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Ronald Kliethermes v. ABB Power T & D

Decision date: February 24, 200916 pages

Summary

The Missouri LIRC reversed the administrative law judge's prior denial and awarded benefits to Ronald Kliethermes for heart arrhythmias (atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter) worsened by an on-the-job electrical shock. The court found that the employee established a substantial causal connection between the electrical shock and the need for pacemaker implantation, constituting a compensable change in pathology.

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Caption

Issued by THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (After Mandate from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri)
Injury No.: 00-128224
Employee:Ronald Kliethermes
Employer:ABB Power T & D
Insurer:Pacific Employers Insurance Company
Additional Party:Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund
Preliminaries
On June 17, 2008, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District issued an opinion reversing the February 10, 2006, award and decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission).Kliethermes v. ABB Power T&D, 264 S.W.3d 626 (Mo. App. 2008) (WD66700) (June 17, 2008). By mandate dated October 31, 2008, the Court remanded this matter to the Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Court.Pursuant to the Court’s mandate, we issue this award. Having reviewed the evidence and considered the whole record in light of the opinion of the Court, we reverse the June 13, 2005, award of the administrative law judge and award benefits. The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Robert J. Dierkes is attached and incorporated to the extent it is not inconsistent with our findings, conclusions, decision, and award herein.
Causation
The administrative law judge concluded that employee failed to carry his burden of proving the electrical shock employee suffered at work was a substantial factor in causing his current heart problems. We disagree. Employee had preexisting arrhythmias (heartbeat irregularities), to wit: atrial fibrillation and atrial flutter. Before the electrical shock, employee experienced infrequent minor episodes of arrhythmia. After the electrical shock, employee experienced much more frequent episodes of arrhythmia such that he required the implantation of a pacemaker to control the arrhythmia and he is unable to work.Under Missouri law, it is well-settled that the claimant bears the burden of proving all the essential elements of a workers' compensation claim, including the causal connection between the accident and the injury. While the claimant is not required to prove the elements of his claim on the basis of "absolute certainty," he must at least establish the existence of those elements by "reasonable probability." Furthermore, the element of causation must be proven by medical testimony, "without which a finding for claimant would be based on mere conjecture and speculation and not on substantial evidence."
Shelton v. City of Springfield, 130 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Mo. App. 2004) (citations omitted).The law in effect at the time employee received the electrical shock dictated that, "[w]here the performance of the usual and customary duties of an employee leads to physical breakdown or a change in pathology, the

injury is compensable." Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Mo. 1983). "[T]he worsening of a preexisting condition is a 'change in pathology.'" Winsor v. Lee Johnson Constr. Co., 950 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Mo.App. 1997) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. banc 2003).

The evidence in this case establishes that employee sustained a change in pathology as a result of the electrical shock. Because we are guided by the thorough analysis and recitation of the evidence set forth by the Court, we adopt the following as part our findings and reasoning:

There is obvious medical significance to the "temporal proximity" of claimant's disability as related to the accident. See, e.g., Cochran v. Indus. Fuels \& Res., Inc., 995 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Mo. App. 1999). Dr. Schuman acknowledged that if there were atrial fibrillation "in close proximity" to the injury (by which he apparently meant sooner than six weeks), it would indicate a causal connection. Dr. Schuman, however, was inconsistent in indicating whether he knew that the claimant experienced atrial fibrillation between the date of the shock and the hospitalization six weeks later on December 18, 2000. In his deposition, introduced at the hearing, he seemed to be unaware of the documented reports of fibrillation, but in his earlier written report, he acknowledged that early fibrillation was reported in the medical records he reviewed. It seems that, regardless of the data, he had in his head the idea that the claimant had little or no difficulty until the December 18 hospitalization. That conclusion is distant from reality, as shown by the medical records. One can reach such a conclusion only by ignoring or disbelieving (without warrant) the claimant's reported history and medical visits to Dr. Cooper and Dr. Kanagawa following the injury

The claimant, who was active and able to work without difficulty before the shock, has never, since the shock, recovered the energy, conditioning, and endurance he enjoyed before the shock. There is no dispute about the fact that the claimant could not successfully perform even one day of work after the shock. After two days of stoically and unsuccessfully attempting to perform at work, he saw the company physician, Dr. Cooper, who put him on medical leave from work. He has never been medically allowed to return to work at ABB.

Dr. Schuman admitted he never heard of anyone with mild atrial fibrillation deteriorating so rapidly. And when he says "so rapidly," he is apparently referring to the period between the November 9 injury and the December 18 hospitalization, not the virtually immediate deterioration which was actually shown to be the case. Again, Dr. Schuman seems in denial of the fact that the claimant began experiencing difficulty controlling the fibrillation and fatigue promptly, if not immediately, after the electrical shock and was unable to work. Dr. Schuman seems to forget that the claimant's abnormal EKG at the hospital, while not so abnormal as to show physical damage to the heart muscle, was consistent with the occurrence of atrial fibrillation. ...Dr. Schuman clearly agreed with the concept that a shock could redirect the electrical pathways and that such a physical event in the heart would not show up on objective measurements. The fact that Dr. Kanagawa, an experienced cardiologist, described something in "layman's terms" does not mean he lacked professionalism or was engaging in a "layman's suspicion" and was not scientific.

