Issue 2: Did the occupational disease arise out of and in the course of employment?
Issue 3: Are Claimant's injuries and continuing complaints, as well as any resultant disability, medically causally connected to his alleged exposure at work leading up to January 1, 2003?
Since this is a Second Injury Fund only case, it is important to note that under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220.1 (2000), in order to qualify for Second Injury Fund benefits, Claimant must prove the presence of pre-existing permanent partial disability, along with a "subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability... [emphasis added]." In other words, if the primary injury against Employer is not a compensable injury, then the Second Injury Fund claim fails.
Claimant bears the burden of proof on all essential elements of his Workers' Compensation case. Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis-Cardinal Ritter Institute, 793 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). The fact finder is charged with passing on the credibility of all witnesses and may disbelieve testimony absent contradictory evidence. Id. at 199.
Claimant alleges that he sustained an occupational disease involving both feet that was medically causally related to his employment for Employer. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067.1 (2000), occupational disease is defined as "an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment." Additionally, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067.2 (2000), "an occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." An injury is defined as clearly work related under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.020.2 (2000) "if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability."
The Court in Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Construction Co., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999), explained the proof the employee must provide in order to make an occupational disease claim compensable under the statute. The Court held that first, the employee must provide substantial and competent evidence that he contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. There are two considerations to that inquiry: (1) whether there was an exposure to the disease greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. The Court then held that the employee must also establish, usually with expert testimony, the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by the conditions in the work place. More specifically, employee must prove "a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease." Id. at 48. Finally, the Court noted, "where the opinions of medical experts are in conflict, the fact finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible." Id.
Having thoroughly reviewed all of the evidence regarding Claimant's bilateral foot conditions, including Claimant's testimony, the medical treatment records from Dr. Kirisits and St. Mary's Health Center, and the independent medical report and testimony from Dr. Feinberg and Dr. Cantrell, I find that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proving the presence of an occupational disease that arose out of and in the course of his employment. I further find that he has failed to prove that his foot conditions and continuing complaints are medically causally related to his employment leading up to January 1, 2003.
The medical treatment records on the feet in evidence cover a period of time of approximately 19 months, from February 4, 2003 until September 2, 2004. Having conducted an exhaustive review of those records, I find no indication in any of the records, from the treating doctors, that Claimant's foot conditions are causally connected to his employment for Employer. There are admittedly a couple references to Claimant doing a great deal of standing and walking as a security guard, but there is no causal connection made between his foot complaints and his employment. Additionally in the Admission Records at St. Mary's Health Center, Claimant consistently reports that there was no injury, and he never indicates the complaints were related to any injury at work. Neither he nor the doctors question the work-relatedness of his foot condition during that whole period of time. Instead, what is consistently mentioned is the peripheral neuropathy and his significant history of hypertension and chronic renal failure for which he was receiving dialysis. He apparently submitted all of his medical bills through his personal health insurance, since Employer paid no medical, according to the stipulations and medical records. Further, he never received TTD for any period of time off work while treating for the feet.
Claimant suggests that since he had peripheral neuropathy for a number of years prior to working for Employer, and he had no foot complaints or ulcerations, therefore, it must have been the amount of walking and standing he was doing for Employer that caused the onset of foot complaints. However, that assertion overlooks the fact that, by the accounts of all the doctors, the peripheral neuropathy is a progressive disease, especially if the root cause of it, in this case the chronic renal failure, is also continuing to progressively worsen. It seems appropriate, based on the accounts of the medical experts, to find that the hypertension, cardiovascular condition and chronic renal failure conditions were all inter-related, in that, the conditions were dependent on each other and all contributed to the peripheral polyneuropathy. There can be no doubt upon reviewing the medical records in evidence that these conditions continued to progress during this time resulting in renal osteodystrophy and severe hyperparathyroidism, status post parathyroidectomy with autoimplantation in the right forearm in 2004, an angioplasty on August 25, 2005 following a positive stress test, and ultimately his kidney transplant on January 24, 2006. In that respect then, I find that Claimant had documented evidence of these progressive, debilitating conditions suggesting a systemic disease (peripheral neuropathy) as opposed to an occupational exposure as the cause of the foot conditions when, in fact, they finally surfaced.
