Director of Revenue Missouri Cases

Appellant Christopher Schmitz appealed the suspension of his driver's license by the Director of Revenue, stemming from a driving while intoxicated arrest. He argued the trial court erred in admitting the police report and that, without it, there was insufficient evidence of probable cause for his arrest. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that even if the police report was inadmissible, other evidence, specifically the bodycam video admitted without limitation, provided substantial evidence to support the probable cause finding for the DWI arrest.

Amelia Van Vickle's driving license was administratively suspended after she was involved in a single-car accident and showed signs of intoxication. The circuit court set aside the suspension, finding she was not under arrest because she was not physically restrained. The Director of Revenue appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that an injured and immobilized driver in an ambulance is considered "actually restrained" for the purpose of an arrest under Section 544.180, making further physical restraint by an officer unnecessary.

David T. Lenau's driving privileges were denied for ten years by the Director of Revenue (DOR) due to three intoxication-related driving convictions. Lenau challenged the DOR's decision, arguing that the North Carolina convictions on his record were insufficiently specific because they did not identify the specific county court. The trial court sustained the DOR's decision. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the information provided for the North Carolina convictions, which included the state, district court, dates, and an ID number, met the minimal identification requirements of the Driver License Compact.

David L. Kaercher appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining the revocation of his driving privileges after a DWI arrest and refusal of a chemical test. Kaercher argued the trial court erred by admitting certified Department of Revenue records without an original signature and by finding he was under arrest when read the implied consent warning. The Eastern District of Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding the records were properly certified and that Kaercher was under arrest for implied consent purposes.

Walmart Starco LLC (Starco) sought a use tax exemption for information technology equipment it purchased and resold to other Walmart subsidiaries. The Director of Revenue challenged an Administrative Hearing Commission decision that found Starco exempt. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that Starco's activities qualified for the use tax resale exemption under §§ 144.018.1 and 144.615(6) RSMo, and that the Director's argument regarding Starco as a disregarded entity was unpreserved.

Ronald Greco, who had previously received a reinstatement of driving privileges after multiple DWI convictions, was again convicted of DWI. The Director of Revenue permanently denied his driving privileges, but the circuit court ordered the Director to expunge this denial. The appellate court reversed, holding that Section 302.060.1(9) of the Revised Statutes of Missouri prevents a driver from obtaining a second reinstatement of driving privileges through court action. The case was remanded with instructions to deny Greco's petition.

Carter Kinkead appealed the suspension of his driving privileges by the Director of Revenue after a DWI arrest. The trial court affirmed the suspension, finding the breath test valid. Kinkead argued on appeal that the arresting officer failed to conduct a proper 15-minute observation period before the breath test. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the breath test results, as the officer's brief breaks in direct observation did not violate the regulation's requirements for the observation period.

James William Gamblin's driving privileges were revoked by the Director of Revenue for refusing a chemical breath test. Gamblin appealed the circuit court's judgment upholding the revocation, arguing the arresting officer failed to allow him twenty minutes to contact an attorney after reading the Implied Consent law, and that he was prejudiced. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Gamblin had already consulted with his attorney and abandoned any further attempts to speak with one, thus satisfying the statutory requirement.

David Wilmoth appealed the circuit court's judgment affirming the Director of Revenue's suspension of his driver's license for an alcohol-related traffic offense. Wilmoth challenged the admission of preliminary breath test (PBT) results and the sufficiency of evidence for probable cause. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the numerical result of a PBT is admissible as evidence of probable cause to arrest and that the circuit court's finding of probable cause was supported by substantial evidence and not against the weight of the evidence.

The Director of Revenue appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) which found Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) was entitled to manufacturing exemptions for use tax paid on replacement equipment. The Director argued that CCE I's provision of telecommunications services does not qualify as manufacturing and that the equipment was not "used directly" in manufacturing. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that telecommunications services constitute manufacturing for tax exemption purposes and that a "substantial use" requirement is not engrafted onto the "used directly" in manufacturing exemption.

The Director of Revenue appealed the circuit court's judgment that set aside the suspension of Dylan Acevedo's driving privileges. The circuit court had excluded certified records containing portable breathalyzer test (PBT) results, citing a lack of foundation. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that PBT results are statutorily exempt from calibration requirements when used to establish probable cause for a driving while intoxicated arrest, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.

Saddle and Sirloin Club of Kansas City sought review of an Administrative Hearing Commission decision that it owed sales tax on monthly membership dues. The Club argued the dues were not solely for recreational activities and conveyed other benefits, or that the Director's denial of a refund was a policy change requiring prospective application. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the Club failed to prove its dues provided non-recreational benefits or to separate taxable portions, and that prior letter rulings did not constitute a policy change.

Delores LaBlance, as personal representative for the Estate of James Townsend, appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that upheld the Director of Revenue's assessment of Green Duck Lounge, Inc.'s unpaid sales tax against Mr. Townsend personally as a responsible party. LaBlance argued the assessment was barred by res judicata due to a prior probate court judgment and was time-barred under a three-year limitation. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that res judicata did not apply and the three-year limitation for "additional amounts proposed to be assessed" did not apply to responsible party assessments.

Carfax, Inc. appealed the Director of Revenue's assessment of sales and use taxes on equipment used to create Vehicle History Reports (VHRs), arguing the equipment was exempt under manufacturing provisions. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) agreed with Carfax, finding the equipment was used directly in manufacturing VHRs. The Missouri Supreme Court vacated the AHC's decision, holding that Carfax does not "manufacture" VHRs for purposes of the sales and use tax exemption statutes because the process does not transform raw data into a product with a separate and distinct use, identity, or value. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Director of Revenue appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that found Beyond Housing, Inc. and Pagedale Town Center II, LLC (PTC II) qualified for sales and use tax exemptions as charitable organizations. The Director argued that charitable and civic exemptions are mutually exclusive and that the organizations' Phase IV development was not a charitable activity. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that the statutory categories are not mutually exclusive and that the primary purpose of the Phase IV development was charitable, benefiting low-income individuals.

Weston Urbaniak appealed the circuit court's judgment affirming the Director of Revenue's decision to sanction his driving privilege. Urbaniak argued the trial court's judgment was against the weight of the evidence because the officer lacked probable cause to believe he was driving under the influence of alcohol. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the officer's observations, Urbaniak's admissions, and the field sobriety test results, viewed in their totality, provided reasonable grounds for the arrest.

Ruben Vasquez appealed the suspension of his driving privileges by the Director of Revenue, which was affirmed by the trial court after a bench trial. Vasquez argued there was insufficient evidence of probable cause for his arrest for driving while intoxicated, specifically regarding his intoxication at the time of the automobile accident. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the totality of the circumstances, including Vasquez's admissions, physical signs of intoxication, and the nature of the accident, provided sufficient probable cause for arrest, even without an exact time of the accident.

Breeanna K. Kisner appealed the circuit court's judgment upholding the Director of Revenue's revocation of her driver's license. Kisner contended her refusal to submit to a chemical breath test was not knowing and consensual because she was not given 20 minutes to contact counsel after being read the implied consent law. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the 20-minute period to contact an attorney, when requested, begins immediately after the implied consent law is read, regardless of when the initial request for counsel was made.

Adam M. Tarwater's driver's license was revoked after he refused a breath test following a car accident. The trial court set aside the revocation, finding Tarwater was too intoxicated to volitionally refuse the test and that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was driving while intoxicated. The appellate court reversed, holding that section 577.033 does not apply to determining refusal under section 577.041, and that refusal is determined objectively without regard to a driver's subjective mental state. The court also affirmed that there were reasonable grounds for the officer to believe Tarwater was driving while intoxicated.

Brad and Christine Francis appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission, which found them liable for state income tax, additions, and interest for the years 2013-2015. The Francises argued that the Commission lacked authority, that they had no taxable income under federal law, and that certain exhibits were improperly admitted. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision, rejecting all of the Francises' arguments as meritless or unnecessary to review.

Kyle Hummel appealed the Director of Revenue's revocation of his driving privileges for one year after he refused a chemical breath test following a DWI arrest. Hummel argued his refusal was not voluntary because he was not afforded a private consultation with his attorney in the patrol car. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, distinguishing a prior case that required privacy in a police station, noting that no such requirement exists for patrol cars and Hummel did not request privacy.

David and Gale Collison sought a sales tax credit for a replacement vehicle after their original car was declared a casualty loss. The Administrative Hearing Commission denied the credit, finding that a revocable trust, not the Collisons, owned the new vehicle, while the Collisons owned the replaced one. On appeal, the Collisons argued they and the trust were the same entity for credit purposes. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that Missouri law distinguishes between natural persons and trusts, making them legally separate owners for the sales tax credit.

John Baker's driver's license was denied for ten years after his third DWI conviction. He petitioned the circuit court for reinstatement, which was granted based on the court's finding that his Michigan disorderly conduct conviction was not alcohol-related. The Director of Revenue appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statute. The appellate court reversed, holding that Baker's Michigan conviction for being a "disorderly person" due to intoxication in a public place constituted an "offense related to alcohol" under Missouri statute § 302.060.1(9), thereby disqualifying him from license reinstatement.

APLUX, LLC and Paul & Ann Lux Associates, L.P. appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) regarding use tax liability on out-of-state aircraft purchases. The AHC found no use tax liability, concluding that lease agreements for two aircraft (the TBM and the Excel) constituted "sales" for a resale exemption. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the agreement with Luxco Inc. did not qualify for the resale exemption because APLUX retained control, but the agreement with Aero Charter Inc. did qualify due to Aero's operational control and custody of the Excel. The case was remanded for a determination of the tax due.

The Director of Revenue appealed the trial court's judgment reinstating Megan Lizabeth Schwandner's driving privileges, which were suspended after her arrest for driving while intoxicated. The trial court had excluded breath sample results because the zip code for the breath analyzer's ethanol-gas mixture supplier differed from the regulation. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that a zip code discrepancy does not invalidate the supplier's approval under the relevant regulation, and thus the breath sample results should have been admitted.

John Charles Gott, operating Gott's To Go, appealed an Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) decision finding him liable for unpaid sales tax, use tax, additions to tax, and statutory interest related to portable toilet rentals. The AHC determined Gott failed to collect and remit sales tax on rentals of tangible personal property and use tax on out-of-state purchases. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that portable toilet rentals are taxable tangible personal property and that Gott failed to meet his burden to demonstrate an exemption.

SEBA, LLC, doing business as Eddie's Southtown Donuts, appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) that found it liable for unpaid state sales tax, statutory interest, and a 5% negligence penalty. The AHC's assessment stemmed from SEBA's inadequate recordkeeping, which led the Director of Revenue to use an estimate-based methodology for calculating taxable sales. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC's decision, holding that SEBA failed to meet its burden of proof regarding its tax liability and claimed exemptions, and that the negligence penalty was properly assessed due to its failure to maintain adequate records.

Johnny Stanton appealed the circuit court's judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue's revocation of his driver's license for refusing a chemical blood test. Stanton argued that the arresting deputy was outside his jurisdiction when requesting the test and that there were no reasonable grounds to believe he was driving while intoxicated. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that criminal procedural rules regarding jurisdiction do not apply to administrative license revocations, and that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the finding of reasonable grounds for intoxication.

Justin Richard Turner's driving privileges were suspended by the Director of Revenue after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The trial court set aside the suspension, finding no evidence of criminal activity for the traffic stop and no probable cause for arrest due to the lack of field sobriety tests. The appellate court reversed, holding that in administrative suspension hearings, the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop is immaterial, and field sobriety tests are not mandatory to establish probable cause for an alcohol-related arrest. The court reinstated the Director's order suspending Turner's driving privileges.

Robin L. Schmidt's driving privileges were revoked after a blood test, obtained via a search warrant following her refusal of a breath test, showed her blood alcohol content was above the legal limit. The trial court initially sustained the revocation but later reversed itself, finding the search warrant invalid due to inaccuracies and post-issuance alteration, and excluded the blood test results. The Director of Revenue appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court's amended judgment, holding that a warrant was constitutionally required for the blood draw and that the warrant issued was valid despite minor inaccuracies and improper alteration, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Benjamin Collier appealed the circuit court's judgment sustaining the revocation of his driving privilege. Collier argued there was insufficient evidence to establish he refused a chemical test, specifically challenging the Director of Revenue's reliance on administrative records without live testimony from the arresting officer. The Western District affirmed, holding that the Director met its burden of proof through certified records, and the trial court was free to credit the officer's report over Collier's conflicting testimony, especially since Collier failed to subpoena the officer.

Dreyer Electric Co., LLC, sought a sales tax refund for electrical equipment installed in a sawmill, claiming it was exempt as "replacement equipment" "used directly in the manufacturing process" under section 144.030.2(5). The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) found all disputed equipment exempt. The Director of Revenue appealed, arguing for a narrower interpretation of the exemption. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the AHC's decision, reaffirming the broader "integrated plant doctrine" but remanding the case for the AHC to apply this doctrine to each type of replacement part or equipment individually, rather than grouping them.

SEBA, LLC appealed from the Administrative Hearing Commission's finding that it was liable for unpaid sales tax, additions to tax, and statutory interest. The Commission found SEBA negligent in reporting its taxable sales and failing to keep adequate records. The Court of Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to define "negligence" as it pertains to sales tax statutes in Chapter 144, concluding that this issue involves the construction of a revenue law, which falls under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Missouri. Therefore, the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

The Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. appealed a decision by the Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) which found the team liable for sales and use tax on items used in the renovation of Arrowhead Stadium. The AHC concluded the team was the "purchaser" of these items. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the AHC's decision, holding that the AHC erred because the team did not provide valuable consideration for the contested items, and therefore was not the "purchaser" under Missouri's sales and use tax statutes. The court clarified that the project funds, including proceeds from tax credit sales and finance board grants, belonged to the county, not the team.

Colton Groom appealed the trial court's judgment suspending his driving privileges after he was stopped for speeding and subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated. Groom, an underage driver, argued the trial court erred by relying on radar evidence to establish probable cause for the stop and by misapplying the law regarding a "special safeguard" for underage drivers. The Eastern District affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that probable cause for an alcohol-related arrest can develop after an initial stop, and the extensive foundation for radar evidence was not required for the administrative suspension.

DI Supply I, LLC, which sells room furnishings to Drury Hotels, challenged a sales tax assessment, contending that its sales were exempt under the resale exemption because the hotels effectively resold the furnishings to guests. The Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the assessment. On review, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying that the sales tax resale exemption requires a transfer of title or ownership, not just the right to use, store, or consume the property. The Court concluded that prior jurisprudence had mistakenly applied use tax definitions to sales tax cases, and DI Supply failed to demonstrate a transfer of ownership to hotel guests.

Stephen C. Smith appealed the circuit court's judgment sustaining the revocation of his driving privileges after he refused a breath test following a DWI arrest. Smith challenged whether the arresting officer had probable cause to support his suspicion of driving while intoxicated. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding that the totality of the circumstances, including Smith's driving, physical appearance, admissions, and refusal of tests, provided sufficient probable cause for the arrest.

Michael Stehwien appealed the circuit court's judgment sustaining the revocation of his driving privilege, which was based on a breath test indicating a blood alcohol content of .187 percent. He argued that the breath test results were inadmissible because the machine was not subjected to proper maintenance and reporting. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding that the maintenance checks on the Intox DMT machine were performed in compliance with Department of Health regulations, thus making the breath test results admissible.

Bryan Goforth appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue's revocation of his driving privileges after he refused a chemical breath test. Goforth argued that the Director failed to prove he operated a motor vehicle on a public highway, which he contended was a prerequisite for implied consent to chemical testing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Goforth's possession of a valid Missouri driver's license, combined with circumstantial evidence of his travel, was sufficient to infer that he had operated a vehicle on public highways, thereby establishing implied consent.

Interventional Center for Pain Management petitioned for review of an Administrative Hearing Commission decision, which determined that certain pain treatment service items used in compounding medications were not exempt from use tax under section 144.054.2, RSMo. The Center argued these items qualified as "materials" used in a compounding operation. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the compounded drugs did not constitute a "product" with independent market value, thus failing to meet the criteria for the tax exemption.

