Caren Braswell v. Missouri State Highway Patrol

The facts were accurately recounted in the award issued by the administrative law judge including the commendable timeline graph setting forth the events and circumstances post-accident as well as employee's ensuing medical treatment. The Commission will supplement the administrative law judge's award with facts as necessitated in the instant opinion.

In summary fashion, employee was a full time employee of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, as a trooper, from August 1, 1993, through May 13, 2005; while on patrol the evening of February 1, 2004, employee responded to a call to provide assistance at a private residence in Stone County; when employee arrived at the private residence in Stone County there were several private individuals/citizens at the residence along with several local law enforcement officers involved in an altercation; during this event one of the individuals had to be restrained by 3 or 4 law enforcement officers and was forced face down on the floor of the residence with his hands restrained behind his back by the officers; while the individual was restrained employee observed another officer draw what employee perceived to be a service revolver from the officer's right side and aim it at the restrained individual; the officer began squeezing the trigger of the weapon and employee, perceiving the officer was aiming a service revolver at the restrained individual and was shooting him began shouting "no," and the employee attempted to intervene as she was under the impression that the restrained individual was going to be executed by the officer.

In reality the police officer had drawn a taser, not a service revolver; however, when the police officer squeezed the trigger on the weapon, employee was of the impression or perception that the officer was intending to shoot the restrained individual; employee began experiencing emotional problems subsequent to the taser event occurring February 1, 2004.

Subsequent to the taser event occurring February 1, 2004, in response to a formal complaint of misconduct lodged against the employee, the Missouri State Highway Patrol instituted an investigation related to employee's actions at the private residence the evening of February 1, 2004. Subsequently, based on its investigation of the circumstances occurring February 1, 2004, the State Highway Patrol classified the complaint as substantiated and served formal charges and an offer of discipline on employee by July 14, 2004; and on July 20, 2004, employee waived rights to appeal any formal charges and accepted the offer of discipline from the Missouri State Highway Patrol.

Simultaneously with the State Highway Patrol investigation and disciplinary proceeding, employee was receiving medical care and treatment for her mental condition.

The details of these facts and events surrounding the occurrence of February 1, 2004, and thereafter, were thoroughly detailed and analyzed by the administrative law judge, and accurately set forth in a timeline graph by the administrative law judge.

Employee utilized three experts in attempting to prove and/or establish a medical causal relationship between the accident occurring February 1, 2004, and her resultant injury, i.e., her present mental stress disorder. The three experts were Roy Jack Gillispie, M.D., Donald E. McGehee, Ph.D, board certified psychologist; and Dale A. Halfaker, Ph.D, licensed psychologist. Employer did not adduce any expert testimony.

Dr. Gillispie testified by deposition, and in summary fashion, his testimony was as follows: employee was a patient of Dr. Gillispie since 2002; as early as April 17, 2002, Dr. Gillispie diagnosed anxiety and depression and he began a course of treatment for these conditions; on July 29, 2004, employee appeared or presented with a significant problem of anxiety; employee described an event at work that had caused a major effect; and the diagnosis of Dr. Gillispie on July 29, 2004, was post-traumatic stress disorder with depression and

anxiety related to the event described at work; and $\quad \mathrm{Dr}$. Gillispie was of the opinion at that point employee was unable to work.

In answer to a hypothetical question propounded to him by employee's attorney concerning the taser event occurring February 1, 2004, the unequivocal opinion of Dr. Gillispie was that the taser event was a substantial contributing factor causing employee's diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder which further worsened her pre-existing depression and anxiety; and in conclusion, Dr. Gillispie was of the opinion that the diagnosis of post-traumatic disorder was definitely a change from any of employee's prior conditions.

On re-direct examination, Dr. Gillispie opined that it is not unusual for post-traumatic stress disorder to not immediately manifest itself subsequent to a traumatic event.

Dr. McGehee testified at trial; Dr. McGehee has a Ph.D in psychology; employee initially presented to Dr. McGehee for treatment on May 11, 2004; Dr. McGehee noted she was distraught due to traumatic experience; the presenting problem employee described to Dr. McGehee was an event in the line of duty involving the use of a taser gun by another law enforcement officer; Dr. McGehee indicated that employee's current symptoms were due to occupational events resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder and depression; Dr. McGehee noted "depressive reaction to trauma due to her peer inappropriate behavior"; this entry was explained by Dr. McGehee to mean it was part of the symptoms that he utilized in deriving the post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis.

After the May 11, 2004 visit, the diagnosis of Dr. McGehee was as follows: post-traumatic stress disorder pursuant to DSM-IV; acute post-traumatic stress disorder, Axis I 309.81; also Axis I 296.2, major depression; and recommended sick leave for seven working days.

On May 11, 2004, Dr. McGehee also noted that employee was not emotionally ready to return to work; employee experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity of self and others. Dr. McGehee testified that the event was the taser incident occurring February 1, 2004, and the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder was due to this event. The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression did not change during the treatment administered by Dr. McGehee, and he excused employee from work from July 29, 2004, to January 26, 2005. Dr. McGehee continued to see employee through June 21, 2005.

In the opinion of Dr. McGehee, the traumatic event, the taser incident occurring February 1, 2004, absolutely was a substantial factor in causing employee's post-traumatic stress disorder; furthermore, through June 21, 2005, all of his services rendered employee were reasonable and necessary; he last saw employee June 21, 2005; she was not psychologically at maximum medical improvement.

Dr. McGehee did opine that the subsequent events, including the disciplinary investigation and proceeding, were experiences that she had to process and that the process related back to the event of February 1, 2004. On re-direct, Dr. McGehee unequivocally stated his opinion that the tasing incident caused her posttraumatic stress disorder.

Dr. Halfaker's testimony coincided with the testimony of Dr. Gillispie and Dr. McGehee, i.e., Dr. Halfaker was of the opinion that the taser event occurring February 1, 2004, represented a significant stressor for employee which employee had trouble resolving, resulting in a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder.

Exhibit F was admitted into evidence without objection. It is an itemization of past unpaid medical expenses incurred on account of the accident in the total amount of $\ 3,746.18. Employer adduced no evidence contra.

IV. Rulings of Law

The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether or not employee's medical condition, a mental disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression, is medically causally related to an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Section 287.120.1 RSMo. In other words, was the taser event occurring February 1, 2004, an accident or traumatic event constituting a substantial factor in causing employee's resulting medical condition or mental disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression.

The administrative law judge denied benefits by applying the provisions of section 287.120.8 RSMo, to conclude that employee did not sustain an injury due to an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.

Employee appeals to the Commission contending that the administrative law judge erred in applying section 287.120.8 RSMo, in determining that employee did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. At the outset the Commission notes that the evidence is uncontroverted that employee suffers from a mental disorder, i.e., post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression.

Section 287.120.8 applies only to claims of mental injury result