Based on the substantial and competent evidence, including Claimant's testimony, my personal observations of Claimant, deposition testimony, the medical records, and all the other evidence of record, I find as follows:
Based on his actions and testimony in the hearing, as well as his conduct and candor with physicians, Claimant is not a credible witness. During the hearing on this matter, Claimant constantly winced as if in unbearable pain, changed position often with exaggerated grimaces and groans, and on several occasions tinkered with his TENS unit as if he couldn't get pain relief. These constant and acute symptoms some three years after the work incident are alleged to be the result of an injury that he did not even bother to report to his personal physician, much less complain of any discomfort, only 13 days after the incident.
During direct examination, Claimant could not remember if he was hospitalized in August of 2003 or 2004 and seemed to ponder this until prompted by his own attorney that the time he was alleged to be in a narcotic coma was in 2003. Then, under cross-examination, when asked about the same incident at St. Mary's Hospital in August 2003, Claimant, without hesitation, recalled the exact date of August 14, 2003 and stated he knew it because it was close to his birthday. Claimant also testified that he could not remember the settlement of his Workers' Compensation claim in 1999 for Injury Number 97-028743 (Employers Exhibit \#3), in which he received over eleven thousand dollars. The stipulation he could not remember signing also included permanent partial disability to his back and left arm, the very parts of the body he is alleged to have injured in the present case.
Claimant, who is a critical care nurse, is certainly in a position to understand the importance of an accurate medical history in diagnosis and treatment. Yet he repeatedly left out important parts of his medical history when being evaluated and treated. It seems to be more than mere coincidence that the facts omitted were most often facts that were detrimental to Claimant's case.
Regarding his alleged psychiatric injury, he failed to inform his treating physician Dr. Irvin, that he had been treated for anxiety prior to the October 16, 2002 work injury. (Exhibit R, Deposition of Dr. Irvin, p. 80, ln. 9). In his testimony, Dr. Irvin stated that he totally relied on the credibility and accuracy of the history provided and that his opinions on causation are dependant upon the accuracy of the history. (Exhibit R p.79, ln. 4-12). Dr. Irvin also acknowledged that Claimant reported that the onset of depression was August 2003 (Exhibit R p.32, ln.20), nine months after the work incident. However, August 2003 is the same month as his alleged coma incident at St. Mary's Hospital, which Claimant testified had caused mental injuries with physical manifestations. Dr. Schwabo apparently also attributed Claimants psychiatric injuries to the event at St. Mary's, as that was she stated was the cause in her letters to Claimant's attorney. (Exhibit R, beginning p.82, ln.14).
Claimant also refused to execute authorizations for Dr. Bassett to procure his entire medical history, for Dr. Bassett to use in his evaluation of Claimant. Dr. Bassett also noted that Claimant seemed to exaggerate his pain and impairment, and he appeared to be physically more impaired then when he was not aware he was being observed. (Exhibit P, Deposition of Dr. Bassett, beginning on p.20, ln.4).
Regarding his alleged physical injuries, Claimant engaged in similar behavior. He did not inform his treating physician, Dr. Abbott, that he had RSD prior to October 2002. In fact, under cross-examination, Dr. Abbott stated that if Claimant had RSD prior to 2002, it would seem to say the RSD is not related to the work injury. (Exhibit O, Deposition of Dr. Abbott, p. 46 beginning $\ln .9)$.
Claimant again concealed the history of his two prior work related injuries and his long history of treatment for back pain from Dr. Cohen during his evaluation for a disability rating. Although he had a prior Workers' Compensation settlement from Nebraska in 2002 for 20\% of the left upper extremity (Employer's Exhibit 4), and a Workers' Compensation
settlement from Missouri in 1999 for 5\% of the BAW at the lumbar spine and 7.5\% of the left elbow (Employer's Exhibit 3), he gave Dr. Cohen a history that included no prior arm injuries and that he had only treated one time about 20 years ago for his back. (Exhibit Q, Deposition of Dr. Cohen, pp. 24-31). Claimant also failed to disclose that he had been treating with Dr. Abbott since 1997 for chronic back pain. Dr. Cohen testified that he relied on the history given. (Exhibit Q, p.35, ln.23-25).
The Division is charged with the responsibility of passing upon the credibility of witnesses. It may disbelieve testimony of a witness even though no contradictory or impeaching information is introduced. Lawson v. Emerson Electric Co., 833 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo.App. S.D. 1992); Page v. Green, 686 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Mo.App., S.D. 1985).
The inconsistencies in his testimony, his demeanor at hearing, and the omission of clearly relevant history to physicians, coupled with Dr. Bassett's diagnosis that Claimant is a somatoform and malingerer, render Claimant's testimony completely unreliable. His complete lack of candor to physicians has rendered, by their own admissions, their opinions as to causation and extent of disability, to be unreliable. If causation and extent of disability remain unproven, opinions regarding liability for past medical bills and future medical treatment become mere speculation. The only physician provided with an accurate factual and medical history, Dr. Russell Cantrell, testified that Claimant has no permanent disabilities, that he is at maximum medical improvement, and that he needs no future medical treatment as a result of the October 16, 2002 work injury.
The party claiming benefits under The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri bears the burden of proving all material elements of his or her claim. Duncan v. Springfield R-12 School District, 897 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995), citing Meilves v. Morris, 442 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. 1968); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc. 933 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); and Decker v. Square D Co. 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998). It is axiomatic that the employee bears the burden of proving all elements of his claim for compensation, including whether his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Duncan v. Springfield R-12 School District, 897 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo.App. 1995). Proof of causation cannot be made based on surmise or speculation. Griggs v. A.B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697 (Mo.App. 1973).
Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing a causal connection between the events of October 16, 2002 and his alleged injuries, that Employer owes for past medical treatment, that he suffers any permanent disability from this incident, and that he is entitled to an award of future medical benefits. As no benefits are awarded, the issue of whether Attorney Theodore Pashos is entitled to enforce an attorney's lien is moot.