Director of Revenue, State of Missouri, Respondent- Missouri Cases

Mark Hood challenged the Director of Revenue's administrative revocation of his driving privileges, which was issued after he refused a chemical test following a DWI arrest. The circuit court upheld the revocation, and Hood appealed, arguing the finding that he operated the vehicle was against the weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that Hood failed to employ the mandatory four-step analytical framework required for an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, thus rendering his argument analytically useless.

The Director of Revenue suspended Thomas Michael Cerutti's driving privileges after his arrest for an alcohol-related offense. Following a trial de novo, the trial court found the Director failed to establish probable cause for the arrest. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the historical facts found by the trial court, when properly applied to the law, established probable cause as a matter of law. The court directed the trial court to affirm the suspension of Cerutti's driving privileges.

Bobby J. Carter appealed the dismissal of his petition for review of the suspension of his driving privileges by the Director of Revenue (DOR). Carter's commercial and base driving privileges were suspended after a DWI arrest. He argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the DOR's notice was conflicting and denied his due process rights, asserting a conflict between statutory appeal deadlines. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the 15-day appeal period from the mailing of the administrative decision is controlling and that the DOR's notice was not misleading regarding the different deadlines for commercial and base driving privileges.

The Director of Revenue appealed a trial court's judgment reinstating Tyler J. Romines's driving privileges, which had been revoked for refusing a chemical test after a DWI arrest. The Director argued the trial court misapplied the law by requiring proof that Romines was "actually driving while intoxicated" instead of the statutory standard of "reasonable grounds to believe" he was driving while intoxicated. The appellate court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to apply the correct legal analysis.