Herbert Morrison, Appellant, vs. Karen Goodwin, City Clerk for the City of Florissant, Missouri, Respondent.(2023)
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern DistrictMay 16, 2023#ED110776
Decision date: October 26, 2020SD36656
Dismissed
Procedural posture: Appeal from refusal to revoke or modify order appointing a receiver
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YAM CAPITAL III, LLC, ) ) Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. SD36656 ) GS HOSPITALITY, LLC, ) FILED: October 26, 2020 ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TANEY COUNTY Honorable Jeffrey M. Merrell, Judge APPEAL DISMISSED (Before Rahmeyer, P.J., Scott, J., and Francis, J.) PER CURIAM. The trial court appointed a receiver in proceedings between YAM Capital and GS Hospitality. GS moved to revoke or modify that order. The court refused. GS appeals. Our disposition allows us to be brief. Background GS defaulted on a $7.7 million note to YAM secured by GS's motel property in Hollister ("Collateral"). GS obtained bankruptcy protection for a time, but the bankruptcy court finally allowed YAM to proceed. YAM then sought and procured the subject order appointing a limited receiver with respect to the Collateral. GS moved to revoke or modify that order, but the trial court refused. GS now appeals that refusal. See §§ 512.020(2) & 515.665 RSMo (2016).
2
Discussion Our narrow issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to revoke or modify its interlocutory order appointing a receiver (see § 512.020(2)), or as GS puts it: "Should the trial court have revoked the Receivership Order?" Yet we cannot grant the relief GS now seeks — that we "set aside, revoke and terminate" the receivership order – because the receiver's final report and account have been filed and approved and he has been discharged by the trial court. "A case is moot 'when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy.'" State ex rel. Hawley v. Heagney, 523 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Mo. banc 2017)(quoting Mo. Mun. League v. State, 465 S.W.3d 904, 906 (Mo. banc 2015)). Mootness implicates justiciability and is a threshold issue to appellate review. Mo. Mun. League, 465 S.W.3d at 906. "'When an event occurs which renders a decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed.'" Humane Soc'y of United States v. State, 405 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. banc 2013)(quoting C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Mo. banc 2000)). 1
An opinion as to error, if any, in the receiver's appointment would be hypothetical and have no practical effect going forward. This appeal is moot. 2
Conclusion We dismiss this appeal as moot. We express no view as to the merits, if any, of the proceeding below.
1 See also Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127, 138 (Mo. 1969)("By reason of the fact that Bardos no longer holds the office of receiver questions concerning his qualifications to act as such and of the regularity of his appointment are moot"); State ex rel. Fischer v. Thomas, 155 S.W. 401, 402 (Mo. banc 1913)("We do not sit as a moot court to determine speculative questions for the benefit of some other case in judgment at some other time. ... The receivership suit is dead, and henceforth is of no use (except to point a moral)"). 2 Neither of two narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. See State ex rel. Peters-Baker v. Round, 561 S.W.3d 380, 384-85 (Mo. banc 2018)(appellate court has discretion to decide moot appeal that became so after submission and argument or if a recurring issue of general public interest and importance will otherwise evade review).
Statutes, rules, and cases referenced in this opinion.
C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322
Humane Soc'y of United States v. State, 405 S.W.3d 532
Mo. Mun. League v. State, 465 S.W.3d 904
Peters-Baker v. Round, 561 S.W.3d 380
See also Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 443 S.W.2d 127
State ex rel. Hawley v. Heagney, 523 S.W.3d 447
Issue-specific holdings extracted from the court's opinion.
Issue: Whether an appeal of an interlocutory order appointing a receiver is moot when the receiver has been discharged.
Yes, the appeal is moot because the receiver's final report has been filed and approved, and the receiver has been discharged, meaning a judgment on the merits would have no practical effect on any existing controversy.
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