that Victim was

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being asked to speculate. The trial court once again sustained the objection and instructed defense counsel to move to the next question. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's objections. A witness may testify "only to those matters of which the witness has personal first-hand knowledge." Tisius v. State, 519 S.W.3d 413, 421 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521, 529 (Mo. banc 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Witnesses cannot testify as to others' intentions. Vescovo v. Kingsland, 628 S.W.3d 645, 660 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). "A witness's attempt to state what was in someone else's mind is either sheer speculation or unadulterated hearsay." Id. (quoting Bryant v. Bryan Cave, LLP, 400 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It would have required "sheer speculation" for Victim to testify, as a factual proposition, that Hallgrimson would not have hit her had she not hit him first. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the admission of testimony that by its very nature would not have been based on personal knowledge. Hallgrimson argues that the exclusion of this question violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. "Because a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present a complete defense, the erroneous exclusion of evidence in a criminal case creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice." State v. Ratliff, 622 S.W.3d 736, 748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Taylor, 588 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this proposition has no application here, as the trial court's exclusion of Victim's answers to Hallgrimson's objectionable questions was not erroneous.

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Point Two is denied. Point Three: Incomplete Submission of Jury Instructions Defining "Knowingly" In his third point on appeal, Hallgrimson asserts that the trial court plainly erred in including an incomplete definition of "knowingly" in the instructions submitted to the jury. Hallgrimson concedes that the definition of "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" that was requested by the State and submitted to the jury in Instruction No. 13 conformed with one of two definitions authorized by the Missouri Approved Instruction- Criminal ("MAI-CR") 4th 433.00 - Definitions. However, Hallgrimson argues that the submitted definition was nonetheless erroneous because it should have included both definitions of "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" authorized by MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - Definitions. Hallgrimson concedes that he did not preserve his claim of instructional error because he did not object to the definition of "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" submitted to the jury. In fact, the record reflects that Hallgrimson acknowledged that he had reviewed Instruction No. 13, which included the definition of "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" requested by the State. Hallgrimson also advised the trial court that there was no record he wished to make regarding any of the proposed instructions, and that he had tendered no alternative instructions which had been refused. Hallgrimson nonetheless requests plain error review under Rule 30.20. 7 Plain error review requires that we follow a two-step process. State v. Hilbert, 663 S.W.3d

7 Although Hallgrimson effectively told the trial court that he had no objection to the jury instruction defining "knowingly," and confirmed that he had not offered an

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462, 465 (Mo. banc 2023). First, we must determine "whether the claim of error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." Id. (quoting State v. Minor, S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022)). To do so, the appellant bears the burden of showing plain error that is "evident, obvious, and clear" based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. (quoting Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731). If we find plain error, we proceed to the second step to "determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice." Id. (quoting Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731). "Instructional error rarely constitutes plain error." State v. Coyle, 671 S.W.3d 702, 713 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citing State v. Gannan, 658 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). "To demonstrate that the trial court's decision to give a particular instruction constitutes plain error, the appellant must establish 'more than mere prejudice and must show that the [trial] court has so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that it is apparent to the appellate court that the instructional error affected the jury's

alternative instruction, our Supreme Court held in State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 154 n.3 (Mo. banc 2011) that plain error review is not waived when counsel "affirmative[ly] state[s] that he ha[s] no objection to [an] instruction" or "fail[s] to submit an alternative instruction." (Citations omitted). We are mindful that in State v. Thompson, 711 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Mo. banc 2025), our Supreme Court appeared to signal an intent to partially restore the concept of waiver of plain error review in criminal cases involving challenged jury instructions. However, the defendant in Thompson not only expressed that he had no objection to an instruction later challenged on appeal, but also tendered an alternative instruction addressing the same subject. Id. That slight variation in facts, along with Thompson's failure to address, let alone abrogate Celis-Garcia, leaves us reluctant to conclude that Hallgrimson waived plain error review by affirming that he had reviewed the State's tendered definition of "knowingly," and that he had no record to make regarding the instructions, or any refused instructions he wanted to preserve in the record.

