| Issued by THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge) |
| Injury No.: 05-029562 |
| Employee: | Ruth Atkins |
| Employer: | Schreiber Foods (Settled) |
| Insurer: | Zurich American Insurance Co. (Settled) |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| Date of Accident: | April 7, 2005 |
| Place and County of Accident: | St. Louis, Missouri |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided bysection 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Pursuant to section 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of the administrative law judge dated November 20, 2007. The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Margaret D. Landolt, issued November 20, 2007, is attached and incorporated by this reference. |
| The Commission further approves and affirms the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable. |
| Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law. |
| Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this _8th_ day of April 2008. |
| LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION |
| William F. Ringer, Chairman |
| Alice A. Bartlett, Member |
| DISSENTING OPINION FILED |
| John J. Hickey, Member |
| Attest: |
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
The administrative law judge erred by substituting her own vocational opinion for the uncontradicted expert vocational evidence provided by Ms. Browning. "[C]ompetent, substantial and undisputed evidence of witnesses who are not shown by the record to have been impeached" may not be disregarded or ignored. Knisley v. Charleswood Corp., 211 S.W.3d 629, 636 (Mo.App. 2007). Since there was no contrary evidence provided, and because Ms. Browning's testimony and report are wholly credible, it is unclear to me why the administrative law judge disregarded this evidence and instead injected her own opinion.
Ms. Browning determined that employee is permanently and totally disabled based on the synergistic effect of the combination of her prior disabilities and the primary injury. Ms. Browning opined that employee could not work as a File Clerk or Customer Service Representative because it was "highly likely that [employee] would have difficulty with continuous use of her hands . . . and use of a computer keyboard . . . secondary to reports of hand cramping after a few minutes of use with paresthesias and numbness and sensitivity to light." The administrative law judge did not find this opinion to be persuasive, making note that some of employee's limitations were based on subjective complaints. The administrative law judge then substituted her own "expert" opinion in place of Ms. Browning's and stated that she did not "believe" employee's hand cramping, numbness and paresthesias would prevent employee from performing sedentary work.
The evidence presented at the hearing shows otherwise. Nothing prohibits
Ms. Browning from considering employee's subjective complaints, especially in light of the fact that those complaints were not contrary to the expert medical evidence. Employee testified credibly that due to her wrist injuries, her hands still go numb, that she can only lift approximately one gallon of milk, and that she is unable to write for extended periods, stir when cooking, or peel potatoes. The administrative law judge does not dispute those findings or directly attack employee's credibility. Without explanation or supporting evidence, she simply stated that she believed employee could perform the job duties of a File Clerk, Customer Service Clerk or Motel Desk Clerk. Such a finding is contrary to the competent and substantial evidence in the record, especially since Ms. Browning's credible and undisputed expert vocation opinion shows that all of those job types would require employee to perform tasks that she is unable to perform due to her disabilities, limitations and restrictions.
Furthermore, even if employee's hand complaints were disregarded as the administrative law judge chose to do, employee is still permanently and totally disabled. Employee's sensitivity to light prevents employee from working jobs requiring the use of a computer monitor. Employee is unable to sit or stand for extended periods due to her prior knee, pelvis and back injuries, which Ms. Browning opined prevented employee from performing work as a File Clerk, Customer Service Clerk or Motel Desk Clerk.
Finally, I also note that the administrative law judge erred in finding that employee turned down offers of work based on the wage offered. Nowhere in the record did employee, or anyone else for that matter, provide evidence that employee was ever offered any work after her primary injury. This finding of fact is simply wrong.
Based on the above, I believe that employee has carried her burden of establishing that she is permanently
and totally disabled based on the synergistic effect of the combination of her prior injuries and her primary work injury of April 7, 2005. Ms. Browning provided expert vocational evidence that based on the combination of employee's physical impairments, restrictions, age, education and training, employee is unemployable in the open labor market. Therefore, employee is permanently and totally disabled. As such, I would reverse the award of the administrative law judge and award employee permanent total disability benefits against the second injury fund.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission to only award employee permanent partial disability benefits.
John J. Hickey, Member