State of Missouri vs. Kendall Wayne Crockett

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87758 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) KENDALL WAYNE CROCKETT, ) February 17, 2026 ) Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri Honorable Keith Michael Bail, Judge Before Division Three: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Janet Sutton, Judge Kendall Wayne Crockett (Crockett) appeals his convictions of first-degree trespass pursuant to section 569.140 (Count I) and second-degree harassment pursuant to section 565.091 (Count II) after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri (trial court). 1

Crockett raises two points on appeal in which he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentencing Crockett on Count II and that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss Count I. We affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as currently supplemented, unless stated otherwise.

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Factual and Procedural Background The marshal's office provides security at the Boone County courthouse. At trial, the sergeant marshal (Marshal) testified that Crockett entered the courthouse on February 28, 2024. That day, Crockett was at the courthouse to file a document with the court clerk, but Marshal testified that Crockett was known to come into the courthouse and record on his smartphone despite knowing that recording was not allowed by local court rule. Marshal testified that, once Crockett entered the courthouse, he asked Crockett if he had any recording devices. Crockett refused to answer, was yelling, and requested to speak with Marshal's direct supervisor, Chief Marshal. Marshal testified that he told Crockett he needed to comply with the rules or leave the courthouse, and Crockett left thereafter. Marshal testified that Crockett then reentered the courthouse with Chief Marshal and that Chief Marshal was going to escort Crockett wherever he was going in the courthouse, but when he walked past Marshal, he "threw up the double bird" at Marshal and the other marshals. Crockett was then removed from the courthouse and Marshal testified that he told Crockett he was "trespassed" for the next twenty-four hours, and, if he came back, he would be arrested for trespass. Approximately an hour later, Crockett returned to the courthouse. Marshal testified that he told Crockett he had been trespassed and needed to leave, giving him multiple opportunities to leave the building. Crockett was combative with Marshal. Crockett was eventually taken into custody and arrested for trespass. Chief Marshal's wife (Wife) testified that on March 2, 2024, in the afternoon she was at home while Chief Marshal was away on a fishing trip. Wife testified that Crockett rang the doorbell and asked if Chief Marshal was home. Wife knew Crockett was not a friend or neighbor, and Wife recognized Crockett only because Chief Marshal had shown her a picture of

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him the evening prior and told her about the disturbance at the courthouse. Wife told Crockett that Chief Marshal was not home, she asked why Crockett needed Chief Marshal, and when he did not respond, Wife asked Crockett how he knew Chief Marshal. Wife testified that Crockett said he knew Chief Marshal from the courthouse and told Wife before leaving, " You tell [Chief Marshal] I was here." Wife said Crockett sounded "intimidating" and "aggressive" when he said, "You tell [Chief Marshal] I was here." Wife called the police, Marshal, and Chief Marshal. Chief Marshal testified Wife was very upset when she called and he went directly home to her. Chief Marshal testified that he never gave Crockett his address or invited him over and did not know him in any fashion other than their interactions at the courthouse. Chief Marshal testified that Crockett had previously emailed his work email months before the incident and that his work phone number was also available on the Boone County website, but that Crockett did not email or call Chief Marshal between February 28 and March 2. The State charged Crockett in Count I with first-degree misdemeanor trespass under section 569.140 for knowingly remaining unlawfully at the Boone County Courthouse on February 28, 2024. In Count II, Crockett was charged with second-degree misdemeanor harassment under section 565.091 for going, without good cause, to Chief Marshal's personal residence with the purpose to cause emotional distress on March 2, 2024. After a bench trial, the trial court found Crockett guilty of Counts I and II. Crockett was sentenced to 180 days in jail on Counts I and II, the trial court suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on two years of unsupervised probation as to the trespass conviction and two years supervised probation as to the harassment conviction, with a special condition that he serve seven days of shock incarceration.

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Crockett appeals. Additional facts relevent to the disposition of the appeal are included below as we discuss Crockett's two points on appeal. Analysis Point I In Crockett's first point on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal on the harassment count because there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Crockett went to Chief Marshal's home with the purpose of causing Chief Marshal emotional distress. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges following a bench trial using the same standard as our review of such challenges following a jury-tried case. State v. Crider, 554 S.W.3d 460, 461 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we determine whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial which would permit a reasonable fact finder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Glaze, 611 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disregarding all contrary evidence and reasonable inferences, we determine whether "any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). Section 565.091 states that a person commits second-degree harrassment if he or she, "without good cause, engages in any act with the purpose to cause emotional distress to another person." Emotional distress is defined as "something markedly greater than the level of uneasiness, nervousness, unhappiness, or the like which are commonly experienced in day-to- day living[.]" § 565.002(7). The emotional distress "must be considerable or substantial to a

