STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent- Missouri Cases

Christina N. Knapp appealed the denial of her Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming her plea counsel coerced her into pleading guilty, rendering her plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. The motion court denied relief, finding plea counsel's testimony credible and that Knapp's plea was voluntary. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the motion court did not clearly err because the plea hearing record and counsel's testimony refuted Knapp's claims of coercion and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The State of Missouri appealed an "Amended Order and Judgment" from the motion court, which granted Howard Roberts' Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, vacated his conviction and sentence, ordered a new trial, and directed his immediate release. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the Amended Order was not a final judgment because it failed to adjudicate all of Roberts' viable claims. Additionally, the court vacated the portion of the order releasing Roberts, holding that Rule 30.17 mandates a defendant remain in custody during the State's appeal of a post-conviction relief order.

Martin Priest appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, which sought to set aside his 1984 first-degree murder conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Priest argued his counsel failed to impeach key witnesses and exclude tainted identification evidence. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial of relief, finding its decision was not clearly erroneous.

Donald McMannis appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion to set aside his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI), which was enhanced to a class B felony due to his habitual offender status. McMannis argued his sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law because the State's evidence was insufficient to prove his habitual offender status. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, holding that a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for habitual offender status is not cognizable in a Rule 29.15 proceeding, the claim was abandoned due to lack of evidence, and the *Nowicki* opinion on prior DWI convictions does not apply retroactively.

Kenneth Sauter appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court determined that Sauter's amended motion was untimely due to appointed counsel's error in applying the wrong version of the rules, constituting abandonment. However, following recent precedent, the court proceeded to review the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court affirmed the motion court's denial of relief, finding no clear error in its conclusion that sentencing counsel was not ineffective for failing to call two mitigation witnesses, as their testimony would not have added material information beyond the sentencing assessment report.

Jordan C. Haden appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, seeking to vacate convictions for second-degree assault and resisting arrest. He alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to properly litigate his persistent misdemeanor offender status. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, holding that Haden was barred from relitigating the issue because it had previously been reviewed for plain error on direct appeal, where the court found no error.

Brandy B. Shaddox appealed the denial of her Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, following her convictions for first-degree murder and other offenses. She claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense and for errors related to jury instructions. The motion court denied her claims, finding counsel's decisions were reasonable trial strategy and that no prejudice resulted from the instructional errors. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, concluding its findings were not clearly erroneous.

Chad R. Emmerson appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter an Alford plea without fully informing him of the sentencing judge's practices and the 85% rule. Emmerson claimed this rendered his plea unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, holding that Emmerson failed to demonstrate prejudice because he did not show that he would have proceeded to trial but for counsel's alleged errors, only that he would have entered a different type of guilty plea.

Ronald R. Spradling appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, following his convictions for kidnapping, armed criminal action, and other offenses. He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a self-defense instruction with forcible felony language and for failing to object to the State's improper questioning regarding witness credibility. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, finding no evidentiary support for the requested self-defense instruction and concluding that Spradling failed to demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the credibility questions.

Terry D. Morrison appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Morrison claimed his counsel was ineffective for offering lesser-included offense instructions (second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter) when the defense strategy was an "all or nothing" approach. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, holding that offering lesser-included instructions was a reasonable trial strategy and Morrison failed to demonstrate prejudice.

Kevin C. Newman appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance from both his trial and appellate counsel following his first-degree murder conviction. Newman argued his appellate counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of evidence, and his trial counsel failed to object to certain photographs and closing arguments. The Southern District of Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's denial, finding no merit in any of Newman's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Jason House appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting mental health evidence as a mitigating factor during sentencing for his murder and assault convictions. The motion court, which was also the sentencing court, denied relief, finding counsel's strategy reasonable and that it had considered all relevant evidence. The appellate court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, concluding that counsel was not ineffective and House failed to show prejudice. However, the court remanded the case for the motion court to correct a clerical error in the sentencing order regarding consecutive vs. concurrent sentences.

