The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri underwent substantial change on or about August 28, 2005. However, in light of the underlying workers' compensation cases involving a claim of injury prior to August 28, 2005, the legislative changes occurring in August 2005 enjoy only limited application to this case. The legislation in effect in or around March 18, 1995, which is substantive in nature, and not procedural, governs substantively the adjudication of this case. Accordingly, in this context, several familiar principles bear reprise.
The fundamental purpose of The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri is to place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. The law is to be broadly and liberally interpreted and is intended to extend its benefits to the largest possible class. Any question as to the right of an employee to compensation must be resolved in favor of the injured employee. Cherry v. Powdered Coatings, 897 S.W. 2d 664 (Mo.App., E.D. 1995); Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Services, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo.Banc 1983). Yet, a liberal construction cannot be
applied in order to excuse an element lacking in the claim. Johnson v. City of Kirksville, 855 S.W.2d 396 (Mo.App., W.D. 1993).
The party claiming benefits under The Workers' Compensation Law for the State of Missouri bears the burden of proving all material elements of his or her claim. Duncan v. Springfield R-12 School District, 897 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo.App. S.D. 1995), citing Meilves v. Morris, 442 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Mo. 1968); Bruflat v. Mister Guy, Inc. 933 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Mo.App. W.D. 1996); and Decker v. Square D Co. 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo.App. W.D. 1998). Where several events, only one being compensable, contribute to the alleged disability, it is the claimant's burden to prove the nature and extent of disability attributable to the job-related injury.
Yet, the claimant need not establish the elements of the case on the basis of absolute certainty. It is sufficient if the claimant shows them to be a reasonable probability. "Probable", for the purpose of determining whether a worker's compensation claimant has shown the elements of a case by reasonable probability, means founded on reason and experience, which inclines the mind to believe but leaves room for doubt. See, Cook v. St. Mary's Hospital, 939 S.W.2d 934 (Mo.App., W.D. 1997); White v. Henderson Implement Co., 879 S.W.2d 575,577 (Mo.App., W.D. 1994); and Downing v. Williamette Industries, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.App., W.D. 1995). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee and in favor of coverage. Johnson v. City of Kirksville, 855 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo.App. W.D. 1993).
I.
Nature of Injury / Medical Causation
The principal issue before the undersigned is whether the employee, James Truelove, sustained an occupational injury in the nature of dementia, as a consequence of being exposed to trichloreoethylene in his employment with the employer, FAG Bearing. The parties offer differing medical opinions relative to this issue.
The employee argues that, in the course of working for FAG Bearing and performing his duties through the 1970's and continuing into the 1980s, he experienced chronic and extreme exposure to trichloroethylene, while cleaning pipes and machines, as well as cleaning a pit area filled with sludge containing trichloroethylene. The employee further argues that this exposure caused him to suffer an injury in the nature of dementia, and he continues to experience symptoms associated with this occupational illness. The employee relies upon the medical opinions of Dr. Heligman, who is a treating physician, and the medical opinions of Dr. Koprivica, who performed an independent medical examination.
The employer and insurer, however, argue that, while Mr. Truelove suffers from an illness and may be totally disabled, the medical condition is not an occupational disease. Rather, the employer and insurer argue, Mr. Truelove suffers from an organic brain syndrome, hypertension, obesity, chronic sinus infections, tobacco abuse and idiopathic migraine variant headaches. Preeminently, the employer and insurer argue that the evidence simply does not support an occupational exposure to trichloroethylene. The employer and insurer rely upon the medical opinions of Dr. Parmet and Dr. Paff.
Section 287.067, RSMo addresses occupational disease, and it states that an occupational disease is defined as "an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment." It goes on to state that,
Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
Further, in order to recover for an occupational disease, Section 287.063, RSMo states that an employee must establish that the disease is a natural result of the employment, that it is particular to the employment, and that there is a known relationship between the disease and the employment. Similarly, Section 287.067, RSMo states that an occupational disease cannot result from a hazard to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of the workplace.
After consideration and review of the evidence, I resolve the differences in medical opinion in favor of the testimonies and opinions of Drs. Heligman and Koprivica, who, in this case, I find to be credible, reliable and worthy of belief. I am persuaded, and thus find and conclude, that the employee James Truelove suffers from dementia, which is causally related to his employment and exposure to trichloroethylene.
In the present case, I find and conclude that Mr. Truelove experienced chronic, severe and acute exposure to trichloroethylene ("TCE") through the 1970's and continuing into the 1980s. This exposure occurred primarily to his hands, but included spills on his pant legs. The exposure during this period occurred through FAG Bearing's use of trichloroethylene, which the company used as a cleanser, while Mr. Truelove cleaned pipes and machines, as well as from his cleaning out the pit area. Mr. Truelove utilized this chemical through the company's "ballmaking machine," which he dispensed by a hose into a bucket. Then, with a shop towel or a wire brush, he would dip the towel or wire brush into the bucket and use the towel or wire brush to clean the pipes and machines.)
