Employer and Insurer's Exhibit F included a Missouri Wage Statement for Claimant. It noted a date of hire of March 26, 2007, a date of accident of April 25, 2007, and an hourly rate on date of accident of $\ 8.25. The Wage Statement showed the following:
| Week Ending | \# of Hrs Worked | Total Gross Wage |
| 1 | 3-31-07 | 32 | 264.00 |
| 2 | 4-07-07 | 16 | 132.00 |
| 3 | 4-14-07 | 32 | 264.00 |
| 4 | 4-21-07 | 40 | 330.00 |
| 5 | 4-28-07 | 24 | 198.01 |
Employee's total gross wages for the four weeks immediately preceding April 25, 2007 were $\ 990.00.
DISCUSSION
ACCIDENT, OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE, MEDICAL CAUSATION
Did Claimant sustain an injury by accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer, and if so, was his injury medically causally related to an accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment?
Section 287.800, RSMo provides in part that administrative law judges shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly and shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
Section 287.808, RSMo provides:
The burden of establishing any affirmative defense is on the employer. The burden of proving an entitlement to compensation under this chapter is on the employee or dependent. In asserting any claim or defense based on a factual proposition, the party asserting such claim or defense must establish that such proposition is more likely to be true than not true.
Section 287.020.2, RSMo provides:
The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.020.3, RSMo provides in part:
- (1) In this chapter the term 'injury' is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. 'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable.
(5) The terms 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body. . .
Section 287.020.10, RSMo provides:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of 'accident', 'occupational disease', 'arising out of', and 'in the course of the employment' to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
Occupational diseases are compensable under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Sections 287.067.1, 2, RSMo. An employee's claim for compensation due to an occupational disease is to be determined under Section 287.067.1, RSMo. It defines occupational disease as:
- In this chapter the term 'occupational disease' is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Section 287.067.2, RSMo provides:
- An injury by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The 'prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
Section 287.067.3, RSMo provides:
An injury due to repetitive motion is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter. An occupational disease due to repetitive motion is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The 'prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.
Section 287.063.1 provides:
An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 8 of section 287.067.
"When construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and to give effect to that intent by giving the words used their plain and ordinary meaning." State ex rel. Nixon v. QuikTrip Corp., 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004).
Claimant must present substantial and competent evidence that he or she has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. The Courts have stated that the determinative inquiry involves two considerations: "(1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort." Polavarapu v. General Motors Corp., 897 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo.App. 1995); Dawson v. Associated Elec., 885 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo.App 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 228; Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo.App 1991); Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo.App 1988); Sellers v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 752 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo.App 1988); Jackson v. Risby Pallet and Lumber Co., 736 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.App. 1987). In proving up a work-related occupational disease, "[a] claimant's medical expert must establish the probability that the disease was caused by conditions in the work place." Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006) (citing Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App. 1991) (quoting Sheehan v. Springfield Seed \& Floral, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 795), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.App. 1987)); Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716. There must be medical evidence of a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease. Coloney v. Accurate Superior Scale Co., 952 S.W.2d 755 (Mo.App. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226; Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716; Sheehan v. Springfield Seed \& Floral, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.App. 1987); Estes v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo.App. 1978). Even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate, a single medical opinion relating the disease to the job is sufficient to support a decision for the employee. Dawson, 885 S.W.2d at 716; Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Mo.App. 1988).
The cause of an employee's medical condition need not be a single traumatic event. An employee may obtain compensation pursuant to The Workers' Compensation Law for gradual and progressive medical conditions which result from repeated or constant exposure to hazards encountered by the employee in the workplace. Smith v. Climate Engineering, 939 S.W.2d 429 (Mo.App. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 227; Rector v. City of Springfield, 820 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App. 1991). Diseases resulting from the chronic traumata of repetitive occupational body movements qualify for compensation if they cause an employee to sustain a loss of earning capacity. Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Company, 481 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo.App. 1972); Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 759 .
Gradual and progressive injuries resulting from repeated exposure to on-the-job hazards is broad enough to now treat compensable aggravations of preexisting diseases or infirmities caused by nonaccidental conditions of employment as either accidents or occupational diseases. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Const. Co., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Mo.App. 1999); Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 436. Aggravation of a preexisting disease or infirmity caused by nonaccidental conditions of employment is compensable as either an accident or as an occupational disease. Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 436.
In claims for compensation for medical conditions associated with repetitive activities, a claimant must prove: 1) the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; 2) causation from jobrelated activities; and 3) nature and extent of disability. Kintz v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Mo.App. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 228. Manipulations and flexions, iterated and reiterated within a concentrated time, are unusual conditions,
and if they inhere in an employment task being performed by an employee, they expose the employee who performs them to a risk not shared by the public generally and to which the employee would not have been exposed outside of employment, and thus qualify for compensation pursuant to The Law. Collins, 481 S.W.2d at 555.
Missouri courts have interpreted section 287.063, RSMo to provide that an employee with an occupational disease is "injured" within the meaning of the section 287.120, RSMo when the disease causes a "compensable injury." Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 759, citing Hinton v. National Lock Corp., 879 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo.App. 1994) (citing Prater v. Thorngate, Ltd., 761 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo.App. 1988)). The "injury" requirement of the Act necessitates that the employee's "injury" create a harm that tangibly affects the employee's earning ability. Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 763; Johnson v. Denton Constr. Co., 911 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Mo. banc 1995). Requiring that the harm tangibly affect the employee's earning ability upholds the intent of the legislature in enacting the Worker's Compensation Act which was to provide indemnity for loss of earning power and disability to work and not for pain, suffering, or mere physical ailment. Coloney, 952 S.W.2d at 760.
The quantum of proof is reasonable probability. Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Downing v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo.App. 1995), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 227; Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Mo.App. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 230. "Probable means founded on reason and experience which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room to doubt." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 620; Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App 1986); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 198. Such proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence. It may not rest on speculation. Griggs v. A. B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo.App. 1974). Expert testimony may be required where there are complicated medical issues. Goleman v. MCI Transporters, 844 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo.App. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229. "Medical causation of injuries which are not within common knowledge or experience, must be established by scientific or medical evidence showing the cause and effect relationship between the complained of condition and the asserted cause." Thorsen, 52 S.W.3d at 618; Brundige v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 812 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo.App 1991).
Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co. Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo.App. 1999); Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229; Hutchinson v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Mo.App. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 231. The Commission's decision will generally be upheld if it is consistent with either of two conflicting medical opinions. Smith v. Donco Const., 182 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Mo.App. 2006). The acceptance or rejection of medical evidence is for the Commission. Smith, 182 S.W.3d at 701; Bowers v. Hiland Dairy Co., 132 S.W.3d 260, 263 (Mo.App. 2004). The testimony of Claimant or other lay witnesses as to facts within the realm of lay understanding can constitute substantial evidence of the nature, cause, and extent of disability when taken in connection with or where supported by some medical evidence. Pruteanu v. Electro Core, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Mo.App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229; Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo.App 1992); Fischer, 793 S.W.2d at 199. The trier of facts may also disbelieve the testimony of a witness even if no
contradictory or impeaching testimony appears. Hutchinson, 721 S.W.2d at 161-2; Barrett v. Bentzinger Brothers, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.App. 1980), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 231. The testimony of the employee may be believed or disbelieved even if uncontradicted. Weeks v. Maple Lawn Nursing Home, 848 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo.App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229.
A preexisting but non-disabling condition does not bar recovery of compensation if a jobrelated injury causes the pre-existing condition to "escalate to the level of disability." Higgins v. Quaker Oats Co., 183 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Mo.App. 2005); Avery v. City of Columbia, 966 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Mo. App .1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226; Miller v. Wefelmeyer, 890 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Mo.App. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 228. An employer is liable for any aggravation of a preexisting asymptomatic condition caused by the primary injury. Gennari v. Norwood Hills Corporation, 322 S.W.2d 718, 722-23 (Mo. 1959); Miller, 890 S.W.2d at 376; Weinbauer v. Grey Eagle Distributors, 661 S.W.2d 652 (Mo.App. 1983). It is sufficient to show only that the performance of usual and customary duties led to a breakdown or change in pathology. Winsor v. Lee Johnson Const. Co., 950 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo.App. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 226; Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 434; Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Mo. banc 1983). The Court noted in Winsor at 509: "Dr. Weed testified that there was an exacerbation of Winsor's previous back injury by virtue of the August 11th incident. 'Exacerbation,' whether used in medical parlance or everyday conversation, means the same thing: an 'increase in the severity of a disease or any of its symptoms,' Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 589 (28th ed.1994), an 'intensification or aggravation, as of a disease, pain, etc.'"
The worsening of a preexisting condition, i.e., an increase in the severity of the condition, or an intensification or aggravation thereof, is a "change in pathology." Winsor, 950 S.W.2d at 509; Rector v. City of Springfield, 820 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Mo.App. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 229. "If substantial evidence exists from which the Commission could determine that Claimant's preexisting condition did not constitute an impediment to performance of Claimant's duties, there is sufficient competent evidence to warrant a finding that Claimant's condition was aggravated by a work-related injury." Avery, 966 S.W.2d at 322; Miller, 890 S.W.2d at 376.
This case is governed by the provisions of the 2005 amendments to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Claimant needs to prove that work was the prevailing factor in causing his injury and disability. Based on all of the evidence and the application of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find that Claimant has met his burden to prove that his repetitive work for Employer on April 25, 2007 was the prevailing factor in causing his neck, left upper extremity, left shoulder, and left hand injury, and the resulting disability, and the need for further medical treatment. I find that Claimant sustained a compensable occupational disease from repetitive motion on his last day of work with Employer on April 25, 2007. I find that Claimant was exposed to a risk that was greater than and different from that which affects the public generally. He was engaged in numerous repetitive lifting tasks. I find that Dr. Van Ryn's conclusions are credible and prove the probability that Claimant sustained an occupational disease from repetitive motion that was caused by conditions in Claimant's workplace. Additionally, I find the opinions and conclusions of Dr. Jacques Van Ryn and Dr. Craig Newland regarding causation and need for future medical care to be more credible than the conclusions of Dr. Christopher Main.
Claimant testified that on April 25, 2007, he was working at the Perfect Binder loading the collator with books that weighed approximately 5 to $51 / 2$ pounds each. Claimant testified that he was lifting two of these books at a time and that his goal was to load approximately 3,000 books per hour with the help of a co-worker. As a result, Claimant's job was to lift and manipulate 1,500 books per hour. Claimant testified that after performing this task for two to three hours, he developed pain in his left shoulder and left arm. He also developed problems with numbness in his left hand as well as his hand turning blue. Claimant's symptoms became so severe that he had to stop work and tell his supervisor.
Claimant's direct Supervisor, John Koehl, testified that the production goal for the Perfect Binder was 3,000 books per hour for the type of book that Claimant was handling on the date of the injury. Mr. Koehl testified that on the date of injury, the Perfect Binder processed 3,088 books that weighed over 8,000 pounds during the two hours ten minutes that Claimant worked on that machine on April 25, 2007.
Additionally, the testimony of Claimant and Mr. Koehl, and the photographs in Employer/Insurer's Exhibit J, demonstrated that Claimant moved the books from a cart onto the binder machine, and was frequently required to lift them to the height of his shoulder. These repetitive activities are consistent with the descriptions provided to the various medical care providers, including Dr. Jacques Van Ryn. These activities are determined to be repetitive enough to cause the injuries sustained by Claimant.
Employer/Insurer asserts that Claimant's current condition is causally related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 2004. However, I find that its position is not convincingly supported by the medical records or the testimony. I find that Claimant's neck and left upper extremity injury arose out of and in the course of his employment for Employer on April 25, 2007, and that his work for Employer on April 25, 2007 was the prevailing factor in causing his resulting medical condition and disability.
The evidence demonstrates that Claimant's motor vehicle accident in May 2004 resulted in injury to his right shoulder, right bicep, left clavicle and face. His left clavicle required surgical repair and the implantation of a metal plate and screws. After his recovery in September of 2004, Claimant sought no further medical care until April 25, 2007, the date of injury in this case. Claimant continued to have occasional aches at the clavicle site, but had no problems with or treatment of his left shoulder, left arm, and left hand.
The treatment records relating to the motor vehicle accident do not reveal treatment for or complaints of numbness or tingling in any of the fingers of his left hand.
However, on April 25, 2007, after working over two hours on the Perfect Binder, Claimant developed severe problems down his left shoulder, left arm, and into his left hand. Claimant was noted to have numbness and tingling in his left hand. These problems have persisted up and until the time of the December 20, 2007 hearing. Claimant's symptoms became so severe on April 25, 2007 that he had to stop work and advise his Supervisor. Claimant's Supervisor, John Koehl, testified that he witnessed Claimant earlier in the day and noted that Claimant was able to perform his work activities and had no problems with his shoulder or arm. However, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Claimant advised Koehl that he was in severe pain and had a knot on his shoulder. Koehl noted that Claimant appeared to be in pain to such extent that Koehl brought him to James Payden. Mr. Payden testified that when Claimant
appeared in his office, he was holding his arm in a fixed position across his body. The symptoms were of such severity that Payden immediately sent Claimant to Dr. Concepcion-Rivera.
Dr. Concepcion-Rivera noted that Claimant was having moderate to severe pain that was exacerbated by any movement. Moreover, the doctor noted that Claimant had a discoloration of his arm from the shoulder to the hand. At that time, the doctor recommended X-rays of the left shoulder as well as a CT scan. Dr. Concepcion-Rivera instructed Claimant not to return to work until further notice. Although Dr. Concepcion-Rivera had seen what she believed to be two loose screws at the clavicle site, a radiological examination confirmed that the screws and plate used to stabilize the fracture were in satisfactory position. There was no indication of any misplacement or loosening of these screws.
Moreover, Dr. Newland examined Claimant on April 26, 2007. Dr. Newland noted that Claimant was having pain and popping in the arm with a bluish appearance to the arm that began thereafter. Dr. Newland reviewed the recent X-rays and compared them to those in 2004 and confirmed that the left shoulder showed a healed clavicle fracture with the internal fixation device in satisfactory alignment. Dr. Newland stated that the mechanism of injury was not one of acute trauma, but rather lifting repeatedly. He also stated that there was no demonstrable relatedness to Claimant's previous clavicle fracture. Dr. Newland's opinion on this matter is given significant weight given the fact that Dr. Newland had also surgically repaired the clavicle and treated Claimant's condition following the motor vehicle accident in 2004.
In spite of the medical opinion from Dr. Newland as well as an X-ray finding verifying that the clavicle fracture was not the cause of Claimant's symptoms, Dr. Christopher Main came to an opposite conclusion. Dr. Main concluded that Claimant had thoracic outlet syndrome as well as a mild malunion of the left clavicle and left shoulder dyskinesia. Dr. Main concluded that he felt that these conditions were related to the past motor vehicle accident and not to Claimant's work activities. Dr. Main's opinion and deposition testimony fails to explain why Claimant was able to go from September 2004 until April of 2007 with no treatment and no symptoms down his left shoulder, left arm, and left hand until performing the work activities.
Dr. Main concluded that Claimant's conditions were related to the motor vehicle accident, yet Insurer authorized the physical therapy, provided a neurological consult, and paid temporary total disability until September 20, 2007. When Claimant was sent by Employer to Dr. Timothy Hodges on June 8, 2007, Dr. Hodges concluded that Claimant had a neurological component of thoracic outlet syndrome that was likely based on the fracture of the clavicle, body habitus changes with additional growth over the past few years as well as possibly some exertion. Dr. Hodges admitted that Claimant's condition may have been exacerbated by his work activities on the date of accident. Dr. Hodges failed to explain how Claimant could have continued to perform work activities from September of 2004 up through April 25, 2007 without requiring further medical attention or without problems or pain down his left shoulder, left arm, and left hand until after the lifting work for Employer on April 25, 2007.
The opinions of Dr. Main and Dr. Hodges were refuted by Dr. Van Ryn. Dr. Van Ryn noted in his deposition and report that Claimant's symptoms were not coming from the clavicle fracture but instead were coming from the shoulder, neck, and hand. Dr. Van Ryn diagnosed Claimant as having a chronic subluxation of the rib articulations that was seen in his X-ray. Dr. Main admitted that his X-rays did not go as high to show the rib articulations.
In addition, Dr. Van Ryn noted that Claimant had bursitis at the scapulothoracic region. The doctor confirmed this by noting the crepitus within the shoulder. Moreover, Dr. Van Ryn noted that Claimant had intensely positive findings of the Tinel's at the left cubital tunnel and left ulnar tunnel. The doctor concluded that this confirmed the diagnosis of left cubital tunnel and would explain Claimant's left handed symptoms. Dr. Van Ryn also noted that Claimant could have possible left cervical radiculopathy but needed further testing to verify this condition as well as possible thoracic outlet syndrome that would come in the form of a brachial plexopathy.
In the present case, Claimant testified that following the 2004 motor vehicle accident, his symptoms were to the front portion of his chest at the site of his clavicle. Claimant testified that although he had limitations in lifting his left arm overhead, he had no severe symptoms when performing his work activities until after the work injury. Additionally, Claimant testified that while he had occasional aching at the clavicle fracture site, he only took occasional Tylenol and received no treatment after September of 2004. Claimant noted that following his lifting activities with the Employer on April 25, 2007, he developed severe pain in his left shoulder. Claimant noted that those symptoms were at the bend at the top of the shoulder and not at the front portion of the collar bone where the clavicle had previously been fractured. Additionally, Claimant noted that for the first time, he had problems with his hand going numb as well as pain going down the backside of his arm into his hand. Claimant noted that following the motor vehicle accident in 2004, he had no such symptoms, and all of these problems were new following the lifting of over 8,000 pounds of books over two hours for Employer on April 25, 2007.
