Having given careful consideration to the entire record, based upon the above testimony, the competent and substantial evidence presented, and the applicable law of the State of Missouri, I find the following:
Claimant alleges two occupational diseases that arose from his work duties. Section 287.067 RSMo., defines occupational disease as:
. . . an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence."
In cases of alleged occupational disease, the disease must be occupationally induced, rather than an ordinary disease of life. Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 296 (Mo.App.1991) (overruled on other grounds). An occupational disease is not compensable if work is merely "a triggering or precipitating factor". §287.067.2 RSMo. The exposure to the disease must be greater or different from disease exposure to the general public, and there must be a disease/work link common to the specific job or profession. Polavarapu v. General Motors Corp., 897 S.W.2d 63 (Mo.App. 1995). The work must be a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. $\S 287.020 .2$ RSMo. A causative factor may be substantial even if it is not the primary or most significant factor. Cahall v.Cahall, 963 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Mo.App. 1998) (overruled on other grounds). Further, there is no minimum percentage set out in the Workers' Compensation Law defining "substantial factor." Id. Whether employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury is a question of fact. Sanderson v. Porta-Fab Corp., 989 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo.App. 1999) (overruled on other grounds).
Determinations of this kind require the assistance of expert medical testimony. Medical causation not within lay understanding or experience requires expert medical evidence. Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.banc 1994) (overruled on other grounds). The weight to be accorded an expert's testimony should be determined by the testimony as a whole and less than direct statements of reasonable medical certainty will be sufficient. Choate v. Lily Tulip, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 102 (Mo.App. 1991) (overruled on other grounds). Two physicians expressed their opinion regarding whether Claimant's work was a substantial factor in his development of arm and knee injuries. Neither physician was a treating physician, or knew every aspect of Claimant's working day. However, Dr. Cantrell
appears to discount the nature of Claimant's work, and yet assign increased significance to Claimant's recreational activities when reaching the conclusion Claimant's arm complaints are not work related. Claimant does own an ATV, but he purchased it after his arm symptoms began. Claimant's auto repair work may be a factor, but Claimant worked on his car on weekends, as compared to performing his work duties five days a week. Regarding Claimant's knee complaints, Dr. Cantrell interpreted his own x-ray, and found lateral patella tilting, a finding not noted by the radiologist on the March 21, 2005, right knee x-ray, which was performed much closer in time to Claimant's request for treatment.
Claimant's job duties are unique to waste management, and are not of the type the general public would be exposed. I find the opinion of Dr. Cohen to be persuasive, and find Claimant's work duties were a substantial factor in his development of bilateral hand and knee complaints. Claimant has met his burden to demonstrate he sustained occupational diseases that arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment, and that the need for medical treatment is medically causally related to his work duties.
Claimant requests total reimbursement of medical expenses in the amount of $\ 4,196.88. Section 287.140.1 RSMo., provides that an employer shall provide such medical, surgical, chiropractic, ambulance and hospital treatment as may be necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the work injury. Additionally, §287.140.3 RSMo., provides that all medical fees and charges under this section shall be fair and reasonable. A sufficient factual basis exists to award payment of medical expenses when medical bills and supporting medical records are introduced into evidence supported by testimony that the expenses were incurred in connection with treatment of a compensable injury. Martin v. Mid-America Farm Lines, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.banc 1989).
Claimant alleges liability of Employer for: radiology charges in the amount of $\ 44.88; St. Joseph West physician billing in the amount of $\ 882.00; his personal physician's office visits in the amount of $\ 197.00; and a St. Joseph West Hospital bill in the amount of $\ 3.073 .00. Copies of itemized medical bills were presented for the radiology charges, hospital physician billing, and personal physician office visits. These itemized bills were supported by the appropriate medical records, and Claimant's testimony. However, the bill from St. Joseph West Hospital, while showing a date of service of March 21, 2005, is not itemized, and it is impossible to know if the total amount would include treatment unrelated to the work injury. While the document is labeled "THIS IS A BILL," in its presented condition I do not find it a reliable document on which to impose liability. Accordingly, I find Employer liable for $\ 1,123.88 in medical expenses accrued by Claimant in an attempt to cure and relieve the effects of his work related injuries.
Claimant seeks future medical care from Employer to cure and relieve his symptoms. As stated previously, Section 287.140.1 RSMo.(2000), provides that an employer shall provide such medical, surgical, chiropractic, ambulance and hospital treatment as may be necessary to cure and relieve the effects of the workers' injury. I find Employer responsible to provide Claimant with additional medical treatment. I further find Employer is obligated to provide the following treatment: Employer shall select a competent physician(s) and authorize any treatment recommended by the physician(s) regarding Claimant's hands and knees including, but not limited to:
1) any tests and procedures as directed by the authorized treating physician(s)
2) any medications directed by the authorized treating physician(s)
3) any splints, slings, braces or similar devices ordered by the authorized treating physician(s)
4) any necessary surgical procedures ordered by the authorized treating physician(s), including all doctor, hospital, diagnostic and medical costs
5) all post-operative and rehabilitative care as directed by the authorized treating physician(s).
Additionally, Claimant seeks TTD benefits regarding future medical treatment. TTD benefits are intended to cover a period of time from injury until such time as claimant can return to work. Phelps v. Jeff Wolk Construction Co., 803 S.W.2d 641 (Mo.App. 1991) (overruled in part). Pursuant to this award, Claimant will receive medical intervention for his occupational injuries. He will also be entitled to receive TTD benefits to cover the healing period associated with such treatment, if Claimant is unable to work during that period.