Section 287.020.7 RSMo. provides as follows: The term "total disability" as used in this chapter shall mean the inability to return to any employment and not merely mean inability to return to the employment in which the
employee was engaged at the time of the accident.
The phrase "the inability to return to any employment" has been interpreted as the inability of the employee to perform the usual duties of the employment under consideration, in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such employment. Kowalski v. M-G Metals and Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919, 922(Mo.App.1992). The test for permanent total disability is whether, given the employee's situation and condition, he or she is competent to compete in the open labor market. Reiner v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 363, 367(Mo.App.1992). Total disability means the "inability to return to any reasonable or normal employment". Brown v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 483(Mo.App.1990). An injured employee is not required, however, to be completely inactive or inert in order to be totally disabled. Id. The key is whether any employer in the usual course of business would be reasonably expected to hire the employee in that person's physical condition, reasonably expecting the employee to perform the work for which he or she is hired. Reiner at 365. See also Thornton v. Haas Bakery, 858 S.W.2d 831,834(Mo.App.1993).
The test for finding the Second Injury Fund liable for permanent total disability is set forth in Section 287.220.1 RSMo., as follows:
If the previous disability or disabilities, whether from compensable injuries or otherwise, and the last injury together result in permanent total disability, the minimum standards under this subsection for a body as a whole injury or a major extremity shall not apply and the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the disability resulting from the last injury considered alone and of itself; except that if the compensation for which the employee at the time of the last injury is liable is less than compensation provided in this chapter for permanent total disability, then in addition to the compensation for which the employer is liable and after the completion of payment of the compensation by the employer, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for permanent total disability under Section 287.200 out of a special fund known as the "Second Injury Fund" hereby created exclusively for the purposes as in this section provided and for special weekly benefits in rehabilitation cases as provided in Section 287.414 .
In general, the issues that are to be determined in this case are:
- Whether the employee had any disabilities that preexisted September 9, 2004 that were of such a hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment that meet what is called "threshold" and combine with the disability created by the September 9, 2004 shoulder accident to create Second Injury Fund liability for permanent partial disability, or 2. Whether the employee had any disabilities that preexisted the September 9, 2004 accident that combine with the disabilities from that accident that create such an obstacle to employment or reemployment that the employee is not competent to compete and is unemployable in the open labor such that no employer would be likely to hire her justifying Second Injury Fund liability for permanent total disability.
The resolution of those legal issues mainly focuses on several blocks of evidence:
- The testimony of the employee.
- The medical records of Dr. Shaw that predated the accident.
- The testimony of Dr. Bernstein.
- The testimony of Dr. Hughes.
The overall testimony of Dr. Berkin is less critical as he adopts the opinions of Dr. Bernstein in formulating his opinions. Obviously, if the opinions of Dr. Bernstein are not found to be credible, per se the opinions of Dr. Berkin would be found to lack credibility.
The record is clear that there are no physical injuries or disabilities that preexisted September 9, 2004 that generate Second Injury Fund liability. The only matters that are in evidence are the employee's prior knee surgeries and she testified and the record shows that she recovered fully from those injuries. Any Second Injury Fund liability therefore focuses on any psychiatric/psychological disabilities that the employee may have had, the extent of those disabilities and when any such disabilities started or existed.
In general the employee testified that she had stress and anxiety problems as far back as 1998-1999 that affected her
ability to work. She testified that she started seeing Dr. Radmanesh and Dr. Shaw in about 1999 for what she referred to as emotional issues and anxiety/panic attacks. There are no records from Dr. Radmanesh in evidence covering this time period, nor did Dr. Radmanesh testify by deposition. The employee also testified that she worked for at least five employers during that period and that she had no physical limitations or restrictions of any kind that were placed on her by any doctor. She also testified that she had no work restrictions that were placed on her by any doctor for anxiety or stress problems. She also testified and the record documents that she was not hospitalized for any emotional/anxiety/stress/psychiatric/psycho-logical problems prior to September 9, 2004. Despite this information, the employee testified that she had "problems" that caused her to have difficulty doing her job and in fact at least on one occasion caused her not to work for a couple of months due to stress. The employee also testified that she cannot presently work due to a combination of her physical and mental problems.
Other than the employee's testimony, the only medical evidence that was presented that documents the employee's medical care prior to September 9, 2004 are the records contained in Employee's Exhibit B which generally contains the records of Dr. Shaw. It is Dr. Shaw's records that were reviewed by Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Hughes and which formed part of the basis for their professional opinions.
The Court carefully reviewed Dr. Shaw's records. Dr. Shaw is a medical doctor and is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist. The first dated entry in those records is August 28, 1998 and the last is September 23, 2005. When you review his records you find that are several references to stress, emotional problems, nerves or anxiety. There is no question that the employee has had difficulties in her personal life that have been of great concern to her for a long time. When you add the psychiatric records post September 9, 2004, the major events that are recurring and which seem to be the major source of the employee's problems are 1) her husband told her he did not love her anymore and wanted to return to his first wife, and 2) the situation with her boss who she says yelled at her and called her a no good bitch. As best as can be determined, the situation with the boss occurred sometime while the employee was working for Shop and Save. The employee indicated that period was somewhere from 1997 to 2000. The time frame for the initial statement by the husband was mentioned in the January 29, 2007 records of Christian Hospital as occurring on April 13th or 14th about four years earlier.