The first and only physician to medically causally connect Claimant's foot problems to his work for Employer was Dr. Barry Feinberg, who only examined Claimant one time at the request of his attorney on April 20, 2006. As documented in his report and testimony, I find that Dr. Feinberg had a rather limited understanding of Claimant's work activities for Employer. The only thing he had to rely on in that regard was Claimant's own statement to the doctor. He had no job description or any other documentation regarding those job duties. His understanding was that he was basically on his feet all day, but he also had no idea how far he might have to walk over the course of the day, and no idea what type of shoes he was wearing during the workday. He also did not know the extent, if any, of the walking Claimant did outside of work. Dr. Feinberg did have some idea of the extent of Claimant's progressive medical conditions, but he apparently did not have a complete history, because his report had no mention of the 2005 cardiac cath procedure that was performed after a positive stress test or the 2004 diagnosis of severe hyperparathyroidism, status post parathyroidectomy with autoimplantation in the right
forearm in 2004. Additionally, he apparently did not have an accurate history of Claimant's right foot problems because a review of medical records and the physical examination sections of the report really contained nothing about the treatment Claimant had received for the right foot, nor any positive findings on the physical examination of the right foot. On the basis of these omissions, inaccuracies or incomplete histories, I find that Dr. Feinberg's medical causation opinion on Claimant's bilateral foot condition is not competent, credible or reliable, and cannot be used as a basis for an award of compensation in this case.
On the other hand, I find that the testimony of Dr. Russell Cantrell regarding the medical causation of Claimant's bilateral foot condition is competent, credible and reliable. Dr. Cantrell had a much more detailed understanding of Claimant's work activities for Employer. He had a good understanding of Claimant's other progressive medical conditions that affected the peripheral neuropathy in the lower extremities, and his physical examination clearly revealed findings in both lower extremities and feet that were apparently left out of Dr. Feinberg's report. Additionally, I find that Dr. Cantrell provided a solid explanation for his opinion that the foot problems and ulcerations were related to Claimant's peripheral neuropathy even absent any work exposure. He explained that ulcerations, such as those described in the medical records, are commonly seen in individuals with these medical conditions whether they have a standing or sedentary job. He explained that the real causes of the ulcerations were the microvascular disease from the hypertension and the peripheral edema from the chronic renal disease along with the reduction in sensation from the peripheral polyneuropathy that adversely affects an individual's ability to feel pain, and, thus, allows the ulcerations to form and progress. Also, while Dr. Stephen Schuman did not specifically make a medical causation opinion on the bilateral foot condition, he did indicate in his testimony that he agreed with Dr. Cantrell's opinion and explanation of this condition.
As Dr. Feinberg was the only physician to find an occupational disease and medically causally relate that condition to Claimant's employment for Employer, and as Dr. Feinberg's opinions in that regard are not competent, credible or persuasive for the reasons listed above, I find that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proving the presence of an occupational disease that arose out of or in the course of employment, or that was medically causally related to it.
Given Claimant's failure to provide credible medical evidence or testimony regarding any occupational disease while working for Employer, I find that he has failed to show whether there was an exposure to an occupational disease greater than or different from that which affects the public generally. Furthermore, he has failed to prove whether there was a recognizable link between any occupational disease and some distinctive feature of his job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Therefore, I find Claimant has been unable to provide substantial and competent evidence that he contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. I further find that he has failed to meet his burden of showing that the disease was medically causally connected to his employment for Employer, by failing to provide competent and credible medical evidence that there is "a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease."
Since Claimant has failed to prove the presence of a compensable underlying primary Claim in this case regarding the bilateral foot condition, Claimant's Claim against the Second Injury Fund also then fails for that lack of proof. The Second Injury Fund Claim is denied.
While this ruling on these issues is dispositive of this case, I do want to address the remaining issues in this case because there is yet another reason why, even if his bilateral foot condition was compensable, he would not have a valid Second Injury Fund Claim.
Issue 4: What is the nature and extent of Claimant's permanent partial and/or permanent total disability attributable to this alleged injury?
Issue 5: What is the liability of the Second Injury Fund?
Given that these two issues are so inter-related in this Claim, and, further, given Claimant's allegation that he is permanently and totally disabled, I will address these two issues together.