Holly N. Waters appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue's suspension of her driving privileges. Waters argued the trial court erred by not considering alleged due process violations that occurred during her administrative hearing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a trial de novo is an original proceeding and the trial court correctly determined it lacked authority to review alleged errors from the administrative hearing. The court also noted that Waters's point on appeal was multifarious and that the denial of summary judgment is generally not reviewable on appeal.

Business Aviation LLC purchased an aircraft in Kansas and leased it to Burgess Aircraft Management LLC, a common carrier in Missouri. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) assessed use tax, finding the lease was not a "sale" for valuable consideration, thus not qualifying for a resale exemption. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the AHC's decision, holding that the lease agreement constituted a sale because the right to use the aircraft was transferred to a common carrier for valuable consideration, thereby qualifying for the resale use tax exemption. The Court also clarified that the right to use does not need to be "fully" transferred for a lease to constitute a sale under Chapter 144.

Sylvia Pauletta Johnson appealed the setting aside of an administrative suspension of her driving privileges for an excessive blood-alcohol level. The trial court found insufficient foundation for the BAC test results, citing multiple tests and lack of implied consent. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred as a matter of law because the blood draw was consensual, not an implied consent/refusal case, and no law limits consensual attempts to obtain a sufficient sample.

David and Jill Kehlenbrink sought a sales tax refund after purchasing a new vehicle, arguing they should receive credit for the sale proceeds of four previously owned vehicles. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) reversed the Director of Revenue's denial, finding the relevant statute ambiguous and allowing credit for multiple vehicles. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the AHC's decision, holding that Section 144.025.1 unambiguously permits sales tax credit for the proceeds of only one vehicle against the purchase price of a new vehicle. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

Earnie R. Thomas's driving privileges were reinstated by the trial court after it found his breath test results inadmissible, concluding the implied consent warning violated his due process rights. The Director of Revenue appealed, arguing the warning was not unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the word "immediately" in the implied consent warning is not misleading and therefore the breath test results were admissible, consistent with a recent Missouri Supreme Court decision.

The Director of Revenue appealed the circuit court's judgment setting aside the suspension of Victor Nix's driving privileges following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The trial court excluded Nix's breath test results because the administering officer failed to sign the certification on the Blood Alcohol Test Report form. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the officer's failure to sign the certification was collateral to the proper administration of the test and did not require exclusion of the results. The case was remanded for a new trial.

James Ridgway, Jr.'s driver's license was suspended after his arrest for driving while intoxicated. He sought a trial de novo, and the trial court found in his favor, sua sponte raising a due process violation due to the arresting Trooper's non-attendance and inability to be cross-examined. The Department of Revenue appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied the law. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred by disregarding certified Department records under Section 302.312.1 RSMo and by finding a due process violation when the Trooper was never properly served with a subpoena.

Matthew Carvalho appealed the suspension of his driver's license for driving while intoxicated after a breath test showed a BAC of .087 percent. He argued the BAC report was inadmissible due to untimely filing of a maintenance report, and that the implied consent and suspension notices violated due process by being misleading or incomplete. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the suspension, holding that the untimely filing of a maintenance report was a collateral issue not affecting the test's validity, and that the implied consent and suspension notices satisfied due process requirements.

The Director of Revenue appealed the circuit court's judgment reinstating Ricky Mills's driver's license, which had been revoked for his refusal to submit to a chemical breath test. The trial court found Mills was not arrested for driving while intoxicated, only on an outstanding warrant. The appellate court reversed, holding that Mills was indeed arrested for driving while intoxicated because he was already in police custody for an unrelated warrant and was informed he was under arrest for the alcohol-related offense while not free to leave. The case was remanded for the trial court to make findings on the remaining elements required for license revocation.

Myron Green Corporation appealed an administrative hearing commission decision finding it liable for sales tax on food sold in a Federal Reserve Bank cafeteria. Myron Green argued the bank's tax exemption applied to all sales transactions. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the commission's decision, holding that Myron Green's cafeteria regularly served meals to the public, the bank's sales tax exemption did not extend to individual employees who were the actual purchasers, and the commission's decision was not unexpected.