Whether the Accident
Arose "out of " and "in' the Course of Employment
The liability of an employer for the payment of workers' compensation benefits is statutory. The basic liability of an employer is created by the following section:
"Every employer...shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of the this chapter for personal injury or death of an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment..." §287.120.1 (emphasis added.)
The courts have construed this language. "Arising out of" and "in the course of" are two separate tests.
Abel v. Mike Russell's Standard Service, 924 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo.banc 1996). For an accident to arise "out of" an employment relationship there must be a causal connection between the conditions of the work required to be performed and the resulting injury. For an injury to occur "in" the course of employment the injury must be within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be fulfilling the duties of employment. (Citing Kloppenburg v. Queen Size Shoes, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Mo.banc 1986). Shinn v. General Binding Corp., 789 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Mo.App. E.D. 1990).)
The condition of the workplace bears a causal connection to the injury only when the condition is unique to the workplace or is a common condition that is exacerbated by the requirements of the employment. Abel at 504. Here, Claimant did not demonstrate that the parking lot or curbside is unique to Employer's premises or that any quality thereof represents a necessary feature or condition created by Employer that might be characterized as a requirement of the employment.
Separately, Section 287.020.3(2) RSMo (2000) provides:
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal non-employment life;
Claimant's injury cannot be called a substantial factor, natural incident, or proximate cause of the employment primarily because there is no suggestion in the record that talking and delivering videotapes is part of the job description given by Claimant on direct examination. Subsection (d), relating to equal exposure outside of employment, cannot be ruled out since the undisputed facts regard unimpeded ambulation over normal surfaces, including curbs, to which the general public is exposed. Thus, Claimant must rely on case law doctrines that sometimes excuse compliance with the statutory language.
Here, the mutual benefit doctrine presents itself. The mutual benefit doctrine holds that "[a]n injury suffered by an employee while performing an act for the mutual benefit of the employer and the employee is usually compensable." Wamhoff vs. Wagner Electric Corp., 190 S.W.2d 915, 917-919 (Mo. 1945). Blades vs. Commercial Transport, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 827 (Mo. Banc 2000). The test under the mutual benefit doctrine is not whether any conceivable benefit to the employer can be articulated no matter how strained, but whether the act that resulted in the injury is of some substantive benefit to the employer. Blades at 831. The mutual benefit doctrine applies in cases where an employee is injured while engaged in an act that benefits both the employer and the employee, and some advantage to the employer results from the employee's conduct. Otte vs. Langley's Lawn Care, Inc., 66 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Mo. App. ED. 2001). [1]
After giving his brother the movie and speaking with family members in the car, Claimant turned and tripped on the curbside falling and injuring his right shoulder. Claimant argues that inviting his family into the restaurant was a benefit to the employer. The delivery of the movie cannot be said to benefit Employer. Thus, the invitation to dinner itself must be proffered as the benefit to Employer. While this is tenuous at best, when Claimant reentered and exited the restaurant with the videotape he was clearly engaged in a personal deviation from employment from which no benefit may be inferred.
Claimant testified to facts that suggest the original purpose of this rendezvous was the delivery of the videotape. Assuming, arguendo, the dinner suggestion was a measurable benefit to Employer, in hindsight, th