Claimant again bears the burden of proof on all essential elements of his Workers' Compensation case. Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis-Cardinal Ritter Institute, 793 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). The fact finder is charged with passing on the credibility of all witnesses and may disbelieve testimony absent contradictory evidence. Id. at 199.
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.190.6 (2000), "'permanent partial disability' means a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree..." The claimant bears the burden of proving the nature and extent of any disability by a reasonable degree of certainty. Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Mo. banc 2004). Proof is made only by competent substantial evidence and may not rest on surmise or speculation. Griggs v. A.B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. App. 1973). Expert testimony may be required when there are complicated medical issues. Id. at 704. Extent and percentage of disability is a finding of fact within the special province of the [fact finding body, which] is not bound by the medical testimony but may consider all the evidence, including the testimony of the claimant, and draw all reasonable inferences from other testimony in arriving at the percentage of disability. Fogelsong v. Banquet Foods Corp., 526 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo. App. 1975) (citations omitted).
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.020.7 (2000), "total disability" is defined as the "inability to return to any employment and not merely ... inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident." The test for permanent total disability is claimant's ability to compete in the open labor market. The central question is whether any employer in the usual course of business could reasonably be expected to employ claimant in her present physical condition. Searcy v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Co., 894 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003).
In cases such as this one where the Second Injury Fund is involved, we must also look to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220 (2000) for the appropriate apportionment of benefits under the statute. In order to recover from the Fund, Claimant must prove a pre-existing permanent partial disability, that existed at the time of the primary injury, and which was of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment should employee become unemployed. Messex v. Sachs Electric Co., 989 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). Then to have a valid Fund claim, that pre-existing permanent partial disability must combine with the primary disability in one of two ways. First, the disabilities combine to create permanent total disability, or second, the disabilities combine to create a greater overall disability than the simple sum of the disabilities when added together.
In the second (permanent partial disability) combination scenario, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220.1 (2000), the disabilities must also meet certain thresholds before liability against the Second Injury Fund is invoked. The pre-existing disability and the subsequent compensable injury each must result in a minimum of 12.5 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole or 15 % permanent partial disability of a major extremity. These thresholds are not applicable in permanent total disability cases.
It is first necessary to determine whether Claimant is permanently and totally disabled, and then the nature and extent of the permanent partial and/or permanent total disability against Employer. Based on the evidence referenced above, including the medical treatment records, the expert opinions from the doctors, as well as based on my personal observations of Claimant at hearing, I find that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled under the statute, but that permanent total disability would not be against Employer as a result of the last injury alone. If it were an otherwise compensable injury, Employer would only have liability in this case for permanent partial disability related to the bilateral foot condition allegedly from January 1, 2003.
In reviewing the medical records and reports in evidence, I found that Dr. Feinberg and Dr. Schuman both provided opinions that Claimant was unable to continue working, and, thus, essentially permanently and totally disabled. Neither of those experts indicated that the permanent total disability was the result of the last injury alone. Therefore, I find there is no evidence in the record to substantiate a finding of permanent total disability against Employer.
I find that the central issue in this case, as far as Second Injury Fund liability is concerned, revolves around the symptomology attributable to his multiple disease processes (neurological, hypertension, cardiovascular, chronic renal failure) and the extent to which those disease processes affect Claimant's ability to compete in the open labor market and be employable without any combination from the alleged bilateral foot condition. In other words, are these multiple disease processes responsible for Claimant's permanent total disability by themselves (without any combination with the alleged bilateral foot conditions)?
Now, I recognize that some of the medical records seemingly document a subsequent deterioration of these debilitating conditions resulting in multiple hospitalizations and surgical procedures including an angioplasty and kidney transplant after the alleged exposure to the bilateral foot condition had occurred. However, even if I did consider this to be a subsequent deterioration case, I would still find that the Second Injury Fund has no liability for the
permanent total disability because Claimant's permanent total disability would then be based on the subsequent deterioration of pre-existing conditions unrelated to the alleged primary bilateral foot condition. Either way, Claimant would have failed to prove that it was a combination of his alleged primary and pre-existing disabilities that resulted in permanent total disability. The other difficulty with looking at this as a subsequent deterioration case, regardless of the medical evidence of record, is that the medical opinions and testimony in the record do not support such a finding. Instead the medical evidence and testimony squarely supports the finding that the combination of the multiple disease processes, without the alleged bilateral foot condition, rendered Claimant permanently and totally disabled.
