Robert Fisher v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.

(Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)

Injury No.: 01-116772

Employee: Robert G. Fisher

Employer: Anheuser Busch, Inc.

Insurer: Self-Insured

Date of Accident: April 1, 2001

Place and County of Accident: St. Louis City, Missouri

The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by section 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated January 25, 2005. The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge John Howard Percy, issued January 25, 2005, is attached and incorporated by this reference.

The Commission further approves and affirms the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.

Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.

Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $22^{\text {nd }}$ day of July 2005.

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

William F. Ringer, Chairman

Alice A. Bartlett, Member

Attest: John J. Hickey, Member

Secretary

1. Are any benefits awarded herein? Yes
2. Was the injury or occupational disease compensable under Chapter 287? Yes
3. Was there an accident or incident of occupational disease under the Law? Yes
4. Date of accident or onset of occupational disease: May 31, 2000
5. State location where accident occurred or occupational disease was contracted St. Louis City, Missouri
6. Was above employee in employ of above employer at time of alleged accident or occupational disease? Yes
7. Did employer receive proper notice? Yes
8. Did accident or occupational disease arise out of and in the course of the employment? Yes
9. Was claim for compensation filed within time required by Law? Yes
10. Was employer insured by above insurer? Self-insured
11. Describe work employee was doing and how accident occurred or occupational disease contracted:

Employee was exposed to harmful noise during 20 years as a security guard for employer

1. Did accident or occupational disease cause death? No Date of death? N/A
2. Part(s) of body injured by accident or occupational disease: Ears and body as a whole
3. Nature and extent of any permanent disability: 3.4 % hearing loss in the right ear and 5 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole due to tinnitus
4. Compensation paid to-date for temporary disability: none
5. Value necessary medical aid paid to date by employer/insurer? none

Employee: Robert G. Fisher

Injury No. 01-116772

1. Value necessary medical aid not furnished by employer/insurer? None
2. Employee's average weekly wages: $>\ 768.20
3. Weekly compensation rate: $\ 303.01 PPD
4. Method wages computation: Stipulation

1. Amount of compensation payable:

1. Second Injury Fund liability: Yes No Open N/A
2. Future requirements awarded: No

Said payments to begin immediately and to be payable and be subject to modification and review as provided by law.

The compensation awarded to the claimant shall be subject to a lien in the amount of 20 % of all payments hereunder in favor of the following attorney for necessary legal services rendered to the claimant:

Jagadeesh Mandava

Employee asserts a claim under Section 287.067.3 Mo. Rev. Stat. (2000) for hearing loss allegedly due to exposure to harmful noise. A hearing in this proceeding was held on September 9, 2004. Both parties submitted proposed awards, the latter of which was received on October 8, 2004.

The parties stipulated that on or about May 31, 200011:

1. the employer and employee were operating under and subject to the provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law;
2. the employer's liability was self-insured;
3. the employee's average weekly wage exceeded $\ 768.20; and
4. the rate of compensation for permanent partial disability was $\ 303.01.

The parties further stipulated that:

1. the employer had notice of the alleged hearing loss and a claim for compensation was filed within the time prescribed by law;
2. no compensation has been paid; and
3. employer has not paid any medical expenses.

The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are:

1. whether claimant sustained an occupational disease of loss of hearing and tinnitus due to industrial noise while in the employment of employer;
2. if claimant sustained a compensable hearing loss, whether he should be provided with any future medical treatment; and
3. if claimant sustained a compensable hearing loss and tinnitus, the nature and extent of any permanent disability sustained by the employee.

Robert Fisher, claimant herein, alleges that he sustained a binaural loss of hearing and tinnitus due to prolonged exposure to harmful noise during his employment with Anheuser Busch. Inc. from 1980 though November 30, 1999.

Section287.067.3 Mo. Rev. Stat. (2000) recognizes a loss of hearing due to industrial noise as an occupational disease. In order to prevail, claimant must prove that he was exposed to harmful noise (i.e. "sound capable of producing occupational deafness") in his employment which caused a loss of hearing in one or both ears.

An employee's claim for compensation due to an occupational disease is to be determined under Section 287.067 Mo. Rev. Stat. (2000). It defines occupational disease as:

an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. (1993 additions underlined)

Section 287.067.2, which was added in 1993, provides that an occupational disease is compensable "if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." Subsection 2 of section 287.020 provides that an injury is clearly work related "if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability." $\underline{[2]}$

Subsection 3(1) of section 287.020 provides that an injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment and be incidental to and not independent of the employment relationship and that "ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging" is not compensable unless it "follows as an incident of employment."

Subsection 3(2) of section 287.020 provides that an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment "only if (a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and (b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and (c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and (d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life[.]"

Much of new subsection 3(2) of section 287.020 was contained in the prior definition of an occupational disease set forth in Section 287.067. Section 287.020.3(2)(b), (c), and (d) were part of the former occupational disease statute. Section 287.020.3(2)(a) is a revision of the prior requirement of a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work was performed and the occupational disease. Direct causal connection is now defined as "a substantial factor in causing the injury." The Supreme Court held in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1999) that the foregoing language overruled the holdings in Wynn v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1983), Bone v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Company, 449 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1970), and many other cases which had allowed an injury to be compensable so long as it was "triggered or precipitated" by work. A substantial factor does not have to be the primary or most significant causative factor. Bloss v. Plastic Enterprises, 32 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Mo. App. 2000); Cahall v. Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Mo. App. 1998). The additional language in section 287.020.3(1) concerning deterioration or degeneration of the body due to aging probably does not overturn any prior court decisions.

Since the 1993 amendments pertaining to occupational diseases have largely readopted the prior statute, caselaw

Claimant must also establish, generally through expert testimony, the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Dawson at 716; Selby v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Mo. App. 1992); Brundige v. Boehringer, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. App. 1991). Claimant must prove that work was "a substantial factor" in causing "the resulting medical condition or disability." Section 287.020.2. Moreover, "an occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." Section 287.067.2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1994). The Supreme Court held in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1999) that the foregoing language overruled the holdings in Wynn v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1983), Bone v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Company, 449 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1970), and many other cases which had allowed an injury to be compensable so long as it was "triggered or precipitated" by work. On the other hand, injuries which are triggered or precipitated by workmay nevertheless be compensable if the work is found to be the "substantial factor" in causing the injury. Kasl, supra.

A single medical opinion will support a finding of compensability even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate. Dawson at 716; Sellers v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 776 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Mo. App. 1989); Sheehan at 797. The opinion may be based on a doctor's written report alone. Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo. App. 1988)."A medical expert's opinion must be supported by facts and reasons proven by competent evidence that will give the opinion sufficient probative force to be substantial evidence." Silman v. Montgomery \& Associates, 891 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Mo. App. 1995); Pippin v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 799 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. App. 1990). Where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Hawkins v. Emerson Electric Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Mo. App. 1984). Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony give