City of St. Louis Missouri Cases

Charles Lane challenged the validity of a City of St. Louis Charter amendment that created a Charter Commission, arguing it violated Article VI, Section 32(a) of the Missouri Constitution by allowing the Commission to bypass the city's lawmaking body in submitting charter amendments to voters. The circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings for the City, finding the amendment valid. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the Charter Amendment, when read in its entirety, provides that the Charter Commission frames proposals, but the Board of Alderman ultimately submits them to the voters, thereby complying with the Missouri Constitution.

Phillip Weeks appealed a judgment in favor of the City of St. Louis on his petition to compel the production of traffic stop data under Missouri's Sunshine Law. Weeks claimed the judgment was against the weight of the evidence because the City allegedly withheld responsive records. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that Weeks failed to cite or apply the necessary four-step analytical framework to demonstrate that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence. The Court also expressly adopted the Houston v. Crider framework for such claims.

The City of St. Louis sought reimbursement from the State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF) for a $250,000 settlement paid to a plaintiff for discovery misconduct by the Attorney General's office and the Board of Police Commissioners. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding it was entitled to reimbursement. The appellate court reversed, holding that the legally significant date for a SLEF claim is when the suit or claim is filed, not when the underlying conduct occurred, and the City's claim was filed after the statutory deadline for reimbursement.

Phillip Weeks appealed a judgment in favor of the City of St. Louis, which denied his petition for an injunction to produce records under Missouri's Sunshine Law. Weeks requested traffic stop data in "worksheet" or "Excel workbook" format, but the City responded it had no existing records in that specific format, though it possessed the data in .csv files. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the trial court's finding that the City did not possess an existing record responsive to Weeks' specific request was not against the weight of the evidence.

The City of St. Louis sought reimbursement from the State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF) for a judgment it paid on behalf of a city police officer. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling it was entitled to reimbursement. The State appealed, arguing the claim was not authorized by statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that SLEF liability is triggered by the date a claim is filed, not the date of the underlying conduct, and the claim in question was filed after SLEF liability for City police officers had terminated.

Rachel Sender sued the City of St. Louis for negligence after a bicycle accident on a bike path, alleging a defect. The circuit court dismissed her claims, finding the bike path was a "thoroughfare" requiring statutory notice under section 82.210, and her notice was insufficient. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the bike path is indeed a thoroughfare under the statute, but it could not review the sufficiency of Sender's notice because she failed to provide the necessary evidentiary hearing transcript in the record on appeal.

Rachel Sender sued the City of St. Louis for injuries sustained after wrecking her bicycle on a bike path, alleging negligence and premises liability. The trial court dismissed her petition, finding her notice to the City insufficient under Section 82.210, RSMo. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that a bike path is a "thoroughfare" under the statute, and the City failed to establish that Sender's notice was so misleading as to prejudice its ability to investigate or defend.

The State of Missouri, ex rel. Attorney General, appealed a circuit court's summary judgment that declared the City of St. Louis had no obligation to make payments under a civil rights settlement, placing the entire obligation on the State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF). The underlying settlement stemmed from a federal civil rights lawsuit filed by George Allen, Jr. and his mother after Allen's 1983 conviction was vacated in 2012. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the statutes in effect when Allen's claim was made in 2014 prohibited SLEF from paying claims against police officers, thus making the City responsible.

Elizabeth Smith, a paramedic, appealed the circuit court's judgment affirming her 15-day employment suspension by the St. Louis City Civil Service Commission. The Commission's written submission process, which Smith chose, required notarized statements from the appointing authority and witnesses. However, the appointing authority's statements were not notarized. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Commission's failure to adhere to its own procedural safeguards violated Smith's due process rights. The case was remanded with directions to remove the suspension and determine back pay and pre-judgment interest.

William Smith, a police officer, appealed the Civil Service Commission's dismissal of his termination appeal. The trial court dismissed Smith's petition for judicial review, finding it was untimely filed. On appeal, the Eastern District affirmed, holding that the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence when ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of statutory authority, and that the Commission's dismissal of a contested case prior to an evidentiary hearing still subjected the judicial review petition to the 30-day filing deadline.

Mark Porter sued the City of St. Louis for negligence after a car accident, alleging the City failed to repair a downed stop sign. Following a jury verdict for the City, Porter appealed, arguing the trial court erred by excluding a witness's prior inconsistent statements and by allowing the City to make prejudicial arguments outside the record during closing. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, finding that the City's closing argument was improper and prejudicial, but affirmed the trial court's rulings on the exclusion of prior inconsistent statements and the admission of an excited utterance.

Judith Britton sued the City of St. Louis for wrongful death after her husband was killed by a negligent driver at a bus stop, alleging a dangerous condition of the City's property. The trial court dismissed her petition for failure to state a claim, concluding the driver's negligence was the sole cause. The Eastern District reversed and remanded, holding that Britton sufficiently pleaded a claim under the dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity, and that an intervening negligent driver does not necessarily preclude a finding of proximate cause at the pleading stage.

Terence Marks sued the City of St. Louis for negligence after a motor vehicle accident with a City garbage truck. A jury found in favor of Marks, assessing 90% fault to the City and 10% to Marks, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The City appealed, challenging the admission of expert testimony, a statement during closing argument, the denial of a mistrial, and the refusal of a jury instruction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no abuse of discretion or prejudicial error.