I find that both Drs. Schuman and Feinberg provided opinions that eliminated the Second Injury Fund from having any liability for this permanent total disability. Dr. Schuman, an expert in cardiology and internal medicine, quite clearly testified that due to the stroke and renal failure, Claimant was unemployable. He further opined that the hypertension, peripheral neuropathy and many other conditions would add to that, but it was simply the stroke (neurological) and renal failure that would make him unemployable. Finally, he confirmed that even if Claimant had not had the foot problems, he would still be permanently and totally disabled based on the prior problems alone. Essentially, Dr. Schuman found that there was no combination between the alleged foot condition and the pre-existing disabilities that caused the permanent total disability; it was Claimant's multiple progressive conditions by themselves that resulted in the total disability. Without any combination involving the alleged bilateral foot condition, there is no Second Injury Fund liability for the permanent total disability. I find Dr. Stephen Schuman's opinion in this regard credible.
Similarly, Dr. Barry Feinberg wrote in his report that, "Patient is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the combination of primarily his cardiovascular problems and kidney problems. The result of these problems has caused patient significant decrease in exercise tolerance, peripheral neuropathy, and kidney failure with the need for transplantation and dialysis." While he tried in his deposition testimony to slightly alter this opinion to include a combination with the alleged bilateral foot condition, on cross-examination he again confirmed a couple times that Claimant's permanent total disability was primarily as a result of the renal and cardiovascular problems. Essentially then, I find that, like Dr. Schuman's credible testimony, Dr. Feinberg also finds Claimant's permanent total disability resulted without any real combination with the alleged bilateral foot condition. While the addition of the alleged foot condition may have made Claimant more permanently and totally disabled, if he was already permanently and totally disabled without it, based just on the renal and cardiovascular problems, then its addition is of no consequence in determining whether the Second Injury Fund actually has any liability for the permanent total disability.
In order for Claimant to have a valid claim for permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, Claimant must prove that it was the combination of the alleged primary bilateral foot condition and the pre-existing disabilities that renders him permanently and totally disabled. If the combination of those disabilities did not result in the permanent total disability, then the Second Injury Fund has no liability for the permanent total disability. In this case, I find based on the competent, credible and reliable evidence in Dr. Schuman's medical report and testimony (as supported by the opinion of Dr. Feinberg) that Claimant's neurological condition (stroke) and chronic renal failure and its resulting symptomology, in and of themselves, resulted
in enough disability to render Claimant permanently and totally disabled independent of the alleged bilateral foot condition at work on January 1, 2003. Therefore, Claimant has failed to prove the proper combination of disabilities and his Claim fails against the Second Injury Fund in that respect.
The medical treatment records from Dr. Mellas, Abbott \& Associates, Inc. and St. Mary's Health Center document the profound problems Claimant was having with his multiple debilitating systemic conditions and how those conditions affected his ability to work. Considering the complaints and problems related solely to these conditions, I find Claimant had profound limitations. I find that any restrictions he may have had attributable to his alleged bilateral foot condition from the alleged 2003 injury are fully overshadowed by, and encompassed in, the already profound restrictions he had based on these other conditions.
I find it significant that despite having had this alleged bilateral foot condition in 2003, there is hardly any mention of it anywhere in the records of Dr. Mellas or Abbott \& Associates, Inc., nor is there any mention of how this alleged bilateral foot condition had any impact on his ability to function. All of this evidence leads me to the conclusion that the profound effects and limitations from the other debilitating conditions, in and of themselves, was enough to render Claimant permanently and totally disabled.
Therefore, based upon Claimant's failure to prove that the combination of the pre-existing and alleged primary disabilities rendered Claimant permanently and totally disabled (as opposed to just the systemic debilitating conditions in and of themselves), I find that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof that he is permanently and totally disabled under the statute against the Second Injury Fund.
Hence, for this separate and distinct reason from that discussed in the prior section, the Second Injury Fund Claim in this case is denied.