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verdict, and caused manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.'" Id. at 713-14 (quoting Gannan, 658 S.W.3d at 111-12). Hallgrimson was charged with domestic assault in the first degree pursuant to section 565.072. Section 565.072.1 provides that "[a] person commits the offense of domestic assault in the first degree if he or she attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to a domestic victim . . . ." "Domestic victim" is defined in section 565.002(6) to include "a household or family member." MAI-CR 4th 419.72, the instruction for domestic assault in the first degree based on knowingly causing serious physical injury to a domestic victim, requires in paragraph First that the jury find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that "the defendant knowingly caused serious physical injury to [Identify victim.] by [Describe means by which injury was caused . . . ]. Relevant to this case, the instruction requires in paragraph Second that the victim be found by the jury to be the spouse or former spouse of the defendant. And the instruction requires in paragraph Third that the jury find and believe that the "defendant (knew) (or) (was aware) that [Repeat the relationship submitted in paragraph Second]." The verdict director submitted to the jury on Hallgrimson's charge of domestic assault in the first degree followed this pattern instruction. The pattern instruction does not require the term "knowingly" as used in paragraph First of the verdict director to be defined. MAI-CR 4th 419.72; see also MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - General, Notes on Use 2.A (noting that the definition of a term is not required unless the Notes on Use to an instruction state that a definition is required). "Where an instruction uses a word in its ordinary, common-sense meaning, then no confusion occurs

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simply because the word is not defined." State v. Ludwig, 18 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (citing State v. Dighera, 617 S.W.2d 524, 534 (Mo. App. W.D. 1981)). Here, paragraph First of Hallgrimson's verdict director required the jury to find and believe that Hallgrimson "knowingly caused serious physical injury 8 to [Victim] by punching [Victim] in the face." The common meaning of "knowingly" is "in a knowing manner . . . : with awareness, deliberateness, or intention." State v. Bozarth, 51 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1252 (1971)). MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - General, Notes on Use 2.B, does provide, however, that it is permissible to define a term when the Notes on Use for a particular instruction authorizes, but does not require the definition. In this case, Notes on Use 7 to MAI-CR 4th 419.72 provides in subsection (a) that the term "knowingly" "may be defined by the court on its own motion and must be defined on written request in proper form by the state or by the defendant." Here, the State requested that the term "knowingly" be defined. The State submitted a stand-alone instruction (Instruction No. 13), which provided definitions for terms used in the instructions. Instruction No. 13 included the following: "Knowingly," "Knowing," "Knowledge," or "Knew."

8 The pattern instruction for domestic assault in the first degree applicable to this case requires "serious physical injury" to be defined as "physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part of the body." MAI-CR 4th 419.72. This definition of "serious physical injury" is from section 556.061(44). The severity of Victim's injuries was not in dispute in this case.

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A person knew, acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his or her conduct or to attendant circumstances when the person was aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances existed This definition is found in MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - Definitions, which requires "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" to be defined in criminal jury instructions as follows: A person knew, or acts knowingly, or with knowledge,

(a) with respect to his or her conduct or to attendant circumstances when the person (is) (was) aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances (exist) (existed), or

(b) with respect to a result of a person's conduct when he or she (is) (was) aware that his or her conduct (is) (was) practically certain to cause that result.

(Emphasis added.) These alternative definitions differ in their focus on conduct or circumstances in the first instance, and on the result of conduct in the second instance. However, both definitions employ a common sense understanding of the word "knowledge" or "knowingly" that is consistent with the dictionary definition of the term. Bozarth, 51 S.W.3d at 182 (holding that the dictionary definition of "knowingly" is "consistent with the definition set forth in MAI-CR3d 333.00," the precursor to MAI-CR 4th 433.00). Moreover, MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - Definitions defines "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" consistently with section 556.061(31), 9 where "knowingly" is defined as follows:

9 Chapter 556 sets forth preliminary provisions of general application to Chapters 556 to 580, known and cited as "The Revised Criminal Code." Section 556.011. Section

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(31) "Knowingly", when used with respect to:

(a) Conduct or attendant circumstances, means a person is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist; or

(b) A result of conduct, means a person is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.

See also section 562.016.3 (describing culpable mental states). The trial court was required by MAI-CR 4th 419.72 to submit a definition of "knowingly" upon the State's request. The definition of "knowingly" tendered by the State was authorized by MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - Definitions. Hallgrimson expressed no objection to the definition requested by the State and did not tender an alternative definition. Though Hallgrimson now complains that the submitted definition was "incomplete," he cites no authority for the proposition that the definition of "knowingly" must (or permissibly can) include both scenarios contemplated by section 556.061(31) and MAI-CR 4th 433.00 - Definitions. See State v. Boedecker, 717 S.W.3d 225, 236 n.7 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (observing that jury instruction defining "knowingly" to include both a reference to "conduct or attendant circumstances" and a reference to "a result of a person's conduct" was not challenged, such that the propriety of submitting a definition using both scenarios was not before the court for appellate review). Hallgrimson has not established, therefore, that the trial court committed evident, obvious, or clear error in submitting Instruction No. 13 to the jury.

556.061 sets forth Code definitions. Section 565.072, describing the offense of domestic assault in the first degree, is part of The Revised Criminal Code. Because section 565.072 does not define "knowingly," the definition in section 556.061(31) applies.

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Nor has Hallgrimson established that the submission of Instruction No. 13 so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that it is apparent on appellate review that the instructional error affected the jury's verdict and caused a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Hallgrimson argues that omission of the part of the definition of "knowingly" that focuses on a defendant's awareness that his conduct is practically certain to cause serious physical injury permitted the jury to convict him by finding only that he knowingly engaged in the conduct of punching Victim, without regard to whether he knowingly intended serious physical injury as a result of his conduct. However, this argument ignores the plain and common sense manner in which paragraph First of the verdict director was written. And, this argument ignores that the State did not argue during closing that all the jury had to find and believe is that Hallgrimson knowingly punched Victim in the face. Rather, the State argued that the jury had to find and believe that Hallgrimson acted "with the knowledge or knowingly with respect to [his] conduct, [and] that [he] [knew] the intended circumstances . . . [and was] aware of the nature of [his] conduct . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The State followed this description of "knowingly" by detailing the evidence of Hallgrimson's pursuit of Victim from room to room, and by highlighting the recording of the aggressive, antagonistic, and prolonged altercation between Hallgrimson and Victim. The State highlighted Hallgrimson's statements that he should have shot Victim, and that he should have "f****** killed" Victim. The State then specifically argued that Hallgrimson "knew that this was a result that was certain to happen . . . ." The State highlighted Hallgrimson's actions and statements after punching Victim, and argued that they were all consistent with guilt and

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remorse because Hallgrimson knew well that he had not been justified in what he had done. Finally, during rebuttal, the State observed that it "comes down to whether [Hallgrimson] knowingly caused serious physical injury to [Victim] by punching her in the face," and again emphasized that the jury could find that Hallgrimson "knew what he was doing" based on the protracted and antagonistic altercation that led to Victim's injuries. Thus, even had Hallgrimson argued, which he did not, that the wrong definition of "knowingly" was submitted, and instead the definition should have been limited to the option that more directly focuses on whether a defendant was practically certain that his conduct would yield a particular result, we would not conclude that the definition misled the jury so as to result in a manifest injustice given the manner in which the definition and the verdict director were argued by the State during closing. 10 And even if we were to conclude (which we do not) that the trial court should have sua sponte submitted a definition of "knowingly" that included both authorized options as Hallgrimson now argues, we would not find that the trial court's failure to do so resulted in a manifest injustice. Hallgrimson's mere speculation that the jury would have come to a different

10 As it so happens, the definition of "knowingly, knowing, knowledge, or knew" submitted by the State, which focuses attention on conduct or attendant circumstances, plainly applies to paragraph Third of the verdict director which required the jury to find and believe that Hallgrimson "knew" that Victim was his former spouse. Though MAI- CR 4th 419.72 does not contemplate submitting a definition of "knew" on request, and instead only addresses the submission of a definition of "knowingly" on request, the fact remains that the definition submitted was correct, as Hallgrimson conceded during oral argument, at least with respect to the use of "knew" in paragraph Third of the verdict director.

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conclusion about his guilt had the submitted definition of "knowingly" included both scenarios contemplated by MAI-CR 433.00 - Definitions is insufficient to establish manifest injustice. See Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 533 (appellant's speculation that "the definition of 'knowingly' would have changed the outcome of the jury's deliberation in his favor" did not give rise to manifest injustice). The jury concluded that the evidence supported finding "knowingly" as instructed. There is no reason to believe it would not have done so again, even had the alternative definition of "knowingly" been added to the instruction. Point Three is denied. Conclusion The trial court's Judgment is affirmed.

__________________________________ Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur