Supreme Court of Missouri / Jul 30, 2024
The Attorney General sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from unconditionally releasing Christopher Dunn after his 1991 murder conviction was vacated under section 547.031. The circuit court had sustained a motion to vacate Dunn's convictions and ordered his immediate discharge, prompting the Attorney General's appeal and writ petition. The Missouri Supreme Court issued a permanent writ, holding that while the Attorney General's appeal did not automatically stay the judgment, the circuit court lacked authority under section 547.031 to order Dunn's unconditional release. The Court commanded the circuit court to vacate its release order and amend its judgment to reflect that Dunn should revert to pretrial detention status, allowing the State an opportunity to indicate its intent to retry him.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District / Date unavailable
Sandra L. Hemme, convicted of capital murder in 1985, sought a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court granted, vacating her conviction. The State of Missouri, through the Attorney General, then filed an original proceeding in certiorari to review the habeas record, alleging several irregularities. The appellate court refused to quash the habeas record, affirming the habeas court's decision that Hemme's due process rights were violated by the suppression of exculpatory evidence and the unreliability of her confession, thereby vacating her conviction and ordering her discharge subject to retrial.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District / Date unavailable
The Attorney General sought a writ of prohibition against Circuit Judge Drew F. Davis, who had ordered Victor Vickers's release from custody via a preliminary writ of habeas corpus. Vickers's habeas petition challenged the Department of Corrections' calculation of his jail-time credit, a claim previously denied in a declaratory judgment action that was pending appeal. The appellate court made its preliminary writ of prohibition absolute, holding that the habeas court exceeded its authority by relitigating a claim already decided on the merits, as the prior judgment had preclusive effect despite the pending appeal.