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reasonable person." State v. Morris, 640 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting R.M. v. Juv. Officer, 625 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). Crockett argues that going to Chief Marshal's home and asking for Chief Marshal "did not demonstrate a purpose to cause emotional distress, even if [Chief Marshal and Wife] were upset by the incident." Crockett first cites R.M. v. Juvenile Officer to support his contention that the State failed to prove he went to Chief Marshal's house with the intent to cause emotional distress. In R.M., a fifteen-year-old confined in a juvenile detention facility made a sexually- explicit comment to a detention aide after the juvenile refused to comply with orders and was being physically removed from a staircase. R.M., 625 S.W.3d at 783. The juvenile also made other comments showing his disrespect for the aide. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we concluded that the circuit court erred in finding section 565.091's "purpose" element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We explained that the juvenile was "troubled" and "acting out" to communicate his disrespect for the aide, but that he did not demonstrate a purpose to cause her emotional distress. Id. In other words, the evidence did not prove that the juvenile had a conscious purpose to cause the aide emotional distress, "which must be something markedly greater than the level commonly experienced in day-to-day living by a detention aide." Id. at 782. Importantly, unlike in R.M. where the juvenile confronted the detention aide in the detention facility, Crockett did not confront Chief Marshal at his place of work—he went to Chief Marshal's personal residence. Crockett had no reason to go to Chief Marshal and Wife's home. Here, therefore, the threshold for "commonly experienced" emotional distress is less than that in R.M. where a detention aide's duties included ensuring the juvenile resident's safety and keeping them "in line with the programs." Id. at 780. Because we reversed the trial court in

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R.M. based on our finding that comments from a "troubled adolescent" "acting out" in a juvenile detention facility were not markedly greater than any emotional distress endured in a detention aide's daily experience, we do not find R.M. instructive in Crockett's case. See id. at 782-83. Crockett additionally attempts to rely on State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. banc 2012), which involved a facial challenge to a previous version of section 565.090. However, the statute at issue in Vaughn was for first-degree harassment which required both a showing of purposeful intent by a defendant and that the act did in fact cause the victim emotional distress. See id. at 521. The statute that Crockett was convicted of violating is 565.091, second-degree harassment. The Missouri Supreme Court applied Vaughn's holding to section 565.091 in State v. Collins, 648 S.W.3d 711 (Mo. banc 2022). Upholding section 565.091's constitutionality, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that the section "contains a scienter requirement that one acts with the purpose to cause emotional distress, not that the victim actually suffer emotional distress." Collins, 648 S.W.3d at 717-18 (emphasis added). 2 And while not necessary, the evidence here did establish that Crockett's actions caused significant emotional distress. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disregarding all contrary evidence and reasonable inferences, we find that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Crockett went to Chief Marshal's house with the purpose of causing emotional distress. Although Crockett argues that "all [he] did was come to the door and ask for [Chief

2 Throughout Crockett's argument, he emphasizes that Chief Marshal's and Wife's mental state in response to Crockett coming to their residence is not at issue when determining whether Crockett intended to cause emotional distress. The law clearly establishes that whether the victim actually suffered emotional distress is not instructive for determining whether the "purpose" element of section 565.091 was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we agree with Crockett's contention. However, for reasons discussed infra, we find that there was sufficient evidence to establish Crockett had the purpose of causing emotional distress without considering any "disturbed," "nervous," or "apprehensive" feelings that Chief Marshal and Wife described in their testimony.

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Marshal], then ask [Wife] to tell him that he was there," Crockett went to Chief Marshal's residence only two days after he was removed from the courthouse without Chief Marshal ever giving Crockett his address or inviting him to his house. Crockett additionally spoke in an "intimidating" or "aggressive" tone when he told Wife to inform Chief Marshal he was there, and he did not make any attempt to contact Chief Marshal despite previously emailing Chief Marshal and being able to access his work phone number online. Therefore, considering Crockett's interactions with Chief Marshal leading up to March 2, the evidence supports a finding that Crockett went to Chief Marshal's house for a purpose other than simply looking for Chief Marshal, as Crockett suggests. See Morris, 640 S.W.3d at 767 (explaining that taking wood from a property barrier rose to the level of actions which would cause a reasonable person emotional distress when considering the interactions between defendant and victim years leading up to the incident which included defendant destroying victim's property). Point I is denied. Point II In his second point on appeal, Crockett contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss Count I, the first-degree trespass charge, because Crockett was in the courthouse to pursue a cause of action and barring him for "flipping off" marshals was an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction to his access of the courts. Crockett's argument is based on the rights created by the open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for an abuse of discretion. 3 State v. Gibbons, 629 S.W.3d 60, 71-72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021); State v. Rodgers,

