Jeremy Sanfilippo v. Firestone Complete Auto Care

the general public may use the parking lot. Employer does not own the parking lot. Employer does not maintain the parking lot.

Employer's lease allows employer to place a storage shed in a designated area of the common parking lot. Employer's lease allows the exclusive use of such designated area for the storage of tires. Employer did in fact place a storage shed (container) on a portion of the common parking lot sometime during the spring of 2008.

The placement of the container was constrained by the existence of an overpass running over a portion of the common parking lot and because there were a number of cars already on the lot on the day that the container was delivered. Employer selected a placement of the container as near to employer's building as possible within the foregoing constraints. The container was situated approximately 150 feet from employer's building. The container was used solely for the purpose of storing employer's inventory. The container was not used by any of the other tenants who shared the common parking lot. Employer enjoyed exclusive access to the container.

Employee was informed on hire that he could park in the common parking area. Employer instructed employee not to park in the front section of the lot, which was reserved for employer's customers. Otherwise, employee was free to park wherever he chose. The back section of the lot is where the container was located. Employee and other employees of employer customarily parked in the back section of the lot. Employer did not provide transportation for employee, nor did employer pay for his gasoline or car insurance. Employee drove to and from work every day in his personal vehicle, although he was not required to do so.

On July 10, 2008, employee finished his work for employer, clocked out, and left employer's building after his normal shift was concluded at approximately 5:30 p.m. Employee then proceeded into the common parking area. Employee's car was parked in back near the container. Employee started his car, left his parking space, and drove his car west toward the parking lot's exit. His route out of the lot on that day took him towards the end of the container. At the same time, another car was heading north along the other side of the container. Employee could not see the other car because his sight was blocked by the container. As employee passed the end of the container, his car was struck by the other car on the rear drivers' side. The driver of the other car was in no way connected or related to employer or to employee. Employee seeks compensation for injuries sustained in this automobile collision, alleging they arose out of and in the course of his employment.

As a preliminary matter, we note that because employee's alleged injury occurred on July 10, 2008, this case falls under the purview of the 2005 amendments to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.

Section 287.120 RSMo "requires employers to furnish compensation according to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law for personal injuries of employees caused by accidents arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Gordon v. City of Ellisville, 268 S.W.3d 454, 458-59 (Mo. App. 2008). "The burden is on

the employee and claimant in a workers' compensation proceeding to prove the basis of his claim, and the first essential is that the claimant must prove that the injuries were the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment." McClain v. Welsh Co., 748 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Mo. App. 1988). Under § 287.020.2.3(2) RSMo: "An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:

(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and

(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life."

This case turns on the sole issue of whether employee carried his burden of demonstrating that his injuries were the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The administrative law judge concluded that the extension of premises doctrine, abrogated by the 2005 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Law, nevertheless applied in this case and that, by operation of that doctrine, employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. We disagree.

On July 10, 2008, employee was involved in an auto collision on his way home from work. Injuries sustained by an employee while traveling to or from work are not normally compensable under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act. Blades v. Commercial Transport, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 827, 829 (Mo. banc 2000). In McClain v. Welsh Co., 748 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. App. 1988), the court stated that "[g]oing to or returning from employment is a personal act, akin to dressing, grooming and presenting oneself for work ... [and] bears no immediate relation to the actual services to be performed." Id. at 725. The court indicated that because it is not connected with the actual services, any injury sustained in that process is not compensable.

Missouri courts historically recognized an exception to the "going and coming" rule, whereby injuries sustained while going or coming from work were compensable if they happened either on the employer's actual premises or "extended premises." Under the extended premises doctrine, injuries sustained while going to or from work were compensable if the employee was injured on premises:

" ... owned or controlled by the employer, or not actually owned or controlled by the employer but which have been so appropriated by the employer or so situate, designed and used by the employer and his employees incidental to their work as to make them, for all practical intents and purposes, a part and parcel of the employer's premises and operation; and that portion of such premises is a part of the customary, expressly or impliedly approved, permitted, usual and acceptable route or means employed by workers to get to and depart from their places of labor and is being used for such purpose at the time of injury."

Wells v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 190, 192 (Mo. 2000) (citations omitted).

A recent case providing an example of the application of the extension of premises doctrine is Huffmaster v. Am. Rec. Prods., 180 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Mo. App. 2006). In Huffmaster, the employee fell in a parking lot adjacent to employer's premises after she had clocked out for the day and was on her way to her personal vehicle to go home. Id. at 526. In finding that the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, the Huffmaster court held that the parking lot was part of employer's extended premises because employer directed employees to park there, the lot surrounded employer's premises, and was customarily used by employer's employees to talk, eat lunch, and smoke. Id. at 528.

However, the extension of premises doctrine was expressly abrogated by the 2005 amendments to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Under § 287.020:

1. ... The extension of premises doctrine is abrogated to the extent it extends liability for accidents that occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer even if the accident occurs on customary, approved, permitted, usual or accepted routes used by the employee to get to and from their place of employment.

Despite recognizing the abrogation of the extension of premises doctrine by the foregoing provision, the administrative law judge concluded that the doctrine remained viable and was applicable to the case at hand. In her award, the administrative law judge set forth two possible bases for applying the extension of premises doctrine in this case. First, the administrative law judge reasoned that the employer "appropriated" and "designated" a portion of the parking lot because the size and placement of the container was "guaranteed to obstruct the view of all drivers and cause an accident." Second, the administrative law judge reasoned that the employer had exclusive control over the area of the parking lot where employee was injured because of facts such as employer having the only key to the container and sole access to its contents, employees making multiple trips throughout the work day to the container, and the container's presence in the most convenient location for employer. The administrative law judge concluded that the extension of premises doctrine "as modified by the 2005 amendments to the law" applied to this case with the result that employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

We disagree with the administrative law judge's decision to apply the extension of premises doctrine in this case. As to the first basis for applying the doctrine, the administrative law judge's discussion of employer's creation of an increased risk might have been relevant in a civil proceeding, but we find it inapplicable to our analysis under the Workers' Compensation Law. As to the second basis, while it is c