Upon using this chemical, he experienced redness on his hands, and in cleaning the pit area, he experienced "rapid heart beats and dizziness." Additionally, in the course of working with this chemical, the chemical would get inside his work boots, which caused him to suffer cracks in his feet, and his "feet would crack" - "they would break open or ... get scaley and break, have cracks in them." Notably, in regards to his feet, Mr. Truelove noted that the cracking as being different from dry skin.
Dr. Heligman identified TCE as a "class of chemicals known as an organic solvent." Dr. Heligman further stated that this chemical is used in many different applications, and is "primarily known as a degreaser because it dissolves fatty materials; can be used to clean other things." Some of the risks associated with exposure to TCE include dizziness, lightheadedness, some nausea, and some of the more serious side effects include liver and kidney damage, and central nervous damage. This occupational disease is a natural result of the employment, and is
particular to Mr. Truelove's employment with FAG Bearing. Notably, there is a known relationship between exposure to trichloroethylene and the disease caused by such exposure. Further, considering the severity and chronic nature of Mr. Truelove's exposure to Trichloroethylene, the occupational exposure and disease suffered by Mr. Truelove did not result from a hazard to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of the workplace.
In addition, as stated by Dr. Heligman, Mr. Truelove experienced symptomology that "correlate quite well with the acute symptoms of trichloroethylene exposure." This acute exposure is indicative of Mr. Truelove's work with trichloroethylene, which included the description of the use of equipment and getting his clothing soaked with trichloroethylene. And, as noted by Dr. Heligman, several tests were performed that eliminated cardiac and neurologic sources as a cause for Mr. Truelove's symptoms, including his described blackouts. Thus, in asserting the causal effect of TCE on the central nervous system, Dr. Heligman opines, and I find and conclude, the most likely explanation for Mr. Truelove's blackouts is his occupational exposure to trichloroethylene. I further find and conclude that, as the blackouts actually started at the time when he had this exposure and infrequently occurred since that time, Mr. Truelove suffers from a "cognitive problem as the result of his exposure that was chronic in nature". This condition is attributed to Mr. Truelove's occupational exposure to TCE during his employment at FAG Bearing.
Further, Dr. Koprivica testified, "there is literature in the toxicology texts that when an individual is exercising and being exposed to TCE, you increase the relative exposure two to three fold." And, while Dr. Koprivica acknowledged that he did not have specific industrial hygiene data regarding Mr. Truelove's exposure, he explained that he was able to form opinions regarding Mr. Truelove without such data. In this context, Dr. Koprivica states the exposure experienced by Mr. Truelove was so enormous - He shoveled containing the chemical over several years, producing massive exposures over years' time.
Additionally, Dr. Koprivica provided explanation as to why Mr. Truelove would still be suffering from problems attributable to such exposure on a long term basis. In this context Dr. Koprivica states, and I accept as true, "the exposure produces injury to the central nervous system and brain function. That type of toxic exposure tends to progress as time goes on. Any type of brain injury-if you look at people with metabolic brain injury, even when the metabolic condition is corrected, the neuron loss continues after that point and it becomes more disabling as time goes on."
Finally, Dr. Parmet does not dispute the fact that Mr. Truelove suffered exposure to TCE during his employment at FAG Bearing. As noted above, there is absolutely no evidence to contradict Mr. Truelove's testimony regarding the nature of his exposure to TCE during his employment at FAG Bearing. Ultimately, Dr. Parmet renders his opinion of no causation on several factors, including the fact that there are no tests documenting liver or kidney abnormalities. Yet, Dr. Koprivica addressed that concern, stating that,
It is true that TCE will affect the liver. It may or may not cause a chronic or permanent liver abnormality once exposure is over. It can permanently injure the
central nervous system and not permanently damage the kidney or the liver. And so in this case I don't think that really makes any difference. It doesn't tell you that he was not exposed because of the time frames of when the laboratory data was available.
Also, Dr. Parmet concludes that Mr. Truelove suffers from damage to the central nervous system. In rendering this opinion Dr. Parmet noted that there was no evidence of Trigeminal paresthesias in Mr. Truelove's history. Yet, Dr. Koprivica states this finding was not significant, wherein he comments:
Trichloroethylene exposures on an acute basis can cause cranial nerve abnormalities. As a matter of fact, in the emergency medicine literature you do see cranial nerve palsies; and it can affect the Trigeminal nerve. There is no literature to suggest that that is universal. There are reports of individuals with neuropsychiatric complications from TCE exposure that don't have cranial nerve abnormality on a chronic on permanent basis. So I don't believe that its absence tells you that it's not in the basis of TCE.
Mr. Truelove has met his burden regarding the issue of medical causation, and regarding whether this incident of occupational disease arose out of and in the course of his employment with FAG Bearing. There is absolutely nothing to contradict his testimony regarding massive exposure to TCE or the absence of any protective gear during such exposure. The parties offer contradictory medical opinions, but the only non-retained expert to address the issue is Dr. Craig Heligman. As noted above, Dr. Heligman was, at the time he examined Mr. Truelove, the Director of Employee Health at KU Medical Center. He saw Mr. Truelove at the referral of Mr. Truelove's personal physician, Dr. Vineyard, in Joplin, Missouri. Dr. Heligman opined that Mr. Truelove was permanently and totally disabled, and that such disability was attributable to problems caused by Mr. Truelove's exposure to TCE at FAG Bearing.
In light of the foregoing, and after consideration and review of the evidence, I find and conclude that Mr. Truelove sustained an injury by occupational disease, secondary to his exposure to Trichloroethylene, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with FAG Bearing.
II.
Statute of Limitations
The employer and insurer assert as an issue, the statute of limitations. In order to determine whether the Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation enjoys jurisdiction to hear this case, this issue must be addressed, even if raised at the time of trial.
The adjudication of the issue of statute of limitations in the present case, as it relates to a claim of occupational disease, involves consideration of Section 287.430, RSMo and Section 287.063.3, RSMo. Section 287.430, RSMo provides, in relevant part:
[N]o proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury, or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the report of the injury or the death is not filed by the employer as required by section 287.380 , the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death. . . .The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.
Section 287.063.3, RSMo, in pertinent part, states:
- The statute of limitation referred to in section 287.430 shall not begin to run in cases of occupational disease until it becomes reasonably discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained.....
In Rupard v. Kiesendahl (Mo. App. W.D. 2003), the Court of Appeals examined this issue and identified three possible points in time, when the statute of limitations in an occupational disease case would begin to run. The thee potential dates include, when "(1) an employee is no longer able to work due to the occupational disease; (2) an employee must seek medical advice and is advised that she can no longer work in the suspected employment; or (3) an employee experiences some type of disability that is compensable." Notably, in identifying the applicable standard to evaluate such cases, the court propounded the following comments:
The standard for triggering the running of the statute of limitations requires: "(1) a disability or injury, (2) that is compensable." Mann v. Supreme Express, 851 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (quoting Sellers v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 752 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988)). An employee can prove compensability by establishing a causal relationship between employment and the disability or injury. Id. "When an injury is reasonably apparent and discoverable is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission[.]" Id. (citing Thomas v. Becker Materials Corp., 805 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991)).
In the case of an occupational disease, the time in which a compensable injury has been sustained is the time when the disease has produced a compensable disability. Sellers, 752 S.W.2d at 416 (quoting Marie v. Standard Steel Works, 319 S.W.2d 871, 880 (Mo. banc 1959) (citing Ford v. Am. Brake Shoe Co., 252 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. App. 1952)). Missouri courts have interpreted this as being "the time when some degree of disability results which can be the subject of compensation." Id. (citing Enyard v. Consol. Underwriters, 390 S.W.2d 417, 431 (Mo. App. 1965)). "This rule gives the employee every possible advantage in the time required for filing his claim." Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 307 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Mo. banc 1957). Generally, "mere awareness on the part of the employee of the presence of a work-related illness is not, in and of itself, sufficient knowledge of a compensable injury." Wiele v. Nat'l Super Mkts., Inc., 948 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997) (citations omitted).
In the present case, and after consideration and review of the evidence, I find and conclude that the statute of limitations on Mr. Truelove's compensable injury began running in March 1995, when he ceased working for the employer FAG Bearing because of his medical condition. Although Mr. Truelove's exposure to TCE primarily occurred in the 1970's and 1980's, he worked at FAG Bearing through March 18, 1995. Further, there is no evidence that Mr. Truelove had knowledge that he had contracted an occupational disease as a result of his exposure to TCE until the summer of 1995. And, while he described problems he experienced during his exposure to TCE, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that any doctor had informed Mr. Truelove that such problems were related to his exposure to TCE until the summer of 1995 .
Notably, the first doctor to attribute unequivocally Mr. Truelove's problems to his exposure to TCE at FAG Bearing was Dr. Craig Heligman, who arrived at that conclusion in July and August 1995. Mr. Truelove's claim was filed in August 1995, within several months after his date of last employment at FAG Bearing and within weeks of being informed by Dr. Heligman that his problems were related to TCE exposure at FAG Bearing. Thus, the Claim for Compensation was filed within several weeks after it became "reasonably discoverable and apparent" to Mr Truelove that he had sustained an occupational disease attributable to his exposure to TCE at FAG Bearing.
In light of the foregoing, I find and conclude that the Claim for Compensation was filed with the applicable period of limitations. This issue is resolved in favor of the employee.