3 Though not at issue here, an exception to the abuse of discretion standard on a motion to dismiss criminal charges exists when determining whether an information fails to state an offense

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396 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). An abuse of discretion has occurred if the trial court's ruling is "clearly against the logic of the circumstances before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Rodgers, 396 S.W.3d at 400. Additionally, trial courts can abuse their discretion "through the inaccurate resolution of factual issues or through the application of incorrect legal principles. Where the facts are at issue, appellate courts extend substantial deference to trial court decisions. However, when the issue is primarily legal, no deference is warranted and appellate courts engage in de novo review." State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Mo. banc 2009) (footnote omitted). The open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution, found in Article I, section 14, states "[t]hat the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." The open courts provision "means simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action the substantive law recognizes," and the provision "does not entitle access to the courts for any and all grievances or concerns[.]" Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr., 459 S.W.3d 901, 909-10 (Mo. banc 2015) (citation omitted); Weigand v. Edwards, 296 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Mo. banc 2009). The open courts provision "was not designed to create rights, but only to allow a person claiming those rights access to the courts when such a person has a legitimate claim recognized by the law." Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. banc 2003) (citation omitted). "An open courts violation is established upon a showing that: (1) a party has a recognized cause of action; (2) that the cause

which is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Gibbons, 629 S.W.3d 60, 72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

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of action is being restricted; and (3) the restriction is arbitrary or unreasonable." Bromwell v. Nixon, 361 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Mo. banc 2012) (citation omitted). See also Ambers-Phillips, 459 S.W.3d at 909 (citation omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that the first two elements of the open courts test are satisfied, we consider whether removing Crockett from the courthouse was "arbitrary or unreasonable." The State defines "arbitrary" by referencing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary as "existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance," while Crockett suggests using the definition that is applied when "analyz[ing] other due process violations," which is "whether the action taken (or the restriction in this case) had a rational basis." Case law does not clearly define "arbitrary" when conducting an open courts analysis. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar, 543 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Mo. banc 2018); Dieser v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 498 S.W.3d 419, 433 (Mo. banc 2016); Weigand, 296 S.W.3d at 461-62; Ladd v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 299 S.W.3d 33, 40-41 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009). However, we find that under either party's suggested definition, Crockett's removal from the courthouse for twenty- four hours was not arbitrary or unreasonable. See Ambers-Phillips, 459 S.W.3d at 910 (explaining "artificial barriers" such as requiring someone appear before a medical review board prior to filing suit bars a plaintiff from bringing a valid and recognized claim and, thus, violates the open courts provision); Weigand, 296 S.W.3d at 462 (discussing Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 552-54 (Mo. banc 2000), where a statute was found to "erect an arbitrary and unreasonable barrier" by requiring a "successful prosecution for the offense of providing liquor to an intoxicated person as a prerequisite to a wrongful death action"). The courthouse prohibited cellphones (with an exception for attorneys, staff, and law enforcement) and recording without prior permission. Marshal testified that Crockett had a

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history of recording inside the courthouse with his smartwatch and phone. Therefore, it was not arbitrary or unreasonable for Marshal to ask Crockett whether he had any recording devices on his person, as was Marshal's common practice for anybody entering the courthouse, and then ask Crockett to leave when he refused to answer questions and began yelling. Crockett was additionally given the opportunity to pursue his cause of action when Chief Marshal escorted him back into the courthouse, but instead he "threw up the double bird" at Marshal which prompted his removal from the courthouse and being barred entry for twenty-four hours. Crockett then could have pursued his cause of action in the courthouse after the twenty-four hours had passed, which we do not find constituted an arbitrary or unreasonable restriction in light of his noncompliance with courthouse procedures and behavior towards Marshal. Similarly, it was not arbitrary or unreasonable for Crockett to ultimately be removed from the courthouse a second time and arrested for trespass when he was told he would be "trespassed" for the next twenty-four hours, yet he returned approximately an hour later. Finally, we note that our Court has previously upheld a conviction for trespassing in a courthouse. In State v. Bertrand, 636 S.W. 3d 181 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020), after a verbal altercation in the courthouse, the defendant was told to leave. Id. at 184. Officers informed defendant that she was trespassing by staying, and defendant still refused to leave. Id. at 185. Officers subsequently arrested defendant for trespassing. Id. The Eastern District affirmed her conviction on appeal. Id. at 193. Point II is denied.

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Conclusion The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

_____________________________ Janet Sutton, Judge

Karen King Mitchell, P.J., and Lisa White Hardwick, J. concur.