Director of Revenue, State of Missouri Missouri Cases

Mark Hood challenged the Director of Revenue's administrative revocation of his driving privileges, which was issued after he refused a chemical test following a DWI arrest. The circuit court upheld the revocation, and Hood appealed, arguing the finding that he operated the vehicle was against the weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that Hood failed to employ the mandatory four-step analytical framework required for an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, thus rendering his argument analytically useless.

Rachel Lynn Sanning appealed the suspension of her Missouri driver's license by the Director of Revenue, which was based on an alleged driving while intoxicated conviction in Germany. The trial court sustained the suspension, finding Sanning's challenge to be an impermissible collateral attack and the Provost Marshal's letter sufficient evidence of a conviction. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Director failed to present substantial evidence of a conviction because the Provost Marshal's letter did not identify a court of conviction or explicitly state a criminal conviction occurred, and Sanning's challenge was not an impermissible collateral attack.

Brendan Ford appealed the suspension of his driving privileges, which was sustained by the circuit court after a trial de novo. Ford contended that the circuit court erred by not preserving a record of the trial de novo. The appellate court agreed, finding the record inadequate for meaningful review. The judgment was reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial de novo on the record.

Payton Chiann Comer appealed the administrative suspension of her driving privileges after a breath test indicated a blood alcohol content above the legal limit. She argued the trial court erred in admitting the breath test result because the administering officer did not maintain continuous direct observation during the required 15-minute period. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the relevant regulation does not require direct observation, only that the officer reasonably ensure no oral intake using their senses.

Paul Mottet's driver's license was administratively revoked by the Director of Revenue for refusing a chemical test. Mottet sought judicial review, and the trial court entered judgment against the Director when the prosecuting attorney failed to appear. The Director moved to set aside the judgment, arguing it was void because Chapter 56 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri required the prosecutor's presence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that Chapter 56's general provisions do not apply to driver's license revocation actions under Chapter 302, and the Director, as a civil litigant, was not denied due process.

Spencer Bradley Ekstam pleaded guilty to an ignition interlock violation and received a suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) and probation. The Director of Revenue (DOR) subsequently revoked his driving privileges, arguing that a finding of guilt under section 577.599 RSMo mandates revocation under section 302.462.1 RSMo. Ekstam sought judicial review, contending an SIS is not a "conviction" as required by the statute. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment reinstating Ekstam's driving privileges, holding that section 302.462.1 requires both a finding of guilt and a conviction, and an SIS does not constitute a conviction.

Jena Rae Haffner's driver's license was suspended after she was involved in a car accident and a blood test revealed a high blood alcohol content. The trial court rescinded the suspension, finding she was not arrested at the time she consented to the blood draw. The Director of Revenue appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Haffner was indeed arrested, both by actual physical restraint due to her injuries and by her submission to the officer's authority after being informed of the implied consent warning and license revocation consequences.

Eric Branson petitioned the circuit court to reinstate his driving privileges after a five-year revocation for driving while intoxicated. The Director of Revenue opposed, arguing Branson was ineligible due to a controlled substance conviction within the preceding five years, as per Section 302.060.1(10). The circuit court granted Branson's petition. The appellate court reversed, holding that Branson's guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance eleven days before filing his petition rendered him ineligible under the plain language of the statute, and the circuit court lacked authority to create exceptions.

Bobby J. Carter appealed the dismissal of his petition for review of the suspension of his driving privileges by the Director of Revenue (DOR). Carter's commercial and base driving privileges were suspended after a DWI arrest. He argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the DOR's notice was conflicting and denied his due process rights, asserting a conflict between statutory appeal deadlines. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 15-day appeal period from the mailing of the administrative decision is controlling and that the DOR's notice was not misleading regarding the different deadlines for commercial and base driving privileges.

Michelle Peterman appealed the circuit court's judgment upholding the Director of Revenue's decision to deny her driving privileges for five years and revoke her license for one year due to two driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions. Peterman argued that the Director's certified Driving Record was insufficient to prove the underlying convictions without an original judgment of conviction. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Driving Record, which provided specific details of the convictions, was sufficient evidence to meet the Director's burden for both the point-based revocation and the five-year denial of privileges.

Jereme Roesing's driving privileges were revoked for one year after he refused a chemical test following an arrest for driving while intoxicated. He appealed the circuit court's judgment sustaining the revocation, arguing that law enforcement deprived him of his statutory right to counsel by listening to and recording his conversation with his attorney. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the statutory right to attempt to contact an attorney under section 577.041.1 includes the right to a private consultation. The Court found the Director of Revenue failed to show Roesing was not prejudiced by the violation, and remanded the case for further proceedings.