...Dr. Kanagawa did not at first conclude there was a causal relationship. He did not jump to such a conclusion. He at first assumed the atrial fibrillation in the late fall of 2000 would be temporary. He also, like

Dr. Pierce and Dr. Cooper, was aware that it would be difficult to show through objective measurement that the increased atrial fibrillation resulted from the electrical shock. But Dr. Cooper and Dr. Pierce both thought that the electrical injury had caused cardiac complications.

Continued study of the matter by Dr. Kanagawa, and the continued inability to control the fibrillation, convinced the doctor that there was such a marked and severe deterioration from the prior mild condition to the current state that it only made sense medically that the electrical shock must have caused a recycling of the electrical pathways, which in turn produced the extremely rapid deterioration. This appears to have

involved a judgment that physicians are often called on to make in considering a history reported by a claimant. For example, both Dr. Cooper and Dr. Pierce exercised such a judgment, believing there was a connection between the injury and the current disabling condition of the claimant. Dr. Kanagawa and the others certainly did consider the "temporal proximity," but not without good scientific reason.

Dr. Schuman also acknowledged that an electrical shock could produce such a result. Dr. Schuman, however, by ignoring some of the data, ended up with an essentially irrational explanation for how the claimant's condition declined. He said it could be natural deterioration, and yet he had never seen or even heard of such a rapid major natural deterioration. He had no explanation for how (even if he ignores the early fibrillation), the claimant could go, in less than two months, from a very stable condition to an "uncontrolled," and "severe," (using Dr. Schuman's own terminology) condition. Although his disease would have progressed naturally as a part of the aging process, there is no reason to believe that, absent the electrical injury, he would have gone precipitously from being stable and active at 57 years of age to being significantly disabled at 57 years of age very promptly after the injury, with neither medication, ablation, nor a pacemaker being sufficient to deliver him from disability.

There is no hint that the claimant is a malingerer. The record speaks loudly that he was an energetic fiftyseven year old who loved being active and pursuing a healthy lifestyle. He did have heart disease, including electrical conduction disease, but it was entirely non-disabling, and the claimant evidently did everything he consciously could to keep it stable. His attempt to return to work four days after the injury was, in keeping with his apparently hardy psychological make-up, more likely an exercise in hopeful stoicism than in realism.

Dr. Pierce, the electro-physiologist (of all the physicians, the one with the most experience and specialized knowledge in rhythm disease), who acknowledged that although the causal relation was difficult to prove, concluded that, because the atrial fibrillation could no longer be controlled with medication: "The patient has continued to suffer greatly increased palpitations and recurrent atrial fibrillation since his electrical shock and with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, I would conclude the increase in atrial fibrillation is related to his shock." To the extent that Dr. Kanagawa is non-scientific because he expresses an opinion without having an imaging study comparing the heart functioning before and after the injury, surely Dr. Pierce was also presumably non-scientific in reaching his view (as was Dr. Cooper, who also expressed belief that the shock caused "cardiac complications").

[A]fter three years of finding the atrial fibrillation to be uncontrollable and severe, after failed experimentation with different medications, after ablation, and after the installation of a pacemaker, [the treating doctors] could not deny the obvious, though they had no imaging studies that would demonstrate the change visually: the electrical shock must have caused a recycling of the electrical pathways of the heart and that is what so drastically altered the claimant's condition. There was no other medically plausible explanation.

Dr. Schuman offered no plausible countervailing theory that would explain the data. Yes, he said, it could have been only the natural progression of the disease; but no, he had never heard of such a drastic natural progression of disease in such a short time. In short, he lacked an opinion based on reasonable medical certainty that would adequately explain the data...

We find the opinions of the treating doctors to be more credible than that of Dr. Schuman.

Based upon the opinions of Dr. Kanagawa and Dr. Pierce, we find employee has carried his burden of establishing that the electric shock he sustained on November 11, 2000, was a substantial factor in causing the exacerbation of his non-disabling heart condition to the level of a permanent disability. We reverse the

award of the administrative law judge and award compensation.

Permanent total disability

On February 5, 2002, Dr. Pierce offered his limitations on employee's physical activities. He believed employee would be unable to perform electrical work because of his pacemaker. Dr. Pierce believes employee has a psychological intolerance to work

Full decision text continues in the plain-text archive copy.

Related Decisions

affirmed

The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision denying workers' compensation benefits to Ronald Kliethermes for heart conditions allegedly caused by an electrical shock sustained on November 9, 2000. The Commission found that medical evidence did not establish that the electrical shock was a substantial factor in causing the employee's heart conditions, and that the employee did not sustain compensable injury or permanent disability from the accident.

electrical shock4,450 words