Employer/Insurer argue that Dr. Van Ryn's opinion with regard to medical causation should be discounted and discarded because he based his opinion on incorrect numbers and weights of books moved by Claimant. Employer/Insurer argues that the evidence revealed that there was not adequate exposure at Employer on April 25, 2007 to cause Claimant to develop the diagnoses. Employer/Insurer further argued that those conditions developed over a period of time following Claimant's 2004 accident and its resulting injuries. I disagree. I find that Claimant's repetitive lifting on April 25, 2007 was adequate exposure to cause his injury, and that Dr. Van Ryn's opinion with regard to causation is credible even though Claimant's description of the extent of his exposure to the repetitive lifting to Dr. Van Ryn was inflated. Claimant first reported his injury on April 25, 2007. He had new complaints of pain, numbness and tingling, and bluish color in his left upper extremity. He was diagnosed with an injury by Dr. Concepcion-Rivera and referred to Dr. Newland who examined him on April 26, 2007 and stated that the mechanism was not one of an acute trauma, but rather lifting repeatedly. Dr. Newland stated that there was no demonstrable relatedness to his previous clavicle fracture. Claimant was a very thin man without a high degree of muscularity. Dr. Van Ryn noted that someone without a high degree of muscularity will fatigue his or her muscles earlier and be more likely to sustain injury in a heavy work environment. Dr. Van Ryn noted that the work activities that Claimant did on April 25, 2007 exceeded his body's capabilities to withstand that kind of work and he broke down.
Dr. Van Ryn noted in his deposition that the work that Claimant did for Employer on April 25, 2007, in which he had to increase the weight and rapidly increase the repetitive nature of taking the books to the collating machine to the pallets, was the prevailing factor that caused his diagnoses. Dr. Van Ryn stated that the things that caused him to believe that Claimant's current symptoms and condition were work related was the description of the work history on that date-a significant increase in the frequency while doing a fairly heavy lifting. He also noted how Claimant had to lift the books to
various heights on the pallet, and then go up to shoulder height to do the stacking. He noted that required a lot of extension, rotation of both the neck, the muscles connected from the neck to the shoulder blade, the muscles connecting the shoulder blade to the rib. He found the activities that day, and a change from his normal activities, to be consistent with producing the diagnoses he had made. Second, was Claimant's history of having had other significant injury in the past and being able to rehabilitate. Then there was a work history that Claimant had been at the book bindery, although a different job, in 2006 and had been able to do that job for several months. Then there was the positive Spurling's maneuver which he found to be a very specific test for nerve irritation from the neck. Objective findings were scapulothoracic bursitis and the consistency of Claimant's pain in the rib cage, which correlated to the mechanism of injury and created the diagnosis of costovertebral syndrome. Also included was the Tinel's in the hand and elbow which indicated significant irritation of the ulnar nerve. I find these opinions of Dr. Van Ryn to be credible.
Employer/Insurer's counsel asserts in her post-trial Proposed Decision that Claimant's injury is the result of an idiopathic condition and is not compensable pursuant to the provisions of Section 287.020.3(3), RSMo. I disagree and find that the evidence does not support Employer/Insurer's position. An idiopathic condition is a condition that is "innate or peculiar" to claimant. Kasl. v. Bristol Care, Inc. 984 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Mo.banc 1999). I find that the evidence proves a known cause of Claimant's injury-the repetitive lifting he did on April 25, 2007. I find that Claimant's injury was not due to an innate or peculiar condition.
Claimant has proven that he suffered a new injury on April 25, 2007. Claimant's testimony and the medical records confirm that in the years leading up to the work injury, he was receiving no active medical treatment and had no problems relating to his neck, left shoulder, left arm, and left hand. Additionally, Claimant had no numbness or tingling down the left hand until following this work injury. Claimant has proven that it was the repetitive work activity for Employer on April 25, 2007 that led to his current condition and, therefore, he has a compensable work injury under the Workers' Compensation Law.
Based on the foregoing, and the application of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I find that the credible evidence has established that Claimant sustained an injury to his neck and left upper extremity arising out of and in the course of his employment for Employer which resulted from repetitive motion exposure to hazards encountered by Claimant in Employer's workplace. I find that Claimant's occupational exposure to repetitive motion while working for Employer on April 25, 2007 was the prevailing factor in causing his injury, his resulting disability, and the need for medical treatment.