Chris Courtois appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, raising two points. First, he argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements to police. Second, he claimed the motion court plainly erred by not inquiring whether his amended motion included all known claims. The Southern District affirmed the motion court's judgment, concluding that appellate counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue a meritless claim regarding the voluntariness of Courtois's statements, and that plain error review is not available for claims not raised in a post-conviction motion.

Patrick Ellswood appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim the trial court erred by denying his request for a second psychiatric examination. The motion court found that Ellswood had waived his request for a second mental evaluation. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, concluding that Ellswood's actions, including withdrawing unresolved motions, constituted a waiver of his statutory right to a second mental examination, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a waived issue.

David K. Holman appealed the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, seeking to overturn his convictions for first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Holman alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to hire a forensic expert and claimed the motion court erred by excluding and failing to consider certain exhibits. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, finding its denial of post-conviction relief was not clearly erroneous.

Clayton D. Counts appealed the dismissal of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which the motion court found untimely. Counts argued his late filing was excusable due to third-party interference from COVID-19 restrictions in prison and challenged the denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, concluding Counts failed to prove the third-party interference exception. The court also held that remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law was not required, as it would be useless given the lack of evidence supporting Counts's claims.

Gabriel Wood appealed the denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Wood claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and introduce bank account records that would have supported his defense against a first-degree burglary charge. The motion court found counsel's performance deficient but denied relief, concluding Wood was not prejudiced. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the bank records would not have disproved an element of the burglary offense, thus failing to establish prejudice under Strickland.

Larry G. McConnell appealed the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, seeking to overturn convictions for statutory sodomy and rape. McConnell argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present his wife's medical and church attendance records, which would have contradicted the victim's testimony regarding the timing of the abuse. The appellate court reversed the motion court's order, finding that counsel's failure to investigate was clearly erroneous and prejudiced McConnell, thereby undermining confidence in the trial's outcome. The court vacated McConnell's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.

Crowin King appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. King claimed counsel failed to call a digital forensic expert and failed to object to testimony about prior uncharged misconduct. The motion court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that counsel's decision regarding the expert was sound trial strategy and that King failed to show prejudice from the unobjected-to testimony in a court-tried case.

Aaron M. Burnett appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentences, which he argued rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The motion court denied his claim after an evidentiary hearing, finding the record refuted his assertion of prejudice. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Burnett failed to establish prejudice because he was aware of the statutory maximum sentence for each count and his plea was knowing and voluntary despite his alleged lack of advice on consecutive sentences.

James Robert Caraway was convicted of child pornography and sought to represent himself, leading to a Faretta hearing. After conviction, he filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his waiver of counsel was unknowing because the trial court failed to inquire about potential defenses. The motion court denied relief, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that such a claim is not cognizable in a post-conviction relief proceeding as it should have been raised on direct appeal.

Qwenten Deon Amlin appealed the motion court's denial of his amended motion for postconviction relief under Rule 29.15, which followed an evidentiary hearing. Amlin raised four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) and one claim that the motion court failed to make required findings and conclusions of law. The appellate court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, finding no merit in any of Amlin's points.

Movant Jose Huckleberry, Jr. appealed the denial of his amended Rule 29.15 motion without an evidentiary hearing on all six claims. The motion court's order only addressed one claim concerning appellate counsel, leaving five claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel unadjudicated. The appellate court agreed with both parties that the motion court's order was not a final judgment because it failed to resolve all claims. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final judgment.

Randall Owens appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel after his convictions for assault and unlawful use of a weapon. The appellate court determined that Owens' appointed counsel filed the amended post-conviction motion one day late, creating a presumption of abandonment. Consequently, the court vacated the motion court's order and remanded the case with instructions for the motion court to conduct an inquiry into whether Owens was abandoned by his counsel.

Tommy R. Morris appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request a change of venue. The motion court denied the relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the motion court did not clearly err in finding counsel's decision was objectively reasonable and that Morris failed to demonstrate prejudice, particularly given his waiver of a jury trial.

Isis Schauer appealed the denial of her Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, asserting five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to her guilty plea. The motion court denied the claims, finding them refuted by the record and not credible. The appellate court vacated the motion court's order, holding that the record did not conclusively refute Schauer's allegations and that credibility determinations could not be made without an evidentiary hearing. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on all claims.

