Treasurer of the State of Missouri, Custodian of the Second Injury Fund Missouri Cases

Jeremy Jarvis appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of his claim against the Second Injury Fund. Jarvis, an iron worker, sustained a primary work injury in 2015, which he argued, when combined with preexisting disabilities, rendered him permanently and totally disabled. The Commission denied benefits, finding that one of Jarvis's three preexisting disabilities did not meet the statutory fifty-week permanent partial disability threshold. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its application of the law or in finding its decision supported by competent and substantial evidence, as a claimant cannot rely on a non-qualifying preexisting disability for Fund benefits.

Robert Balliu appealed the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's decision, which denied his claim for worker's compensation from the Second Injury Fund (SIF) for a 2015 work-related injury. Balliu contended that a prior 1999 hernia combined with his 2015 injury to cause permanent total disability, making the SIF liable. The appellate court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that the SIF is not liable when the primary injury alone, not in combination with a preexisting disability, results in permanent total disability, and found the Commission's factual findings were supported by sufficient evidence.

Thomas Dubuc appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of Second Injury Fund benefits, challenging its refusal to allow additional discovery and evidence after a prior remand and its finding that he lacked "medically documented" preexisting disabilities. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. The Court held that the prior remand did not require additional evidence and that Dubuc's self-reported medical history was insufficient to meet the "medically documented" requirement under section 287.220.3. It also found that generic expert testimony did not establish that his preexisting disabilities directly and significantly aggravated his primary injury.

Robert March appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of permanent total disability (PTD) benefits from the Second Injury Fund. The commission found March failed to prove that the combination of his preexisting disabilities and primary work-related injuries, rather than his preexisting disabilities alone, rendered him permanently and totally disabled. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commission correctly applied the burden of persuasion, which requires a claimant to show it is "more likely true than not true" that the combined injuries caused PTD, and that "equally likely" evidence fails to meet this burden.

Thomas Dubuc appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of Second Injury Fund benefits, which occurred on remand from a prior appeal. The Commission had denied Dubuc's motion for additional discovery and evidence, interpreting the prior remand as limiting its review to the existing record, and found his preexisting disabilities were not "medically documented" under section 287.220.3. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that its prior mandate did not restrict the Commission to the existing record, and denying additional evidence was an abuse of discretion given a significant change in the law. The court also found the Commission erred in its interpretation of "medically documented," clarifying that self-reported medical history in records can satisfy this requirement.

Mark Lynch appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of his claim against the Second Injury Fund for permanent total disability benefits. The Commission found Lynch's permanent total disability was due to preexisting conditions, not a combination with his work-related carpal tunnel syndrome, and relied on evidence not properly in the record while disregarding uncontradicted expert medical opinion. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission arbitrarily ignored competent and substantial evidence, including the only qualified expert medical opinion, and improperly substituted its own theory of medical causation.

William Wilson appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of his workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund. The Commission had concluded that the Second Injury Fund was not liable because Wilson failed to prove his disability resulted solely from one qualifying preexisting disability combined with the primary injury. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Commission erroneously interpreted and applied section 287.220.3(2) by limiting consideration to a single preexisting disability, contrary to the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in *Treasurer as Custodian of Second Injury Fund v. Parker*. The case was remanded with instructions to enter an award for Wilson.

Robert March, an employee, appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's denial of permanent total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund. The Commission had found the employee's expert medical testimony on causation credible but then substituted its own lay opinion to deny compensation. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission cannot substitute its lay opinion for uncontradicted, credible expert medical testimony on causation.

Rick Hunsaker (Employee) appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's decision that his claim against the Second Injury Fund (SIF) was time-barred. The Commission found that Hunsaker's amended claim was not timely filed under § 287.430. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a settlement with the employer did not restart the statute of limitations for the SIF claim because a formal claim had already been filed. The court also determined that Hunsaker's constitutional challenges were merely colorable, thus not invoking the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

Diana Penney, a pharmacy technician, was awarded permanent total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund due to a combination of three work-related occupational diseases. The Fund appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's award, contending that preexisting compensable occupational diseases do not satisfy the statutory requirements for Fund liability under Section 287.220.3(2)(a)a(ii). The appellate court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding that Section 287.020's definition of "injury" encompasses occupational diseases as provided for in Chapter 287, specifically Section 287.067.

Norma Huffman appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's decision denying her workers' compensation benefits for a permanent total disability from the Second Injury Fund. Huffman alleged a psychological injury from a 2015 work accident that, combined with pre-existing conditions, rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's denial, finding Huffman failed to establish a psychological disability related to the work injury. The appellate court affirmed, concluding there was sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination.