Based upon the findings of fact and the applicable laws of the state of Missouri, I find the following:
Under Missouri workers' compensation law, the claimant bears the burden of proving all essential elements of his or her workers' compensation claim. ${ }^{13}$ Proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence, and may not rest on speculation. ${ }^{14}$ Medical causation not
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[^0]: ${ }^{13}$ Fisher v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990); Grime v. Altec Indus. 83 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003);
${ }^{14}$ Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. App. 1974).
within lay understanding or experience requires expert medical evidence. ${ }^{15}$ When medical theories conflict, deciding which to accept is an issue reserved for the determination of the fact finder. ${ }^{16}$
In addition, the fact finder may accept only part of the testimony of a medical expert and reject the remainder of it. ${ }^{17}$ Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony that it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. ${ }^{18}$
The claimant must establish a causal connection between the accident and the injury. ${ }^{19}$ The fact finder is charged with passing on the credibility of all witnesses and may disbelieve testimony absent contradictory evidence. ${ }^{20}$ "Arising out of employment" means that a causal connection exists between the employee's duties and the injury for purposes of workers' compensation. ${ }^{21}$ An injury is compensable only if it is clearly work related, and an injury is clearly work related only if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the injury and the resulting medical condition. However, an injury is not compensable if work was merely a triggering or precipitating factor. ${ }^{22}$
This claim concerns an alleged occupational disease from before the 2005 statutory changes; therefore, the 2000 version of Section 287.067 applies and it defines occupational disease as follows:
[a]n identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a "triggering or precipitating factor." ${ }^{23}$ It must be shown that work is a "substantial factor" in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. ${ }^{24}$ Work that is merely a triggering or precipitating factor is not deemed to be compensable. ${ }^{25}$
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[^0]: ${ }^{15} Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994).
{ }^{16} Hawkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 977 (Mo. App. S.D. 1984).
{ }^{17} Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo. App. 1984).
{ }^{18}$ Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) overruled on other grounds by Hampton; Hutchinson v. Tri State Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo. App. 1986) overruled on other grounds by Hampton.
${ }^{19} Fisher v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 198 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990).
{ }^{20} Id. at 199.
{ }^{21}$ Cruzan v. City of Paris, 922, S.W.2d 473 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Hampton.
${ }^{22} Section 287.020.2, RSMo. 2000.
{ }^{23} Section 287.067.2, Section 287.020.2, and Section 287.020.3, RSMo.
{ }^{24} Section 287.020.2, RSMo.
{ }^{25} \mathrm{Id}$.
Section 287.020.3 defines an "injury" to be one that "has arisen out of and in the course of employment." In addition, the "injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of the employer and employee. Ordinarily, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment."26
The opinions of Drs. Kiburz, Volarich, Rosenthal, and Parmet were entered into evidence. These physicians all conclude that the claimant has a pre-existing congenital condition, Madelung's deformity, which involves both of her wrists. Dr. Volarich and Dr. Kiburz indicate that the claimant's work was a substantial factor in the cause of the claimant's injury - the aggravation of the asymptomatic condition of Madelung's deformity. Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Parmet disagree. I find that the testimony and opinions of Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Parmet are more credible and convincing than those of Dr. Kiburz and Dr. Volarich.
Of all the physicians that examined the claimant, Dr. Rosenthal clearly has the most experience and expertise with Madelung's deformity. Dr. Rosenthal has actually seen and treated 20 to 30 patients with this condition. Her testimony was thorough, credible, and convincing. I find that substantial and competent evidence from Dr. Rosenthal establishes that the claimant's upper extremity complaints were a natural progression of her Madelung's deformity and that work was not a substantial factor in causing her complaints. After examining the claimant, reviewing the medical records, and reviewing the claimant's job description, Dr. Rosenthal concluded that the claimant's employment with the Sedalia Democrat was not a substantial factor in causing the Madelung's deformity to become symptomatic. Dr. Rosenthal provided detailed information and analysis regarding Madelung's deformity and the natural progression of the condition. She described in detail the various bones that make up the wrist joint, how Madelung's deformity develops, and its impact on the activities of daily living. Dr. Rosenthal testified credibly that the claimant's condition was unchanged by her work activities. She testified that the claimant's complaints were due to the mechanics of her bone structure, and that her job activities with the employer did not cause any change in physical pathology or cause the claimant to become symptomatic. Dr. Rosenthal testified that the claimant would have developed symptoms regardless of her work activities.
Dr. Parmet also opined that the claimant's work activity at the newspaper was not a substantial contributing factor in causing, aggravating, or accelerating her condition.
Dr. Kiburz's testimony is less credible than that of Dr. Rosenthal. Dr. Kiburz is a general orthopedic surgeon and not a hand or upper extremity specialist. He has seen only one patient with Madelung's deformity. He offered no clear explanation as to why the work activities were a substantial factor in allegedly aggravating the claimant's symptoms. He did not testify about the progression of Madelung's deformity, nor did he testify in detail about how the condition in its natural progression causes pain and increased disability, even in the absence of vocational activity. He opined that the claimant would be able to return to gainful employment. However,
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[^0]: ${ }^{26}$ Section 287.020.3, RSMo.
Revised Form 31 (3/97)
he did assign 10 % impairment to both the right and left upper extremities due to work being an "aggravating factor." ${ }^{27}$
Dr. Volarich is not an orthopedic surgeon. Before examining the claimant, he had never seen a patient with Madelung's deformity, but he did briefly review a medical journal or article on the condition. He testified that based on what he read, there are no symptoms associated with Madelung's deformity. When viewed in the light of Dr. Rosenthal's testimony, it is clear that Dr. Volarich's opinion regarding the absence of symptoms is erroneous and not persuasive.
In addition to diagnosing the claimant with Madelung's deformity, Dr. Volarich diagnosed the claimant with bilateral shoulder impingement that he opined was caused by the claimant's repetitive use of her arms and overhead activity for her employer. Dr. Volarich did not, however, describe any overhead activity in the claimant's job description. He admitted that there were no x-rays or other diagnostic tests that confirmed a diagnosis of impingement syndrome, and there was no documentation of a diagnosis of right shoulder impingement in the medical records. He did not know when the claimant's right shoulder symptoms began and did not recall any other physician documenting right shoulder complaints. In fact, Dr. Volarich was the only doctor to diagnosis the claimant with right shoulder impingement syndrome.
The substantial and competent evidence shows that the claimant's work activities were, at best, a triggering or precipitating factor of her pain. This does not rise to the level of a substantial factor entitling the claimant to compensation. The claimant has failed to establish through expert testimony that the workplace activities caused the "injury" of pain and decreased mobility in the claimant's upper extremities. A review of the medical evidence establishes that it is more likely than not that her complaints were merely the natural progression of her Madelung's deformity.
As the claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish that an accident or occupational disease that arose out of and in the course of her employment, her claim fails and all other issues are moot. I will, however, briefly address the claimant's renewed motion to join her husband, Robert Harvey Woolery, as an additional party in this case. ${ }^{28}$ The claimant contends that her husband "was a dependent spouse at the time of this injury and continues in this status and may have an interest if he survives Dolores Woolery," and that as such, he should be added as an additional party. Section 287.240(4) states, in part: "The word 'dependent' as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean a relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who is actually dependent for support, in whole or in part, upon his or her wages at the time of the injury." [Emphasis added.] As the employee, Dolores Woolery, is not deceased, Robert Harvey Woolery does not meet the statutory definition of "dependent" at this time; moreover, he may never meet the statutory definition of "dependent." Therefore, I find no basis for the granting of the requested relief. The claimant's motion to join an additional party is again denied.
Any pending objections not expressly ruled on in this award are overruled.
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[^0]: ${ }^{27} Claimant's Exh. C, pp. 21-23.
{ }^{28}$ The claimant previously filed a Motion to Join Additional Party. That motion was denied by order issued February 5, 2009. The claimant renewed her motion at the hearing.
A true copy: Attest:
Naomi Pearson
Division of Workers' Compensation