Juvenile Officer Missouri Cases

P.W.R., Jr. (Father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to B.W.R. (Son), arguing the trial court failed to make required statutory findings. The appellate court affirmed the judgment. It held that Father's claim of error, which pertained to the form or language of the judgment, was not preserved for appellate review because he failed to file a motion to amend the judgment as mandated by Rule 78.07(c).

C.B. appealed the juvenile court's judgment dismissing juvenile proceedings and transferring him for adult criminal prosecution, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during the certification proceeding. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court clarified that the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington is the appropriate framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in juvenile certification proceedings, and found that C.B.'s counsel was not ineffective and C.B. was not prejudiced.

F.P.L. appealed a juvenile court judgment finding him repeatedly and without justification absent from school, a status offense under section 211.031.1(2), RSMo. F.P.L. argued there was insufficient evidence he was subject to compulsory school attendance. The appellate court affirmed, first clarifying that F.P.L.'s argument was not a challenge to personal jurisdiction, and then finding sufficient evidence that F.P.L., a 15-year-old enrolled in school, was subject to compulsory attendance and did not qualify for any statutory exceptions.

Father K.D. appealed the Family Court's judgment placing his child, K.K.S.S., in the custody of the Children's Division based on a finding of abuse. He argued the court erred by denying his motion to continue the adjudication hearing and by failing to inquire about court-appointed counsel after his retained counsel withdrew. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the continuances due to Father's serial efforts to delay the proceedings by changing counsel. It also held that the Family Court had adequately informed Father of his right to counsel, and his self-representation was a consequence of his own actions.

Father appealed the circuit court's judgment terminating his parental rights to Child, E.G. The Juvenile Officer had petitioned for termination based on Father's prior felony convictions under chapter 566 involving child victims. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, declining to address Father's first two points regarding statutory interpretation and constitutionality due to lack of preservation. The Court found sufficient evidence to terminate Father's parental rights under section 211.447.2(4) and that termination was in the child's best interest.

A.L.H., a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court's judgment committing him to the Division of Youth Services based on a delinquency finding for stealing and engaging in behavior injurious to his welfare. A.L.H. contended the court erred by finding him delinquent without a record, finding, or factual basis that he knowingly and voluntarily admitted to the alleged conduct. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the juvenile court committed plain error by failing to comply with Rule 128.02(d)(3), which resulted in manifest injustice and violated A.L.H.'s constitutional rights.

D.C., a juvenile, appealed the circuit court's modification of his dispositional order, which stemmed from an initial adjudication of delinquency based on a federal firearms offense. The appellate court held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate D.C. delinquent for violating federal law and thus reversed the parts of the disposition based on the federal offense and related probation violations. However, the court affirmed the adjudications of new state-law offenses (stealing and a status offense) alleged in the modification motion, finding the procedures for these were proper. The case was remanded for a new dispositional hearing based solely on the valid state-law violations.

C.R.B. appealed the circuit court's order dismissing his juvenile proceedings and certifying him for adult prosecution on charges of murder and armed criminal action. He argued his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competence evaluation, given his history of mental illness and low IQ. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding that C.R.B. failed to establish prejudice under the Strickland standard, as there was no reasonable probability he would not have been certified even if an evaluation had been conducted.

P.D.E., a juvenile, appealed his delinquency adjudication, arguing his admissions were not knowingly and voluntarily made. The juvenile officer contended the appeal was untimely. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order of disposition, which included restitution "in an amount to be determined," was a final, appealable judgment, and the juvenile's notice of appeal was filed more than seven months after this final order. The Court reasoned that delaying finality until the exact restitution amount is set would contradict the goals of chapter 211 and the fluid nature of juvenile proceedings.

D.J.T.S., a 14-year-old, appealed the juvenile court's judgment finding him delinquent for making a terrorist threat. He contended his statements about shooting up a basketball game were jokes and protected by his constitutional right of free speech. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that D.J.T.S.'s specific and detailed threats, coupled with showing pictures of a gun and causing fear among students, constituted a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment.

J.R.K., a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court's judgment finding he violated a condition of his probation by failing to pay restitution. He contended the finding was erroneous because the court never entered an authorized probation order under Section 211.181, specifically arguing that probation requires the suspended execution of a commitment order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that other disposition options under Section 211.181, such as placing a child under supervision in their own home with conditions, are synonymous with probation and do not require a suspended commitment order.