James W. Henneha appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which the motion court dismissed as untimely filed. Henneha argued that circumstances beyond his control, including the COVID-19 pandemic and solitary confinement, justified the late filing. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the motion court did not clearly err in concluding Henneha failed to prove a recognized exception to the timeliness requirement, as he did not show he did all he reasonably could to ensure timely filing or that the delay was solely due to third-party interference.

Joshua Johnson appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief. Johnson claimed his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing advice and that his constitutional rights were violated when sentencing continued while he was unconscious. The motion court found Johnson's testimony not credible, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the motion court did not clearly err in finding the plea knowing and voluntary, and that the claim regarding his presence at sentencing was not cognizable in a post-conviction motion.

Chris Courtois appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 amended motion for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The appellate court determined that the motion court had granted an extension for filing the amended motion after the mandatory deadline had passed, rendering the motion untimely. Consequently, the court reversed the motion court's order and remanded the case with directions for the motion court to conduct an abandonment inquiry to determine if Movant was abandoned by post-conviction counsel before proceeding further.

James D. Moreland appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreland claimed his attorney inaccurately advised him he would receive probation and mental health court if he entered an open plea. The motion court found that both plea counsel and trial counsel testified they never guaranteed a specific sentence, and Moreland's plea colloquy confirmed no promises were made. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, concluding it did not clearly err in finding Moreland's plea was knowing and voluntary.

Justin W. Lawrence appealed the dismissal of his Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion as untimely, arguing his plea counsel's incorrect advice constituted active interference. Lawrence contended counsel told him to wait until his 15-year sentence was executed before filing, which led to a three-year delay. The motion court dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that mere reliance on counsel's advice, without showing an attempt to timely file, does not meet the "active interference" exception, and the record refuted his claim of being misinformed about the filing deadline.

Jamaal J. Walls pleaded guilty to burglary and failure to appear, receiving consecutive sentences. His burglary judgment erroneously classified him as a dangerous offender. Walls filed Rule 24.035 motions, and the motion court removed the erroneous language but denied his request to vacate his guilty pleas. On appeal, Walls argued the motion court erred in refusing to vacate his pleas, but the appellate court affirmed, holding that Walls failed to preserve the issue for review by not filing a Rule 78.07(c) motion to amend the judgment to include findings and conclusions on his due process claim.

Jerry Glenn Haffly appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest because she previously represented the confidential informant (C.I.) in his case. The motion court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Haffly failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected her performance, as required for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Cornell Anthony Cornelius appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing the State breached its plea agreement by clarifying a 20-year minimum sentence and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment. It found the plea agreement's term "something less" to be ambiguous, permitting consideration of extrinsic evidence, and concluded Movant failed to prove either a breach of the agreement or ineffective assistance of counsel.

Gabriel Pulliam appealed the dismissal of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, which the motion court found untimely. Pulliam argued his motion should be treated as timely due to a mistaken belief that he needed to file a certified Department of Corrections (DOC) account statement and DOC's delay in providing it, which he contended constituted third-party interference. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Pulliam's mistaken belief and choice not to file did not fall within the narrow third-party interference exception to the mandatory filing deadline.

Damien Bryan sought Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief after being convicted of felony DWI and two counts of second-degree murder following a fatal multi-vehicle collision. He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel across seven points, including failure to call witnesses, object to testimony, challenge scientific evidence, cross-examine, present disability evidence, and conduct proper voir dire. The motion court denied relief, and the appellate court affirmed, finding no clear error in the motion court's findings and conclusions and no merit in any of Bryan's claims of ineffective assistance.

Michael Andrew Hurst appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a learning disability. The motion court found his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the motion court did not clearly err in denying relief, as Movant's participation in the plea hearing and plea counsel's testimony supported the finding of competency.

Nick E. Johnson pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary in 2012 but was not sentenced until 2018. He appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that the six-year delay in sentencing resulted in a de facto consecutive sentence, breaching his plea agreement, and that his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, finding no clear error as Movant's claims did not challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea at the time it was entered, but rather complained about unforeseeable future actions.