Dr. Shaw's records make a few general references to social stressors and problems with her job. When you read the records, the references to "problems" are sometimes included in the section "Reason for Call". The Court believes that the source of that information is the employee. While the employee was prescribed Xanax, there is no diagnosis of any psychiatric or psychological illness in his records. On September 9, 1999 Dr. Shaw's records indicate "A/P Anxiety/severe social stressors". The Court interprets this to mean assessment and plan. On February 4, 2000, Dr. Shaw's record indicates that he would like the employee to see Dr. Radmanesh. When you consider the extent, the substance and the content of all of Employee's Exhibit B, it is the Court's opinion that there is not a whole lot of information that documents the existence of, extent of, severity of, or timing of any psychological problems that the employee may have had before September 9, 2004. There are no records of any mental health professionals. There are no records that the employee sought the services of any mental health professionals at any community counseling centers prior to September 9, 2004.
Regardless of the Court's opinion, it is the records of Dr. Shaw that is the basis for the opinions of medical health professionals that is relevant in this case, and that would have to be utilized in assessing Second Injury Fund liability. The Court has very carefully reviewed, contrasted and compared the opinions of Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Hughes. It is the opinion of the Court that the opinions of Dr. Hughes are far more credible than those of Dr. Bernstein. Dr. Hughes' opinions provide a more credible view of what the records of Dr. Shaw say and what they do not say. While it is certainly relevant that Dr. Hughes is a board certified psychiatrist and Dr. Bernstein is a psychologist, it is the content of their opinions and the conclusions that they derived from the records that they reviewed, specifically the records of Dr. Shaw, that caused the Court to value the opinion of Dr. Hughes far more greatly than the opinion of Dr. Bernstein. The Court finds it interesting that one of the main reasons that employee's counsel gives for suggesting that the opinion of Dr. Hughes should not be given any weight is because he did not personally interview the employee. Dr. Hughes testified that a personal interview is always the best. The Second Injury Fund is not given the right under the law to demand that Dr. Hughes be allowed to interview the employee. Only the employee could allow or disallow such an interview. Dr. Bernstein's opinion is based on a review of Dr. Shaw's records. Regardless of that observation, it is the content, substance and expertise of the doctors' opinions that is relevant to the Court.
Dr. Bernstein reviewed the evidence and testified that Dr. Shaw's records alluded to anxiety and family problems and showed a history of depression and anxiety that existed in 2002. In addition he stated that he diagnosed Major Depression that existed at the time of the employee's accident on September 9, 2004. Dr. Hughes took exception to the findings of Dr. Shaw indicating that there was no basis for them. He testified that it was clear that the employee was not suffering from any major depression at the time of her injury on September 9, 2004. His opinion was that the employee had an episode of major depression spanning August 1998 to June 2003, but as of June 2003 that problem was resolved and gone. He testified that the employee was off medication a considerable time before September 9, 2004 and that between June 2003 and September 2004 when the employee injured her shoulder, there was no reference in the treating doctor's records to the employee reporting any psychiatric distress. There is no credible evidence presented by the employee that there was a hindrance or obstacle to employment in this time period.
Dr. Hughes was particularly critical of Dr. Bernstein's testing and analysis. He testified that asking a patient about how they feel today does nothing to establish a condition that existed years before. The only way to do that is by an examination of the prior records which reports what the patient's condition was in the past. While there are no psychiatric/medical records diagnosing Major Depression prior to the employee's accident, that is certainly not the case beginning in 2007 and 2008. The record is clear that the employee has suffered from and been diagnosed with severe problems in that time frame. Some of the stressors that existed in the past have apparently continued to cause distress to the employee but have escalated. It is also clear that any left shoulder problems developed after the fact; if not, they would have been dealt with when the employee settled her case in 2008. While the employee had problems after September 9, 2004, those matters do not form any basis for Second Injury Fund liability.
The opinion by Dr. Bernstein that the employee is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combination of her preexisting mental problems and the disabilities from her accident is rejected by the Court as lacking in foundation and credibility. The employee has failed to prove that the Second Injury Fund is responsible under the law to pay permanent total disability benefits.
There is no question that the employee has experienced a lot of stressors in her life that have caused her anxiety and stress. But the evidence does not convince the Court that a combination of any problems that she had prior to September 9, 2004 and/or on September 9, 2004 combine with the disabilities that she received from her shoulder surgeries to create permanent total disability and liability for the Second Injury Fund. The employee has not presented credible and convincing evidence that she is unemployable in the open labor market.
In addition the Court finds that the employee has failed to prove that she had any disabilities that preexisted September 9, 2004 that arose to a level of hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment that meet what is called "threshold" and combine with the disability created by the September 9, 2004 shoulder accident to create Second Injury Fund liability for permanent partial disability. The employee worked at Tri-County Group XV without restriction. She was working full duty with no restrictions prior to the primary injury. She worked for employers in the past without restriction. Any anxiety/stress problems that the employee may have had in the past were resolved at the time of her accident or were not job debilitating. Her subsequent psychiatric problems were far more serious, as evidenced by the multiple hospitalizations for expressed suicidal ideations
The employee has the burden of proof to provide competent and credible evidence proving the issues in dispute. The employee has not done so in this case. The Second Injury Fund has no liability in this case.