M.T.W., a fifteen-year-old, appealed the Buchanan County Juvenile Court's judgment finding her delinquent for making a terrorist threat in the third degree under an accomplice-liability theory and placing her on probation. She argued there was insufficient evidence to prove she possessed the requisite mens rea. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that evidence, viewed favorably to the Juvenile Court, was sufficient to infer M.T.W. acted with the purpose of assisting in disseminating the threat.

C.L.F. appealed the juvenile court's order dismissing her juvenile proceeding and transferring her to a court of general jurisdiction for criminal prosecution as an adult. C.L.F. contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in certifying her as an adult, arguing the alleged offenses were not serious or violent, her behavior did not indicate she was beyond rehabilitation, and she was not sophisticated or mature. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's order, finding no abuse of discretion based on the totality of the circumstances, including C.L.F.'s history with the juvenile justice system, her age, and the lack of available resources.

P.D.E. appealed a judgment finding him delinquent for burglary, trespassing, and property damage, arguing he did not knowingly and voluntarily admit to the conduct. The trial court's disposition order included restitution "in an amount to be determined," with the specific amount set several months later. The appellate court noted that P.D.E.'s notice of appeal was untimely, as it was filed more than six months after the disposition order, which the court deemed the final appealable judgment. However, due to a reasonable basis for disagreement on when a juvenile disposition order becomes final for appeal purposes, and the issue's general importance, the court transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri for decision.

K.D.D., a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court's judgment dismissing his juvenile proceeding and certifying him for adult criminal prosecution. K.D.D. argued that requiring him to attend his certification hearing via two-way video, instead of in person, violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Relying on recent Supreme Court of Missouri precedent, the appellate court vacated the juvenile court's judgment and remanded the case for an in-person certification hearing, holding that the juvenile's right to be physically present at this critical stage was violated.

A.S.B., a juvenile, appealed the trial court's judgment finding he committed acts that would constitute domestic assault, arguing that conducting his adjudication hearing entirely via two-way live video violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process. The trial court held the virtual hearing over A.S.B.'s objection, citing COVID-19 pandemic concerns. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the trial court erred by failing to make witness-specific findings of necessity for virtual testimony, as required by In re C.A.R.A., thereby violating A.S.B.'s right to confront witnesses.

S.R.W., a juvenile, appealed a trial court judgment finding her delinquent for violating a St. Joseph municipal ordinance. The juvenile argued that the Juvenile Officer failed to produce any evidence of the municipal ordinance she was charged with violating. The Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that a valid municipal prosecution requires proof of the ordinance, which was not provided, and entered a judgment of acquittal.

L.I.B., a juvenile, appealed the circuit court's finding that he committed acts constituting second-degree assault and armed criminal action. He contended that the court erred by requiring him to participate in his adjudication hearing via two-way videoconference from secure detention, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to be present and confront his accusers. The appellate court agreed, vacating the circuit court's judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings, citing a substantially similar Missouri Supreme Court case.

J.N.W., a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court's order dismissing his juvenile proceeding and transferring him to a court of general jurisdiction for criminal prosecution as an adult. He asserted that the certification was unsupported by evidence, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the judge was biased. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's order, holding that the certification order was appealable, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in certifying J.N.W. as an adult, and J.N.W. failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or judicial bias.

Juvenile T.R.T. appealed the trial court's judgment finding he committed statutory sodomy in the first degree against his three-year-old cousin. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the sexual act and intent, and the admission of the victim's hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the statements and that sufficient evidence supported the finding of guilt.

R.M., a juvenile, appealed the circuit court's judgment finding he committed second-degree harassment for making sexually explicit comments to a detention aide. The appellate court reversed, concluding there was insufficient evidence to prove R.M. acted with the purpose to cause emotional distress as required by Section 565.091. The court found that while R.M.'s comments were disrespectful, they did not demonstrate the conscious object to cause the requisite level of emotional distress under the statute's interpretation.

D.R.T. appealed the juvenile court's judgment dismissing him from its jurisdiction and transferring his case for prosecution as an adult. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as untimely. It held that the juvenile court's judgment was final and appealable when entered in February 2019, and D.R.T.'s notice of appeal, filed over sixteen months later, exceeded the statutory deadline. The court rejected D.R.T.'s argument that the judgment became appealable only after the Missouri Supreme Court's D.E.G. decision in June 2020.

D.L.C. appealed the juvenile court's order dismissing his juvenile proceedings and transferring him to a court of general jurisdiction for criminal prosecution as an adult. He argued he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel and due process during the certification proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, finding that D.L.C. failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's performance, even under the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also noted D.L.C.'s extensive history with the juvenile system and the serious nature of the alleged offenses.