Wesley Hatmon appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing the motion court erred by finding no abandonment by counsel and ruling on the merits of an untimely amended motion. This was the second appeal in the proceeding, following a prior remand for an independent inquiry into abandonment. The appellate court vacated the motion court's order, holding that it clearly erred by conflating the abandonment analysis with the Strickland prejudice analysis, which led it to improperly rule on the merits of the untimely motion. The case was remanded for the motion court to properly determine abandonment and then adjudicate either the amended motion or the initial pro se motion accordingly.

Vernon Earl Miller appealed the motion court's order granting his amended Rule 29.15 motion to vacate convictions for forcible rape, statutory sodomy, and statutory rape. The motion court found Miller's counsel ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony and failing to litigate a motion to exclude evidence. The appellate court reversed, concluding the motion court clearly erred because Miller failed to prove prejudice from counsel's actions. The case was remanded with directions to deny Miller's post-conviction motion.

Cory Jones appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion to set aside his first-degree murder conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate his mental health history before his guilty plea. The motion court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, finding no indication of mental instability and strategic reasons for the plea. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that Jones failed to show a factual basis for a questionable mental condition that would have required counsel to investigate, thus not meeting the deficient performance prong of Strickland.

Shawn Henry Scrivens, who pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, filed a Rule 24.035 motion alleging his plea was involuntary due to inadequate medical care in jail. The motion court denied his claim, finding his plea was knowing and voluntary. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the motion court's thorough inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea, where Scrivens confirmed he would still plead guilty even with adequate medical care, was not clearly erroneous.

Brian Jones appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, seeking to set aside his convictions for second-degree murder and armed criminal action. He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel on three grounds: failure to call a neuropsychologist at trial and sentencing, and failure to object to the trial court's explanation for excusing a juror. The motion court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court affirmed, finding the motion court's decision was not clearly erroneous and that counsel's actions constituted sound trial strategy or did not result in prejudice.

Nathan Hilliard appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Hilliard argued that the trial court imposed a vindictive sentence, punishing him for exercising his right to a trial by sentencing him to a longer term after conviction than he had received in a prior plea agreement. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, holding that a claim of vindictive sentencing is generally considered trial court error and does not fall under the "rare and exceptional circumstances" required for such an error to be cognizable in a Rule 29.15 motion.

Karl David Lawrence appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, following his conviction for statutory sodomy. Lawrence claimed his trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to provide notice of an alibi defense and failing to call an additional alibi witness. The Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's denial, concluding that the issues of prejudice had been resolved on direct appeal and could not be relitigated under the higher Strickland standard for post-conviction relief.

Timothy Easley appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion to set aside his conviction for first-degree assault, following a guilty plea. Easley argued that his guilty plea lacked a sufficient factual basis and that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him on the elements of first-degree assault. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's denial, holding that the factual basis claim was not cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding and deferring to the motion court's credibility findings regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Ronald McLemore filed a Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, making credibility findings regarding trial counsel's strategy based solely on the trial transcript. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the motion court erred by denying an evidentiary hearing when credibility findings were necessary and the record did not conclusively refute Movant's claims.

David Cole Nash appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the trial court's failure to sua sponte order a mental evaluation. Nash contended that a mental evaluation would have led to medication, preventing his removal from trial due to disruptive behavior. The appellate court affirmed the denial, concluding that the motion court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the trial court had no reason to order a mental evaluation, as Nash's behavior appeared manipulative rather than incompetent.

Billie J. Borschnack appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that appointed counsel abandoned him, which would make his retained counsel's subsequent amended motion timely. The motion court found no abandonment because the public defender's office was never effectively notified of the appointment. The appellate court affirmed the motion court's judgment, holding that without effective notice, there was no abandonment by appointed counsel, and thus the retained counsel's amended motion was untimely. Consequently, Borschnack's initial pro se motion, which contained only a conclusory allegation, was properly denied.

Marcus L. Johnson appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson claimed his counsel was ineffective for advising him that his prior felony conviction would be revealed at trial, leading him to plead guilty, and for failing to present mental health mitigation evidence at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the denial, finding counsel was not ineffective on either ground.