Section 287.230.1, RSMo Cum Supp. 2005, provides that upon the death of an employee due to causes unrelated to a work injury, any "accrued and unpaid compensation due the employee shall be paid to his dependents without administration..." Claimant argues that an employee has the right to terminate treatment pursuant to § 287.140.5, RSMo. And if that termination is reasonable, as opined by Dr. Paff, permanent partial disability can be affixed. While I am not unsympathetic to Claimant's position, based on the cases decided to date, I conclude the law precludes an award in her favor.
The General Assembly has defined permanent partial disability as "disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree." § 287.190.6(1), RSMo. The permanent nature of an injury must be shown to a reasonable certainty and such proof of permanent disability "may not rest on surmise and speculation." Sanders v. St. Clair Corp., 943 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. banc 2003). An employer's liability for permanent partial disability is not affected by the death of the employee, "so far as the liability has accrued and become payable at the time of the death." § 287.230, RSMo. Claimant has the burden of proving all elements of the claim, including accrual of permanent partial disability. Cardwell v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). In this case Claimant has failed to meet that burden of proof.
In Sanders v. St. Clair Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 12, an employee's dependents sought permanent partial disability after the employee died from cancer unrelated to the work injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's holding that the claimant had not sufficiently met the burden of proving the nature and extent of disability. The claimant offered medical evidence, but the Commission deemed the evidence insufficient because one doctor had given no opinion about permanency of disability, another testified that the claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement, and a third doctor's opinion was based on an assumption of improvement if the claimant had not suffered from cancer. Because "Missouri courts have routinely required that the permanent nature of an injury be shown to a reasonable certainty, and that such proof may not rest on surmise and speculation," any permanent partial disability award would have been inappropriate for the "lack of requisite proof." 943 S.W. 2d at 16. The holding in
Sanders was limited to the factually inadequate proof presented in that particular case and not based on whether maximum medical improvement must be reached for permanent partial disability to accrue as a matter of law.
The Commission decision in Gregg Allen Peery v. Mid Continent Industrial, Injury No.: 04-084324, 2008 WL 541376 (Mo. Lab. Ind. Rel. Com. February 25, 2008), is instructive on this issue. In Peery, the injured employee died before reaching maximum medical improvement. A doctor gave an estimate of the employee's permanent partial disability rating based on the employee's condition at death rather than on the employee's residual permanent disability after the completion of the healing period. The Commission held that the rating rested on surmise and speculation and thus the claimant failed to prove permanent partial disability to a reasonable degree of certainty. Like the appellate court in Sanders, the Commission in Peery noted that its decision was based on the particular evidence of the case and not a determination that maximum medical improvement must be reached for permanent partial disability to accrue as a matter of law, leaving that question open.
The question left open in Sanders and Peery was answered in Cardwell v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). In Cardwell, the Court of Appeals affirmed a Commission decision precluding payment of permanent partial disability benefits until maximum medical improvement was reached. The Cardwell Court acknowledged that "maximum medical improvement" is not a phrase used in the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Nevertheless, many cases used maximum medical improvement as the standard for determination of the accrual of permanent partial disability benefits, citing Soard v. Town \& Country Supermarkets, 193 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006), and Lorenz v. Sweetheart Cup Co., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001). According to the Court, there is an intended timing of benefits paid by employers - permanent partial disability is to be awarded "[a]fter reaching the point where no further progress is expected." 249 S.W.3d at 910. Maximum medical improvement is one of several terms Courts have used to describe that point. Thus, permanent partial disability does not accrue until an injury "will no longer improve with medical treatment." 249 S.W.3d at 910. In other words, Claimant must reach maximum medical improvement before Employer is liable for permanent partial disability compensation.
Claimant offered the medical report of Dr. Victoria Kubik pursuant to § 287.210 RSMo. Dr. Kubik treated employee's left wrist injury. Employee was last seen by Dr. Kubik on June 11, 2007. At that time, Dr. Kubik recommended arthroscopic surgery for debridement and/or repair of employee's triangular fibrocartilage complex tear. Because employee died of cancer the next month, the surgery was never undertaken. Nonetheless, in a July 19, 2007 letter to Claimant's widow, Dr. Kubik assessed a permanent partial disability rating. According to Dr. Kubik, she would "estimate that [employee's] impairment of [the wrist] was approximately 25 %." (Exhibit E, emphasis added).
Dr. Kubik's report cannot sustain a finding of Permanent Partial Disability because she did not find Claimant at maximum medical improvement. Rather, she recommended further surgery. Employee had not reached a point where his injury "will no longer improve with medical treatment," as required by Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 910, for permanent partial disability to accrue. Furthermore, Dr. Kubik was only able to offer an estimation of permanent disability. Under Sanders, a mere estimation is insufficient because disability cannot be established by surmise or speculation, but must be proven to a reasonable certainty. 943 S.W.2d at 16. Because further treatment was never provided, it can only be speculated as to how Employee's injury would have progressed had treatment continued and the healing period been completed. Employee could have had a fantastic or a disastrous result from surgery, leading to minimal disability or great disability. Dr. Kubik's report is insufficient to carry Claimant's burden of proof because Dr. Kubik clearly did not find Employee at maximum medical improvement.
Like Dr. Kubik's rating, Dr. Paff's rating is based on speculation as to Employee's condition following proper treatment. Such a rating is inherently based on surmise and speculation as specifically admitted by Dr. Paff. Dr. Paff clearly assumed an outcome from treatment then speculated as to residual disability. However, it could not be known what condition employee would have been in after he had reached a point where his injury "will no longer improve with medical treatment," as required by Cardwell, 249 S.W.3d at 910, for permanent partial disability to accrue. Dr. Paff testified Employee "could have had treatment for it [his medical conditions] that might have made him better." (Ex. O., p. 33). Thus, Dr. Paff's report is also insufficient to meet Claimant's burden of proof.